Millstone Power Station

After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Drill Date - June 30, 2010

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program

FEMA

Published

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Millstone Power Station

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Contents

Executive Summary 3
Section 1: Exercise Overview 4
1.1 Exercise Details 4
1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership 4
1.3 Participating Organizations 4
Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 6
2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design 6
2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities 8
2.3 Scenario Summary 8
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 9
3.1 Drill Evaluation and Results 9
3.2 Summary Results of Drill Evaluation 9
3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries 13
3.3.1 Support Jurisdictions 13
3.3.1.1 Windham Reception Center Direction & Control 13
3.3.1.2 Windham Reception Center Dosimetry 13
3.3.1.3 Windham Reception Center Evacuee Registration 13
3.3.1.4 Windham Reception Center Female Mon & Decon 14
3.3.1.5 Windham Reception Center KI Decision 14
3.3.1.6 Windham Reception Center Male Mon & Decon 14
3.3.1.7 Windham Reception Center Portal & Secondary Monitoring 15
3.3.1.8 Windham Reception Center Vehicle Mon-Decon & Traffic 17
Section 4: Conclusion 19
Appendix A: Drill Evaluators and Team Leaders 20
Appendix B: Exercise Plan 21
Appendix C: Windham Reception Center 36

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On June 30, 2010, a Host Community Reception Center Drill was conducted in Windham, Connecticut. The purpose of this drill was to assess the capability of the Windham Emergency Management Personnel to respond to a radiological incident involving the Millstone Power Station. This drill was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP) and procedures.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in the State of Connecticut, the Support Jurisdiction of the Town of Windham, and the numererous volunteers who participated in this drill.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the Exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility as volunteers providing vital emergency services twenty four (24) hours to the communities in which they live. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants was observed during this drill.

This report contains the final evaluation of the Windham Host Community Reception Center Drill.

The Windham Host Community Emergency Management Response Organizations, Fire Department Personnel, and Volunteers successfully demonstrated their knowledge to implement their emergency response plans and procedures. There were no deficiencies. There were three Areas Requiring Corrective Action that were re-demonstrated successfully on the spot. There were two Areas Requiring Corrective Action from a prior exercise that were cleared through a successful demonstration.

SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

1.1 Exercise Details

Exercise Name
Millstone Power Station

Type of Exercise
Drill

Exercise Date
June 30, 2010

Program
Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

Scenario Type
Radiological Emergency

1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

None

1.3 Participating Organizations

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Millstone Power Station drill:

- State Jurisdictions
  - CT Department of Emergency Mangement and Homeland Security
  - CT Department of Environmental Protection, Radiation Division
  - CT Department of Developmental Services
- Support Jurisdictions
  - Town of Windham: Town Clerks Office, Finance, Housing Code, Planning, Human Services, Recreation, Public Works, Water Works & Water Treatment Departments
  - Windham Emergency Management Office

Willimantic Fire Department
South Windham Volunteer Fire Department
North Windham Volunteer Fire Department
Windham Center Volunteer Fire Department
Columbia Fire Department
Willimantic Police Department
North Central District Health Department
Windham High School
Windham Community Emergency Response Team (CERT)
American Red Cross, Connecticut
Connecticut Towns Individual Volunteers

Private Organizations
Dominion: Millstone Emergency Preparedness

Federal Jurisdictions
Federal Emergency Management Agency

SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351, and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

A. Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;

B. Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;

C. Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and

D. Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

U.S. Department of Commerce
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
U.S. Department of Energy

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
U.S. Center for Disease Control
U.S. Department of Transportation
U.S. Department of Agriculture
U.S. Department of the Interior
U.S. Food and Drug Administration

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region I Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Millstone Power Station to FEMA Region I by the State of Connecticut and involved local jurisdictions occurred in 1982. Formal approval of the RERP was granted by FEMA in October 1984, under 44 CFR 350.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region I RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Administrator.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in the following:

A. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;

B. 67 FR 20580, "FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology," September 12, 2001, amended April 25, 2002.

Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise objectives at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based format.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities

A Host Community Reception Center Evaluated Drill was conducted on June 30, 2010, by FEMA Region I, REP Staff to assess the capabilities of the Emergency Management Personnel of Windham, Connecticut, to demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees of a Millstone Power Station incident. The purpose of this drill report is to present the drill results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable drill objectives at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) assessed during this drill, recommended corrective actions, and the State and Local Governments' schedule of corrective actions for each identified drill issue, and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous drills and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.

2.3 Scenario Summary

The exercise scenario was developed to evaluate the response of the exercise participants to a radiological emergency. The scenario is listed in Appendix C: Exercise Plan.

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

3.1 Drill Evaluation and Results

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation at each jurisdiction or functional entity that participated in the June 30, 2010, Windham Host Community Reception Center Drill.

The purpose of this drill was to assess the capabilities of the Emergency Management Personnel of Windham, Connecticut, to demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees of a Millstone Power Station incident.

Each functional jurisdiction or entity was evaluated on its demonstration of criteria contained in the drill evaluation areas as outlined in the federal Register, Volume 67, No. 80 "FEMA - Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology" (April 25, 2002).

All activities were based on the plans and procedures and completed as they would have been in an actual emergency except as noted in the Extent of Play Agreement.

3.2 Summary Results of Drill Evaluation

The State of Connecticut and Local Emergency Response Organizations successfully demonstrated their capabilities to implement their off-site radiological emergency response plans and procedures based on the evaluation of this drill by the Regional Assistance Committee and a team of Federal evaluators. There were no deficiencies. There were three Areas Requiring Corrective Action that were re-demonstrated successfully on the spot. There were two Areas Requiring Corrective Action from a prior drill that were cleared through a successful demonstration.

The matrix presented in the table on following pages presents the status of all drill evaluation area criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during the drill at each participating jurisdiction and functional entity. Drill criteria are listed by number, and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercise)

A - ARCAs assessed or unresolved ARCAs from previous exercises

D - Deficiency assessed

P - Plan Issues

N - Not Demonstrated

Table 3.1 - Summary of Drill Evaluation

DATE: 2010-06-30 SITE: Millstone Power Station, CT M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		Windham RC Ops	Windham RC Dosimetry	Windham RC Regn	WIndham RC Female Mon Decon	Windham RC KI	Windham RC Male Mon Decon	Windham RC Portal & Sec Mon	Windham RC Vehicles
Emergency Operations Management									
Mobilization	1a1	M							
Facilities	1b1								
Direction and Control	1c1	M							
Communications Equipment	1d1	M							
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	M							
Protective Action Decision Making									
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1								
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1								
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2								
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1								
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1								
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1								
Protective Action Implementation									
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1		M		M		M		
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1					M			
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1								
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2								
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1								M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2								
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1								
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2								
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1								
Field Measurement and Analysis									
RESERVED	4a1								
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2								
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3								
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1								
Laboratory Operations	4c1								
Emergency Notification and Public Info									
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1								
RESERVED	5a2								
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3								
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4								
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1								
Support Operations/Facilities									

Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1			M	M		M	M	
Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1							M	M
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1								
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1								

3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

3.3.1 Support Jurisdictions

3.3.1.1 Windham Reception Center Direction & Control

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.2 Windham Reception Center Dosimetry

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.3 Windham Reception Center Evacuee Registration

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.4 Windham Reception Center Female Mon & Decon

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.5 Windham Reception Center KI Decision

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.6 Windham Reception Center Male Mon & Decon

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.7 Windham Reception Center Portal & Secondary Monitoring

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.a.1, 6.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 6.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 38-10-6a1-A-01

CRITERION: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees.

CONDITION: The team at the portal monitors was initially using outdated versions of their procedures (HCP-4.5, Rev 08/03 and HCP-4.5, Rev 01/10).

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The team used the procedures they had found in the portal monitor container, which was an outdated version. The accompanying materials box had the correct version of the procedures.

REFERENCE: HCP-4.5, Rev 5/10; NUREG 0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b.

EFFECT: If the procedures had changed, the team could have missed any updates.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Through discussion with the controller and evaluator, the team re-demonstrated use of the latest procedures, dated 05/10, which were included in the accompanying materials box. Once they were referencing the correct procedures, the team re-checked their work to ensure they were in compliance.

ISSUE NO.: 38-10-6a1-A-02

CRITERION: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees.

CONDITION: The team at the portal monitors monitored the presentation pad at one of the monitors using a CDV-700 survey meter to ensure it was not contaminated. While doing so, the worker doing the monitoring allowed the cord of the instrument to drag along the pad.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The worker may not have been aware of the correct method to monitor the pad.

REFERENCE: HCP-4.5, Rev 5/10; NUREG 0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b.

EFFECT: Dragging the cord could have spread contamination in a real event.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The controller stopped play, trained the worker on proper monitoring procedure, and the worker re-demonstrated the task successfully.

ISSUE NO.: 38-10-6a1-A-03

CRITERION: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees.

CONDITION: Per procedure HCP 4.5b, Rev 05/10, page 4 of 14, workers at the secondary monitoring station were to ask contaminated individuals if their car alarmed the portal and report relevant information via radio to the vehicle monitoring team for follow-up if necessary. During the exercise, workers were unaware of this requirement and how to perform it.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Workers were new to their positions and may not have been familiar with this portion of their procedures.

REFERENCE: HCP 4.5b, Rev 05/10, page 4 of 14; NUREG 0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b.

EFFECT: Lack of communication with the vehicle monitoring team could have led to incorrect monitoring or classification of vehicles in a real event.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The controller stopped play and conducted training on the procedure. When play resumed, the workers successfully re-demonstrated the task through simulation and interview.

c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.8 Windham Reception Center Vehicle Mon-Decon & Traffic

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.d.1, 6.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 3.d.1, 6.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 38-03-3d1-A-11

ISSUE: Due to the need for personnel to direct vehicles along an elongated route into the vehicle monitoring area, personnel from the clean vehicle parking area were reassigned. This left only one person in the “Clean Parking Lot” to register vehicles. A line began to form and was beginning to affect the ability of additional vehicles to exit the portal monitor. There was no actual obstruction during the drill but sufficient personnel need to be assigned to the “Clean Parking Lot” so that vehicle information can be recorded at the parking space. This will free up the area leading into the lot and not cause a backup during a true event.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Traffic control was successfully set-

up with cones and emergency workers on the road leading to the automobile portal monitor. Once determined a clean vehicle, they instructed the driver to the clean parking lot. If the vechicle was determined dirt/contaminated, they instructed the driver to the dirty parking lot. This was demonstrated successfully in accordance to plans and procedures.

ISSUE NO.: 38-03-6b1-A-12

ISSUE: A greeter in the vehicle monitoring area was observed placing a hand on two of the first three vehicles coming into the vehicle monitoring area. Although he realized what he had done he took no action to determine if he was contaminated or not. A vehicle monitoring team member logging contaminated vehicles placed a clipboard on the hood of a contaminated vehicle in the contaminated vehicle parking lot.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: A past ARCA indicated Vehicle Monitoring Staff had touched vehicles prior to monitoring. This was not observed at this drill. Team members did not touch vehicle exteriors, interiors or occupants of vehicles deemed contaminated.

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

All criteria were successfully met and/or redemonstrated successfully.

APPENDIX A: DRILL EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

DATE: 2010-06-30, SITE: Millstone Power Station, CT

LOCATION	EVALUATOR	AGENCY
Windham Reception Center Direction & Control	*Helen LaForge	FEMA RI
Windham Reception Center Dosimetry	*Helen LaForge	FEMA RI
Windham Reception Center Evacuee Registration	Melissa Savilonis	FEMA - RI
Windham Reception Center Female Mon & Decon	Patricia Foster	FEMA RI
Windham Reception Center KI Decision	Melissa Savilonis	FEMA - RI
Windham Reception Center Male Mon & Decon	Robert Swartz	FEMA RI
Windham Reception Center Portal & Secondary Monitoring	Ingrid Bruns	FEMA RI
Windham Reception Center Vehicle Mon-Decon & Traffic	*Helen LaForge	FEMA RI
* Team Leader		

APPENDIX B: EXERCISE PLAN

This section contains a summary of the simulated sequence of events used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs during the Millstone Nuclear Power Station exercise on June 30, 2010.

The scenario was approved by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region I. The summary presented in this appendix is a compilation of exercise scenario materials submitted by the Millstone Nuclear Power Station.

WINDHAM HOST COMMUNITY
EOC/Reception Center
Exercise Scenario 2010

Note: * indicates on-the-spot correction allowed

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
EOC PHASE:				
0745	No Evaluation	**Dispatch Center** (Windham Public Safety Building)	**MESSAGE #1** (**Initial Notification**) DEMHS Region 4 Control Cell To Windham Dispatch/EMD	**DEMHS Region 4 Office—** Message from a simulated DEMHS Region 4 Coordinator (control cell) to notify Windham Host Community via telephone call of declared **Site Area Emergency.** Willimantic Dispatch receives call, takes message and makes notification calls per their procedure.
0800-0815	No Evaluation	**Dispatch Center** (Public Safety Building)		Willimantic Dispatcher makes call to EMD/designee. EMD authorizes "call-out" of EOC responders.
0815-0900	No Evaluation	**EOC** (Windham Public Safety Building)		Staff begins to arrive at EOC.
0830 – 0900	No Evaluation	**EOC**	**MESSAGE #2** EOC Controller To Windham EOC	Following EOC activation, communication checks are conducted with simulated Region 4 Office (controller cell). "This is a drill" will be used during all radio communications.
0900	1.c.1 Direction and	**EOC**	**MESSAGE #3**	The simulated Region 4 Coordinator (controller) provides update information on

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
	Control		DEMHS Region 4 Control Cell To Windham EOC	the declared **General Emergency** at Millstone directing Windham Host Community EOC Director to prepare the Reception Center to receive evacuees from the designated EPZ towns. The total 20% population count used for New London and Fishers Island in the plan is 5,440 for planning purposes and sheltering**.**
	No Evaluation	**EOC**		Primary Displays in the EOC consist of Emergency Classification Level table, Shelter status Board, Evacuation Map, Local Traffic Map and Shift Sign-in Board.
0900		**EOC**		The EMD requests the Willimantic Dispatcher to "tone-out" Windham Fire Department staff and Volunteer FDs to activate the Reception Center at Windham H. S.
0900-1000	3.d.1 Traffic Control (No Evaluation)	**EOC**		The Windham **Police Dept**. is responsible for the town's Traffic Control from entry point to Reception Center and will participate at the EOC only (not evaluated). Implementation of traffic control including Traffic Control points and potential impediments to traffic flow as they exist on the day of the drill will be conducted by discussion only.
0915		**EOC**	**MESSAGE #4** Region 4 Control Cell To Windham EOC Director	EMD/Director is notified by Region 4 Coordinator (Controller message) that the EPZ public is being advised to take KI tablets.

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
		EOC		The Red Cross and school administrative personnel discuss plan for opening shelter(s). These will be posted on the EOC shelter board. EOC determines shelter needs for population expected. ARC representative and EOC Director may determine order of shelter opening based on availability, location and capacity of each facility.
		EOC		Red Cross calls out for Red Cross representatives to staff the Reception Center to assist with shelter assignment. (Shelters will not be staffed for this demonstration.) Red Cross prepares shelter management roster/plan. At least one representative assists registration staff with information on shelter availability at the reception center.
RECEPTION CENTER SET-UP PHASE/With EOC Activated				
		RECEPTION CENTER (Windham H.S.)		**Reception Center Activation** Windham F.D distributes equipment and supplies to reception center. Windham F.D. also provides radio equipment and will provide traffic control at the vehicle monitoring and parking area only.
	1.c.1 Direction and Control			The Windham FD designated Incident Commander will act as Reception Center Manager and maintain communications and contact between Reception Center locations and the Windham EOC. A command

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
				center will be established at the Reception Center, after which the Windham EOC will cease to be the command center.
0915 -0930	1.e.1* Equip and Supplies 3.a.1* Dosimetry 3.d.1 Dosimetry Briefing	**RECEPTION CENTER**		Following their briefing, Willimantic and Windham FDs will begin to set-up the Reception Center. **Dosimetry** is prepared and dosimetry paperwork is initiated for local Windham radiological emergency workers only. A PRD and 0-5R Self-reading dosimeters are issued. (*The 0-200 R Dosimeter contained within the packet is not issued to host E-workers per procedure.)* A Dosimetry briefing is provided to all Emergency workers during the dosimetry issue process. Female workers will be briefed on special limits for declared pregnant females. The Windham FD Radiological Officer will provide guidance as needed with radiological issues.
0945 - 1045	1.d.1* Comm. and Equip	**RECEPTION CENTER/ EOC**		**Communication**: Radio checks are conducted between Reception Center Manager and the Windham EOC. Communications checks at Reception Center between the Reception Center Manager and remote locations throughout RC are also conducted. **(Radio communications should begin and end with "*This is a drill.*")**

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
0945 - 1045	6.a.1* Mon/Decon. Register Workers and Evacuees	**RECEPTION CENTER Windham High School**		**Preparation of CDV-700 survey meters.** Survey meters (CDV-700) are operationally checked for issue to monitoring staff ready for use. Hand surveys will be demonstrated at the Secondary Monitoring area and Decontamination Areas.
	6.a.1* Mon/Decon. Register Workers and Evacuees			**Personnel Portal Monitors**: Two portal monitors will be set up in the gymnasium and operationally checked with a 1 micro-curie check source. (These are staggered to prevent exiting evacuees from crossing paths to Secondary Monitoring or Registration pathways.)
0945 - 1045	6.b.1* Mon/Decon/ Monitoring Equipment and Vehicles	**RECEPTION CENTER**		**Vehicle Monitoring/Decon.:** One vehicle portal will be set up per diagram in High School parking lot. Clean and contaminated parking areas are shown in the vehicle monitoring area diagram. **Vehicle/Equipment Decon**. will take place by discussion only.
	6.a.1* Mon/Decon Register Workers and Evacuees			**A Secondary Monitoring Area** will be established for manual survey prior to decontamination or release to Registration
0945 - 1045	6.a.1* Mon/Decon Register Workers and Evacuees	**RECEPTION CENTER**		**Separate Decontamination Areas** will be set up for male and females within separate athletic locker rooms. Each has local and full body decontamination areas, i.e. hands, face and full body showers if necessary.

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
				Temporary clothing is issued as needed. A representative sample of temporary replacement clothing will be available at each decontamination area.
	6.a.1* Mon/Decon Register Workers and Evacuees			**Local EPZ town/State Emergency Workers:** Emergency workers who come to the host community are identified at the Portal Monitoring or Secondary Monitoring stations. These workers will have been issued their own dosimetry (Workers who alarm portal return their dosimetry to the designated contaminated side of the dosimetry issue table for monitoring, otherwise it is returned to clean side.)
	6.a.1* Mon/Decon Register Workers and Evacuees	**RECEPTION CENTER**		**Post-Decontamination monitoring** is located just past the decontamination areas prior to individuals exiting the decontamination areas to go to registration. Personnel monitoring forms are completed and evacuees receive a green wrist band (if clean) and copy of personnel monitoring form prior to being directed to the registration area. Escorts are stationed just outside each decon area to assist in directing evacuees upstairs to the registration area.
0945-1045	3.b.1 Implement KI	**RECEPTION CENTER**		**The Registration Coordinator** will direct Registration and KI Issue areas and report to the Reception Center Manager. The **Windham Human Services and Health Dept** will be dispatched to set up a

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
				KI Triage, KI Issue and Registration in the upper level gymnasium of Windham HS. **Health Dept.** staff will have the responsibility of preparing for the issue of KI. A bin of KI tablets, etc. will be available for distribution, but will not actually be issued. (Candy may be substituted for actual tablets.)
0945 - 1045	6.a.1* Mon/Decon Register Workers and Evacuees	**RECEPTION CENTER**		**Human Services** will direct Evacuee Registration with possible assistance from **CERT volunteers** for directing traffic. Registration is conducted via face-to-face interview by written forms. **Windham IT** staff will provide the means for Data entry of information from the forms using laptop computers.
		RECEPTION CENTER		The **Red Cross** will assist evacuees with shelter assignment as needed.
1000-1100	1.c.1 Direction and Control	**RECEPTION CENTER/ EOC**		**Reception Center Manager/Incident Command** Once Reception Center stations report their readiness to the Reception Center Manager, the Reception Center Manager notifies the EOC that the Reception Center is fully operational. The EOC will continue to receive updates on status of Reception Center operations and reports this information to the Region 4 Coordinator (also the EOC Controller) once Reception Center is operational.

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
1100		**RECEPTION CENTER**		When the Reception Center is ready to receive evacuees and EOC has been notified, the actual demonstration with will begin as evacuees arrive. The Lead Controller will notify the evacuees to proceed by vehicle to Reception Center via High Street, turning into the High School. Evacuees will be provided identification packets for this purpose.
RECEPTION CENTER DEMONSTRATION PHASE/with EOC minimally staffed:				
1100	6.a.1*, 6.b.1* Vehicle Monitoring & Decontamination Traffic Control	**RECEPTION CENTER**	**MESSAGE #5** Vehicle Controller To Vehicle Monitor Lead	**Vehicle Monitoring** All arriving vehicles (marked as Evacuee Vehicles) will be directed through the portal monitor, logged if contaminated, marked and directed to park in a designated "clean" or "contaminated" area as appropriate. (Vehicles may be those coming in from the EOC as well as volunteer evacuees.)
1100 - 1200	6.b.1* Mon/Decon Register Equipment and Vehicles	**RECEPTION CENTER**		At least two vehicles will be designated "contaminated" by controller inject. Clean vehicles may be tagged/marked later if notified that the occupants were determined to be contaminated.
As convenient		**Reception Center**	**Message # 6** Vehicle ontroller to Vehicle Mon. Team	Describe how and where vehicles could be decontaminated if needed
1100 - 1200	6.a.1* Mon/Decon/Regist.	**RECEPTION CENTER**	**MESSAGE** #7 Portal Monitor	**Personnel Monitoring** All individuals (except Evaluators,

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
	Workers and Evacuees		Controller To Portal Monitor Attendants	Controllers, Observers) entering the facility will be monitored. Emergency workers and special needs individuals, including parents with children may be given higher priority during monitoring. Individuals who **alarm** a portal monitor are directed to secondary monitoring for a whole-body hand survey with a CDV-700 survey meter. Individuals who **do not alarm** the portal monitor receive a green wrist band as proof of monitoring, and are directed to registration via clean pathway.
				A green wrist band on the hand from • portal monitoring, • secondary monitoring or • post decon monitoring **indicates the individual is "clean" and can proceed to registration.**
1100 - 1200	6.b.1* Mon/Decon/Register Equipment and Vehicles	**RECEPTION CENTER**	**MESSAGE #8 Contingency** Portal Controller to Portal Attendants Contingency message (capture dosimetry before it gets to secondary monitoring)	At least two individuals (one female, one male) will be "contaminated" per controller message. At least two of the contaminated individuals will be evacuated EPZ Emergency Workers who will also be wearing prior issued dosimetry. The Emergency workers' dosimetry is removed, bagged and returned to the Dosimetry Issue/Return desk to be read and recorded prior to the emergency worker leaving the reception center. A copy of the

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
				completed form should be returned to the emergency worker.
1100 - 1200	6.a.1* Mon/Decon/Register Workers and Evacuees 6.b.1* Mon/Decon/Register Equipment and Vehicles	**RECEPTION CENTER**	**MESSAGE #9 Contingency** Secondary Monitoring Controller to Secondary Monitor	Vehicle Monitoring is notified of potential internal contamination of a vehicle (previously monitored as clean) so that it can be tagged/marked for interior monitoring later even if parked in a designated clean parking area. Monitoring results will be provided by the controller.
As Convenient	6.a.1* Mon/Decon/ Register Workers and Evacuees	**RECEPTION CENTER**	**MESSAGE** #10 Portal Monitor Controller To Portal Monitor Attendants	***Portal Monitoring (pre-staged) demonstration:*** *This demonstration will take place after the "normal" evacuees have gone through. The controller will direct six individuals through each portal monitor, one monitor at a time for evaluation purposes. A controller and evaluator must be present for this portion of the demonstration. Portal monitor attendants should provide clear direction for entering and exiting the monitors and ensure that step-off to clean areas are maintained. Controller should also time the walkthrough and record results. Populations for each host are maintained in the HCP-4.6, Attachment 2.*
			MESSAGE #11 Secondary	Personnel Monitoring Forms are initiated at Secondary Monitoring to indicate the

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
			Monitor Controller To Secondary Monitor	location and contamination levels for action in the Decontamination areas**.** **However, if secondary monitoring indicates no contamination, the individual may be directed via clean pathway to Registration.** Monitoring results will be provided by the controller.
1100 - 1200	6.a.1* Mon/Decon/Registe r Workers and Evacuees	**RECEPTION CENTER**	**MESSAGE** #12 Decon Area Area Controller To Post-Decon Monitors	**Male/Female Decontamination Areas** Decontamination staff review Personnel Monitoring Forms and advise/assist with decontamination via discussion. If minimal local contamination is detected, nearby bathroom sinks may be utilized. Simple instructions may be posted over sink with an attendant nearby to assist and direct individuals to Post Decontamination Monitoring. If decontamination is successful at this point, individuals will receive a green wrist bracelet and will be directed to the Registration Area with a copy of their Personnel Monitoring Form. Monitoring results will be provided by the controller. If full shower is recommended, decontamination procedures will be described verbally. Temporary representative “coverings” will be available for demonstration. Final monitoring results will be provided by the controller.

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
				NOTE: Evacuees must exit decontamination areas through the clean path to registration. A traffic flow assistant should be posted post decon to direct people to the door leading into the gymnasium.
				Vehicle Monitoring Team, upon being notified of potential contamination of vehicle interior should tag vehicles for future interior monitoring. (Interior monitoring of vehicles will not be demonstrated).
	3.b.1 Implement KI			**KI ISSUE** All "evacuees" will be directed to the Registration Area, for processing in the gymnasium. 1. At KI Triage, evacuees will be asked if they have taken KI prior to arrival. 2. If YES, evacuees will be directed to Registration. 3. If NO, evacuees will be directed to KI Issue.
1100 - 1200	6.a.1* Mon/Decon/Registe r Workers and Evacuees	**RECEPTION CENTER**		For Reunification – A number of inquiries will be made by the controller to locate family members. Evacuees are interviewed/registered by registrars at the registration area.

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
				A green wrist band on the hand or completed Personnel Monitoring Form is proof of "non-contamination" and previously monitored/clean evacuees. Registration is completed by hand written form with assistance from a registrar. **Before leaving evacuees are also provided with decontamination advisory information either verbally or on a printed card.** A computer software program may be used to process information from the written form to create a database of information. An information area is located near the registration area to post messages given to registrars for reunification of family members.
		RED CROSS Assistance Area		Shelter information and water are provided by Red Cross staff following registration. Evacuees will be directed to the Exit or the waiting area.
1200 - 1230		**RECEPTION CENTER**	**MESSAGE** #13 Lead Controller To Reception Center Manager	**Exercise Termination** When all Reception Center objectives have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of evaluators, a controller message is issued to the Reception Center Manager that **The Exercise is terminated.** (The RCM may choose to break down areas as they complete their mission and return dosimetry and meters while other areas are

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
				still completing their activities.) Play ends and all areas are returned to normal condition.
POST DEMONSTRATION PHASE:				
1230 - 1300		**RECEPTION CENTER**	Controllers collect all paper work and provide to Lead Controller	Players will be directed to return their areas to a normal condition and report to a specified area for their comments and lunch

APPENDIX C: WINDHAM RECEPTION CENTER

Extent of Play
State of Connecticut & Millstone Station
FEMA Evaluated
Windham Host Community –June 30, 2010

Evaluation Area 1 - Emergency Operations Management
Sub-element 1.a.1 - Mobilization.

Criterion 1.a.1: Off-site Response organization use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4., D.3., 4., E.1., 2., H.4)

INTENT
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 which provides that OROs should have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and to activate and staff emergency facilities.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL
Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner. In addition, responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the plan and/or procedures. Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the extent of play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. Further, pre-positioning of staff for an out-of-sequence demonstration is appropriate in accordance with the extent of play agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures, and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC
1. The Windham Host Community will be mobilized by phone call or controller message from the State Region 4 Coordinator to the Windham Emergency Management Director.
2. No turnover between the Windham EOC and the Reception Center will be demonstrated.
3. Activation of congregate care facilities will be simulated.
4. Operations/communications staff will show call down or computerized lists for the notification of Windham officials and emergency responders to the FEMA evaluator.

5. Volunteer Fire Department personnel may be prepositioned at a nearby location.
6. Additional responders from outside the immediate area, to include American Red Cross, may be prepositioned at a nearby location.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

NONE

Evaluation Area 1 – Emergency Operations Management
Sub-element 1.b.1 – Facilities.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654, H)

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have facilities to support emergency response.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

Facilities will only be specifically evaluated for this criterion if they are new or have substantial changes in structure or mission. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of emergency operations. Some of the areas to be considered are: adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, backup power and/or alternate facility (if required to support operations).

Facilities must be set up based on the ORO's plans and procedures and demonstrated, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. The Windham EOC will not be evaluated.
2. The Eastern Connecticut State University Student Center is a new facility on the list of shelters, and FEMA will do a walk-through of that shelter out of sequence.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

NONE

Evaluation Area 1 – Emergency Operations Management
Sub-element 1.c.1. Direction and Control.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the Off-Site Response Organization provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. NUREG-0654, A.1.d., 2.a.,b.)

INTENT
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that the ORO have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL
Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for example; keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.

All activities associated with direction and control must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC
1. The Reception Center Manager as Incident Commander will be in command at the Reception Center.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

NONE

Evaluation Area 1 – Emergency Operations Management
Sub-element 1.d.1. Communications and Equipment.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1., 2.)

INTENT
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should establish reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as the following: appropriate contiguous governments

within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, emergency operations centers (EOC), and field teams.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL
OROs will demonstrate that a primary, and at least one backup system, are fully functional at the beginning of an exercise. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed. Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units should be used as needed for the transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities and field teams should have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations. OROs should ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exist.

The specific communications capabilities of OROs should be commensurate with that specified in the response plan and/or procedures. Exercise scenarios could require the failure of a communications system and the use of an alternate system.

All activities associated with the management of communications capabilities must be demonstrated based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC
1. Communications checks will be demonstrated throughout the Reception Center, and between Windham Emergency Management and the Region 4 Office, and between the Windham EOC and the Reception Center.
2. Immediate correction of performance issues relating to communications and equipment where remediation is possible will be allowed.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

NONE

Evaluation Area 1 – Emergency Operations Management
Sub-element 1.e.1. - Equipment And Supplies To Support Operations.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k., 11, K.3.a.)

INTENT
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL
Equipment within the facility(ies) should be sufficient and consistent with the role assigned to that facility in the ORO's plans and/or procedures in support of emergency operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged.

All instruments, including air sampling flow meters (field teams only), should be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. They should be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations (or at least annually for the unmodified CDV-700 series or if there are no manufacturer's recommendations for a specific instrument; modified CDV-700 instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer.). A label indicating such calibration should be on each instrument or verifiable by other means. Note: Field team equipment is evaluated under 4.a.1; radiological laboratory equipment under 4.c.1; reception center and emergency worker facilities' equipment is evaluated under 6.a.1; and ambulance and medical facilities' equipment is evaluated under 6.d.1.

Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers should be available for issuance to all categories of emergency workers that could be deployed from that facility. **Appropriate direct-reading dosimeters should allow individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.**

Dosimeters should be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced, if necessary. CDV-138s, due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, should be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced if necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the Annual Letter of Certification, and/or through a staff assistance visit.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers, as indicated on rosters; institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and, where stipulated by the plan and/or procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ.

Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification submission, and/or verified during a Staff Assistance Visit. Available supplies of KI should be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from FEMA

indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance. FEMA issues these letters based upon the findings of the certified independent laboratory that performed the analysis at the ORO's request and expense.

At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc.) should be available or their availability described.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. A limited number of supplies (for demonstration purposes only) will be brought to the Reception Center.
2. Immediate correction will be allowed if initially not being able to show proper equipment supplies, or documentation.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

NONE

Evaluation Area 3 – Protective Action Implementation
Sub-element 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control.

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.)

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimeters and permanent record dosimeters; provide for direct-reading dosimeters to be read at appropriate frequencies by emergency workers; maintain a radiation dose record for each emergency worker; and provide for establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of protective action guides, always applying the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) principle as appropriate.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimetry chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers. **For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows**

individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits (that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities) contained in the OROs plans and procedures.

Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and to manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated.

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker should report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans and procedures. OROs should demonstrate the actions described in the plan and/or procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker to incur additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should interview at least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the event authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Emergency workers may use any available resources (e.g. written procedures and/or co-workers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission and adequate control of exposure can be affected for all members of the team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, e.g., at reception centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers, may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. It should be noted that, even in these situations, each team member must still have their own permanent record dosimeter.

Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, **essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must re-enter an** evacuated area following or during the plume passage, should be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions.
All activities must be based on the ORO’s plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. Dosimetry packets will be issued to a representative number of Reception Center radiological emergency workers only. (Non-radiological emergency workers such as KI issue and registration staff will not be issued dosimetry.)
2. Radiological emergency worker knowledge will be demonstrated through evaluator interviews.

3. Immediate correction of issues relating to exposure control where remediation is possible will be allowed.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

None

Evaluation Area 3 – Protective Action Implementation
Sub-element 3.b.1 – Implementation of KI Decision

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, E. 7., J. 10. e., f.)

INTENT
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the capability to provide radio-protective drugs for emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plan and/or procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to emergency workers and institutionalized individuals, the provision of KI to the general public is an ORO option, reflected in ORO's plans and procedures. Provisions should include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of the distribution of radioprotective drugs.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL
OROs should demonstrate the capability to make KI available to emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in the ORO plan and/or procedures, to members of the general public. OROs should demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made. Organizations should have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers and institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. The ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI is **not** necessary. OROs should demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate appropriate instructions on the use of KI for those advised to take it. If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information should be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of procedures for the use of KI whether or not the scenario drives the use of KI. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. The supply of general public (evacuee) KI will be available for evaluator inspection, only a representative number of packets will be used for simulated distribution during the evaluated exercise.
2. Reception center staff will demonstrate the process, procedures and equipment for KI distribution and direction to ingest KI through discussion to simulated evacuees at the facility. KI will not be ingested by any drill participants.

Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

NONE

Evaluation Area 3 – Protective Action Implementation
Sub-element 3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control –TCP/ACP are established.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.g., j., k.)

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs have the capability to implement protective action plans, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated areas. This sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

OROs should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with evacuation/sheltering decisions (for example evacuating, sheltering and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. This capability may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview in accordance with the extent of play agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (rail, water, and air traffic), they should demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies with authority to control access.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless specified above or indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. Traffic control points, designated in the plan, will not actually be posted by the police.

Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

NONE

Evaluation Area 6 – Support Operations/Facilities
Sub-element 6.a.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h.; K.5.b.)

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers, while minimizing contamination of the facility, and registration of evacuees at reception centers.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees/ emergency workers should be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the extent of play agreement. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles. Expected demonstration should include 1/3 of the monitoring teams/portal monitors required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours. Prior to using a monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees should demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20% emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 hours. This monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored per hour by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate monitoring procedure. A minimum of six individuals per monitoring station should be monitored, using equipment and procedures specified in the plan and/or procedures, to allow demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators in order to determine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be met. Monitoring of emergency workers does not

have to meet the twelve-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers.

Decontamination of evacuees/emergency workers may be simulated and conducted by interview. The availability of provisions for separately showering should be demonstrated or explained. The staff should demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and appropriate means (e.g. partitions, roped-off areas) to separate clean from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions should also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes of clothing for individuals whose clothing is contaminated, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any individual found to be contaminated, procedures should be discussed concerning the handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings.

Monitoring personnel should explain the use of action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They should also explain the procedures for referring evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow up in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures. Contamination of the individual will be determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source.

The capability to register individuals upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities should be demonstrated. The registration activities demonstrated should include the establishment of a registration record for each individual, consisting of the individual's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination, if any, or as otherwise designated in the plan. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. Three portal monitors assigned to Windham will be demonstrated—two for personnel, one for vehicles (one portal monitor is required for personnel, one for vehicles).
2. At least one staff radiological monitor will demonstrate hand-held instrument monitoring techniques for personnel at the Secondary Monitoring Station.
3. Reception Center staff will use radiological monitoring equipment issued to the Windham Fire Department, to include CD V 700 with probe.
4. Contamination control measures and decontamination techniques for at least one male and one female subject will be simulated.
5. Vehicle monitoring will be demonstrated via portal monitoring only.
6. A representative sample of replacement clothing resources will be available for decontaminated individuals in the male and female decontamination areas.
7. Immediate correction of issues relating to monitoring, decontamination and registration where remediation is possible will be allowed.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

1. A greeter in the vehicle monitoring area was observed placing a hand on two of the first three vehicles coming into the vehicle monitoring area. Although he realized what he had done, he took no action to determine if he was contaminated or not. A vehicle monitoring team

member logging contaminated vehicles placed a clipboard on the hood of a contaminated vehicle in the contaminated vehicle parking lot.

RECOMMENDATION: Additional training to insure that procedures are followed and an awareness established of potential cross-contamination causes while working with potentially contaminated vehicles and equipment.

2. Due to the need for personnel to direct vehicles along an elongated route into the vehicle monitoring area, personnel from the clean vehicle parking area were reassigned. This left only one person in the "Clean Parking Lot" to register vehicles. A line began to form and was beginning to affect the ability of additional vehicles to exit the portal monitor. There was no actual obstruction during the drill but sufficient personnel need to be assigned to the "Clean Parking Lot" so that vehicle information can be recorded at the parking space. This will free up the area leading into the lot and not cause a backup during a true event.

RECOMMENDATION: Review the reception center plan, vehicle traffic and monitoring sections, to insure that sufficient personnel are allocated to those operations.

Evaluation Area 6 – Support Operations/Facilities
Sub-element 6.b.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuee Vehicles and Emergency Worker equipment.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

INTENT
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL
The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to monitor equipment, including vehicles, for contamination in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures. Specific attention should be given to equipment, including vehicles, that was in contact with individuals found to be contaminated. The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of equipment including vehicles based on guidance levels and procedures stated in the plan and/or procedures.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of

one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as air intake systems, radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles should be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with individuals found to be contaminated should also be checked.

Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be decontaminated, may be simulated and conducted by interview.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. Decontamination capabilities and provisions for vehicles and equipment will be demonstrated by discussion.
2. No vehicle interiors will be monitored.
3. Immediate correction of issues relating to monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and emergency worker equipment will be allowed.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

None

Evaluation Area 6 – Support Operations/Facilities
Sub-element 6.c.1 Temporary Care of Evacuees

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., 12.)

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs demonstrate the capability to establish relocation centers in host areas. Congregate care is normally provided in support of OROs by the American Red Cross under existing letters of agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

Under this criterion, demonstration of congregate care centers may be conducted out of sequence with the exercise scenario. The evaluator should conduct a walk-through of the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with ARC 3031 **In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations, as they would be in an actual**

emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this criteria, exercise demonstration expectations should be clearly specified in extent-of-play agreements.

Congregate care staff should also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination, have been decontaminated as appropriate, and have been registered before entering the facility. This capability may be determined through an interview process.

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the facility(ies). However, availability of such items should be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. Only one shelter, the new ECSU Student Center, will be evaluated. This will take place during a walk-through, out of sequence from the Reception Center portion of the exercise.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

None

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