



## LESSONS LEARNED & BEST PRACTICES

*The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Shelter Programme in Haiti 2010-2012*

*An independent report by:*

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## 1. Acronyms & Terminology

CGI	Corrugated Galvanised Iron (roofing sheets)
DPC	Direction Protection Civile
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
HSW	Haiti Shelter Best Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop
HNRCS	Haitian National Red Cross Society
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INA	Integrated Neighbourhood Approach
Movement	The ICRC, IFRC Secretariat and member national societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
PMER	Planning Monitoring Evaluation and Reporting
PNS	Participating National Societies

POA	Plan of Action
PPR	Participatory Project Review
Progressive Shelter	A transitional shelter that can be adapted to a more permanent shelter solution
RC/RC	Red Cross Red Crescent
REDLAC	Risk, Emergency and Disaster task group for Latin America and the Caribbean
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
STC	Shelter Technical Committee
STT	Shelter Technical Team
TDW	Technical Delegates Workshop
T Shelter	A transitional shelter intended to provide shelter between emergency shelter and permanent shelter
Recovery shelter	In this case mostly transitional shelters, progressive shelter and cash grants for rental solutions), and to some extent repairs/retrofitting/construction.

*Note: In the text where it refers to the 'IFRC' or 'Federation' this means the IFRC Secretariat and the Participating National Societies.*

*When the text refers to the IFRC Secretariat this means the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva, the Zones and the country delegation.*

## 2. Introduction & Acknowledgements

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) response to the January 12th 2010 earthquake in Haiti has been the largest IFRC operation in a single country in living memory.

124 Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies, supported by their public, the private sector, their governments and multilateral funding organizations rose over \$ 1.1b to support emergency response and recovery operations in Haiti. Twenty eight per cent of these funds went towards recovery shelter programmes managed by the IFRC and twelve national societies<sup>1</sup> and their partners which took over 30,000 families out of camps for the internally displaced (IDP) and into improved shelter conditions.

In the emergency phase the IFRC and its members, working with the Haitian National Red Cross Society (HNRCS), distributed emergency shelter items to nearly 180,000 families and replacement shelter items to 67,000 of these beneficiary families.<sup>2</sup>

Recovery shelter solutions included the construction of eleven different types of transitional or progressive shelter; house reconstruction and repair and rental support.

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<sup>1</sup> American Red Cross, British Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross, French Red Cross, joint German/Austrian Red Cross, Haitian Red Cross National Society, Italian Red Cross, Netherlands Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross, Spanish Red Cross, joint Swiss/Belgian Red Cross

<sup>2</sup> Twelve month progress report, IFRC, 1 April 2011

Some Participating National Societies (PNSs) working with the HNRCS continue to support those still living in IDP camps through improving the original emergency shelters and finding alternative shelter solutions outside the camps.

Strategies and shelter options required considerable flexibility in the shelter approach in order to cope with the considerable contextual challenges such as land mapping and tenure, logistic supplies, weakened local authorities, lack of building standards and codes, construction chain quality control, the complexity of the environment, endemic poverty, poor security and the impact of additional crisis, such as cyclones and a cholera outbreak.

Various activities were integrated into the shelter programming, such as Federation community mobilization assessment and response tool adaptation, site planning and risk mitigation, water and sanitation, livelihood support, vocational training and community technical capacity reinforcement, rubble removal and recycling.

In support to the Haitian Red Cross, Federation shelter programme coordination and implementation has mobilized massive funding and required vast technical support, both in country and at global level.

Due to the scale and complexity of the shelter programme, especially in the recovery phase, the IFRC decided to conduct a review of best practices and lessons learned from the past two years of shelter programming in Haiti that could inform its membership and secretariat for any new major catastrophe in Haiti as well as inform shelter operations world-wide. The best practice and lessons learned review was also an opportunity to learn about membership services and Movement cooperation. During March and April 2012 two consultants were engaged

to discuss with PNSs, the HNRCS and the IFRC secretariat their own views of best practice and lessons learned, both at the field and headquarters level as well as conduct field visits to meet with national society staff and make technical observations of the different types of shelter solutions.

The outcome of this process is expected to be global learning from the examples of best practice employed in the Haiti shelter operation and improved shelter operations worldwide as the IFRC and national societies learn from best practice as well as adapt approaches to shelter programming based on lessons learned.



*Haiti Shelter Best Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Port au Prince, April 2012*

## Acknowledgements

*The evaluators would like to thank everyone who supported this report. The IFRC Movement Coordination team in Port au Prince assisted greatly with setting up appropriate meetings and contacts and providing highly constructive comments to the draft report texts, content, annex and layout as well as demonstrating total commitment to the learning process that is at the core of this report.*

*We would like to thank the PNS management, delegates and shelter teams and IFRC shelter programme unit that were always available to support field visits and provide insights into the shelter programmes and were always available to put aside time for dozens of interviews that were such an important part of finding best practice and lessons learned.*

*We would also like to thank the HNRCS volunteers and local staff supporting the IFRC and PNS shelter programmes for their tireless energy and dedication to restore dignity to the lives of the Haitian population.*

*And finally we would like to thank the shelter programme beneficiaries and those still waiting for shelter solutions for their friendliness, openness and willingness to show us the conditions they live in and for the beneficiaries to share with us the changes that have taken place in their lives.*

### THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

- ü The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti resulted in a massive loss of life, extensive injuries and the displacement of an estimated 1.6 million people
- ü The International Federation response was the largest international operation in a single country combining the size of the appeal and the number of international delegates deployed
- ü The Haiti operation was the largest urban crisis the International Federation has ever faced
- ü A record number of Emergency Response Units were deployed to support the response in Haiti
- ü The earthquake response took place during continuous threats of new emergencies and was impacted by the devastating 2010 and 2011 cholera outbreak
- ü Not only is Haiti is the poorest country in the region, in the Americas and the northern hemisphere, based on the Human development Index (UNDP); the disaster took place during a period of political transition with an already weak public authorities infrastructure
- ü The initial emergency response was compromised by limited airport access in Port au Prince
- ü The Haitian population is well used to come-and-go humanitarian assistance from previous emergencies



Port-au-Prince aerial picture and IFRC team in Tapis Rouge IDPs camp, 20 January 2010

- ü Operational response was further complicated by the presence of hundreds of thousands of tons of rubble in Port au Prince and Leogane and by unclear land ownership rights.

### 3. Executive Summary

In one of the largest ever shelter operations the IFRC and its members have ever undertaken there has been much to learn and much to recognise from the Haiti response during 2010 – 2012. There were many instances of ‘best practices’ in the Haiti operation that are important to recognise and take into future shelter programming, while there are also important lessons learned, especially in regard to monitoring and listening, flexibility and integrated planning. The overall shelter response, especially in the recovery phase was technically appropriate and of sufficient scale to make a considerable impact on the affected population. Having a solid and successful foundation for the Federation-wide shelter response in Haiti has made it easier to concentrate on learning for the future. This evidence-based report provides insights and opportunities to ensure both high standards are maintained in future shelter operations and effectiveness and impact are improved in those areas where learning has taken place.

In the February 2010 RC/RC coordination meeting in Montreal the IFRC committed to build 30,000 transitional shelters as a contribution towards the shelter needs of 1.6 million displaced people following the January 12<sup>th</sup> 2010 earthquake in Haiti. In the relief operation in Haiti the IFRC had already provided an estimated 30 to 40% of all relief distributions with the United Nations (UN) and over 2,000 NGOs present:<sup>3</sup> as with the decisiveness and implementation of the relief operation the IFRC undertook commitments for a sizeable shelter recovery operation. With a considerable level of risk taking the IFRC committed to a significant

undertaking to provide recovery shelter to take 30,000 families out of formal and informal camps for the displaced and from the neighbourhoods.

One could easily argue that this decision was premature and without any appropriate level of both needs assessment and cultural understanding. The current evidence indicates that the ability to take risks and to implement decisions based on extremely weak evidence had a significantly positive impact on the affected population. The confidence witnessed in both the emergency relief and shelter recovery programme decision making was further expressed when the IFRC took the lead on new sheltering options, such as rental support for the regions outside Port au Prince and within the capital to help families to make their move outside of camps. This recovery shelter planning did come, however, in the wake of high quantity but lower quality emergency shelter response where the wide distribution of covering kits was not sufficiently supported by wood and tool kit distributions which would have strengthened the initial response, though tarpaulins were regularly replaced during 2010 and 2011.

Recovery shelter planning started exceptionally fast but created a situation whereby shelter solutions were sought with limited local design advice and before permanent shelter solutions or strategies from the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) or the Haitian government had been developed. The IFRC and PNS took a long time in the search for a single shelter design where local architects, builders and carpenters were notably absent, however two beneficiary surveys indicated a high level of satisfaction with the shelter solutions including both T Shelters and rental

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<sup>3</sup> HNRCS report to the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, November 2011

solutions.<sup>4</sup> The technical quality of the shelters was reported as good with most being easily adaptable to more permanent solutions. This was an important learning point as it became increasingly evident during the course of the programme that what were originally considered as purely transitional shelters would in fact be permanent shelters for many beneficiaries.

While there are over 150 recommendations captured from evaluator interviews and observations; the Shelter Lessons Learned and Best Practice Workshop and the subsequent Haiti Learning Conference there are four key learning words that stand out, namely adaptability, flexibility, listening and integration, each with a mixture of lessons learned for the future and examples of best practice. Each of these learning areas is related to each other. For example listening led to the need for adaptation; flexibility allowed for adaptation, and flexibility and adaptation made up for a general lack of integrated planning and integrated programme implementation. All those involved in the Transitional Shelter programme were clearly open to taking flexible approaches as lessons were learned during the course of the programme. While there was little *organised* learning from, or listening to beneficiaries, when listening and learning did take place the shelter solutions were changed. Providing cash grants with shelter solutions helped beneficiaries overcome areas missed by shelter partners that would have been considered if a more integrated approach had been used in assessment, planning and implementation, such as introducing electricity and lighting, interior screens for privacy, mosquito nets and fences and gardens.

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<sup>4</sup> Participatory Project Reviews: IFRC Secretariat Recovery Shelter Review, Rees-Gildea, January 2012 and Interim survey of phase one shelters, Ida Holdus for the Norwegian Red Cross, November 2011

*A key learning is that shelter is a complex programme area. It requires not just a physical structure, but an understanding of the environmental, social, cultural and economic context. If the approach is flexible, open to adaptation and open to active observation and listening, one should not be too concerned to start a shelter programme with limited assessment, one should be open to taking risks, making mistakes and adapting the programme as it progresses.*

#### Best practices in adaptation

*A beneficiary survey and mid-term programme review indicated the unexpectedly long distance walked between T Shelters and water points, and the cultural importance of having a protected veranda for cooking. By holding a large contingency fund it was possible to both revise phase two of the programme and retro-fit phase one to ensure shelters were adapted to include a veranda and install rainwater catchment. Subsequent surveys and beneficiary interviews on water indicated improved hygiene practice. Where lighting was introduced along with verandas there were examples of improved commerce, protection and education:*

*Listening: beneficiary communication activities, beneficiary surveys and mid-term reviews*

*Flexibility: holding a large contingency budget*

*Adaptability: adding a veranda and rainwater catchment system*

Such an approach as expressed above requires a certain type of programme management that needs to be clearly understood between field teams, headquarters and back-donors. This was not always the case in the Haiti shelter programme where a number of donors were too restrictive in their budgeting to allow for flexibility and adaptation, but also funding applications were, on occasion also too restrictive. Learning from problems with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami operations most PNS headquarters implemented a lot of programme controls, and indeed best practice, to protect the investments in the Haiti shelter programmes, but often what the headquarters considered to be best practice in risk management resulted in a loss of flexibility and adaptability in the field, leading to reduced efficiency and performance. There were not always adequate communications between headquarters and field teams to resolve critical programme issues either due to a lack of technical experience in headquarters, a lack of field visits and a lack of a shared understanding on a strategic approach to risk management and programme implementation. Shelter programmes are complex and cannot be managed between field and headquarters by e mail.

An area of risk that was underestimated by a number of shelter partners was human resource management, especially in regard to local staff, volunteers and daily labour. In the early stages of the operation a number of local staff and daily labour were incorrectly wearing the Red Cross emblem and a number of construction teams or labour were hired on daily labour contracts despite working as local staff, in breach of national labour laws. While some PNS showed best practice in regard to accident insurance for construction teams, many provided no accident insurance.

While this study of best practice and lessons learned has been mostly retrospective it is very important to recall that the Haiti response operation is far from over. There are still over 400,000 displaced Haitians

living in increasing poor conditions in formal and informal camps, some 25% of whom have a direct relationship to the HRCS, IFRC or PNS in regard to on-going or finalised service provision, such as water and sanitation, health or emergency shelter support. While the initial and ambitious shelter solution targets have been met, this does not mean that all shelter needs in the country have been met. It is important that the future direction of the Haiti response takes into account outstanding needs and that recovery or permanent shelter solutions are found for this population in order to meet increasingly urgent humanitarian needs and to protect the positive image created so far by the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement that could be so easily lost if appropriate attention is not considered for this vulnerable population. Expectations on the Movement are high, based on recent beneficiary interviews where over 50% of interviewees when asked about their future said they would look to the RC/RC Movement for support. The stakes are high as most NGOs have now left Haiti, the government has no published plans for the remaining displaced population<sup>5</sup> and the United Nations has a limited budget to provide either recovery solutions or permanent shelter solutions. The IFRC has recently committed to providing shelter solutions to a further 11,000 households and will encourage the displaced back home through the Integrated Neighbour Approach (INA) that invests in community based solutions.

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<sup>5</sup> The government plan 16/6, which has been extended to additional camps outside of the first 6 camps, as for Champs de Mars, with the support of humanitarian community (including IFRC), look at helping IDPs to find safer accommodations outside of the camp. But it does not fully define how this targeted camp population will be handled in the mid or long term. There is also no actual plan or clear strategy to deal with large camps which might become long lasting informal settlements, with the risk to see those becoming slums.

## 4. Methodology

The Best Practices and Lessons Learned report is not a *review* or an *evaluation* of the Federation-wide shelter programme in Haiti.

In an attempt to capture learning from the shelter operation in Haiti, national societies and the IFRC secretariat that carried out shelter programmes were invited to comment on their own perspectives of what they considered to be best practice and where they had adapted their programmes through learning lessons during the course of the programme or where they would change approaches to future operations based on learning from the Haiti programme. To avoid any sense of inequity between national societies the report purposefully avoids naming specific national societies or partners linked to examples of best practice or lesson learning. In some cases an example may be best practice for one national society while it is a lesson learned for another national society.<sup>6</sup> In some cases a specific topic, such as providing cash grants along with housing, is seen by one party as a best practice while not providing cash grants is seen as best practice by another party. Some areas of best practice or lessons learned were universal across all programmes: these have been prioritised in the text.

While the report looks at best practice and lessons learned from a technical point of view, supported by a number of field visits to shelter programmes, it also looks at wider management and strategic issues for both field programme management and headquarters.

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<sup>6</sup> For example a national society lists taking a full WASH approach to the Water/Sanitation component of the shelter programme while other PNS see the failure to introduce a full WASH approach as a lesson learned.

The mission took place over a relatively short timeframe during a major 'out-of-country' period for field staff and Easter holidays for many headquarters and field staff. Many key staff had left their programmes and could not easily be contacted and some staff was on medical leave. While every effort was made to contact as many IFRC, HRCS and PNS staff as possible, based on contact information received from PNS, it was not always possible to make contact. The report writers offer their apologies to those who may feel they should have been contacted and were not.

A number of reports and evaluations were made available to the consultants though many of these were internal or confidential documents. The documents are listed in the annex, but where quotes or comments from those documents are used in the report text, they are not referenced in order to maintain the required learning while at the same time protecting the confidentiality of the document.

There is less attention in the report to programme areas that were exclusive to the IFRC as these have already been reported on in more detail in the document '*Haiti: Recovery Shelter Programme Review: A Review of the IFRC Secretariat Recovery Shelter Programme in Haiti 2010-2012*' (the executive summary of this report is available in Annex 8.9). As the emergency phase was not in the terms of reference for that report, emergency shelter is included in this report.

On 14 April 2012 a Technical Delegate Workshop (TDW) was held in Port au Prince attended by 27 delegates and Haitian staff from seven national societies and the IFRC Secretariat working in recovery shelter programmes. Initial findings were presented at this workshop and further lessons learned and best practices were identified. The outputs from this workshop informed the technical sessions at the 17-20 April 2012 Haiti Shelter Lessons Learned and Best Practice Workshop (HSW) in Port au

Prince where over 70 Red Cross and Red Crescent managers and technical experts<sup>7</sup> gathered to discuss the findings and consider the recommendations. Management and strategic issues were presented in a power-point presentation based on the March - April 2012 field visits and interviews with national societies. The workshop reviewed the key findings<sup>8</sup> that were presented<sup>9</sup> and discussed further recommendations coming from the experiences of the HRCS, IFRC and PNS.

This report was prepared based on the initial findings that were presented to the HSW and the outcomes of the workshop. The key findings from the HSW were presented at the April 2012 Haiti Learning Conference and the April 2012 Shelter Reference Group meeting in Ottawa. They will also be presented to the REDLAC shelter working group in Panama for the regional level, and in Geneva for the global level.

For purposes of clarity this report is based on the thematic 'key learning areas' discussed at the HSW emanating from the presentation, as opposed to being presented in regard to the three main objectives: Learning for Haiti; Global Learning, and Movement Cooperation learning. It will be the responsibility of the IFRC to review the recommendations in this report and consider which of the three objectives is most appropriate for each recommendation, and also for those recommendations approved by management, which are the most effective IFRC, HRCS and PNS vehicles to carry those recommendations into policy, guidelines,

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<sup>7</sup> From HNRCS, ICRC, IFRC Geneva/Panama Zone/country delegation and 12 national societies.

<sup>8</sup> The key findings were discussed and new recommendations introduced at the HSW; the 150+ recommendations noted in the PowerPoint presentation were not discussed in detail.

<sup>9</sup> The key findings were sent to participants prior to the meeting.

training and practice. The authors have reworded recommendations where the original wording from the HSW was unclear and have removed or consolidated recommendations which were duplicated or closely associated.

A note on understanding the sources of the recommendations:


- R** *Recommendations from the interviews and observations of the evaluators*
- TDWR** *Recommendations emanating from the Technical Delegates Workshop*
- HSWR** *Recommendations emanating from the Haiti Shelter Lessons Learned Workshop*

The **Core Recommendations** at the end of each chapter in the report have been prepared by the evaluators on the basis of summarising the range of recommendations in each chapter and identifying what they consider to be the key learning points for the IFRC.



*Technical Field workshop, 14 April 2012*

## Red Cross Red Crescent Societies shelter projects | Geographical implementation



## 5. Key Findings: Management and Strategy

### 5.1 Integrated Planning and Flexibility

Two of the most important key findings were in regard to the importance of flexibility in planning and running shelter programmes and the importance of approaching shelter in an integrated manner. While nearly all shelter programme implementers demonstrated flexibility in their programmes and adapted the shelter products through the course of the programme, which definitely provided a better final product that would have been the case otherwise, it is not possible to say the same in regard to multi-sectorial planning where all PNS, IFRC and other implementing partners failed to appreciate the importance of looking at a shelter through the eyes of a beneficiary family and understand the sheltering process needs to support the way a family lives in a shelter and what expectations they have from a shelter, as well as taking into account the challenges of the surroundings and services, the need for improved sites for settlements and mitigating the risks inherent to sloping ground and congested areas.

Flexibility was essential for this programme as adaptations had to be made as transitional shelters were increasingly perceived to last for a longer period than initially planned and as cultural aspects were brought into the programme. The decision taken in Montreal in April 2010 to build 30,000 Transitional Shelters was done before there were any national shelter plans from the Haitian government or the United Nations or any assessment of the context at the national level in regard to land tenure,

property rights or market analysis. There was considerable urgency to find a shelter solution though with the upcoming rainy season in Haiti. This lack of clarity about reconstruction solutions made it difficult to define what a Transitional Shelter should be in the post-earthquake context, and indeed during the course of the programme it became increasingly evident that a Transitional Shelter was in fact a more durable shelter solution in many cases. Bearing this in mind it was important that national societies and the IFRC did not get trapped by over-planning the shelter programme and be unable to adapt as the programme developed.

The overly prescriptive decision from Montreal for Transitional Shelters did not initially encourage a broader range of sheltering options that subsequently emerged, such as the rental support programme. National Societies that over-committed to a single technical design or large upfront purchase orders found it more difficult to adapt during the course of the programme. For example the IFRC 'final product' came from many iterations during the programme, such as introducing a second door, adding a veranda and patio and changing the windows and doors from plywood to metal while national societies also adapted to add second doors, verandas and roof extensions, cement patios and rainwater collection solutions. National Societies that had put aside large contingency funds and adopted community involvement practices found it easier to adapt the programme, including retro-fitting, than those that had started with a more detailed and finite budget structure.

The significant need for flexibility, especially to allow the field teams to adapt the programme was not always assisted by donor behaviour or by PNS submitting over-detailed proposals to donors. Shelter in such a context and potentially many future contexts, cannot be planned in detail and must have built-in flexibility to allow for product adaptation during

Access to water is an important factor in sheltering solutions

*Assumptions were made by the IFRC about the ease of access to water in the Haitian context and no assessments were made regarding water access in the 'T Shelter for decongestion' programme. From a beneficiary participatory review conducted in January 2012 by the IFRC and from a more detailed beneficiary review conducted by one PNS it was clear that water in both the rural and urban context was a serious problem for displaced populations with many walking over 20 or 30 minutes to a water source. This has clear implications for hygiene behaviour and has to be taken even more seriously when considering the ever-present threat of cholera in Haiti.*

the course of the programme. Perhaps public funds are more appropriate for shelter programmes than government of funding agency funds, as the latter do not necessarily provide the required level of flexibility which is needed to find successful outcomes.

A key lesson learned across all implementing partners was the importance of building flexibility into the planning and budgeting and being prepared to act, learn and adapt based on monitoring and beneficiary feedback.

Some best practices that took place were the use of a large contingency budget; the openness to adapt the programme and the open-minded attitudes that allowed for continuous programme changes, though one cannot ignore that the considerable size of the available funding made

adaptation easier, which may not have been the case on more restricted budgets.

Before moving on to integrated planning, the recommendations below on flexibility come from the original presentation to the Working Group, while at the end of this section there are recommendations on both flexibility and integrated planning.

*R28: Proactively propose pilot trails and be prepared to learn*

*R29: Anticipate the need to continually adapt the shelter response as you get cultural beneficiary feedback*

*R30: Plan to monitor and adapt. HQs to support the need for the field to adapt and be flexible in the response*

*R31: HQs to be flexible to support needs of the field*

*R32: Advocate to donors the importance of flexibility in shelter programmes*

*R34: Hold a large contingency budget*

As mentioned in the introduction to this section one of the weakest areas in the Shelter programme was the lack of integrated planning, monitoring and implementation. This is partly an organizational structural problem where the IFRC and many PNS are structured by sector, but also a monitoring and beneficiary feedback problem. The structural problem is also compounded by the increased use of technical experts who may be

experts in their specialist area, but may lack some broader observational skills to recognise very basic issues around shelter, such as food-security, for example understanding where a family could cook in safe conditions, protection (the provision of lighting), sanitation (access to water), health (shelter design for vector control, such as mosquito screens), let alone more subtle areas such as livelihoods and education. Certainly the delivery demands on the shelter programmes put all implementing partners under pressure, where the focus was clearly on construction and the logistics support for the construction.



*Norwegian Red Cross shelter with rainwater harvesting in Petit-Goave, April 2012*

This pressure was partly self-imposed as many PNS and the IFRC placed pressure on themselves by providing over-optimistic construction targets that would never be met, especially in the first year. If the Transitional Shelter had been considered as purely a short-term transition to a

permanent shelter, perhaps some of these oversights would have been of less concern and would have been properly addressed in the permanent shelter phase, and perhaps the general lack of monitoring also meant PNS and the IFRC were not picking up critical messages about integrated sheltering early enough.

*Special issue:*

*What are the risk levels of inequity in Haiti when dealing with high-value assets such as shelters?*

*Some PNS argued that to provide a cash grant as well as a shelter increased the inequity between the shelter recipients and the non-beneficiaries. There may be some studies available from others on this subject, though the author interviewed a number of non-beneficiaries in T Shelter locations and gained the impression that community mobilisers had explained the selection criteria well, the criteria were perceived as fair and at the end of the day to receive or not receive a T Shelter was in the hands of God. During the interviews there were no indications of jealousy or resentment against T Shelter owners, and indeed to-date there is no evidence of attacks against T Shelter beneficiary families.*

There was some evidence through the IFRC Participatory Project Review (PPR) with beneficiaries that the provision of a cash grant along-side a shelter solution mitigated many of the oversights in regard to integrated shelter programming. Over 70% of families receiving a cash grant made some adaptation or change to their shelter, while in a PNS survey where cash was not provided, only 28% made adaptations while over 55%

wanted to make changes but had not been able to do so. From the limited data available and from the lessons learned on the lack of integrated planning, it would appear to be self-evident that cash along with shelter is an appropriate response.

One of the most critical issues identified in regard to the lack of integrated planning was the lack of attention to protection. While shelter design or implementation issues around health or nutrition may seem important, they do not compare with shelter design and location when the result can be rape and other forms of sexual and physical violence. For example T Shelter camps were erected without lighting, despite their proximity to volatile and violent camps, no consideration of violence was initially taken in regard to T Shelter design or T Shelter location. Lighting had been planned for the camps but lengthy delays in the procurement process meant camps remained unlit for many months. The role of the municipal authorities in regard to street and site lightening and other services such as solid waste disposal was not clear at the beginning of the programme but will need resolution in the longer term.

#### *Adapting the shelter design for protection*

*The first shelters did not include locks but as learning took place wooden doors were replaced with metal doors and locks. An 'out-swinging' door that can be easily leveraged open could have been replaced by 'internally swinging' door to improve security. Lighting could have been considered as part of the programme following the evidence that beneficiaries did seek individual solutions for electric power*

This problem was both evident in Transitional Shelter camp design as well as the initial design of individual shelters, which were later adapted to improve the security of doors and windows. It was not all a failure in regard to integrated planning. While not one single implementing partner that has been observed to date introduced any enquiry or solution for cooking and nutrition, at least some introduced best practice water solutions, mostly through rainwater harvesting.

#### *Core recommendation for integrated planning and flexibility*

*To provide appropriate sheltering solutions, be they rental or transitional, it is important to understand a shelter solution as something that must take into account how people use a shelter, including, for example, health, nutrition, protection, water and sanitation and livelihoods. As these social and cultural contexts cannot always be understood in advance it is important to build flexibility into the programme to allow for adaptation which should be driven by community participation*

The recommendations that came out of the Shelter Workshop on integrated planning were:

**R24:** *Always include water and sanitation solutions (preferably WASH) with shelter solutions*

**R25:** *Assess shelter needs and response in an integrated manner, including protection, health, nutrition, livelihoods and wat/san*

**R26:** *Involve a multidisciplinary team able to assess the evolution of the situation, learn from PNS pilot activities and disseminate to partners*

**R27:** Take a multidisciplinary approach to proposal writing

**R33:** Look for alliances with others in weak technical areas

And 9 recommendations on both the importance of flexibility and integrated planning from the Haiti Shelter Workshop included:

**HSWR 1.1** Avoid getting locked into narrow solutions with donors, so use wording such as shelter solutions for x families as opposed to specifying the exact type of shelter solution. This builds in flexibility to include emergency, transitional and permanent solutions and to integrate other programme components. This should be discussed in advance with donors to prepare them for funding applications for future disasters.

**HSWR 1.2** Have a multi-sectorial assessment team. Recovery assessments should focus on the identification of beneficiary needs in an integrated way. Include beneficiaries in all phases of the programme and ideally categorize their needs and respond accordingly.

**HSWR 1.3** VCA should be used as the starting point to engage communities in a participatory fashion to ensure cross-sectorial coherence. Participatory tools such as CBHFA, PHAST, and PASSA etc. can be integrated into the programme to address and complement the identified needs.

**HSW 1.4** Target vulnerable people in the whole community not only the ones directly affected by disaster. Focus on the anticipated impact.

**HSW 1.5** Implementation: assess and plan for an integrated programme and make multi-sectorial indicators. Implementation can be more

sectorial to make it manageable, but coordination is crucial to ensure integration. Be open to partnerships; plan for change during the programme; being flexible requires a change of mind-set. Do mid-term reviews so that the opportunity to change is planned for.

**HSW 1.6** Have a large contingency budget to allow for adaptations during the programme.

**HSW 1.7** Start with a pilot phase to test original ideas, and then adapt the programme based on the findings.  
Think big but start small to allow for adaptations.

**HSW 1.8** There should be an independent monitoring team separate from the implementation team.

**HSW 1.9** One should monitor the impact, not just the activities.



Netherlands Red Cross transitional shelter, extended by beneficiaries, in Petit Goave, April 2012

## 5.2 Monitoring and Beneficiary Feedback Loops

One of the key learning areas was around monitoring and feedback from beneficiaries. While there were a few limited examples of best practice by shelter implementers there was a general lack of any organised programme monitoring or engagement with beneficiaries to both involvement in the design of the programme and measuring the success of the shelter outcomes during the course of the programme. Programme adaptation took place based shelter delegates being open to change, from inputs from the HNRCs or from beneficiary feedback, but in general the adaptations took place later than would have been the case had institutionalised monitoring been taking place.

### *Lessons learned and beneficiary feedback best practice*

*In January 2012 the IFRC Participatory Project Review (PPR) identified leaking roofs in T Shelters as the largest beneficiary complaint on shelter construction. The cause of the leaks came from construction teams not applying the training they had received to site the roofing nails in the CGI sheets in alignment with the hidden roof beams below.*

*One national society had a 24/7 call line where beneficiaries could call in regarding any problems with their shelter. The calls were logged and passed to the community mobilisation team who would alert the construction team if repairs were required.*

*The Noula beneficiary feedback project provided valuable learning for the IFRC Secretariat programme though logging key beneficiary comments.*

This general lack of monitoring also occurred in the emergency shelter phase where the issue of distributions to phantom camps was not picked up as monitoring was not taking place in some areas where phantom camps existed.<sup>10</sup> ERU Relief teams when questioned about the need for post-distribution monitoring responded that the massive distributions demands left no time for monitoring.<sup>11</sup> It is unknown how many goods were distributed to these phantom camps. Best practice occurred however in the camp decongestion programme where teams made early morning visits to camps to identify and mark empty tents, demonstrating an awareness of families maintaining a house (or a shelter in another camp) and a 'phantom' tent or emergency structure in the hope of benefitting from decongestion programme benefits.

When monitoring did take place it was generally focussed on outputs, not programme impact and mostly linked to obligations to donor reporting, thus monitoring the number of shelters constructed was perceived to be the most important part of monitoring, while monitoring in regard to how beneficiary families were actually using the shelter was absent in nearly all programmes. Perhaps this perverse view of monitoring came from the original plans of actions which were generally number-based in regard to indicators with a lack of any indicators into regard to family welfare related to the shelter, such as access and the use of water and how this related to hygiene practices; the installation of electricity and the impact on protection; livelihoods and general wellbeing, and how these factors

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<sup>10</sup> Netherlands Red Cross Recovery Assessment Team report, March 2010. The extent of phantom camps was not established and seems to have been a problem identified in Leogane and not Port au Prince.

<sup>11</sup> However night-time monitoring which would most easily have identified the problem of phantom camps was not possible due to the time restrictions of the evening curfew.

may have had an impact on occupancy rates. Changes were made to shelter programming based on beneficiary feedback, but this was mostly done through informal learning rather than from institutionalised approaches to monitoring and beneficiary feedback. The IASC did not have any cross-cluster monitoring process that could have benefitted all operational organisations.

The IFRC Planning Monitoring Evaluation and Reporting (PMER) unit did not have sufficient capacity to be adequately involved in programme indicators for the IFRC Plan of Action (POA) or field based monitoring and PPR for the IFRC operation. Interviews with PNS indicate some similar challenges for all implementing partners. The small IFRC PMER team in Port au Prince was so engaged in operations reporting that dedicated time on programme monitoring was not available. Likewise the Federation-wide reporting unit in Panama did an excellent job in monitoring overall programme achievements but was not designed to undertake operations monitoring.

When considering the financial costs of monitoring and the costs regarding the quality and satisfaction of the end product are difficult to quantify, but considering the costs of retrofitting and repairs alone would lead to the conclusion that the costs of providing adequate capacity in a PMER function will easily pay for itself in terms of programme efficiency and output quality. While operational shelter teams or units should have obligations to monitor their own work, there is evidence from the Haiti operation that operational units were so challenged by the construction and delivery demands that time was not spent on monitoring, in particular qualitative monitoring and beneficiary feedback. Operations would have benefitted from an independent monitoring function that was not pressured by the operational demands, was not under the authority of operations (whom may deem meeting targets to be more relevant than monitoring) and whom could add real value to the

operation by feeding back valuable learning from monitoring and beneficiary feedback. While the PMER unit was only responsible for the Federation Secretariat programme, there may be an opportunity in future operations to consider PMER operations monitoring as a potential service to all active PNS. The IFRC established a Beneficiary Communications unit which provided a strong platform for messaging to beneficiaries and programme feedback. The majority of the products used such as loudspeaker trucks and posters were one-way communications to beneficiaries, while the Haiti Red Cross radio programme and parts of the SMS messages project provided for two-way communications.



*Participatory project review, IFRC Port-au-Prince Base Camp, January 2012*

### Beneficiary feedback project

*In October 2010 a pilot questions and complaints service was launched to cover the construction of T-shelters and provision of rental and relocation grants at the Annexe de la Mairie camp. Run in partnership with a Haitian call centre called Noula, the system worked by providing call centre staff with a list of common questions beneficiaries may ask; such as 'Will I get a T-shelter?' and 'How can I register for a rental grant?' Call centre staff log each call if they have satisfactorily answered the question. Once per week the beneficiary communications team produce a report for the shelter community mobilisation team, categorizing each call and noting what, if any follow-up is required.*

*Despite initial teething problems, Noula proved popular with beneficiaries generating an 85% satisfaction rate. The system was then expanded to cover Caradeux camp and Mais Gaté camp. To date Noula has handled over 4,000 calls.*

The Noula system is now being expanded to cover all sites covered by the Integrated Neighbour Approach (INA) projects, as well as existing camp decongestion and T-shelter sites.

An influx of complaints over the length of time it took to receive and pay rental grants did support the argument for faster financial procedures, but it did not highlight issues such as the leaking roofs. The reasons for this are unclear, but are most likely due to beneficiaries not realising they could use Noula to highlight this kind of issue. A recommendation would be for the beneficiary communications team, PMER (Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting) and the shelter community team

to work more closely together to see how Noula could be better leveraged as a monitoring and feedback loop tool. By designing feedback mechanisms carefully, in partnership with beneficiary communications, shelter and PMER, the feedback received is expected and asked for and therefore much more likely to be used to adapt programmes. The soon-to-be launched interactive phone line will provide another excellent opportunity for beneficiary monitoring and feedback and this tool should be maximised for the INA programme. Note, while references to a complaints mechanism are important, beneficiary feedback needs to be understood in a broader context where the community and beneficiaries don't just have the opportunity to complain, they have an opportunity to contribute to a programme. The beneficiary communications unit provided services mostly to the IFRC programme and was not used by other shelter programme implementers.

There were few examples of best practice in monitoring and beneficiary feedback from shelter programme implementers, with each example cited below coming from only one or two known sources:

- *Two implementing partners established free-phone complaints lines for shelter beneficiaries. Complaints were followed up by community mobiliser teams and, if required, by construction repair teams.*
- *A national society conducted a mid-term review of their T Shelter programme and subsequently adapted the shelter design to include a porch and roof extension and added a rainwater catchment system to all shelters.*
- *Two shelter programme implementers conducted a beneficiary participatory project review which provided essential intelligence on beneficiary behaviour in regard to hygiene practices, access to water, the use of cash grants and shelter standards.*

**Core recommendation for monitoring and beneficiary feedback loops:**

*International response to a major disaster requires adequate planning and monitoring capacity to ensure that from the outset programme planning indicators are set, independent programme monitoring is taking place, beneficiary communications and feedback loops are established and the learning emanating from the monitoring is fed back into operations.*

In the evaluators presentations to the Haiti Shelter Lessons Learned and Best Practices Workshop (HSW) there were four key recommendations on monitoring and beneficiary feedback loops:

**R18:** *For large shelter programmes introduce a monitoring unit/function outside the implementation unit/function*

**R19:** *Start with a smaller program making it easier to monitor and make adaptations to the program*

**R20:** *Establish a beneficiary feedback system, leveraging beneficiary communication support and tools if available and developing these in partnership between beneficiary communications, PMER and shelter*

**R21:** *Use monitoring and beneficiary feedback to adapt the programme*

And three recommendations came from the HSW working groups:

**HSW 5.2** *Before any project starts, develop a beneficiary communications plan and include communication and participation questions in*

*assessments: where can people find information and how is the information provided to the community? What are the communication networks to be used, such as churches, schools, radio, SMS etc.?*

**HSW 5.3** *Projects should be divided into different stages to allow space for learning: mid-term evaluations should be done to allow for adaptation of the response. Pilot projects should be followed by an evaluation in which beneficiaries participate to allow for learning and adaptation.*

**HSW 5.4** *We need indicators which represent the quality, use and process of the project instead indicators that are limited to the number of outputs or activities. Quality, use and process can be measured based on beneficiary satisfaction surveys. Measure the socio-economic impact of the project.*



*5<sup>th</sup> Show "Radio Croix-Rouge", response on air to questions by beneficiary on shelter, August 2010*

## 5.3 Programme Management

As mentioned in previous chapters the Haiti shelter programme had to keep reinventing itself to stay relevant to the needs and relevant to the changing realities and perceptions about transitional shelter from early 2010 through 2012.

This was never going to be a programme easily captured in a Logical Framework approach and was one where flexibility, mandate, continuous change management and listening through-out all the processes of needs assessment and operations management was required. The need for flexibility, which was essential due to the appropriately risky pre-emptive decision making, was paramount in the programme. Meanwhile the size of the budgets involved would challenge headquarters who had already taken on board learning from the Indian Ocean tsunami operation, to apply risk management strategies.<sup>12</sup> The two requirements of flexibility and risk management were not always easy companions.

The desire for speed, action and risk-taking is typical and appropriate to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and exemplifies the understanding the Movement has in regard to its mandate, as provided by all States signatory to the Geneva Conventions, through the decisions of the International Conference, in particular the inter-governmental recognition of the Statutes of the Movement, the Constitution of the IFRC and the Principles and Rules for Disaster Relief.

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<sup>12</sup> Such large-scale transitional shelter planning possibly involved even more risk than the Tsunami permanent shelter programmes as the IFRC had never undertaken such a large transitional programme or undertaken transitional shelter without a clear concept of permanent shelter solutions to follow the transitional phase.

While the emergency shelter response lacked an appropriate follow-up strategy, the quickly taken decision in regard to transitional shelter, taken in the absence of any strategic shelter planning from the government or the United Nations, must be considered as relevant and appropriate. It would have been easier to define the IFRC shelter response on the back of a more clearly defined and operational shelter strategy, preferably backed up with a financial plan, from the government, which was never to come in the years following the earthquake.<sup>13</sup> While shelter solutions have still not been addressed for some 400,000 people still living under increasingly deteriorating emergency shelter conditions, the Federation, despite its exceptional efforts to provide transitional and permanent shelter solutions for over 41,000 families (30,883 already reached, remaining to be implemented in months to come), is increasingly exposed as a major budget holder while shelter needs still exist. This situation has left the IFRC with a moral dilemma in regard to the shelter 'gap' left in Haiti regarding its mandate, resources and obligations and the challenge of how to incorporate a response to the gap with the on-going commitment to the INA programme. The current problem of recovery shelter needs for the 400,000 IDPs still living under canvas has also to be

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<sup>13</sup> **The Safer Shelter Strategy (Option 1, Green houses, UNOPS)**

*The Government has endorsed a strategy to help Haitians living in spontaneous settlements since the earthquake to find safer shelter ahead of the coming rainy season.*

*This strategy proposes five basic options for the affected population:*

- § *Return to a safe home, after evaluation by trained engineers*
- § *Return to a safe plot, after debris has been removed from the site*
- § *Stay with a host family*
- § *Stay in a current spontaneous settlement, if conditions at the site can be made to meet minimum standards in the medium term*
- § *For those who do not have another option, move to a temporary relocation site planned by the Government*

§

understood in regard to the potential for cholera and the risks borne by the 2012 hurricane season in the Caribbean.

Risk management was generally perceived differently by some field and headquarters (HQ) staff. HQ staff generally considered that HQ budget control was effective risk management while field teams perceived HQ controls over budgets as restrictive to effective field management where flexibility was essential to programme efficiency. There was a general lack of joined-up understanding between field staff and headquarters to balance risk management and HQ control with field authority to take essential decisions on programme efficiency. When important operational decisions were taken by the HQ it was not always the case that the HQ had a sufficient technical or operational experience to make decisions without a clearer understanding of field opportunities and challenges. Some HQ decision makers had made very few field visits to fully understand the operational challenges faced in the field.

The transfer of authority from emergency units in PNSs to geographical departments was also often quoted as a problem and needs PNSs consideration in regard to transition management.

The most often quoted response to 'what could we have done better' was an increased attention to the requirements for human resource capacity in the services areas, such as human resources, logistics, and administration and finance services. This was both in regard to the scale of the operation but also, and perhaps more importantly, about the service needs for shelter programmes.

Shelter is the most singular programme requiring integrated planning. A best practice noticed in the field was a PNS that only took shelter operational decisions when HR, finance, logistics and administration were party to the discussion and decision making. Another best practice was

budgeting 20% of the total budget for contingencies. This allowed for flexibility during the programme including retro-fitting phase one shelters after a mid-term review advised modifications for the shelters.

While the IFRC heads of operations and country representatives over the past two years created a protective environment for the various operations teams that promoted risk taking and flexibility that were critical to the successes of the shelter programme, one could argue that more could have been done to drive an integrated approach to the shelter programme and that vertical programme units were allowed to work independently where integration could have been placed more forcibly into the management structure. This may also apply to some of the PNS shelter programmes.

There were interesting examples of creative partnerships that added value to the overall recovery shelter response. In one case a PNS constructing T Shelters allied with another PNS that constructed the latrines alongside the shelters. One national society that had good construction capacity but insufficient finances, received financing from the IFRC Secretariat to continue and expand its programme. This was a unique experience for Movement Cooperation and provides an interesting model for the future.

The IFRC created the Shelter Technical Committee (STC) In February 2010, in accordance with the Movement Coordination Framework, which provided a platform for National Societies to come together and learn from each other and share experiences. The STC also acted as a technical library and interlocutor with the IASC Shelter Cluster and other inter agencies coordination and Governmental dedicated fora, which also provided technical advice and *Who – What – Where* information on recovery shelter projects. One could observe that PNSs did not make

sufficient use of this platform and did not bring to the table a wide variety of best practice in T Shelter programme management that could have helped other PNSs, neither did PNSs express a willingness to share mid-term reviews or beneficiary surveys that could have added to the collective social intelligence on shelter programming. Examples of issues that could have been useful topics for the STC that were not placed on the agenda include:

- *Rainwater harvesting and how to protect water butts from theft*
- *Improved emergency shelter solutions and community capacities in basic shelter construction*
- *Latrine solutions in locations with a high water table*
- *Beneficiary adaptations to shelters, including cement floors*
- *The need for, and use of electricity by beneficiary shelter adaptations and the relationship of electric power and protection*

#### Core Recommendation for Programme Management

*Shelter is a complex programme area that requires confidence, monitoring, flexibility and innovation and also requires higher than usual levels of support services, especially in the field. Such management demands require highly 'joined-up' relationships between headquarters and field teams and a collaborative approach to understanding and resolving challenges*

Recommendations include:

*R40: Seek advice from the Host national society in regard to their volunteer policy and national labour law*

*R41: Bring adequate HR management capacity in shelter programmes to handle large work forces*

*R42: Ensure staff are insured against accident*

*R53: Increase the field capacity for support services in large shelter programmes; (be it construction, rental, cash support etc) this may also apply to HQs*

*R54: Promote a cooperative and balanced approach to decision making between HQ and field staff and encourage regular field visits*

*R58: Review support procedures for major operations*

*R47: Get technical working groups started early and aggressively seek input and learning opportunities, proactively looking for skills, experience and capacities within the Movement.*

*R47a: PNS should support Movement Coordination by openly sharing information and learning*

And four recommendations came from the HSW working groups:

*HSW 3.1: Have a firewall between implementation and movement coordination and implementation and the cluster role.*

**HSW 3.3:** Movement coordination requires sufficient capacity to provide mapping, land tenure, technical guidelines, etc. Movement Coordination services should include both a strategic function and a technical function.

**HSW 3.4:** Technical movement coordination is required from the beginning of an emergency when early programme decisions are already taking place.

**HSW 3.5:** Movement Coordination can include direct support to PNS implementation, for example the French Red Cross partnership with the IFRC (the direct financing of a PNS from multilateral funds).

**Additional from evaluator:** The Movement Coordination position in shelter is already agreed as an non-negotiable requirement from the follow up recommendations of the Tsunami programmes, but it still considered as 'optional'. This position is not optional and must always be deployed, indeed this applies to all sectorial programmes.



*Voice of communities? Workshop organised by Technical Movement Coordination, November 2010*



*Shelter Technical Committee, Meeting and field visits in Léogane, May 2011*

## 6. Shelter Options and Technical Solutions

### 6.1 The Emergency Phase

The demand of responding to a massive disaster in an urban setting in an impoverished country with a weak political structure was a serious challenge for humanitarian organizations. The scale of death and injury was immense; the geographic scale of the disaster covered much of the country's terrain<sup>14</sup> and the overall level of poverty in Haiti made normative approaches to vulnerability assessment difficult.

In January 2010 the Federation Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT) which had been quickly deployed by the IFRC Secretariat requested support from a shelter technical team (STT) which was subsequently deployed by the IFRC in Geneva. This technical team presented a wide range of shelter options for consideration, as did the Recover Assessment Team (RAT) in January and February 2010. The STT established the Technical Committee meetings to review the available shelter options, including a report of options and risks.

Over sixty national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies deployed teams in response to the Haiti earthquake while the membership of the Federation attracted over one billion dollars in funding.

One of the major needs after the earthquake was the provision of emergency shelter, following the destruction or damage to a large amount of the national housing stock.<sup>15</sup> The IFRC, recognizing its capacity

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<sup>14</sup> Especially when taking into account the displacement of over 600,000 people from Port au Prince to the provinces.

<sup>15</sup> Initial estimates of destroyed buildings were later revised downward after government inspections.

and also its limitations, targeted 80,000 vulnerable families for emergency relief and went on to provide shelter covering kits to 180,000 families, representing an estimated 900,000 people out of a needy population of 1.6 million people considered as displaced and vulnerable. The emergency response targets were ambitious, but using the resources of the IFRC international disaster response tools and the capacity of the Haitian National Red Cross Society (HNRCS), the emergency response from the IFRC and the (HNRCS) was considerable. Despite the response being sometimes more quantitative than qualitative a large proportion of the population was served with basic emergency response assistance in the first weeks after the earthquake, though improved emergency shelter solutions were constrained by a lack of distribution capacity.

After the initial emergency response came the next major challenge for the IFRC and the HRCS: what to do in the early recovery stage of the operation? The Recovery Assessment Team (RAT) had laid out the opportunities and risks of different types of shelter intervention for different beneficiary types, and recommended programming for 10,000 tents, 20,000 emergency shelter kits with wooden frames, 30,000 transitional shelters and an additional support for 3,000 host families. There were various changes to the objectives over the course of the programme, but the core of the IFRC shelter programme over the next two years was building transitional shelters (T Shelters), supporting PNS to build T Shelters, and finding alternative self-sheltering solutions, such as rental support.

The lack of agreed standard operating procedures between the STT, FACT Shelter and Relief ERUs led to some lack of clarity and decision making in the emergency shelter phase. Tarpaulins were distributed to 180,000 families, though less than 40% were accompanied by ropes to make up a covering kit, while only 15% families received wooden supports to the

covering kits, provided through a relief ERU dedicated to support the emergency shelter response.<sup>16</sup> If all four relief ERUs had been used to distribute wood a better level of improved emergency shelter would have been provided. The separation of emergency shelter from the main relief distribution was a lost opportunity and needed to be resolved. In April 2010 the global meeting on shelter drafted new standard operating procedures that were subsequently revised and adopted by the Relief ERU Working Group that clarified the roles and responsibilities between FACT Shelter, the STT and ERU Relief. This demonstrated learning from the Haiti programme that should have an impact on future emergency shelter operations.

A shelter management team as part of the operations team was clearly required noting the scale of the shelter operation, but was not developed or prioritised within the human resource planning. The STT which was sent to support the Haiti Operations Team all came from the Shelter department in Geneva or the Americas Zone, with an impact on global shelter programmes, and became, de-facto, the shelter management team, but without the authority of managers, and were never given clear terms of reference regarding their role. This confusion in roles and responsibilities between the STT and operations management had a negative impact on the early shelter response.

In the second week of the operation the STT recommended a large rapid procurement of standard timber sections, to add to the small local procurement of timber pieces however the IFRC management decided against the proposal on the basis of a lack of clarity regarding the final use of the timber. A further large scale requisition for timber was proposed by the STT, in coordination with the Logistics Unit, in week seven of the

operation. The proposal was put on hold until the in-coming replacement head of operations was in place.

The operations team appeared to consider that the distribution of tarpaulins was an adequate response to emergency shelter and fitted well into the large-scale NFI distribution plan. The STT strongly promoted the need for timber framing and made efforts to secure timber, but without success. The lack of clarity from the STT about the size of timber and quantities required may have contributed to the management rejection or delays in the procurement requests, where it would have taken very little time in the field to clarify the size of wood being used to support tarpaulins as evidenced from beneficiaries procuring locally available wood to build their shelters. It is unclear why distributions that did use wood provided only two pieces of wood (2" x 4" x 14 - 16'). They were distributed with shelter tool kits allowing families to use wood as they needed, but it was clear from field visits that in the early stages of the operation camps in rural areas were using the equivalent of 8 x 2" x 2" x 7', providing four uprights and four cross-beams for a simple 'box' structure. In urban areas less wood was required where beneficiaries were camped in collapsed buildings whereby tarpaulins could be attached to some form of existing upright structure. Emergency shelter upgrades evidenced in 2011/2012 either provided by humanitarian agencies or done by beneficiaries used 2" x 4" timbers for stronger structures.

Rope was not a standard item distributed with tarpaulins. Large diameter rope had to be unravelled by hand to provide a more appropriate size of rope to be used with emergency shelter. Rope, other than that included in the shelter kit, is not held as standard in the Zonal Logistics Units. Procurement delays (procurement was required as rope was not held as relief stock) meant that tarpaulins were distributed without rope in some 75% of all cases.

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<sup>16</sup> IFRC Relief Cell final matrix figures

While a massive NFI distribution took place, including tarpaulins, a disjointed management structure and some poor decision making contributed to a less than satisfactory emergency shelter response.

Some very basic lessons can be learned from this experience:

- ü Shelter management needs to be properly resourced
- ü When a shelter technical team is provided to support operations, their purpose and terms of reference need to be clear.
- ü STT needs to conduct basic field visits to quickly determine emergency shelter needs.
- ü The emergency shelter needs must be integrated into the relief operation and be part of the operations distribution plan as a priority.
- ü Local markets should be immediately assessed for the provision of shelter items, such as timber, even if only enough material is available to get the programme started. Procurement should be made under the 'emergency procurement' regulations to avoid delays.
- ü Suitably sized rope for emergency shelter should be part of relief stocks and held in quantities equivalent to tarpaulin stocks.
- ü Training of operations managers, such as FACT, needs to reinforce understanding of emergency shelter response, and training for shelter delegates needs to include an understanding of the need for speed of action in responding to emergency shelter needs.

The IFRC relief unit in Port au Prince was wound up in 2011, though there are still outstanding relief needs in the IDP camps. With no tarpaulin replacements since September 2011 the situation in the camps is deteriorating. It is important the IFRC and PNS providing camp services find recovery solutions for those camps where they are identified as camp service providers. Some camps are clearly not suitable for habitation, even with improved emergency shelter, and require more permanent solutions such as decongestion supported by rental support. In 2012 the Federation has committed to provide new shelter solutions for an additional 11,000 families through camp decongestion programmes and Housing Repair, in addition to the 30,000 initial shelter solutions target and which have been already provided.

Recommendations - emergency phase:

*R43: Don't assume recovery replaces emergency phase – they can run in parallel*

*R44: Monitor and plan responsible exit strategies for IFRC camps as part of a broader government, UN and NGO plan*

*R45: Decongest IFRC camps or improve emergency shelter in camps which cannot be decongested*

*R46: Plan for and stock sufficient tarpaulins for regular replacement in selected camps*



*Emergency Shelter material and NFI distribution in camps (credit Pepe Jimenez), May 2010*



*Shelter conditions in camps are deteriorating, field visit in IDPs camp in Delmas, April 2012*

## 6.2 The recovery phase

The scale of the loss of housing in Haiti linked to the exposure to hurricanes for 1.6 million displaced people living under basic emergency shelter conditions set a significant challenge to the humanitarian community. Most of the displaced population were previously renters, not owners, while confusing land rights and limited access for repairs or reconstruction due to the amount of post-earthquake rubble made rebuilding a complicated affair. High interest rates and the absence of an underwritten loans or mortgage opportunities in Haiti made owner-driven repair or rebuilding slower than would otherwise have been the case.

Based on this initial analysis the IFRC decided to concentrate on the construction of transitional shelters, on the assumption that the government, World Bank or the United Nations would identify ways in which to manage the need for permanent shelters. With land rights being so complicated in Haiti it was decided that the proposed transitional shelters would be moveable, so once a temporary land agreement expired the owner of the transitional shelter could move the shelter to another location. The IFRC secretariat and the PNS estimated they had the capacity to build 30,000 transitional shelters, with a further 100,000 shelters to be built by other actors in coordination with the IASC Shelter Cluster that also saw the constructions of transitional shelters as an appropriate response to the immediate needs and risks.

A strategy paper outlining shelter options and risks was produced by the IFRC Secretariat. The paper listed options such as transitional shelters; progressive shelters that would start from the base of a transitional shelter and subsequently allow for the upgrading of the shelter to a permanent shelter; the repair of damaged housing; retro-fitting damaged

houses to provide for seismic resistance; the reconstruction of individual housing; construction of multi-occupancy social housing; the provision of construction materials and support to host families to provide housing for the displaced. Somewhat surprisingly these options were never fully discussed, and at the Cooperation Meeting in Montreal in March 2010 the IFRC and PNS committed to build 30,000 transitional shelters, while some national societies committed to undertake housing repairs, reconstruction and support to hosting families.

This report focuses mostly on transitional shelters, as these represent 78% of the recovery shelters solutions implemented by March 2012. Interestingly a shelter solution never listed in the original options paper came to represent the second largest shelter solutions, namely the provision of one year's rental support which represents 20% of the total shelter solutions.

The IFRC Secretariat and PNSs that engaged in the transitional shelter options ended up with twelve different models, varying between wooden structures, steel-frame structures, plywood and mesh alternatives for walls and different floor, door and window solutions. The costs per shelter unit from different partners have not been compared at this stage and a costing methodology has not been established. Nearly all the materials for the shelters were imported with only an estimated 20%-30% of the total project capital going back into the local economy. While traditional rural building practices include daub and wattle walls supported by wooden frames, or brick or breeze blocks structures, the decision to build with metal frames required international procurement and a wooden shelter core with such large numbers required the import of wood, especially with considerable competition for limited national supplies from so many agencies, and included all the challenges importing wood presented, such as quality control.



## Shelter Options table, Federation Wide & big picture...

Update 12 April 2012	RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES		% RCRC in Haiti		Haiti E-Shelter/CCCM cluster	
	Planned	Achieved	Planned	Achieved	Planned	Achieved
Safe and Improved shelter solution						
Transitional, upgraded and progressive shelter	25,660	24,067	22%	22%	115,508	108,559
Rental/Return to provinces Subsidies	9,203	5,282	49%	43%	18,871	12,247
Permanent Housing Construction	1,303	296	10%	6%	13,252	4,887
Permanent Housing Repair	5,250	1,238	17%	9%	30,043	13,260
<b>Total</b>	<b>41,416</b>	<b>30,883</b>	<b>23%*</b>	<b>22%*</b>	<b>177,674</b>	<b>138,953</b>

\* More than 1/5 solution under Federation Programme

This could be considered as environmentally appropriate when working in a country as severely deforested as Haiti, though a better balance between imported and local material could have reduced the carbon imprint from reducing transport emissions. Some partner building solutions were based on local building practices while one can note that in general the materials used for the shelters can be used towards a potential permanent shelter solution.

Most PNSs established their own supply pipeline for the shelter supplies while others took this as a service from the IFRC Secretariat. One PNS decided to go through external partnerships to expand the Federation wide response capacity which represented more than 6,000 Transitional Shelters<sup>17</sup>. Most partners under-estimated the time involved in implementing the programme. The supply chain took a while to establish as did negotiations with the local authorities, establishing the community mobilisation teams and conducting assessments and registration.

Over the course of the programme it became evident that there would not be a permanent housing solution for the displaced and therefore the approach to transitional shelter would have to take into account that what was originally planned as transition would need to be adapted, where possible, to a more durable shelter. It was felt that by introducing the title Transitional Shelter without having a permanent shelter solution locked the IFRC and PNSs into a term that both did not describe the final product and could have led to misperceptions among the beneficiary community. The original shelter design was also adapted during the

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<sup>17</sup> please refer to table in page 43

course of the programme by some of the implementing parties to a more culturally appropriate model that adapted a core rectangular structure to a more typical rural wooden house with an extended roof over a veranda, two doors, and a cement floor and in some cases rainwater catchments systems. All IFRC and PNSs programmes included an individual (or occasionally shared) latrine<sup>18</sup> along with the shelter. The majority were pit-latrines with an estimated five year plus life-span. Some latrines with CGI walls were replaced with plywood walls to reduce the heat in the latrine. Some implementers constructed raised latrines where the water table was high, while others did not construct latrines in high water-table locations. Latrine solutions in the denser urban areas were considerably more difficult than in rural areas. The IFRC and some PNS confronted challenges in regard to a truly integrated shelter and wat/san response to the needs.

While the T Shelters had been designed to withstand hurricanes<sup>19</sup> and rain storms and were considered to be reasonably resistant to earthquakes, there was a general practice to treat the project as a construction exercise without adequate attention to how a shelter is used, for example shelter design related to cooking, protection, electricity, access to water, health and the social use of a house. Families living in shelters without a protected veranda had nowhere to cook when it rained, while some families had erected a lean-to from local materials as a cooking area. A large number of beneficiary families had found an electricity supply which was mostly used to power an internal light. In

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<sup>18</sup> Latrines were not always provided in locations with a high water table.

<sup>19</sup> While the original shelter design was intended to be hurricane resistant, it remains unclear how this standard may have been compromised by the addition of the veranda and roof extension.

some cases families had added external lighting. In all observed cases the owner-installed electrical wiring was poor, and nearly all was illegal, though there were no reports of injury or fire emanating from an electricity source. Protection is a critical issue in Haiti and the provision of a shelter with a power supply (such as solar powered lighting) or internal electrical frame would have reduced the risk of sexual and physical violence. Attention to health and vector control had not been taken into account in the design of the shelters, for example window screens to control mosquitos. Only a few partners dealt with water supply by including a rainwater catchment system. Some reports indicated families had to walk up to thirty minutes to find a source of clean water, including those in urban areas. Access to water was also an issue for those moving to rental properties where access to water had not always been considered carefully by the family when agreeing a rental solution.

Different technical solutions for different physical soil conditions


*Shelter sites included mountain locations (with rocky soil), “normal areas” (with soil characteristics corresponding to the technical studies that helped to develop the standard T Shelter design) and valley areas (with soft soil and a high water table level).*

*Three different foundations were developed to fit these three areas. As adaptations were not planned at the beginning, it took time and money to agree, and then implement the necessary changes.*

There were varying levels of engagement in regard to risk reduction, with some shelters located on hill-sides without adequate attention given to the risk of floods, landslides and mudslides. It was unclear how much

advice had been given to the siting of a shelter in relation to the direction of prevailing winds, hurricanes and rain.

The issue of family origin, status and location did not easily fit the standard approach to the programme. For example: The Shelter Cluster allocated specific areas of intervention to each PNS. Some beneficiaries identified by a PNS in a given area were initially living in an area not covered by this particular PNS. The PNS was subsequently forced to develop unplanned strategies to tackle this issue. Some beneficiaries negotiated land rent in the hills, far away from the anticipated locations where land rents were higher. This had implications for the logistics of working off-road, the cost per unit, environmental risk management and dealing or not with the lack of infrastructure, such as paths or roads. On the other hand, when beneficiaries located close to their previous dwelling they benefitted from easier logistics and from available materials such as rubble. The environmental costs of various shelter options were not considered, such as the carbon costs of the transport solutions and the damage to roads due to the use of heavy lorries to deliver materials.



Approaches to owner participation varied, with some partners demanding that beneficiaries would clear and level the land, dig the pit for the latrine, carry the shelter kit from the offload site, cement the patio and paint the shelter, in other cases some of these activities were carried out by the construction teams. Letting beneficiaries select the colour of paint and paint their own house and being encouraged to make adaptations increased the sense of beneficiary ownership.

There would appear to be a direct correlation between the provision of a cash grant and owner adaptations to their shelters. The most frequently observed adaptations were setting up a cloth screen in the interior of the shelter effectively creating two rooms from the internal space, installing electricity, erecting a fence around the shelter or on the veranda and establishing a small garden for growing herbs, corn or flowers. One negative adaptation was the use of shelter material, such as internal bracing struts, which were removed for other purposes. Some basic

education on the shelter at hand-over could have potentially mitigated this problem.

All implementers that were interviewed had changed from a daily rate payment for construction teams to a payment per unit approach with a contract with a construction supervisor who was responsible for the recruitment of the construction team. There was reported efficiency gains after taking on this approach of up to 25%, though some adaptations had to be made in hilly locations where land preparation could take an equal time to construction. By engaging and training local construction teams the Federation-wide shelter programme leaves behind a legacy of trained carpenters, from which a key lesson was the importance of recruiting local people in the construction teams: this reduced tensions between beneficiaries and the surrounding community and improved security for the project in hand.

In most of the shelter projects the initial shelter status of the beneficiaries was not taken into account. The same shelter solutions were offered to all, no matter if they were previous house owners, land owners, or renters. Many PNS delegates assessed that more relevant sheltering solutions could have been developed if beneficiaries status had been better taken into account, for example permanent houses or house repair for land owners and more emphasis on house repair in rural areas with more attention to rental solutions in urban areas.

To promote the longevity and maintenance of the shelter it was important to consider the design and material used. If power tools were required in construction of materials used that could not be purchased in the market, it was evidently going to be more difficult to maintain the structure and extend its life. By the time partners realised that transitional shelters were likely to become permanent, it was too late to take such thinking into account, as designs and construction had already

been decided, but this point is certainly relevant for future approaches to transitional shelter.

The overall observations regarding the shelter programme was that the strategic options chosen and the technical implementation solutions, for both the transitional shelters and rental solutions, were relevant, appropriate and were implemented above the original targets. Nevertheless, the fact that the initial designs and technical solutions did not always support the cultural norms or the concept of building back safer can be seen as a lost opportunity as were the opportunities to assess risk.

Some best practices observed in the programme included: the move from a donor driven to an owner driven approach; the encouragement for owners to make adaptations and improvements to their shelters with a strategy to support such initiatives with training and sensitisation; the provision of a cash grant linked to the shelter; taking a flexible approach at the beginning of the programme on the understanding that the programme will change as the implementing organisation learns; that involving beneficiary engagement and involving the whole community in the project increases local acceptability and project success.

### Core recommendation for Shelter Options and Technical Solutions

*Think process not product: sheltering is a process that requires a multilateral and integrated approach bound in local customs and culture and requires an understanding of the environmental, cultural, social, technical and economic context in which the project is managed*

*Emergency, recovery and reconstruction phases should be interlinked and reinforce each other to contribute as much as possible to short-term needs as well as contributing to a build-back safer strategy*

Recommendations include:

**R4:** *Assessments should include the study of the local building culture in order to provide options for T-shelter designs and sheltering solutions that can be used for building back safer strategies*

**R5:** *Involve local architects*

**R7:** *Give the community the chance to share ideas about shelter solutions, materials, etc.*

**R9:** *Be open to multiple shelter solutions in a large and complex urban, peri-urban and rural environment*

**R103:** *Think “sheltering” not “shelter”, process not product.*

**R107:** *Facilitate population own choice.*

**R133:** *Maximize the investment in the locality*

**R137:** Use all project as opportunities to reinforce local capacities at all level (HRC, train artisans, sensitize population, reinforce community based organisation, local and national government)

**R145:** For INA, have a vision on how the money invested will benefit to the population at the long term.

**R146:** INA should benefit from existing experience by PNS and other organization who are doing INA for months/years (CHF, PCI, etc...)

**R149:** Although we move to INA, keep an eye on remaining IDP's conditions

And below, main recommendations came from the HSW:

#### *HSW - Shelter Options*

**HSWR 1.1:** Reword T-shelter where we know that the solution (might) become permanent. Call it a progressive shelter so donors expect and there is flexibility possible in the programme. In urban areas, we cannot speak about T-Shelter. Better to talk about progressive solutions.

**HSWR 1.2.1:** Develop list of shelter options regarding context

**HSWR 1.2.3:** Look for solutions with high beneficiary involvement. Part of the house can be provide by us, part can be done by the beneficiaries themselves (e.g. walling, flooring, finishing,...) Give options to people to be part of the construction process, to contribute to the work (their own materials / solutions) or support them accordingly with vouchers or other solutions.

**HSWR 1.2.4:** Home-owner driven approach could work as well in the urban areas. It will support building community resilience.

**HSWR 1.2.5:** Transitional camp /settlement should be the last option. If we do, we should also look after services such as street lightening and infrastructure

**HSWR 1.2.6:** Water /sanitation is an essential component of sheltering solutions and must always be included

**HSWR 1.2.7:** Think handover strategies / Exit strategies from the beginning of the project.

HSW - Quantitative, Qualitative results; implementation strategies

**HSWR 9.1:** The Montreal process was good; the right decision makers were on board. Making the decision to agree on a national target was good. Permanent reconstruction needs should have been integrated in the target.

**HSWR 9.2:** Start with the implementation of a small amount of shelter solutions, (target only 20 % of the expected 30 000 solution) and adapt them later according the local context.

**HSWR 9.3:** Our response was more based on the needs we understood. Our response was more supply driven than owner driven. What about education and livelihood? These were major needs (mentioned by the beneficiaries), but not FIRC priorities.

*HSWR 9.4: Focus also on soft component in the programme (like hygiene promotion and Watsan). Include house maintenance, risk reduction, etc... The response should be a package.*

*HSWR 9.5: Role of federation in the development and dissemination of implementation guidelines. More comprehensive strategy globally.*

*HSWR 9.6: Improve the quality of indicators and monitoring tools. Log frame has to include qualitative indicators.*

*HSWR 9.7: Look after equity. Better communication towards beneficiaries (selection, models, reasons for differences, etc...)*

*HSWR 9.8: Better understanding of the local context, for example how did people construct before the crisis. Design the project (strategies and product) in such a way that this is taken into account.*

*HSWR 9.9: Adapt our resources mobilization strategies to the specificities of donors. (first phases ECHO; quantitative and inflexible)*

#### HSW – lessons for Haiti

*HSWR 3.2: Need for well-trained technical team that is able to train community members in order to be well prepared in case of an emergency.*

*HSWR 3.3: Take into account local context and local culture. Develop standards which take into account traditional construction techniques. It is important to use PASSA on the preparation phase.*

*HSWR 3.4: PNSs trained many people. We should develop a database of people trained and classify them in specific regions. We can call this trained people. Refreshing course could be required in the field. HSW – lessons from Haiti*

*HSWR 4.1: Think ahead how will look like the permanent solutions and how can your activities be a step in this direction*

*HSWR 4.2: Need to have the courage to use many different sheltering methods. To be combine in appropriate packages (shelter + livelihoods /cash / or other sector activities). Shelter solutions, no shelter products*

*HSWR 4.3: Despite this, consider the advantage and disadvantage of standardization (ex: cost and speed of implementation)*

*HSWR 4.4: Capitalize on “by products “ of implementation such as*  
ü *the capacity building of workers.*  
ü *the training provided*

*HSWR 4.5: Extend the impact by considering boarder subject training, giving concrete support at tend of project such as tool boxes or certificated linked to recognised institutional bodies*

*HSWR 4.6: Facilitate the transfer of knowledge gained towards more marketable skills (permanent construction method / Wood working / Furniture, etc.)*

*HSWR 4.7: Don't constrain yourself by reaching for legally recognised standard (Land issue). Come with approach that can minimize risk and maximise participation.*

Recommendations from the Technical Delegates Workshop:

***TDWR 1:*** Think about the exit strategy from the beginning of the programme

***TDW 2:*** Develop common tools for registration, local staff contracts etc.

***TDW3:*** Retain experienced delegates




*Spanish Red Cross progressive shelter, extended by beneficiaries in Léogane, April 2012*



*Swiss Red Cross, raised upright footings to avoid rotting, Léogane April 2012*



*German Red Cross roof bracing solution, Léogane April 2012*



*American Red Cross partner alternative wall solutions, Petit Goave, April 2012*



*Haiti Shelter Lessons Learned Workshop, Port-au-Prince, April 2012*



*Technical delegates workshop, 14 April 2012*

## Conclusions

The process to identify best practice and lessons learned in the International Federation shelter programme in Haiti involved an independent external report, a technical workshop with shelter delegates, a group one-day field visit workshop participants, two day workshop to discuss the preliminary findings of the external report and finally shelter discussions as part of the two day Haiti Learning Workshop. A key challenge for the International Federation is to now maintain the energy that has been present so far in pushing forward the final recommendations from the learning process. The recovery shelter programme in Haiti was a major undertaking that can be celebrated as a success, with over 30,000 families affected by the earthquake provided with improved shelter solutions. Although the programme developed over time as the transitional nature of the shelters became less obvious, the high level of beneficiary satisfaction is an important indicator of success. While it is too early to assess the sustainability of the programme which will be better determined when land leases for T Shelter occupants expire, initial indications from beneficiary surveys are that land will be leased beyond the initial agreements, though no study has been undertaken with land owners.

The key learning from the shelter programme was captured from best practices from a number of implementing partners and similar findings came from the review of lessons learned. While the report identifies over 150 recommendations there are four major findings that can influence future shelter programmes:

1. *Shelter is a complex programme area that requires building flexibility into all aspects of planning and programming to allow for adaptation during the course of the programme.*
2. *It is important to continually monitor shelter programmes and include mechanisms to listen and learn from shelter programme beneficiaries in order to adapt the programme to meet cultural norms.*
3. *Shelter, be it transitional or permanent, requires an understanding of how a family lives in and uses a shelter and therefore requires integrated approaches to planning and implementation that includes water and sanitation, health, protection, risk reduction, nutrition, power supply, and the family and community social aspects in regard to sheltering.*

4. *All phases of shelter can support each other, thus approaches to emergency shelter can contribute to*

*transitional shelter which in turn should contribute to permanent shelter with a 'build back safer' approach.*

Annex - 8.1 Shelter Statistics



*Shelter Options table, Federation Wide & big picture...*

Update 12 April 2012	RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES		% RCRC in Haiti		Haiti E-Shelter/CCCM cluster	
	Planned	Achieved	Planned	Achieved	Planned	Achieved
Safe and Improved shelter solution						
Transitional, upgraded and progressive shelter	25,660	24,067	22%	22%	115,508	108,559
Rental/Return to provinces Subsidies	9,203	5,282	49%	43%	18,871	12,247
Permanent Housing Construction	1,303	296	10%	6%	13,252	4,887
Permanent Housing Repair	5,250	1,238	17%	9%	30,043	13,260
<b>Total</b>	<b>41,416</b>	<b>30,883</b>	<b>23%*</b>	<b>22%*</b>	<b>177,674</b>	<b>138,953</b>

\* More than 1/5 solution under Federation Programme



## Shelter Options table, by partners (1)...

Update 12-04-2012	Haiti: Earth quake   <i>Safe and Improved Shelter Solutions Matrix</i>		
RCRC Partners	Safe and Improved Shelter Solutions Households Commitments	Households Supported	Shelter Units built
<b>Transitional, upgraded and progressive shelter</b>			
Canadian Red Cross	6,705	6,565	6,565
Canadian Red Cross - IFRC	195	195	195
French Red Cross - IFRC	2,316	2,316	2,319
German Red Cross / Austrian Red Cross	3,000	2,763	2,763
Spanish Red Cross / Haitian Red Cross	4,500	3,508	4,297
Netherlands Red Cross	174	174	174
Swiss Red Cross	599	598	598
Norwegian Red Cross - IFRC	700	700	700
American Red Cross (External Partners)	6,000	6,005	6,005
IFRC / Haitian Red Cross	1,471	1,243	1,376
<b>Transitional, upgraded and progressive shelter</b>	<b>25,660</b>	<b>24,067</b>	<b>24,992</b>
<b>Transitional shelter solution upgrading</b>			<b>Units upgraded</b>
<i>Spanish Red Cross - Permanent Cladding</i>	3,960	3,225	4,039
<i>Swiss Red Cross - Phase 2</i>	599	78	78
<b>Transitional shelter solution upgraded</b>	<b>4,559</b>	<b>3,303</b>	



## Shelter Options table, by partners (2)...

Update 12-04-2012	Haiti: Earthquake   <i>Safe and Improved Shelter Solutions Matrix</i>	
RCRC Partners	Safe and Improved Shelter Solutions Households Commitments	Households Supported
<b>Alternative Shelter Solutions</b>		
American Red Cross	103	103
British Red Cross	100	90
IFRC / Haitian Red Cross	9,000	5,089
<b>Alternative Shelter solutions</b>	<b>9,203</b>	<b>5,282</b>
<b>Permanent Housing Construction/Reconstruction</b>		
British Red Cross	400	5
IFRC / Haitian Red Cross	250	0
Italian Red Cross / IFRC / Haitian Red Cross	53	0
Canadian Red Cross (External Partner)	600	291
<b>Permanent Housing Construction/Reconstruction</b>	<b>1,303</b>	<b>296</b>
<b>Permanent Housing Repair</b>		
American Red Cross (External Partner)	5,000	1,238
British Red Cross	250	0
<b>Permanent Housing Repair</b>	<b>5,250</b>	<b>1,238</b>
<b>Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies - Shelter Solutions</b>	<b>41,416</b>	<b>30,883</b>




## Shelter Options table, by location...

Update 12-04-2012 RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES   Haiti: Earthquake   <i>Safe and Improved Shelter Solutions Matrix</i>					
Area	Communes	Safe and Improved Shelter Solutions Households Commitments	Safe and Improved Shelter Solutions Households (percentage)	Households Supported	Households Supported (Percentage)
Port au Prince Metropolitan Area	Port au Prince, Delmas, Cité Soleil...	16,066	38.79%	12,831	41.55%
Other Affected Area	Leogane, Petit Goave, Jacmel, other provinces...	25,350	61.21%	18,052	58.45%
<b>Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies - Safe and Improved Shelter Solutions</b>		<b>41,416</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>30,883</b>	<b>100.00%</b>




## Shelter Programme, Overall progress implementation...





## Shelter Programme, Monthly progress implementation...



## 8.2 “Flight Package” for Haiti Shelter Lessons Learned Workshop participants.

*This document has been prepared based on key findings, lessons learned, best practices and recommendations identified by consultants, with introduction of main facilitator of the workshop. It has been sent to all Workshop participants few days before the events, for them to take acknowledgement of key findings, helping prior understanding of the issues before the discussions.*

*The structuring of the document follows the 3 main sessions of the workshops.*

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*Why a shelter Lessons Learned Workshop in Haiti? Introduction by Xavier Génot  
| IFRC Shelter Movement Coordinator in Haiti*

*Which Background? | The Federation has contributed significantly to rebuilding Haiti through a range of recovery programme sectors, such as shelter, WASH, relief, health and livelihoods in partnership with Haitian Red Cross (HRC) and partner national societies (PNS) active in Haiti.*

*2 years after the earthquake, more than 30,800 families received safe and improved shelter support from Red Cross Red Crescent. To achieve this, the membership has implemented a wide range of shelter options comprising emergency shelter distribution, emergency shelter replacement, emergency shelter reinforcement, transitional shelter, progressive shelter, upgraded*

*transitional shelter, host family and communities support, resettlement projects through accommodation support and more recently permanent housing construction and housing repair.*

*The Shelter Technical Committee and membership has agreed on the need to look back on how the shelter programme and options has been implemented; which lessons learned and best practices must be capitalized from it, to inform futures responses both at Haiti and at the global level.*

*Which Context? | In response to the 12 January 2012 earthquake, to support Haitian Red Cross and affected population, Red Cross Red Crescent triggered one of its larger operations in a single country. It has been the first time that the Federation is confronted with an urban context of such a scale and density of one city as Port-au Prince, requiring adaption of its tools and ways of working.*

*Strategies and shelter options have required constant flexibility in the approach, to cope with enormous contextual challenges, due to specificities of Haitian context as land mapping and tenure, logistic supplies, weakened local authorities, lack of standards as building codes, construction chain quality control, complexity of environment setting, endemic poverty, impact of additional crisis and security context.*

*To allow the shelter programme implementation, various activities have been developed and integrated as part of shelter programming, such as Federation community mobilization assessment and response tool adaptation as VCA or PASSA, site planning and risk mitigation, water and sanitation, livelihood support, vocational training and community technical capacity reinforcement, rubble removal and recycling, to highlight few of them.*

*In support to the Haitian Red Cross, Federation shelter programme coordination and implementation has mobilized massive funding and required vast technical*

support, both in country and at global shelter community level. Federation wide reporting estimate that around 30% of the total funds has been and will be spent under the shelter sector, 158,8 million CHF till September and around 190 CHF till 2014.

*Which Process? | The purpose of the capitalisation process is to identify key lessons learned and best practices from the first 26 months of Federation Shelter Programme in response to 12 January 2010 earthquake. To do so a team of 2 consultants has been mandated by IFRC (Peter Rees as team leader and Olivier Moles as shelter specialist) to inform the 3 objectives defined and agreed by membership at country and global level.*

*Objective 01. To analyse the various options undertaken till date, in order to develop a range of recommendations for eventual disaster in Haiti, to reinforce predictability of Haitian Red Cross and membership shelter response.*

*Objective 02. To record key lessons learned and recommendation for Haiti Operation, to feed Red Cross Red Crescent global shelter programming and preparedness in response to large scale disaster in urban settings.*

*Objective 03. To review the internal and external coordination, planning and implementation mechanisms of Red Cross Red Crescent Shelter Programme in Haiti in order to develop a range of recommendations to membership management and technical departments, for future shelter Red Cross Red Crescent response in natural disaster, especially in urban settings.*

*The overall objective of this process is to propose an analysis on the different components of the Red Cross shelter programme implemented in Haiti on response to 12 January earthquake. It aims to support Haitian Red Cross, IFRC and national societies to identify key lessons learned and best practices for*

*shelter options and strategies to be targeted for response to eventual new disasters in Haiti, and at global level for major future disasters in urban settings, to optimize predictability, contingency planning, future response mechanisms and shelter support delivered to affected population.*

*What is the aim of this document?*

*In complement of the publication of the shelter technical brief, 24 months, the preparation of the film developed by Séverine Vanel "Red Cross Red Crescent shelter programme - 26 months after - Finding a flexible approach" which will be presented for the first time, Peter Rees and Olivier Moles will present their key findings during this workshop.*

*A first technical event has been organised on April 14 with 25 technical and field Haitian staffs & delegates, in order for Olivier Moles to exchange with the shelter technical committee on the observations, lessons learned and best practices that are part of this first initial report.*

*This document "Shelter Best Practice & Lessons Learned Capitalisation Process, key findings" regroup the summary of lessons learned and best practices identified by the team. As there is too much to cover in the time of the workshop, the team, during the 3 dedicated sessions, will focus on the most important key findings from the 76 Lessons Learned, 108 Best Practices and 158 Recommendations from their key findings.*

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## Shelter Best Practice & Lessons Learned Capitalisation Process, Key findings.

*An independent report by Peter Rees and Olivier Moles*

### Summary | Methodology

- ü This is not an evaluation or review
- ü This is about learning from each other and capturing best practices and lessons learned
- ü All PNS involved in shelter were contacted as best as possible – but this cannot be exhaustive
- ü The report will not quote or reference particular implementing partners
- ü The report looks at the strategic, management and technical learning
- ü Some topics are both best practice and lessons learned
- ü Some universal consensus, some individual
- ü Document review (confidentiality), field visits, face to face and Skype, preparatory workshop April 14th
- ü Complements the IFRC Secretariat Shelter review
- ü Draft report to this workshop, then Workshop learning, revision and institutionalisation (and input to Learning Conference)

### Summary | The Operational Environment

- ü This was the largest mortality rate compared to population size recorded from any natural disaster

- ü This was the largest international operation in a single country combining the appeal and international delegates deployed
- ü Haïti is the poorest country in the Caribbean
- ü The response took place during continual threats of new emergencies
- ü The earthquake response was diverted by the cholera outbreak
- ü The disaster struck during a period of political transition and an already weak public authorities infrastructure
- ü A record number of ERUs were deployed to the Haïti operation
- ü An early response was compromised by limited airport access
- ü This was the largest urban crisis the IFRC has ever faced
- ü The population is already adapted to come-and-go humanitarian assistance

### Summary | The Achievements

- ü IFRC/HRCS provided over 40% of all relief with an estimated 2,000 NGOs and the UN in-country, including IFRC distribution of 18,000 metric tons of food
- ü 22% of all recorded shelter assistance came from the RC/RC
- ü IFRC/HRCS led the rental solution concept to shelter
- ü The IFRC has proved its staying power
- ü The IFRC effectively led the Shelter Cluster
- ü The IFRC/PNS all met their T Shelter targets

## Summary Session 1 | Introduction to the learning process & Key Reflections

### Introduction to the key findings

- ü There is a considerable amount of valuable learning to be taken from the Shelter Programme in Haiti that can help the RC/RC improve future response and recognise some 'best practices'.
- ü From wide-ranging responses from multiple PNS, HRCS and the IFRC there are nine critical areas that stand out:
  - § **The need for a strategic balance and transition management between emergency shelter, transitional shelter and building back better**
  - § **The impact of early recovery decisions from the Montreal process**
  - § **Shelter Options undertaken**
  - § **Tsunami learning and risk management and the field consequences**
  - § **Feeding programme performance through monitoring and beneficiary feedback loops**
  - § **The importance of integrated planning**
  - § **The importance of flexibility in sheltering programmes**
  - § **Issues around Local Human Resources**
  - § **There are still important emergency sheltering needs to be met**

\*During April 14 workshop, in green recommendations which received most support by participants, in blue the ones which received important support,

### 1.1 The need for a strategic balance and transition management between emergency shelter, transitional shelter and building back better

#### Observations:

- § IDP camps were going to exist for a long time while transitional and permanent shelter solutions were developed. After the initial Covering Kit distribution for 180,000 families there were replacement tarpaulin distributions for 60,000. Replacement tarpaulins were provided up to September 2011. Conditions in the 'IFRC' camps remain poor and exit strategies are required. Covering Kits were not an adequate emergency shelter solution.
- § After closing the IFRC relief cell it is not clear if the IFRC/HRCS has the capacity to implement an exit strategy. There are 29 IDPs camps in the INA locations, some the same as the 21 'IFRC' camps, but how can IFRC and HRCS support the camps not in the INA zones or not included in the government 6/16 strategy?
- § Did the splitting of the Clusters reduce the opportunity for an integrated shelter strategy that covered continued emergency shelter needs, transitional solutions and permanent housing solutions?
- § Two main options are considered for future actions regarding remaining IDPs shelter conditions in camps. This is still a draft in discussion which have been shared to the Movement Operational Committee.
  - Ø A. camp decongestion,

For a target up to 5,800 Households in camps under threat of eviction and on support of GoH initiative. Finalized targeting after coordination with GoH UCLBP, DPC, Mairies, CCCM cluster, Inter agency Return Group, to avoid duplication and facilitate synergies.

Ø B. Reinforce autonomy of IDPs communities for maintenance of their shelter/settlements

For long lasting camps (more than 1,000 Households), 10 to 12 sites identified. Built up on French Red Cross actual approach, with experience from British Red Cross past programmes. Training of Camps communities for E Shelter reinforcement. Targeted material distribution after coordination with E-shelter CCCM cluster, DPC, Local authorities, to define common agreement on modalities and package

#### Lessons Learned

- § L1: *There was a lack of an integrated shelter strategy dealing with both emergency and transitional shelter*
- § L2: *Emergency shelter needs should have been better assessed and monitored*

#### Best Practice

- ü B1: *PNS projects for 'improved emergency shelter'*
- ü B2: *PNS using ERU entry point into IDP camps to develop camp assistance projects*

#### Recommendations

- Ø R1: *For long term displacement have high standards in the initial emergency shelter phase*
- Ø R2: *Improve assessment, use VCA, monitor and identify exit strategies*

Ø R3: *If taking the Shelter Cluster role, ensure coherence between emergency, recovery and permanent shelter strategies*

#### 1.1.2 Balance between transitional shelter and building back safer strategy

##### Observations

- § T-Shelter are considered "permanent" by a great number of the population. Life expectation of all T-Shelter structure is considered to be between 5 - 25 years by some, assuming upgrades to the shelters. This will have an impact on the concept of transitional shelters and approaches to permanent shelter solutions
- § Transitional shelter implementation requires the training of a large number of artisans. Some construction choices have had a positive impact on Building Back Safer strategies as local knowledge is developed

##### Lessons Learned

- § L3: *Too little attention was paid to the impact of transitional shelter on sustainable shelter solutions*

##### Best Practice

- § B3: *The T-Shelters included relevant technical solutions that can be useful for a building back better strategy*

## Recommendations

- Ø *R4: Assessments should include the study of the variety of local building culture in order to provide options for T-shelter designs and sheltering solutions that can be used for building back safer strategies\*.*
- Ø *R5: Involve Haitian architect*
- Ø *R6: Involved MTPTC, they are the end user*
- Ø *R7: Give the community the chance to share ideas about shelter solutions, materials, etc.*
- Ø *R8: Agree a timeline for "transitional" shelter*

## 1.2 Early Recovery Timing

### Observations

- § The Montreal and New York process brought PNS together with a shared plan for Transitional Shelter but paid less attention to the need for long term support for Emergency Shelter or links between recovery and permanent shelter
- § The Montreal commitment for 30,000 T Shelters was too prescriptive so early in the operation. 30,000 Shelter Solutions would have been a more flexible approach

### Lessons Learned

- § *L4: You can run parallel programmes for emergency and recovery phases*
- § *L4a: Shelter is complex and needs built-in flexibility in programming*

### Best Practice

- ü *B4: The Host Family programme*
- ü *B5: Rental Programme shelter solutions*

## 1.3 Shelter options

### Observations

- § PNS and IFRC took on a range of recovery shelter options, the main focus being T Shelter/Progressive shelter support (8 implementers, 24,067 shelters); rental and host family support (2 implementers, 5,282 solutions); permanent housing construction (4 implementers, 296 solutions); permanent housing repair (2 implementers, 1,238 solutions)
- § Naturally transitional shelter completion was faster than permanent house construction or repair, and rural T Shelters proved generally easier than urban T Shelters. There were eleven different models of T Shelter used, all appropriate in their own way
- § Note the rental support was never a planned solution, but provided excellent results, thus reinforcing the importance of flexibility
- § There is a high level of beneficiary satisfaction (over 70% from two surveys on T Shelters and rental support)
- § PNS managed to adapt the initial design to a more culturally acceptable design

### Lessons Learned

- § *L5: Working with different approaches to shelter solutions provided for more learning, though learning could have been enhanced with more positive efforts on sharing*
- § *L6: Trying different T Shelter models was not a constraint, except in the delays caused by the early search for a single agreed T Shelter model*

§ L7: House repair and reconstruction could have been better included into a Federation-wide shelter strategy (along with emergency shelter)

#### Best Practice

- ü B6: Flexibility to implement multiple solutions to shelter challenges
- ü B7: Rental solutions

#### Recommendations

- Ø R9: Be open to multiple shelter solutions in a large and complex urban, peri-urban and rural environment
- Ø R10: Achieve standard of quality throughout entire implementation
- Ø R11: It might be better to study local construction and incorporate safe standards, rather than coming with “boxed mind” options
- Ø R12 : Repairs should have been used more in rural areas where traditional construction methods were present, understood and appropriate

### 1.4 Risk Management

#### Observations

- § Everyone had learnt from the Indian Ocean Tsunami programme and had learnt lessons on Risk Management
- § Many of the problems in the Tsunami programmes were avoided in Haiti due to improved Risk Management
- § IFRC established multiple platforms through the Movement Coordination Framework to manage all risk areas
- § In some cases HQ budget control reduced flexibility in the field

§ The largest observed risk was the misuse of the Emblem by local staff

#### Lessons Learned

§ L8: Balance risk management with programme flexibility

#### Best Practice

- ü B8: High level HQ leadership consensus on risk management
- ü B9: Established an effective Movement Coordination Framework
- ü B10: Hold a large contingency budget (20% +)
- ü B11: Smart PNS/PNS and PNS/IFRC partnerships reduced risk
- ü B12: Develop Risk Management plans with both HQ and Field

#### Recommendations

- Ø R13: Learn from the Haiti Movement Coordination Framework structures
- Ø R14: Develop Risk Management approaches in close coordination with the field team and build in field level flexibility to be able to adapt the shelter response
- Ø R15: Build in large contingency budgets
- Ø R16: Look for PNS/PNS or PNS/IFRC partnerships especially where technical shelter capacity is limited
- Ø R17: Get help from the host national society to understand national labour law, NS volunteer policy and appropriate use of the emblem (see section Key Findings 8 for more on this topic)

## 1.5 Feeding programme performance through monitoring and beneficiary feedback loops

### Observations

- § The huge demands on implementation and results reduced attention to programme monitoring and beneficiary participation
- § If monitoring had been better, effective adaptations could have been introduced earlier
- § All PNS had to work with a great variety of beneficiaries: owner / tenants ; displaced / non displaced

### Lessons Learned

- § *L9: Shelter Programmes that adopted monitoring and beneficiary feedback loops were generally more efficient*
- § *L10: Shelter solution should be designed regarding the beneficiary origins and expected recovery status*

### Best Practice

- ü *B13: PNS mid-term review*
- ü *B14: Participatory Project Review*
- ü *B15: Beneficiary complaints system*
- ü *B16: Beneficiary communications projects*
- ü *B17: Initial assessment included an analysis of local capacity*

### Recommendations

- Ø *R18 : For large shelter programmes introduce a monitoring unit/function outside the implementation unit/function*

- Ø *R19 : Start with a smaller program (500 instead of 5000 houses). Easier to monitor and add flexibility to the program*
- Ø *R20: Establish a beneficiary complaints system*
- Ø *R21: Use monitoring and beneficiary feedback to adapt the programme*
- Ø *R22: Assessments should include the identification of key local partners*
- Ø *R23: Adopt owner driven approach using iterative strategies and flexible program*

## 1.6 The importance of Integrated Planning

### Observations

- § There was a tendency to focus on shelter as a physical structure and a logistics challenge, rather than shelter as a place where a family lives
- § Often attention had not been paid to access to water (despite the threat of cholera), almost no attention given to food preparation and despite much evidence no attention to power and lighting (and the relationships to protection and violence). Little regard had been given to health
- § Programmes were too often guided by architects, where what was required were inputs from social architects or anthropologists

### Lessons Learned

- § *L11: Shortcomings in integrated planning were mitigated by providing a household grant and livelihoods grant*
- § *L12: The lack of monitoring meant key learning was not taking place*
- § *L13: There was a need to analyse living and building traditions*

### Best Practice

- ü B18: A full WASH approach, not just providing a latrine
- ü B19: Assessing distance from shelter to water and putting in water harvesting solutions
- ü B20: Providing a household grant and/or livelihoods grant
- ü B21: Conducting participatory reviews and satisfaction surveys

### Recommendations

- Ø R24: Always include water and sanitation solutions (preferably WASH) with shelter solutions
- Ø R25: Assess shelter needs and response in an integrated manner, including protection, health, nutrition and wat/san
- Ø R26 : Involve a multidisciplinary team able to assess the evolution of the situation, learn from PNS pilot activities and disseminate to partners
- Ø R27: PMER teams perfectly involved with technical people to write properly the proposals or reports. Full understanding is crucial.
- Ø R28: Proactively propose pilot trails if funds are available

## 1.7 The importance of flexibility

### Observations

- § Shelter is a complex programme area that does not easily fit any standard approach and is hard to plan for in detail at the beginning of an operation. Almost inevitably the shelter response will adapt over time, thus is it critical that the budget and operational plans build in sufficient room for adaptation
- § The final T Shelter product changed significantly over time based on HRCS guidance and beneficiary feedback: for example the second door, the roof extension and veranda, cement floors, rainwater catchment

### Lessons Learned

- § L14: Programmes improved as the approaches were adapted to beneficiary needs
- § L15: Beneficiaries made many adaptations themselves. If this was monitored, it would allow for future design adaptations

### Best Practice

- ü B22: Holding a large contingency budget to allow for adaptation and retro-fitting
- ü B23: Adding second door, roof extension and veranda , as related to local culture
- ü B24: Adding rainwater catchment
- ü B25: Retro-fitting shelters where adaptation had not been implemented
- ü B26: Providing a choice of paint
- ü B27: Allowing beneficiaries to locate the doors and veranda
- ü B28: Replacing wooden doors with metal doors (improved security)
- ü B29: Providing mosquito nets due to the design of T Shelter windows
- ü B30: Providing household or livelihoods grants
- ü B31: Providing cement for self-help patio/veranda or floor

### Recommendations

- Ø R29: Anticipate the need to continually adapt the shelter response as you get cultural or beneficiary feedback
- Ø R30 : Plan to monitor and adapt. HQs to support the need for the field to adapt and be flexible in the response
- Ø R31 :HQ to be flexible to support needs of the field
- Ø R32 : Donors to be flexible as well
- Ø R33 : Look for alliance to complements & adapt in case no chance to be flexible by your own
- Ø R34: Hold a large contingency budget

- Ø *R35: Avoid over-ordering supplies for any given solution, the design may change*
- Ø *R36: Encourage beneficiaries to make adaptations to the shelter solution*
- Ø *R37 : Ensure that a design can be adapted to various context such as the environment, logistics challenges, hazards etc.*
- Ø *R38 : Avoid unique solution*
- Ø *R39: Adopt an iterative strategy so that implementers can readjust their sheltering strategies according to lessons learnt*

## 1.8 Local Human Resources

### Observations

- § There was some confusion and some misunderstandings about the different status between national staff and volunteers of the HRCS and local staff working for PNS/IFRC and hired daily labour
- § Some PNS and IFRC local staff and daily labour were using the Red Cross emblem (either a plain Red Cross, or PNS emblem or HRCS emblem) improperly, as they were not trained or recognised by the HRCS and had not signed the Code of Conduct
- § PNS and IFRC Human Resources were not always able to properly contract staff, thus misused daily labour that should have been contract staff and thereby abused national labour legislation
- § The misuse of daily labour had implications for accident and health insurance, pensions and taxes

### Lessons Learned

- § *L16: The lack of understanding and effective management of local staff and daily labour can lead to an abuse of national law and leave people unjustly without insurance. Staff are also potentially put into conflict with their own authorities in regard to pensions and taxation*
- § *L17: Perhaps this was an area where the IFRC, working with the HRCS could have played a larger service role*

### Best Practice

- ü *B32: Some PNS found excellent accident insurance solutions*
- ü *B33: Bring adequate professional human resource capacity to manage large labour forces*
- ü *B34: PNS sought advice from the HRCS*
- ü *B35: HRCS updated their Volunteer Policy*

### Recommendations

- Ø *R40: Seek advice from the Host national society in regard to their volunteer policy and national labour law*
- Ø *R41: Bring adequate HR management capacity in shelter programmes to handle large work forces*
- Ø *R42: Ensure staff are insured against accident*

## 1.9 Outstanding Emergency Shelter Needs

### Observation

- § 500,000 IDPs are still in camps, 21 camps identified with the RC. Conditions are very bad and support plans (responsible exit from camps) still need to be decided
- § The relief cell was closed but is still needed to support emergency shelter solutions
- § There are insufficient tarpaulins in stock for replacement
- § While the IFRC and national societies have plans for their 'own' beneficiaries, is there a clearer national plan, of which the IFRC plan is a part, for the entire affected population?

### Lessons learned

- § *L18: Emergency and recovery are not always consequential. This operation would have benefitted from a parallel shelter strategy*
- § *L19: Should not have closed the relief cell with ongoing future distribution needs*

### Best practice

- ü *B36: NS supported emergency shelter improvements*

### Recommendations

- Ø *R43: Don't assume recovery replaces emergency phase – they can run in parallel*
- Ø *R44: Monitor and plan responsible exit strategies for IFRC camps as part of a broader government and UN plan*
- Ø *R45: Decongest IFRC camps or improve emergency shelter in camps which cannot be decongested*
- Ø *R46: Plan for and stock sufficient tarpaulins for regular replacement in selected camps*

## Summary Session 2 | Coordination and implementation mechanisms

### 2.1 Movement Coordination

### 2.2 Programme Coordination

### 2.3 The Emergency Phase

### 2.3 Programme Management

### 2.4 Learning for Haiti

## 2.1 Movement Coordination

### Observations

- § The IFRC put in place a comprehensive Movement Coordination Framework which provided high level strategic platforms, a Movement operational committee, technical committees, performance and accountability oversight and a communications working group

- § Where PNS worked closely with the regional Shelter Cluster they had less need from the IFRC, especially regarding the who-what-where database
- § The IFRC took a flexible and open approach to providing support and coordination functions with multilateral and bilateral partners
- § The Shelter Technical Committee provided an excellent platform for sharing and learning, but was possibly underutilized by PNS

#### Lessons Learned

- § *L20: High level coordination mechanisms benefit Movement coherence*
- § *L21: The IFRC could have been more aggressive to get input into the Shelter Technical Committee*
- § *L22: PNS would have performed better if sharing and learning from others. Lost learning opportunities included:*
  - *Rain harvesting solutions*
  - *Protecting water butts from theft*
  - *Improved emergency shelter solutions*
  - *Latrine solutions on a high water-table*
  - *WASH approaches*
  - *Environmental protection and health solutions*
  - *Cement floor options*

#### Best Practice

- ü *B37: The establishment of the Movement Coordination Framework*
- ü *B38: The establishment of the coordination mechanism of the Shelter Technical Committee*
- ü *B39: The 'open attitude' to providing membership services*

#### Recommendations

- Ø *R47: Get technical working groups started early and aggressively seek input and learning opportunities*

#### 2.2 Programme coordination

#### Observations

- § The Shelter Cluster allocated specific areas of intervention to each PNS. Some beneficiaries identified by a PNS in a given area were initially living in an area not covered by this particular PNS. The PNS was subsequently forced to develop unplanned strategies to tackle this issue
- § The interaction between various projects (under the RCRC movement or with external partners) helped to achieve a better response. This could have been even better by integrating other programs (rubble removal, construction, etc..) and strategies (cash for work, cash for production, T-shelter, permanent shelter).
- § There was some duplication of support to the same beneficiaries which occurred during the programme. Good communications between various agencies and the involvement of relevant local partners helped to solve this problem

#### Lessons Learned

- § *L23: Need to address people's needs where is it easy for them to settle*
- § *L24: The Shelter cluster should help to achieve a better integrated approach, linking all projects in order to achieve a more holistic solution*

- § L25: Using standard tools to register beneficiaries would facilitate the exchange of data and reduce risk of duplication
- § L26: Some field teams found it difficult to have a constructive relationship with regional or national authorities. This can also be understood as the authorities may not understand why similar questions come repeatedly from several PNS

#### Best practice

- ü B40: Flexibility is required to address people's needs where it is easy for them to settle (if secured) and not according to an "administrative decision" regarding PNS areas of responsibility
- ü B41: RCRC societies should develop common tools for facilitating the exchange of data. These tools can be shared with other agencies at the early stage of the crisis

#### Recommendations

- Ø R47: Discuss zoning of "identification" versus "implementation" at the cluster shelter when deciding areas of implementations
- Ø R48 : Federation to reinforce its policy to disseminate common tools to all shelter delegates through shelter training and other means of dissemination
- Ø R49 : Common tools to be developed before to need them, To be disseminated to all aid agencies
- Ø R50 : IFRC to not limit coordination / support / guidance to the solutions IFRC are implementing
- Ø R51 : Put capacity in country to start researching / planning BEYOND the "emergency" shelter response

### 2.3 The Emergency Phase

#### Observations

- § The distribution of shelter materials such as wood and shelter kits was not sufficiently included in the relief response. Shelter was separated from relief and there was little coordination between the two
- § There appeared to be little transitional planning from relief to recovery in the shelter sector

#### Lessons learned

- § L27: The separation of relief and emergency shelter seriously impacted the size and quality of the emergency shelter response. While 180,00 covering kits were provided, more should have been achieved with proper emergency shelters

#### Best practice

- ü B42: PNS engaged in improved emergency shelter
- ü B43: There was a massive distribution of covering kits
- ü B44: Regularly replacing worn-out tarpaulins

#### Recommendations

- Ø R52: Integrate emergency shelter into emergency relief

### 2.4.1: Support services, procedures and HQ/Field coordination

#### Observations

- § Nearly all PNS/IFRC underestimated the scale of the need for support services, especially Human Resources, Finance, Logistics and Administration
- § Most PNS/IFRC struggled to find sufficient experienced shelter delegates

- § There was more of a need for project managers than for specialist architects, and architects needed to be project managed
- § There were many frustrations regarding various procedures that reduced implementation speed and flexibility in the field. Many procedures were considered as inappropriate to the scale of the operation
- § Field staff felt hampered by HQ micro-management while HQ felt their programme control was an important part of risk management
- § HQs that controlled programme decision making didn't always make sufficient field visits to understand the issues under discussion

#### Lessons Learned

- § *L28: Needed to bring a larger support service package for the shelter programme*
- § *L29: Should have had more face to face meetings between the HQ and field team – shelter is a complex programme and not easily managed by e mail*
- § *L30: Should have reviewed procedures for such a complex operation*
- § *L31: When HQ have access to a resource person with a technical background decision-making in the field is improved*

#### Best practice

- ü *B45: Field implementation was efficient because decision-making always included staff from logistics, HR and Finance*
- ü *B46: Regular field visits from HQ to understand the programme, resolve issues and support field staff*
- ü *B47: Project managers with a flexible approach to problem solving and client orientation*

#### Recommendations

- Ø R53: Increase the field capacity for support services in large shelter construction programmes, this may also apply to HQs
- Ø R54: Promote a cooperative and balanced approach to decision making between HQ and field staff and encourage regular field visits
- Ø R55: Put field coordinator to ensure good field coordination
- Ø R56: Shelter coordination to be proactive regarding PNS needs
- Ø R57: Have an online tool with links containing useful information regarding specific challenges in implementation
- Ø R58: Review support procedures for major operations
- Ø R59: Shelter cluster "ignored" any organisation that is not implementing T-Shelters. Gap as no permanent shelter, nor repairs support or guidance because not deemed to be "emergency shelter"
- Ø R60: The movement needs a clear position on "permanent" solutions. This can add flexibility to our approach & programs

#### 2.4.2 Reasons for success

##### Observations

- § The most commonly quoted reason for success was - flexibility
- § Nearly all PNS/IFRC felt that close liaison and cooperation with the local authorities had been critical to success, and that programme implementation improved where this aspect was strengthened
- § PNS/IFRC were helped by regional Shelter Cluster support to identify suitable locations for T Shelter programmes
- § PNS/IFRC that invested heavily in Community Mobilization appeared to have more flexible and 'owner-driven' approaches to programme implementation

- § There were many different approaches to beneficiary involvement in the T Shelter programme with best results and satisfaction apparently coming from the programmes that had the maximum beneficiary contribution to the shelter and latrine

#### Lessons learned

- § *L32: Shelter is a complex programming area that requires a lot of flexibility; this needs to be taken into account in job descriptions and delegate recruitment*
- § *L33: Through the course of the programme PNS/IFRC recognised the importance of close engagement with the local authorities*
- § *L34: In the Haitian context asking for large beneficiary contributions to the programme is appropriate and beneficial as the end result is highly prized*

#### Best Practice

- ü *B48: Solid engagement with local authorities*
- ü *B49: Big investment in community mobilization*
- ü *B50: Full beneficiary contribution to the project*
- ü *B51: Flexibility in all aspects of the programme*

## 2.5 Learning for Haiti

#### Observations

- § The HRCS provided a flexible environment for IFRC/PNS interventions
- § Despite numerous international operations in Haiti it is surprising there was not already a contingency plan. This is now being prepared by the HRCS with support from the IFRC. One could, however argue that no contingency plan

could have anticipated a disaster on the scale of the January 2010 earthquake.

- § A core element of preparedness in Haiti for emergency shelter response has to be the stocking (or supplier framework agreements) of timber for emergency shelter construction to avoid emergency response delays, to provide adequate standards for emergency shelter and to reduce the impact on the environment through the cutting of saplings
- § There is a natural resilience in the Haitian population that is sometimes under-estimated
- § Local government may be more effective than central government

#### Lessons Learned

- § *L35: Import delays and slow vehicle registration appears to be inevitable unless there are significant changes to government policy and procedures*
- § *L36: The HRCS pointed out important flaws in the T Shelter designs and influenced change*
- § *L37: Beneficiaries are prepared to contribute to solutions when properly engaged*

#### Best Practice

- ü *B52: HRCS provided flexibility and support to welcome in a massive international presence*
- ü *B53: HRCS advice on shelter design was critical*
- ü *B54: Pilot emergency shelter support response including wood by three implementing partners*

## Recommendations

- Ø R61: Include IDRL aspects into the contingency planning
- Ø R62: Anticipate import delays for in-coming goods
- Ø R63: Conduct VCA in response programmes to understand the resilience of the population
- Ø R64: Recognise the importance of working with the local authorities

## Summary Session 3 | Field implementation and technical learning

### § 3.1 Tools and methodology

### § 3.2 Field implementation learning

#### 3.2.1 Quantitative results

#### 3.2.2 Qualitative results

#### 3.2.3 Areas of implementation

#### 3.2.4 Strategies of implementation

#### 3.2.5 Field management and logistic

### § 3.3 Technical learning

#### 3.3.1 Environmental

#### 3.3.2 Social


#### 3.3.3 Cultural

#### 3.3.4 Technical

## 3.1 Tools and methodology

### 3.1.1 Field questionnaire

#### § Short description of the beneficiaries



#### § Was it a success?

#### § Why?

#### § What challenges did you face, and how did you solve them?

#### § What are the strengths you gained from others RCRC members to benefit your operation?

#### § What support you would like to receive from the RCRC network?

§ *What are your recommendations to achieve your objectives and what would you improve in case of a new disaster?*

### 3.1.2 Analysis criteria

### 3.1.3 Restitution workshop

## 3.2.1 Achievement of quantitative results

### Observations:

All PNS achieved their quantitative objectives

The quality of the final product deliver was very good

Beneficiary satisfaction rates are very high

### Lessons Learned:

- § *L38: Initial designs have to be adapted to contextual issues*
- § *L39: Involving local partners helps in making smooth and efficient implementation (from assessment to project completion)*

### Bests practice:

- ü *B55: Technical choices as well as implementing strategies need to be flexible in order to facilitate adaptation of original plan to field realities*
- ü *B56: Allocate donors fund to quantitative results and secure RCRC fund for qualitative result / piloting / Innovative approach*

### Recommendations:

- Ø *R65: Develop project strategies that allow flexibility during implementation.*
- Ø *R66: Lobbying in direction of funding agencies in order to advocate program flexibility*
- Ø *R67: Planned large amount of money for site preparation according to context. Shelter is not only the construction of enclosed area*
- Ø *R68: Make the people easy to do what they want*

## 3.2.2 Achievement of qualitative results

### Observations:

In some cases, the T-shelter strategy was proposed as a solution to all PNS beneficiaries, not taking into account their initial, on-going or future shelter needs

PNS were able to develop a wide range of shelter solutions

More than 500,000 people are still IDP's in camp today. If the need of direct beneficiaries is properly achieved, this is not the case for the global needs of the country.

Field teams observed that more flexibility in technical solutions as well as project strategies would have helped to achieve a more integrated response to a greater numbers of beneficiaries

The T-Shelter project impacted on building back safer, even if it wasn't originally planned as an indicator of success

### Lessons Learned:

- § L40: Affected population has its own way to face the challenge of re-sheltering.
- § L41: PNS was able to implement strategies based on the support of local initiative (rental support, host families, etc).
- § L42: Implementing various sheltering solutions is not a challenge for PNS. Federation play a useful role to fill gaps (resources) of some PNS
- § L43: Secretariat may play the role of facilitating the work of PNS (technical, financial)
- § L44: PNS to be involved in determination of the mandate of secretariat shelter coordinator

### Bests practices:

- ü B57: Monitoring and evaluation is a necessary mean to adapt the project according to evolving situation.
- ü B58: Adopting a more iterative approach makes it possible to learn from the field and to be innovative and more in touch with people realities.
- ü B59: PNS Involve dedicated team to analyse the fast changing situation and give direction for future "immediate activities" to be implemented.

### Recommendations:

- Ø R69: Think process and not product.
- Ø R70: Think T-Shelter in order to positively impact on Building Back Safer
- Ø R71: Keep beneficiaries at the centre of the whole process
- Ø R72: Learn from people's initiatives
- Ø R73: Ensure a minimum of equity through avoiding large differences in beneficiaries' and non beneficiaries treatments Capitalize PNS piloting activities, and give direction for PNS evolving strategies

- Ø R74: Quality and Quantity should be both take into account & balance correctly to achieve ultimate goals.
- Ø R75: More donor education for shelter solutions.

### 3.2.3 Areas of implementation

#### Observations:

- § If field office is settle in the area easy to access from all areas of project implementation, it make it easy for only a group of person to stop all project activities. If not, this may be more difficult, and group may only stop activities in one of the area of implementation.
- § Areas where beneficiaries are displaced may be different from areas where these same persons want to re-settled. In these two areas are not under the same PNS responsibility, it may create problems to achieve the needs of these beneficiaries.

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L45: Strong linkage with locally based organisation reduce conflict
- § L46: Keep informed local authorities in project progress. Help them to visit field activities

#### Best practices:

- ü B60: Build strong local partnership

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R76: Assessment should include identification of key local partners and strong partnership with local organisation to be developed

- Ø R77: There should be an emergency solution or exit point in case of any problems

### 3.2.4 Strategies of Implementation

#### Observations:

- § Items may “disappear” during the supplying of material from aid agencies to beneficiaries. And it prove difficult to assess where problems occur
- § Some product given to the beneficiaries where sold and not used, while they are of importance for inhabitant security (paint to prevent contact of persons with treated wood)
- § Paying labourers per T-Shelter achieved was faster than paying these same labourers per days. Quality product were not affected.

#### Lessons Learned:

- § *L47: Delivering procedure from the ware house to the site of implementation has to be properly monitored.*
- § *L48: Beneficiaries should be sensitized to the importance and the role of all the various component of the T-Shelter.*
- § *L49: Final transport can be part of beneficiaries contribution*

#### Best practices:

- ü *B61: If supplying process is properly established, the aid agencies should take decision of replacing lost items with great caution in order to avoid creating a precedents.*
- ü *B62: Ownership of the T-Shelter is not given to the beneficiaries as long as it is not completed*

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R78: Role and responsibilities of all actors involved in material supplying should be properly assessed.
- Ø R79: Proper beneficiary sensitization of the technical parts of the T-Shelter has to be done
- Ø R80: Beneficiaries should participate in the construction
- Ø R81: Give money and technical training to the beneficiaries, so they can build what they want (need).
- Ø R82: Think the exit strategies from the beginning of the project.

### 3.3.1 Environmental, hazard

#### Lessons Learned:

- § *L50: Re-use and improvement of local building practice can give chances to reduce the vulnerability of non direct beneficiaries.*
- § *L51: Sheltering project is a good support for implementing more global risk reduction program*

#### Best practices:

- ü *B63: Implementation with adequate training and sensitization.*
- ü *B64: Promoting local building culture enhances local resilience.*
- ü *B65: Secure consolidation phase including Risk Reduction component.*
- ü *B66: Hazard include community hazards (garbage, waste, septic,...)*

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R83: Understand local building practice strength and weaknesses
- Ø R84: Demonstrate solution that improve local solution and reduce local vulnerability.
- Ø R85: Design should be enough flexible to be adapted to local hazard and contextual environment.

- Ø R86: Beneficiaries should understand the shelter design in order to avoid making mistake by removing some structural part.
- Ø R87: Instead of introducing new practices, improve local practices.
- Ø R88: Guideline / options for beneficiaries to adapt / improve their shelter without sacrificing the structural integrity / hazard resistance.

### 3.3.2 Environmental, climate

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L52: Orientation has an impact on comfort aspect (hot, cold, wind, rain) and durability of material

#### Best practices:

- ü B67: Good if the house and its openings be orientated accordingly to main rain
- ü B68: Design to be done according main climatic constraint

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R89: Take into account main climatic condition while designing and implementing T-Shelters.
- Ø R90: Option could have been given to the beneficiaries between expansive imported insulated roofing material and other local solutions.

### 3.3.3 Environmental impact

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L53: To take local and global environmental impact into account
- § L54: The use of locally available material helps to reduce cost, transport and logistic needs.

- § L55: Locally available material include rubble and other material that can be re-used from the previously existing houses.

#### Best practices:

- ü B69: Think on how will be recycled the material from the T-Shelter.
- ü B70: Give options based on the study of the local building culture, and so enhanced the potential use of local materials.

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R91: Make a proper balance between imported and local material
- Ø R92: More flexibility in the nature of the non structural part of the T-Shelter allows the valorization of locally available building materials.
- Ø R93: Evaluate impact in local market by using local material (quality / Capacity)
- Ø R94: Infrastructure design or planning must be coordinated with MTPTC to be integrated with future urban planning of the city.

### 3.3.3 Environmental, impact on logistic

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L56: Prefab solutions are not adapted to remote or very narrow urban areas.
- § L57: Beneficiaries have relevant solutions. They can usefully be involved in the process if items are adapted to their capacities.

#### Best practices:

- ü B71: Option for on site production where relevant.
- ü B72: Discuss supplying solutions with beneficiaries, and adapt strategies and product to their capacities will be a plus.

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R95: Flexibility regarding prefab material or construction on site will be a plus.

- Ø R96: *Take in to consideration of communities capacities*
- Ø R97: *Stronger link between logistics & shelter teams to adapt program management to local capacities asap. Log unit also serves as advisor.*

### 3.3.4 Social, security

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L58: *It is important to help beneficiaries to feel in security where they will settle. This involves technical, social and environmental issues.*

#### Best practices:

- ü B73: *Most of RCRC adopt strategies that helped affected population to resettled according to its own choice (close to relative or friends, in a context they will be able to master)*

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R98: *Caution to be paid for focusing in increasing the security for a group of beneficiaries surrounded by affected population who did not benefit from the international aid. This may increase social tension between the two community and results in more insecurity*
- Ø R99: *Let beneficiaries choose their neighbours and it will contribute to better social security (in T-SH camps).*

### 3.3.5 Social, privacy

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L59: *When the design of the T-Shelter is flexible, PNS did not face a great challenge to adapt the building size to the number of the family.*

#### Best practices:

- ü B74: *Adapt Shelter size to the effective number of the family.*

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R100: *Design the T-Shelter as well as the implementation strategies in order to be able to implement modular solutions.*
- Ø R101: *A shelter should be divided into at least two rooms to help keeping beneficiaries privacy.*
- Ø R102: *Shelters should allow modification by the beneficiaries*

### 3.3.6 Social, sheltering

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L60: *Sheltering is not only to give a roof, but to help people to access to various service such as cooking, place to meet, water, sanitation...*

#### Best practices:

- ü B75: *Few RCRC though at "sheltering" at the beginning. These were focusing on shelter. This is the reality in the field that force them to go to the necessary improvement (veranda, toilet, access to water, electrification...).*

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R103: *Think "sheltering", no "shelter"*
- Ø R104: *Shelter is a process, not only a construction. There is different aspect to take into account for present and future*
- Ø R105: *Some shelter are considered as upgradeable, but they are not and will be harmful to beneficiary if they are upgraded.*

### 3.3.7 Social, local economy

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L61: It make sense to help local population to benefit from the Shelter, but also to benefit from the money invest to produce the Shelter. And it can also be a plus if they can latter on benefit from the amount of money they can earn by selling the Shelter (if non permanent).

#### Best practices:

- ü B76: RCRC non permanent T-shelter were made out of material that can be easily sold in the existing local market.

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R106: A bigger emphasis in using the local potential (both human and material) may help to increase project impact in the local economy, with a better repartition within the whole local community (local suppliers, local artisans, beneficiaries themselves).
- Ø R107: Facilitate population own choice.
- Ø R108: Sheltering solution should be though as a strategy to build local capacities for further building back safer implementation.
- Ø R109: Use shelter program as a livelihood opportunity. As well, the efforts will have double results

### 3.3.8 Social cohesion

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L62: Local communities do have their own organizations, politic, churches, VBO,CBO, etc.

#### Best practices:

- ü B77: Knowing local practice and involving local stakeholders in designing and implementing the project help to reduce tension

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R110: Projects to be implemented through existing locally based organization.
- Ø R111: Technical complexity of the sheltering program need to be adapted to the capacity of targeted communities (greater potential for involving it).
- Ø R112: To avoid social tensions, take the time identify the legitimate local representatives + local organisations.

### 3.3.9 Cultural, aesthetic and appropriation

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L63: Haitian are artists and love to show their skills through their houses. Most of RCRC T-shelter allow Haitian to perform in this aspect
- § L64: Haitian are use to beautify their house each December. It can be appropriate to give the paint at this time of the year.

#### Best practices:

- ü B78: The fact that beneficiaries may choose the color of the paint help in shelter appropriateness.

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R113: It will be a plus if the sheltering options given will easy integrate in the local feature.
- Ø R114: Know your community, know leaders within the community
- Ø R115: Assess cultural appropriateness + acceptability
- Ø R116: Site planning has to be compatible with local customs
- Ø R117: Liaise with local institution for shelter / house design
- Ø R118: Invest in pre-disaster planning with communities
- Ø R119: Involve owners in the whole process

- Ø R120: Inclusion, ownership, sense of responsibility, people will continue to manage when you pull out

### 3.3.10 Cultural, livelihood

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L65: Housing is not only a roof. It help inhabitant to store goods, handle livelihood activities, socialize, etc....

#### Best practices:

- ü B79: Design sheltering solution according to the various use of the house

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R121: It will be a plus to involve beneficiaries to assess the various use of the house, and to design solutions taking these assessments into account.

### 3.3.11 Cultural behaviour

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L66: In many culture, houses are designed according to local behaviors. Size, orientation, partition, openings, etc. are essential to be respected in order to help inhabitant to adopt and make the best benefit from their Sheltering solutions.

#### Best practices:

- ü B80: Involve Haitian partners (HRC) in monitoring and evaluation
- ü B81: Give a chance to beneficiaries to express their expectation and to comment the given solutions
- ü B82: Adopt an iterative approach in order to capitalize faster lessons learnt

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R122: Assess "cultural" design
- Ø R123: Flexibility of sheltering program is necessary.
- Ø R124: In touch with Religious leader might ease access to information sharing or awareness building
- Ø R125: Local knowledge/practice should be adapted but must also be evaluated to promote safer / hygiene environment/ for community improvement

### 3.3.12 Cultural, Local best practice

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L67: Societies all over the world have developed specific local building cultures, resulting in the establishment of recognizable "situated" architectures and building systems taking into account locally available resources to meet their needs, while adapting to social constraints, local climatic and natural risks.

#### Best practices:

- ü B83: Recognizing the value of locally available building best practice will impact on building back safer, resilience, and dignity of the local population.

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R126: Assess local building culture strength and weaknesses and use sheltering project to improve and promote these good practices.

### 3.3.13 Technique, recycling

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L68: When they go for improvement, some material from the T-shelter may be a source of income for beneficiaries.
- § L69: Expensive material from the T-Shelter to be selected regarding their potential to achieve permanent solution, or to be recycled for building permanent solution.
- § L70: Moving T-Shelter from a place to another should be as easy as possible

#### Best practices:

- ü B84: Select easy to recycle material (material related to the existing market)
- ü B85: Design T-Shelter as to be easy to remove without losing quality.

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R127: Think since the beginning on how T-shelter may be recycled, as a whole (e.g vertical extension), or as space part.
- Ø R128: Recycling of materials from destroyed houses is also a solution that could have been more considered (more specifically for slab backfilling, infill inside the structural framework...)

### 3.3.14 Technical, Durability / Maintenance

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L71: Maintenance and reparation will be difficult if:
  - § material used are not available in the local market
  - § technologies required are not available at the local level
  - § equipment required to achieve it are not available or affordable at the local level

#### Best practices:

- ü B86: Adapt the techniques to local existing resources, both human, material and equipment
- ü B87: Balance durability of product with local capacities to allow maintenance and sustainability of the given product

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R129: Initial assessment should include existing local capacities and availability of material in the market
- Ø R130: Supply material from the local suppliers. It will help to design shelter according to market availability. It will impact in the local economy. It may reduce delay (customs, etc...).
- Ø R131: Work closer to logistic experts when planning the shelter programming

### 3.3.15 Technique, easiness for extension

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L72: Many T-Shelter will be self improved and extended by the population.

#### Best practices:

- ü B88: Compatibility between T-Shelter techniques/material and locally available techniques/material will help for extension and improvement.
- ü B89: Be careful that extension will be done without affecting quality of the house (bracing...).

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R132: Design the T-shelter as a core house, thinking (where it is possible) at site implementation, doors creation, roof extensions.

### 3.3.16 Technique, economical impact

#### Lessons Learned:

§ L73: If some vulnerable cannot afford anything else than the gift they received, some people may have cheaper or more sustainable solutions than the one proposed by the aid agencies.

#### Best practices:

- ü B90: Adapting the sheltering solution to the particular statute of the beneficiaries will and needs
- ü B91: It will be useful to help people to have sheltering options.
  - ü Full package
  - ü Part of the package could be according to beneficiary decision (voucher? equivalent of the part of the building not provided) that will allow beneficiaries to apply their own solution.

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R133: Maximize the investment in the locality
- Ø R134: Owners driven approach
- Ø R135: Reinforce resources on social issue to handle a more owner oriented sheltering solutions.
- Ø R136: Opportunity to increase availability of better quality building materials by ordering locally

### 3.3.17 Technique, building back safer

#### Lessons Learned:

§ L74: Planned or not planned to be an output, Sheltering program will have an impact on the construction sectors

#### Best practices:

- ü B92: Understand good practice from the local(s) building culture
- ü B93: Value existing good practice through the Sheltering project implemented
- ü B94: Assess weaknesses of local building culture and introduce improvement regarding these weaknesses in the sheltering project to be implemented

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R137: Use all project as opportunities to reinforce local capacities at all level (HRC, train artisans, sensitize population, reinforce community based organisation, local and national government)
- Ø R138: Include "building back safer" as a strategy when implementing sheltering project.
- Ø R139: Include training and sensitization within sheltering activities (or latter in consolidation phase / Risk Reduction Phase).

## 4 Learning for Haiti

#### Lessons Learned:

- § L75: Be careful with what you promise to the population. It may drive your activities for the whole duration of your project
- § L76: Do not underestimate time to implement project

#### Best Practice:

- ü B95: Initial assessment should include local potential and capacities
- ü B96: VCA is a continuous process that should feed M&E activities
- ü B97: Think building back safer when designing sheltering project (URD)
- ü B98: Develop proper partnership with local partners (VBO, CBO, local authorities, etc.)
- ü B99: Design projects in an iterative way as to be able to adapt to changing environment
- ü B100: Implement project by phase
- ü B101: While designing your technical solution, imagine how beneficiaries will adopt and adapt their solutions in the future

- ü B102: Include enabling strategies while providing services
- ü B103: Involve M&E that will focus on overall objectives taking into account the evolving situation.
- ü B104: Help exchange between Field actors / Focal point / Head quarter
- ü B105: Plan research / development activities and pilot project in order to be innovative and able to better answer people needs.
- ü B106: Assess local initiative and understand their weaknesses, in order to determinate the proper support to be given.
- ü B107: PNS to develop common tools before they will be necessary.
- ü B108: Beneficiary communication is VITAL (as part of explanation of the program, reducing over expectancy, media to listen more from the people)

#### Recommendations:

- Ø R140: Develop strategies to help building capacities within the local civil society while implementing project.
- Ø R141: Involve local and national government in implemented activities, not only to solve problems.
- Ø R142: Recognise the importance of the local authorities and use project to strengthen theirs capacities.
- Ø R143: Evoke active responses from local authorities for future support of exit strategies
- Ø R144: INA should include lessons learnt from the 2 last years.
- Ø R145: For INA, vision on how the money invested will benefit to the population at the long term should benefit as much as possible to the population
- Ø R146: INA should benefit from existing experience by PNS and other organization who are doing INA for months/years (CHF, PCI, etc...)
- Ø R147: For INA, activities benefiting to the whole community (road, retention walls, sanitation) may be a starting point to work with the community.
- Ø R148: Conduct VCA in response programmes to understand the resilience of the population
- Ø R149: Although we move to INA, keep an eye on remaining IDP's conditions
- Ø R150: Link INA with Camp decongestion

- Ø R151: Capitalisation of experience should feed both researches and training activities. Training and research findings should be disseminated to the field actors under a very easy to apply manner.
- Ø R152: Research should include technical, social, environmental and cultural issues.
- Ø R153: It is important to develop loyalty of experimented staff as they capitalize a lot of experience (Strategy of internal training, position at HQ, etc.)
- Ø R154: A more global policy between Emergency, Relief and Development will help to implement more integrated approach, to a more owner driven than donors driven.
- Ø R155: PNS should prepare and have ready a context note that can support initial designs
- Ø R156: Capitalization not only within the RC movement. Let's look out of the "box". Specialized organism have more experience to share & more tools
- Ø R157: Exit strategies, lessons learnt from previous experience? Is there any plan with some PNS in Haiti? It is necessary to be ready since from the beginning.
- Ø R158: Before leaving the country or closing the shelter programs, everyone of us (PNS, IFRC) MUST have cleared any issue to avoid HRC future problems

Below are recommendations not included in the 'flight pack' but added from the perspective of shelter and protection and included in the Workshop presentation

- Ø *RP1. In major disasters the IFRC should construct refuge centres for those affected by violence.*
- Ø *RP2. Give women the opportunity to construct homes so they develop construction skills which can be used later as sources of employment and do not become dependent on men for maintaining their homes.*
- Ø *RP3. Research cheap, temporary but rapid installation solar lighting to reduce the risks of violence at night in camps*
- Ø *RP4. T-shelters should include a second door, a lock (including internally), interior lighting, exterior lighting ESPECIALLY outside and around latrines to reduce the risks of violence against women and children, particularly at night when they use toilets, and to allow families to better protect themselves from break ins in areas where the risk of this is high.*
- Ø *RP5. People with different vulnerabilities should be mixed across blocks i.e. no more 'deaf' block, 'disabled' block etc. to prevent communities becoming divided according to their vulnerability and isolated from each other.*
- Ø *RP6. In t-shelter camp sites where community violence in the area is high deaf, blind persons or the elderly should not be housed at the most vulnerable areas i.e. near the entrances/roads in camp sites, but instead in the centre of the camps.*
- Ø *RP7. Labour lists should not be the responsibility of only local staff, to prevent them being burdened with high risk of being attacked. Delegates should be present on the ground supporting them to manage these lists.*

## 8.3 Haiti Shelter Lessons Learned Workshop Outcomes

### OUTCOMES FROM HAITI SHELTER BEST PRACTICE AND LESSONS LEARNED WORKSHOP

*WORKING GROUPS - Sessions 1 and 2*

*PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI, 19 April 2012*

#### Group 1: Integrated planning and flexibility

- 1.1 Avoid getting locked into narrow solutions with donors, so use wording such as shelter solutions for x families as opposed to specifying the exact type of shelter. This builds in flexibility to include emergency, transitional and permanent solutions and to integrate other programme components. This should be discussed in advance with donors to prepare them for funding applications for future disasters.
- 1.2 Have a multi-sectorial assessment team. Recovery assessments should focus on the identification of beneficiary needs in an integrated way. Include beneficiaries in all phases of the programme and ideally categorize their needs and respond accordingly.
- 1.3 VCA should be used as the starting point to engage communities in a participatory fashion to ensure cross-sectorial coherence.

Participatory tools such as CBHFA, PHAST, and PASSA etc. can be integrated into the programme to address and complement the identified needs.

- 1.4 Target vulnerable people in the whole community not only the ones directly affected by disaster. Focus on the anticipated impact.
- 1.5 Implementation: assess and plan for an integrated programme and make multi-sectorial indicators. Implementation can be more sectorial to make it manageable, but coordination is crucial to ensure integration. Be open to partnerships.
- 1.6 To plan for change during the programme and to be flexible requires a change of mind-set. Do mid-term reviews so that the opportunity to change is planned for.
- 1.7 Have a large contingency budget to allow for adaptations during the programme.
- 1.8 Start with a pilot phase to test original ideas, and then adapt the programme based on the findings.
- 1.9 Think big but start small to allow for adaptations.
- 1.10 There should be an independent monitoring team separate from the implementation team.
- 1.11 One should monitor the impact, not just the activities.

#### Group 2: Transition and Exit Strategy

- 2.1 Plan for exit strategies before starting projects: this is required to determinate the expected situation at the end of the engagement and how local stakeholders will handle the situation on their own at the end of the programme.
- 2.2 An exit strategy requires involving local partners in project activities, particularly local populations and local government authorities in order to build the required capacities for a smooth exit.
- 2.3 Once an exit strategy is planned the program could be implemented in different phases. The first phase of responding to immediate basic needs is maybe the only phase where one can use purely quantitative outputs. At this phase sheltering solutions should be as broad as possible.
- 2.4 Develop strategies to understand and respond to more permanent solutions and plan exit strategies accordingly. This will require a strong commitment for the involvement of local communities and requires a participatory approach. This will also require one to evaluate one's own strengths and weaknesses and to be able to coordinate with other partners in order to manage areas where one has less capacity. This requires flexibility and guidance from a monitoring and evaluation process.
- 2.5 It is important to clarify the terminology that is used for shelter solutions. For example using the term Transitional Shelter could lead to false expectations among beneficiaries. It would help to clarify what we mean regarding shelter solution terminology in relation to cost, durability, function etc. of the shelter solution.

- 2.6 In order to secure funds for a more flexible approach, one needs to convince funding agencies that alternative project solutions may arise during the programme. One should document and disseminate success stories in order to lobby donors in regard to the importance of building flexibility into shelter programming.

### Group 3: Programme management, coordination and Movement Coordination

- 3.1 Have a firewall between implementation and movement coordination and implementation and the cluster role.
- 3.2 The provinces needed more Movement Coordination capacity. Movement Coordination needs to be present wherever operations take place.
- 3.3 Movement coordination requires sufficient capacity to provide mapping, land tenure, technical guidelines, etc. Movement Coordination services should include both a strategic function and a technical function.
- 3.4 Technical movement coordination is required from the beginning of an emergency when early programme decisions are already taking place.
- 3.5 Movement Coordination can include direct support to PNS implementation, for example the French Red Cross partnership

with the IFRC (the direct financing of a PNS from multilateral funds).

- 3.6 Consider having a blog or other social media for improved communications between the IFRC Movement Coordination and PNS.
- 3.7 Shelter coordination needs to also coordinate with other sectors to support integrated planning.

#### Group 4: Learning from Haiti: the emergency phase and Contingency Planning

- 4.1 For an effective initial response it is important to have well trained volunteers in advance.
- 4.2 One should have specific training at all levels for emergency shelter and NFI distribution using the standard methodology used by the Relief ERU.  
Reinforce training by integrating Civil Protection into the training (so that DPC knows and understands RC/RC tools, methods, materials etc.).
- 4.3 Train teachers to educate children to understand risk and risk reduction. Develop a family contingency plan at a national level which would be followed by all organizations in the country.
- 4.4 Capture the experiences of different PNS in regard to managing land tenure issues and approaches to beneficiary selection. Record all legal issues that occurred during the programme. Use this information for advocacy to the authorities for a national

emergency law. Do this based on the IDRL experience of IFRC Geneva.

- 4.5 HRC should define standard shelter design options in advance (emergency, transitional etc.) in association with universities, enterprises and government bodies.

#### Group 5: Beneficiary feedback and monitoring

- 5.1 Before any project starts, develop a beneficiary communication plan: where can people find information and how is the information provided to the community? What are the communication networks to be used, such as churches, schools, radio, SMS etc.?
- 5.2 Projects should be divided into different stages to allow space for learning: mid-term evaluations should be done to allow for adaptation of the response. Pilot projects should be followed by an evaluation in which beneficiaries participate to allow for learning and adaptation.
- 5.3 We need indicators which represent the quality, use and process of the project instead indicators that are limited to the number of outputs or activities. Quality, use and process can be measured based on beneficiary satisfaction surveys. Measure the socio-economic impact of the project.

OUTCOMES FROM HAITI SHELTER BEST PRACTICE AND LESSONS  
LEARNED WORKSHOP

WORKING GROUPS - Sessions 3

PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI, 20 April 2012

Group 1: Quantitative, Qualitative results; implementation strategies

Quantitative

- 1.1 The Montreal process was good; the right decision makers were on board. Making the decision to agree on a national target was a good idea. Permanent reconstruction needs should be integrated in the target.
- 1.2 Start with the implementation of a small amount of shelter solutions, (target only 20 % of the expected 30 000 solution) and adapt them later according the local context.
- 1.3 Our response was more based on the needs we understood. Our response was more supply driven than owner driven. What about education and livelihood? These were major needs (mentioned by the beneficiaries), but not FIRC priorities.
- 1.4 Focus also on soft component in the programme (like hygiene promotion and Watsan). Include house maintenance, risk reduction, etc... The response should be a package.
- 1.5 Role of federation in the development and dissemination of implementation guidelines. More comprehensive strategy globally.

- 1.6 Improve the quality of indicators and monitoring tools. Log frame has to include qualitative indicators.
- 1.7 Look after equity. Better communication towards beneficiaries (selection, models, reasons for differences, etc...)
- 1.8 Better understanding of the local context, for example how did people construct before the crisis. Design the project (strategies and product) in such a way that this is taken into account.
- 1.9 Adapt our resources mobilization strategies to the specificities of donors. (first phases ECHO; quantitative and inflexible)

Group 2: Shelters Options

- 2.1 What would be the menu (or shelter solution) in case of a new disaster in Haiti? Hurricane / earthquake safe; what does it means
- 2.2 List of options regarding context

Potential solutions and areas of implementation	
Return to province assistance	Urban
Enhanced emergency shelter	Urban
Emergency shelter	Rural / urban
T Shelter	Rural

Progressive / Core house	Rural
Repairs	Urban
Permanent	Rural
Rental assistance / Livelihoods	Urban
Host families assistances	Urban
Cash vouchers / training in construction	Urban
Materials / Training	Urban
Livelihoods	Urban
Technical assistance in construction	Rural / Urban
Partial construction / Training	Rural
INA	Urban

2.3 Solutions in which we support self-builders through advise and technical support

2.4 Look for solutions with more beneficiary involvement. Part of the house can be provide by us, part can be done by the beneficiaries themselves (e.g. walling, flooring, finishing,...) Give options to

people to be part of the construction process, to contribute to the work (their own materials / solutions) or support them accordingly with vouchers or other solutions.

- 2.5 Home-owner driven approach could work as well in the urban areas. It will support building community resilience. This needs a change of mind-set in HQ. Involving beneficiaries requires more time for implementation. Process versus product.
- 2.6 Reword T-shelter where we know that the solution (might) become permanent. Call it a progressive shelter so donors expect and there is flexibility possible in the programme. In urban areas, we cannot speak about T-Shelter, Better to talk about progressive solutions.
- 2.7 Transitional camp /settlement should be the last option. If we do, we should also look after services (street lightening, infrastructure)
- 2.8 Property agreement. Handover strategies. With Who? Standard liable document for handing over.
- 2.9 Need to have time to assess solution.
- 2.10 HRC should set minimum / core standards and requirements for transitional / progressive shelter based on lessons learned from PNS programmes. Include extra options which can be integrated depending on the available budget. This allows flexibility in shelter options.

### Group 3: Lessons for Haiti

- 3.1 It is important to have good coordination between IFRC / PNS / HRC
- 3.2 Need for well-trained technical team that is able to train community members in order to be well prepared in case of an emergency.
- 3.3 Take into account local context and local culture. Develop standards which take into account traditional construction techniques. It is important to use PASSA on the preparation phase.
- 3.4 PNS trained many people. We should develop a database of people trained and classify them in specific regions. We can call this trained people. Refreshing course could be required in the field. 3.5 There is need for a clear HRC policy in terms of emergency, in accordance with IFRC plan of action.

**Group 4: Lesson from Haiti**

Shelter is a process, not a final product “need to be understood at all stakeholders’ level”.

- 4.1 Think ahead how will look like the permanent solutions and how can your activities be a step in this direction
- 4.2 Need to have the courage to use many different sheltering methods. To be combine in appropriate packages (shelter + livelihoods /cash / or other sector activities). Shelter solutions, no shelter products
- 4.3 Despite this, consider the advantage and disadvantage of standardization (ex: cost and speed of implementation)

- 4.4 Capitalize on “by products “ of implementation such as
  - ü the capacity building of workers.
  - ü the training provided
- 4.5 Extend the impact by considering boarder subject training, giving concrete support at tend of project such as tool boxes or certificated linked to recognised institutional bodies
- 4.6 Facilitate the transfer of knowledge gained towards more marketable skills (permanent construction method / Wood working / Furniture, etc.)
- 4.7 Don’t constraint yourself by reaching for legally recognised standard (Land issue). Come with approach that can minimize risk and maximise participation.

Haiti Shelter Lessons Learned and Best Practice Workshop

*What are your recommendations to implement these lessons learned?  
What will we do to apply these lessons?*

*PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI, 20 April 2012*

Haitian Red Cross

- Regroup the IFRC, HRC, and PNS around the housing theme

- Develop Haitian RC methodology and training (training for people who will intervene after emergencies and who will implement the solutions)
- Remain lessons learned in the HRC
- Create a central team that should help the regional committees to standardize different models
- Create a technical team which has a specify in emergency shelter and habitat
- Identify those who will be trained and train trainers in their specific committees.
- Identify necessary budget to reach the goal and that is in line with the objectives
- Create an assessment that includes all actors (not sectorial)
- Have a turnover of personal (rotation of human resources) to prevent certain habits and in order to have better transparency

- Separate recovery team which is responsible for community mobilization. (Separate from sectors)
- Challenge the IFRC to give the tools and to ensure we are talking about the same thing
- DRR in sheltering. Use that type of people in different positions.
- Have a briefing session in the beginning of every session
- Deliver adequate reports so we have adequate tools and we can work in an adequate manner
- Reinforce dialogue with donors so they have a more open approach (not sectorial)
- People in the field should know that there is a huge variety of options to respond (training should show that) – alternatives are there.
- Learn from other national societies and haitian RC - share information

#### PNS

- Retain staff so the knowledge is used; we lose institutional knowledge after the disaster
- Keep people interested by giving them training and work opportunities
- Keep in touch so you don't lose knowledge
- Change mindset in HQ, create new profile at HQ (project mgmt). He is responsible to manage all the field managers.
- Have integrated indicators for experts so they can report
- Advocate to donors that we move from sectorial approaches

#### IFRC

- Use very standard tool – urban response plan
- Prioritize issues
- Different movement coordination bodies will sign off on this on how we will implement recommendation
- Contextualize lessons learned
- Stress the importance of beneficiary communications
- Develop common tools so we have a common understanding of ...
- Insure in the future that there is a proper handover / transition between of leadership and people in the field
- Have a shelter reference group to capture global lessons learned

- Work with relevant stakeholders (logistics,...) other sectors are included
- Use this learning conference in other conferences to discuss bigger issues

## 8.4 Key informants

### American Red Cross

Bonhomme Bedlais, Handicap International  
Jean Hardy Leconte, Transitional Shelter Monitoring Officer, ARC  
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### British Red Cross

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Melvin Tebbutt, Head of Delegation

### Canadian Red Cross

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Solon Gethro, Community Mobilizer  
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Sophie Riviere Legallic, co-desk  
Luce Peret, Livelihoods delegate

### German Red Cross

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### Haitian Red Cross Society

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Ing. Roland Palme, Secretary General  
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Garibaldy Santiago, Team Leader, Disasters project  
Patrizia Coppola, Human Resources Director, embedded

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James Bellamy, Emergency Shelter and Settlements Coordinator  
Hugh Brennan, Senior Construction Coordinator  
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Sandra Durzo, Shelter department, Geneva  
Pieter de Rijke, Surge Capacity senior officer, ERU, Geneva

Carmen Ferrer, Shelter advisor, Panama Zone  
Marcel Fortier, former Country Representative, Haiti  
Xavier Genot, Movement Coordinator Shelter, Haiti  
Juliet Kerr, Violence Prevention Delegate, Haiti  
Federica Lisa, Community Development Delegate  
Camilia Marinescu, Acting Head sub-delegation, Leogane  
Ascension Martinez, Senior Community Coordinator  
Stephen McAndrew, former Head of Operations, Haiti  
Munumuri Musori, PMER Coordinator  
Henrik Ortved, Logistics Coordinator for Haiti  
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Latifur Rahman, Movement Coordinator Disaster Risk  
Management  
Graham Saunders, Head Shelter department, Geneva  
Margaret Stansberry, Technical Movement Coordinator,  
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Lorenzo Violante, Head, Haiti Support Team, Panama  
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Becky Webb, Communications Coordinator, Haiti

#### Italian Red Cross

Antonella Feola, Project Manager Solferino Village, Haiti

#### Netherlands Red Cross

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#### Norwegian Red Cross

Shir Shah Ayobi, Project Manager, Haiti  
Andreas Bold, former Project Manager, Haiti

Felix Muhigana, Country Representative, Haiti  
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#### Swiss development Cooperation

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#### United Nations

Magie Stephenson, UN Habitat

## 8.5 Reference Documents

©= confidential/internal

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21.11.2010

*Original documents and presentations from the Technical Delegates Workshop, the Haiti Shelter Best Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop and the Haiti Learning Conference are available from the Movement Cooperation Unit in Port au Prince, Haiti. E Mail requests to:*

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## 8.6 Criteria for Sheltering Design

<b>CRITERIA FOR SHELTERING DESIGN</b>	
<b>Environmental</b>	<b>Hazard</b>
	<b>Climate</b>
	<b>Local and global impact</b>
	<b>Access / Logistic</b>
<b>Social</b>	<b>Security (including surrounding areas)</b>
	<b>Privacy</b>
	<b>Services (sheltering)</b>
	<b>Local economy</b>
	<b>Community cohesion</b>
<b>Cultural</b>	<b>Aesthetic and appropriation</b>
	<b>Livelihood</b>

	<b>Behavior</b>
	<b>Local best practices</b>
<b>Technical / economical</b>	<b>Recycling</b>
	<b>Durability and maintenance</b>
	<b>Easiness for extension</b>
	<b>Economical impact</b>
	<b>Building Back Safer</b>

## 8.7 Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference (TOR)	
"First 24 months Federation Shelter Programme Options in Haiti, Lessons learned and best practices capitalization process"	
1	<p><b>Summary</b></p> <p>The IFRC's Earthquake Recovery Operation in Haiti is seeking two consultants, specialised in shelter and watsan programming and Red Cross Red Crescent movement coordination and implementation mechanisms from emergency to recovery. The consultants will analyse, review and report on shelter programme options – best practices and lessons learned of the first 24 months of implementation and coordination of Federation shelter programme in Haiti.</p>
2	<p><b>Context</b></p> <p>In response to the 12 January 2012 earthquake, to support Haitian Red Cross and affected population, Red Cross Red Crescent triggered one of its larger operations in a single country. It has been the first time that the Federation is confronted with an urban context of such a scale and density of one city as Port-au Prince, requiring adaption of its tools and ways of working.</p> <p>Following the 2005 Red Cross shelter mandate, Haiti shelter cluster has been the most important deployment of the 18 IFRC leads coordination team deployed to date. IFRC has adapted its coordination and operational support to the scale of this disaster response and scope of shelter programming.</p>

	<p>Strategies and shelter options have required constant flexibility in the approach, to cope with enormous contextual challenges, due to specificities of Haitian context as land mapping and tenure, logistic supplies, weakened local authorities, lack of standards as building codes, construction chain quality control, complexity of environment setting, endemic poverty, impact of additional crisis and security context.</p> <p>To allow the shelter programme implementation, various activities have been developed and integrated as part of shelter programming, such as Federation community mobilization assessment and response tool adaptation as VCA or PASSA, site planning and risk mitigation, water and sanitation, livelihood support, vocational training and community technical capacity reinforcement, rubble removal and recycling, to highlight few of them.</p> <p>In support to the Haitian Red Cross, Federation shelter programme coordination and implementation has mobilized massive funding and required vast technical support, both in country and at global shelter community level. Federation wide reporting estimate that around 30% of the total funds has been and will be spent under the shelter sector, 158,8 million CHF till September and around 190 CHF till 2014.</p>
3	<p><b>Background</b></p> <p>The Federation has contributed significantly to rebuilding Haiti through a range of recovery programme sectors, such as shelter, watsan, relief, health and livelihoods in partnership with Haitian Red Cross (HRC) and partner national societies (PNS) active in Haiti.</p>

	<p>2 years after the earthquake, more than 27,000 families received safe and improved shelter support from Red Cross Red Crescent. To achieve this, the membership has implemented a wide range of shelter options comprising emergency shelter distribution, emergency shelter replacement, emergency shelter reinforcement, transitional shelter, progressive shelter, upgraded transitional shelter, host family and communities support, resettlement projects through accommodation support and more recently permanent housing construction and housing repair.</p> <p>The Shelter Technical Committee and membership has agreed on the need to look back on how the shelter programme and options has been implemented; which lessons learned and best practices must be capitalized from it, to inform futures responses both at Haiti and at the global level.</p>	<p><i>Objective 03. To review the internal and external coordination, planning and implementation mechanisms of Red Cross Red Crescent Shelter Programme in Haiti in order to develop a range of recommendations to membership management and technical departments, for future shelter Red Cross Red Crescent response in natural disaster, especially in urban settings.</i></p> <p>The overall objective of this process is to propose an analysis on the different components of the Red Cross shelter programme implemented in Haiti on response to 12 January earthquake. It aims to support Haitian Red Cross, IFRC and national societies to identify key lessons learned and best practices for shelter options and strategies to be targeted for response to eventual new disasters in Haiti, and at global level for major future disasters in urban settings, to optimize predictability, contingency planning, future response mechanisms and shelter support delivered to affected population.</p> <p>It is anticipated that the capitalisation process will provide insight into the extent to which the project has successfully met the following criteria:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• adherence to Fundamental Principles and Code of Conduct,</li> <li>• relevance and appropriateness</li> <li>• efficiency</li> <li>• effectiveness</li> <li>• coverage</li> <li>• impact</li> <li>• coherence</li> <li>• sustainability and connectedness</li> </ul>
4	<p><b>Objectives</b></p> <p>The purpose of the evaluation is to identify key lessons learned and best practices from the first 24 months of Federation Shelter Programme in response to 12 January 2010 earthquake, to inform the 3 objectives defined and agreed by membership at country and global level. These objectives are:</p> <p><i>Objective 01. To analyse the various options undertaken till date, in order to develop a range of recommendations for eventual disaster in Haiti, to reinforce predictability of Haitian Red Cross and membership shelter response.</i></p> <p><i>Objective 02. To record key lessons learned and recommendation for Haiti Operation, to feed Red Cross Red Crescent global shelter programming and preparedness in response to large scale disaster in urban settings.</i></p>	

5	<p><b>Research Questions</b></p> <p><i>Objective 01: To analyse the various options undertaken till date, in order to develop a range of recommendations for eventual disaster in Haiti, to reinforce predictability of Haitian Red Cross and membership shelter response</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How Red Cross planned, included and monitor options in its shelter programming in response to Haiti earthquake context, from emergency to early recovery?</li> <li>• Which key lessons learned from first 24 months of the operation, have to be considered to enhance future shelter response to such kind of natural disaster scale in Haiti?</li> <li>• Which key lessons learned from past and actual shelter programming within Earthquake Operation must be considered to enhance Red Cross Red Crescent Integrated Neighbourhood Approach in Haiti?</li> <li>• What made shelter programming in Port au Prince urban area different from the provinces?</li> <li>• Which challenges have to be considered to implement shelter programming in Haiti? Which strategies have been developed to cope with it, especially regarding rubble management, lack of construction materials in the local market, transport and land access/ tenure?</li> <li>• How shelter programming has impacted the local economic environment?</li> <li>• Which was the value added of each option proposed? Which ones can be considered cost effective?</li> <li>• How procurement and logistic pipeline defined a part of the response?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were assessment and response integrated?</li> <li>• On which factors were defined beneficiary selection and geographical location of intervention?</li> <li>• Which lessons to take from the emergency shelter items in Haiti (shelter kits, covering kits etc.)?</li> <li>• Which lessons to take and best practices to capitalise from the variety of transitional shelters models implemented in Haiti?</li> <li>• What would be the key specificities to include in eventual transitional shelter programming in Haiti?</li> <li>• How were households and communities integrated in shelter programming definition and evolution? How did they take ownership of various options implemented and how did they transform and extend shelter provided to them?</li> <li>• Are all implemented options relevant and which others else could have been considered?</li> <li>• How has transitional shelter programming include specific individual, community, cultural and environmental needs?</li> <li>• How transitional shelter were accepted and adapted by beneficiaries?</li> <li>• How transitional shelter programming evolved to its context?</li> <li>• Which lessons to take from cash use as one of the tool of shelter options implementation?</li> <li>• How resettlement grant worked out and supported camp decongestion?</li> <li>• How grant in complement of transitional shelter, helped families to adapt it to their specific needs?</li> <li>• How livelihoods enhance shelter response?</li> </ul>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How shelter programme reinforce knowledge transfer and technical capacities of communities?</li> <li>• What would be the agreed early recovery shelter solutions and approaches to be implemented, if relevant in response to future new disaster?</li> <li>• How Sphere standards have been taken in consideration and what were the limitations of post-earthquake Haitian context on this regard?</li> </ul> <p><i>Objective 02: To record key lessons learned and recommendation from Haiti Operation, to feed Red Cross Red Crescent global shelter programming and preparedness in response to large scale disaster in urban settings</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Which key factors specific to urban setting component of the disaster have to be looked at to insure relevant shelter strategies, from emergency to early recovery?</li> <li>• Which key elements to include in shelter programming to integrate cooking, watsan, health or energy components? How must they be integrated in shelter response?</li> <li>• How Shelter programming has to integrate cross cutting issues as protection, violence prevention, gender, age or disability as considered in Sphere manual?</li> <li>• How Red Cross had monitored its national societies various shelter projects to have broader impact on adaptation and flexibility of Federation programming?</li> <li>• How land access (availability, tenure, legal framework...) and other key challenges as rubble management and vacuum of in country policies have impacted shelter programming and which strategy has to be developed?</li> </ul>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Which key skills and expertise must the Federation reinforce and/or partnerships develop in order to be more performing from the onset of response?</li> </ul> <p><i>Objective 03: To analyse the coordination, planning and implementation mechanisms of Red Cross Shelter Programme in Haiti in order to develop a range of recommendations for future shelter Red Cross responses in natural disaster, especially in an urban settings.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What lesson learned to take from coordination and interaction with IASC Shelter Cluster lead by IFRC coordination team?</li> <li>• How Federation capacity building due to shelter mandate taken in 2005 has enhanced its response to Haiti earthquake?</li> <li>• How Federation coordination mechanisms have helped to improve its programming and response?</li> <li>• Which skills and coordination mechanisms must be timely ensured, to enhance shelter response in challenging urban settings major disaster?</li> <li>• How Federation secretariat and national societies structuring at national, regional, zone and global level, had facilitate shelter response preparedness, predictability, implementation and monitoring?</li> <li>• Which resources, skills, mechanisms and capacities must be reinforced to adapt Federation shelter programme to large scale disaster such as Haiti earthquake?</li> <li>• What lessons learned to take from roles and responsibilities undertaken from the emergency to</li> </ul>
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	recovery phase?
5	<p><b>Outcome</b> Consultants will propose methodology and conduct appropriate research and analysis to identify key findings and recommendations with Red Cross shelter technical committee in Haiti, to be proposed for acknowledgement and endorsement by concerned Federation members involved in shelter programming and response, during Red Cross Shelter lessons learned workshop in Haiti from 18 to 20 April 2012.</p> <p>The consultant will be expected to (not limited activities):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collect and conduct desk analysis and review/evaluation of existing documentation and available membership shelter programme evaluations</li> <li>• Identify external additional evaluation on specific technical subjects' part of analysis scope</li> <li>• Implemented shelter options field visits</li> <li>• Stakeholder interviews</li> <li>• Haiti Red Cross lessons learned workshop</li> <li>• Prepare a report on lessons learned and best practices with the backbone key findings to feed "Lessons learned and best practices workshop" on April 18-20</li> </ul> <p>A report will be submitted by the latest on April 15, after the completion of the review and before the start of the workshop, to the IFRC Shelter Movement Coordinator – Xavier Genot. The report will highlight key findings about lessons learned, conclusions and recommendations to be considered in future shelter programming in Haiti and at global level in order to enhance practices and quality of shelter support provided to natural disaster affected population.</p>

	<p>The report will include (not limited):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analyse of all shelter programme and options with identification of key lessons learned and best practices</li> <li>• Case studies representing the experiences of a diverse selection of beneficiaries</li> <li>• Recommendations that must inform the 3 objectives of the process</li> <li>• Recommendations to be considered for the Integrated Neighbourhood Approach in Haiti</li> </ul>
7	<p><b>Timing</b> The consultancy will be held between March 15 and June 2011. Work for consultancy is not more than 30 working days, of which at least 25 spent in Haiti and including report submission. The consultant may conclude report preparation in her/his home country</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• March, 15 – April, 15: Collect and conduct desk analysis and review of existing documentation and available membership shelter programme evaluations.</li> <li>• April, 15: Preliminary findings due to IFRC</li> <li>• April, 18-20: Presentation of key findings during the Lessons Learned Workshop</li> <li>• May, 10: IFRC comments due to consultant</li> <li>• May, 20: Final reports: internal and public version due to IFRC</li> </ul>
8	<p><b>Audience</b> The capitalisation process is primarily intended for the Federation membership in Haiti and at global level in order to enhance shelter programming quality and efficiency in response to future disaster, especially in urban settings.</p>

	<p>It is envisaged that the workshop and final report will highlight key lessons learned, and that these will be presented as recommendations to be considered in future shelter programming in Haiti and at global level in order to enhance practices and quality of shelter support provided to natural disaster affected population. The report is also expected to be of interest to the Haitian Red Cross, to Federation shelter programmers and senior managers both in and outside of Haiti.</p> <p>The evaluation report will be not been made public in this full version outside of Federation membership but tailored products will be to inform shelter humanitarian global community via the IFRC website and other appropriate information sharing sites, such as ALNAP.</p>
9	<p>Commissioners</p> <p>The IFRC Technical Movement Coordination unit in Haiti is the commissioner and funder of this evaluation.</p>

## 8.8 Executive Summary of the Haiti Shelter Programme Review: a review of the IFRC Secretariat recovery shelter programme in Haiti 2010-2011

This review was commissioned by the Shelter Unit of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Secretariat to report on progress in its shelter early recovery programme two years into the operation and to identify challenges and successes that can be used to inform the next stages of the Haiti operation as well as inform IFRC shelter programmes globally. The review is limited to the shelter early recovery operation directly implemented by the IFRC Secretariat and is not a review of the Federation-wide shelter operation in Haiti.

There was a critical need to find shelter solutions following the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, with an estimated one and a half million people displaced and an estimated 250,000 houses damaged or destroyed. The majority of the affected population was living in formal and informal camps for the internally displaced, mostly in the national capital of Port au Prince. The emergency shelters in the camps were either tents or basic structures made from tarpaulins or plastic and were not appropriate for the longer term and would provide only limited protection from rain and flooding as well as being exposed to the threat of seasonal hurricanes.

The IFRC responded quickly to the disaster with emergency and recovery assessment teams, emergency response units for relief,

mass sanitation, water and sanitation, logistics, telecommunications, basic health care and base camps. Over sixty Red Cross Red Crescent national societies sent emergency response personnel to support the relief operation while the collective membership of the IFRC raised over one billion Swiss francs for Haiti.

The IFRC in Port au Prince established a shelter unit to manage the shelter response in the recovery phase of the shelter programme and set up a movement coordination function to work with participating national societies involved in shelter recovery.

The IFRC shelter unit constructed wood-framed transitional shelters for over seven hundred families in two large camps for the internally displaced and, as a major part of the shelter response, provided over three thousand transitional shelter kits for the French, Norwegian and Canadian Red Cross recovery shelter programmes. The shelter unit introduced alternative shelter solutions as part of a camp decongestion programme providing rental solutions in Port au Prince and in the outlying provinces as well as constructing individual transitional shelters. Household and livelihoods grants were linked to the shelter solutions and a vocational training programme was also established.

This evaluation began in December 2010 and concluded in February 2012. The evaluation started with a review of documents, including strategic, operational and technical papers and followed with site visits to internally displaced camps, individual transitional shelter plots, areas where participating national societies were constructing transitional shelters, areas planned for future programming and a visit to the main IFRC construction warehouse in Port au Prince. Over

thirty interviews were held with the Haitian Red Cross Society (HRCS), IFRC management and technical staff from the Haiti country office, the zone office in Panama and the secretariat headquarters in Geneva, and with partner Red Cross societies in the shelter recovery programme. One hundred and eighty beneficiaries and local staff were involved in a participatory project review to gain insight into beneficiary attitudes regarding the quality of the shelter recovery programme.

The evaluation came to a number of conclusions, as follows:

The IFRC took on the exceptional challenge of providing early recovery solutions in the shelter sector with courage, imagination and flexibility. The operational context in Haiti is not for the faint-hearted, presenting risks in nearly all programme areas. Through the maze of programme options the IFRC undertook its own multilateral programming with confidence and a flexibility that allowed for continual adaptations as the programme progressed.

The development of a shelter recovery strategy has been somewhat iterative over the last two years and made complex in regard to sustainability with no clear government direction on permanent housing solutions. The original concept of basic short-term transitional shelter developed over time as it became increasingly clear that there were no plans beyond a transitional shelter solution that would lead to something more durable, thus the original designs for transitional shelters were upgraded over the course of the programme. Programme options for the repair of partially damaged houses and the reconstruction of destroyed houses were complicated by the presence of rubble, difficulties in regard to land ownership and the absence of construction guidelines and urban planning

regulations. A critical development of the shelter programme was the introduction of rental solutions as camps for the internally displaced were closed. The IFRC took a lead role in finding rental solutions for displaced families.

The key recommendations in regard to the current programme are to review the future of the camp populations living in transitional shelters in La Piste and Annexe de la Marie and to consider permanent shelter solutions for these beneficiaries or a maintenance programme to extend the lifetime of the transitional shelters and to review the impact of the rental programme and make adjustments as required. The vocational training programme needs to be more closely aligned to employment outcomes.

In regard to future shelter programming it is recommended to be clearer regarding the need for an overall strategy for shelter, especially if not working in permanent shelter and to have a clear record of decision making in this regard, while leaving space for adaptation and flexibility throughout the programme that should be informed through a continuous monitoring process. Emergency shelter is part of a shelter strategy and needs to be included in the conceptual framework of the initial emergency response. The concept of sheltering needs to be understood in its broadest context and assessment and programming efforts need to take into account aspects such as cooking and nutrition, power and lighting, health and protection and water and sanitation. The organizational structure needs to support this more integrated approach to shelter. While shelter targets are usually based on early assessments and budget allocations, there needs to be a clearer strategic understanding of beneficiary needs and operational capacity based on field assessments, which should be reviewed throughout the duration of

the programme. Time should be spent on reviewing how support services such as human resources, finance and procurement can be better aligned to support large-scale shelter operations.

Future shelter programmes can benefit from some of the best practices identified in the Haiti early recovery shelter programme, including the provision of household and livelihoods grants which allowed shelter beneficiaries to make personal adaptations and improvements to their shelters. The creative partnerships between the IFRC and PNS partners in the Haiti operation maximized the capacity of the International Federation to provide shelter solutions to beneficiaries and provided useful models for future consideration. The Haiti shelter rental programme provided an interesting approach to shelter solutions and should be fully documented for future learning as should the approach to post-earthquake rubble management and the conversion of rubble into building materials. The approaches to beneficiary communications in the Haiti shelter programme provided a number of unique experiences that significantly contributed to the success of the shelter programme: these approaches to beneficiary communications need to be well documented for future learning.

Below are summaries of the recommendations in the sectors covered by this review.

#### Document management:

There were a wide and interesting number of reports and documents produced throughout the life of the programme, especially in regard to shelter options. While new shelter ideas were progressively integrated into the operation reporting, it was less easy to find reasons for planned activities being dropped out of the programme

and not always easy to find the reasoning and rationale behind some key strategic decisions. It is important to maintain good documentation and reasoning as an operational strategy develops over time and explain why new shelter approaches are undertaken or previously planned shelter approaches are dropped.

#### Integrated Planning

The construction of thousands of transitional shelters was a considerable undertaking, requiring up to fifty construction teams and a major logistics effort. The attention paid to the operational demands of constructing such a large number of shelters may have reduced the required attention to broader sheltering issues, such as power and electricity, health and protection, cooking and nutrition and access to water. A more integrated approach to conducting initial assessments and a more structured approach to monitoring and beneficiary feed-back could have identified issues earlier in the programme, though the provision of household and livelihoods grants linked to transitional shelters mitigated some oversights as beneficiaries were empowered to adapt their shelters and solve sheltering problems not covered by the IFRC Secretariat programme.

#### Organisational Structure

The separation of shelter programme implementation and Movement coordination for shelter was an important organizational decision, consistent with the post-Indian Ocean Tsunami policy. Efficiency and quality gains could have been achieved if water and sanitation had been folded into the Shelter Unit, as was demonstrated by having the livelihoods and alternative shelter solutions teams working inside the unit. Such a large and complex operation needed a more sophisticated information management system, though the

beneficiary mapping function in the Shelter Unit was to be commended.

The scale of the shelter programme put pressure on support functions, such as human resources, finance and procurement, where procedures were not always appropriate to the scale of the operation, leading to employment short-cuts that left daily labour uninsured against accident or injury. Authorization levels and support service capacity need to be reviewed in major operations such as the Haiti earthquake response.

#### Innovation and flexibility

The shelter programme benefitted considerably from the flexible approaches demonstrated over the life of the shelter programme that led to a large number of adaptations in regard to the transitional shelter design; led to the critical introduction of the household and livelihoods grants and provided a creative management environment that allowed for the development of the rental support programme. Providing opportunities for beneficiaries to adapt their shelter through the provision of household or livelihoods grants is to be encouraged and regular monitoring of household behavior should provide insights into sheltering solutions that may have been overlooked in initial assessments.

#### PNS Partnerships and services

IFRC Secretariat partnerships with PNS were effective in regard to using capacities where they were best placed and innovative in regard to the types of partnership relationships. All partner PNS were satisfied with the services and support provided by the IFRC Shelter Unit and commented on the positive problem-solving attitude taken by the Shelter Unit. PNS capacity should always be considered when assessing a multilateral operational response and creative

partnerships should be encouraged. There were outstanding shelter needs in areas where PNS were operational after initial shelter targets had been reached which should be assessed and responded to as part of an agreed strategic plan with PNS partners.

#### The Transitional Shelter project

The construction of transitional shelters formed the backbone of the shelter programme and was only supplemented by rental solutions in mid-2011. Sanitation solutions were occasionally only provided some time after the transitional shelter was constructed and access to water was not adequately assessed during the programme. Adaptations to the shelters and retrofitting took place during the life of the programme as it became increasingly evident that it was unlikely that permanent shelters were to be provided in the longer term. Water and sanitation solutions should be implemented at the same time as shelter construction and the potential for retro-fitting be planned for as monitoring results and shelter strategies develop over time.

#### Camp design

The transitional shelter programme in La Piste and Annex de la Marie were brave undertakings and provided shelter solutions for over seven hundred families, though exit strategies will need to be negotiated with the public authorities in regard to the future of these camps. Everyone involved in the project agreed that in retrospect the building site at Annexe de la Marie should have been better prepared before shelter construction started, especially in regard to the issue of flooding. Camp and individual house lighting could have been provided at an earlier stage and more attention should have been paid to the need for protection in the camps.

### The Future of La Piste and Annexe de la Marie camps

The intentions of the government and local authorities regarding the future of the camps at La Piste and Annexe de la Marie remain unclear, placing the future of these camps in doubt. As the transitional shelters and latrines in these camps will deteriorate over the coming years, decisions are required as to the real or perceived obligations of the IFRC to either maintain the transitional shelters or find permanent shelter solutions for these camp populations. Negotiations need to be opened with the public authorities and programme decisions need to be taken in regard to the future of these camp populations.

### Sustainability

The current shelter programmes are unsustainable in their current form, though there were no indications that sustainable solutions were ever considered in the Haiti shelter recovery programme. As mentioned above, solutions are required for the two transitional shelter camps that should also include other transitional shelter beneficiaries. The provisional finding from the rental programme indicates that receiving one year's rental support does not necessarily lead to families finding solutions for the future, once the rental support expires. Further research is required in regard to the rental programme to identify possible types of intervention that could improve resilience and sustainability.

### Livelihoods and vocational training

The livelihoods grant is an unconditional grant that was used for livelihoods investments as well as used for a wide number of other basic needs. While this may have relieved immediate financial problems, it is yet to be demonstrated whether the grant has

generated sufficient income to get families out of their previous levels of poverty. The results from the participatory project review should be followed up to gain more insight in regard to the future of families receiving the livelihoods grant. Research needs to be undertaken to assess whether the provision of vocational training has helped beneficiaries to use newly found skills to find employment. There is a need for the vocational training programme to be better linked to employment solutions, thus potentially increasing the likelihood of durable solutions for the future.

### Decongestion

If the overriding purpose of the decongestion programme is to clear IDP camps, it must be considered as a success. However it is important to further review the rental support programme to understand the impact the programme has on a family's future resilience and if further adaptations to the programme are required to have a longer-lasting impact.

### Rubble

The current pilot project has provided considerable learning about the potential use of rubble as an opportunity to produce construction material, but will require a clearer business plan for the future in regard to the potential support for the INA programme or permanent shelter solutions. Such a business plan could look at the potential for partnerships with NGOs in need of construction materials and partnerships with the private sector.

### Water and Sanitation

Sanitation solutions were provided alongside all transitional shelters and sanitation facilities were assessed for the rental programme in

Port au Prince. Assumptions were made regarding beneficiary access to water in both the T Shelter and rental programmes that were not borne out by the feedback from the participatory beneficiary review. More could have been done to assess and monitor access to water and technical solutions could have been explored and implemented. Access to water should always be assessed and monitored in shelter programmes and considered in regard to both health and protection as additional to the basic need for cooking and hygiene.

#### Beneficiary communications

There is much to learn from the beneficiary communications projects in Haiti and how various tools and products were used to support the shelter programme. To build on some excellent work in beneficiary communications one could anticipate how this could be developed for the INA approach and be formalized to provide a mechanism for beneficiary complaints. The approaches, tools and products used in the Haiti earthquake response should be recorded and made accessible for future programmes in order that some 'best practice' is not lost, and such approaches could be considered as the base for a beneficiary complaints system.

#### Participatory Project Review

The participatory project review provided considerable insight to beneficiary attitudes to the transitional shelter and rental programmes which were overall very positive. The project review demonstrated the importance of continuous programme monitoring but also indicated the importance of finding durable solutions for the future. There were considerable expectations on the future support from the IFRC/Haitian Red Cross that are not part of current plans or budgets. These expectations will need to be addressed either through

the provision of durable solutions or through a well-planned beneficiary communications programme. Feedback from the PPR in regard to construction quality, access to electricity and water need to be pursued and taken into consideration in the future INA programmes.

## 8.9 Shelter Technical Committee, Terms of Reference and statistics

### Technical Committees, Terms of Reference

*Extract from Annex 1 to the memorandum of understanding between the Haitian National Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding the Movement Coordination Framework for Haiti:*

#### **FUNCTIONS AND COMPOSITION OF THE MOVEMENT COORDINATION FRAMEWORK IN HAITI AND OF THE ADDITIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS FOR THE HAITI OPERATION.**

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#### **Technical Committees (TCs)**

**Purpose:** Manages coordination and implementation between partners of the Plan of Action according to technical areas

**Tasks:**

1. Agrees common approaches, standards, indicators for respective technical areas.
2. Reviews proposed projects/programmes for compliance with agreed common standards.

3. Ensures awareness and application of Movement policy and principles.
4. Ensures integrated approaches between sectors and particularly in relation to capacity building initiatives with the HRC
5. Under the guidance of the performance and accountability working group, establishes and maintains systems for quality assurance and programme monitoring.
6. Ensures that Federation Wide Reporting is implemented in each sector.
7. Assures shared knowledge between technical committees. Represents the Movement in external technical coordination bodies, including the UN cluster system.
8. Raises programmatic issues to the MOC level.

**Chair/Support Structure:** Designated by MOC. The chair and its support structure must be independent from any implementation structure.

**Membership:** Representatives of Movement Components working in each particular sector.

**Meets:** Weekly or as needed.

**Decision Making:** by consensus

**Minutes and Record of Decisions:** Kept and shared with MOC and designated distribution list.

### Shelter Technical Committee, Key statistics:

- ü 36 Shelter TC meetings, 79% in Port au Prince – 21% in Provinces
- ü 20 STC in 2010, 13 in 2011, 3 in 2012
- ü Average of 12 people by meeting
- ü Representatives attending meetings: 4% Haitian Red Cross / 39% IFRC / 53%PNSs / 1% ICRC / 2% External stakeholders
- ü 4 Workshops organised:
  - Federation Wide Initiative in Delmas – First event related to INA (January 2011)
  - Shelter Options Risk Management (January 2011)
  - Voice of Community? – INA event (November 2011)
  - Shelter Lessons Learned Workshop (April 2012)

### Shelter Technical Committee, Key deliverables and outputs:

- ü 16 Shelter Point Newsletters
- ü More than 320 documents gathered in Technical Library
- ü Monthly and Ad Hoc shelter options matrix, cross checked with shelter cluster
- ü 2 Shelter Technical Brief (12 months and 24 months)
- ü Housing Repair concept note on request of Movement Platform

- ü 3 Workshops restitution documents
- ü 2 Mailing Lists (Focal Points and general mailing list)

### Shelter Technical Committee meetings, Key topics on the agenda:

Topic	% STC	Topic	% STC
Mapping Progress and issues	91%	PNS project presentation	18%
Strategy / POA / workplan	53%	Specific Technical topic (housing repair / 2nd door /accessibility/emblem/solar energy...)	41%
assessments / database	12%	Land issues / tenure / renters vs. owners	21%
Training / outreach	3%	concept papers	15%
Information Management	76%	Shelter Technical Movement Coordination	50%
Reporting / Federation Wide reporting /M&E	26%	Other sector (DRR, Watsan, Livelihood...)	18%
Cluster and context	65%	Cross cutting (gender, gender based violence Risk management)	9%
Beneficiaries targeting	9%	External stakeholder / expertise	6%
Host families	3%		

## 8.10 Consultants biography

Peter Rees-Gildea is a consultant on International Humanitarian Affairs and, amongst other reviews and evaluations, has conducted five reviews in Haiti since the earthquake as well as leading the Shelter Cluster in the summer of 2010. He has 33 years of experience in disaster management and recovery including 20 years of experience with the International Federation.

Oliver Moles, associate research professor, CRATerre-ENSAG laboratory (France). Since 1990, Oliver Moles has initiated monitored and evaluated programs for the promotion and upgrading of local building cultures constructive in over 40 countries, under the aegis of various organizations (UNESCO, UNIDO, FAO, UNDP, UN Habitat, MISEREOR, CARITAS, IFRC...).