Understanding Deviance: Connecting Classical and Contemporary Perspectives

Book · January 2014

1 author:

T. L. Anderson
University of Delaware

HALFTITLE

Understanding Deviance

Connecting Classical and Contemporary Perspectives

In this collection of 48 reprinted and completely original articles, Tammy Anderson gives her fellow instructors of undergraduate deviance a refreshing way to energize and revitalize their courses. *[36 are reprints; 12 are original to this text/anthology]*

First, in 12 separate sections, she presents a wide range of deviant behaviors, traits, and conditions including: underage drinking and drunk driving, doping in elite sports, gang behavior, community crime, juvenile delinquency, hate crime, prison violence and transgendered prisoners, mental illness, drug-using women and domestic violence, obesity, tattooing, sexual fetishes, prostitution, drug epidemics, viral pandemics, crime control strategies and racial inequality, gay neighborhoods, HIV and bugchasers, and (lastly) youth, multicultural identity and music scenes.

Second, her pairing of "classic" and "contemporary" viewpoints about deviance and social control not only "connects" important literatures of the past to today's (student) readers, her "connections framework" also helps all of us see social life and social processes more clearly when alternative meanings are accorded to similar forms of deviant behavior. We also learn how to appreciate and interact with those who see things differently from ourselves. This may better equip us to reach common goals in an increasingly diverse and ever-changing world.

Third, a major teaching goal of Anderson's anthology is to sharpen students' critical thinking skills by forcing them to look at how a deviant behavior, trait or condition, can be viewed from opposing or alternative perspectives. By learning to see deviance from multiple perspectives, students will better understand their own and other's behavior and experiences and be able to anticipate future trends. Balancing multiple perspectives may also assist students in their practical work in social service, criminal justice and other agencies and institutions that deal with populations considered "deviant" in one way or another.

Tammy L. Anderson is a Professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice at the University of Delaware. Her recent books *Rave Culture: The Alteration and Decline of a Philadelphia Music Scene* (Temple University Press), *Sex, Drugs, and Death* (Routledge), and *Neither Villain nor Victim: Empowerment and Agency among Women Substance Abusers* (Rutgers University Press), along with her many peer review papers on substance abuse, crime, and music scenes, showcase her range of scholarship in the area of deviance, culture, and social control.

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FULLTITLE

Understanding Deviance

Connecting Classical and Contemporary Pieces

Edited by Tammy L. Anderson

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First published 2014
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Simultaneously published in the UK
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
[CIP data]

ISBN: 978-0-415-64260-6 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-415-64261-3 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-87963-5 (ebk)

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by [Typesetter]

Understanding Deviance:
Connecting Classical and Contemporary Perspectives

Preface
Tammy L. Anderson

Acknowledgments

Part 1: Classic and Contemporary Approaches to Deviance

Section 1. Defining Deviance

Introduction
Tammy L. Anderson.

1. *Rules for the Distinction of The Normal and the Pathological*
   Emile Durkheim
   Durkheim defines deviance from a statistical standpoint, or by the prevalence of deviance in society. He seeks an objective criterion by which social phenomena can be rendered normal, or pathological and deviant. From this perspective, Durkheim claims to measure the condition of society. His approach to deviance is different from the moral and social reaction definitions of deviance included in this section.

2. *Notes on the Sociology of Deviance*
   Kai T. Erikson
   Erickson relies on morals, customs, and traditions that are often tied to religious doctrine to define deviance. His view is that deviance sets boundaries for acceptable behavior and strengthens solidarity among citizens. His approach breaks from Durkheim's statistical view and is more in tune with Becker's social reaction approach.

3. *Definitions of Deviance* and *Deviance and the Responses of Others* from *Outsiders*
   Howard S. Becker
   Becker's work is considered a classic social reaction definition where deviance is anything people so label. He argues that deviance is not an objective fact, contrary to Durkheim's position. Instead, Becker reasons, it is something people define and redefine through social interaction.

4. *Defining Deviance Down*
   Daniel Moynihan
   Moynihan's article is a newer classic in the field of deviance that cautions against reclassifying unacceptable behaviors as acceptable, or trivializing their significance and impact. By moving away from objective standards for behavior

and endorsing a core set of values, as Becker and Erickson propose, Moynihan believes society enters dangerous territory and compromises itself.

5. *Connections: Definitions of Deviance and the Case of Underage Drinking and Drunk Driving*
   Tammy L. Anderson
   In this original connections essay, I compare the positions on deviance of Durkheim, Erickson, Becker, and Moynihan by using the case of teenage drunk driving and binge drinking in the United States. The essay illustrates the divergent viewpoints of these key deviance scholars at work in our lives today. Critical Thinking Questions

Section 2. Functionalism, Anomie, General Strain Theory

Introduction
Tammy L. Anderson.

6. *Social Structure and Anomie*
   Robert Merton
   Sociologist Robert Merton explains deviance as a result of anomie, a state of normlessness in society. His macro-level or environmental theory focuses on unreasonable cultural goals and institutional obstacles to attaining those goals. This tension between goals and obstacles produces anomie and leads to deviance. Thus, his approach focuses on the structural arrangements in society rather than on individual behavior or group interaction.

7. *Homeboys, New Jacks, and Anomie*
   John M. Hagedorn
   In this article, Hagedorn reports on his ethnographic study of African-American gang members in Milwaukee. He finds that race-related inequality and anomie leads to criminal behavior for some inner-city black males. His work endorses Merton's macro-level theory, but adds racial discrimination as another structural obstacle that can lead to deviance.

8. *A General Strain Theory of Community Differences in Crime Rates*
   Robert Agnew
   Agnew extends Merton's classic theory of anomie by linking micro-level factors, such as personal experiences and values and how individual s feel about them, to the more macro-level causes Merton uses to explain anomie and deviance. Agnew's efforts result in a newer theory of crime—General Strain theory—that describes community deviance as a result of both environmental and individual influences.

9. *Connections: Understanding Doping in Elite Sports through Anomie and General Strain Perspectives*
   Tammy L. Anderson
   In this original connections essay, I use the case of doping in elite sports to show the differences and similarities between Merton and Hagedorn's anomie approach and Agnew's General Strain theory. I highlight, both the weaknesses

and strengths of macro-level or environmental, and micro-level or individual level, explanations of deviance in our society.
Critical Thinking Questions

Section 3. Social Disorganization and Collective Efficacy

Introduction
Tammy L. Anderson

10. *Introduction* and *Growth of Chicago and Differentiation of Local Areas* from *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*
    Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay
    In this reading, Shaw and McKay describe crime and delinquency as a result of socially disorganized neighborhoods. By focusing on things such as poverty, crowding, ethnic diversity, and population turnover in Chicago, Shaw and McKay offer social disorganization theory to the field of deviance. This theory explains crime as a function of neighborhoods, not individual behavior.

11. *Collective Efficacy Theory: Lessons Learned and Directions for Future Inquiry*
    Robert J. Sampson
    In the late1990s, Sampson and a team of sociologists at the University of Chicago expanded Shaw and McKay's landmark study to attribute community crime rates to collective efficacy, meaning the degree to which neighborhood residents share a mutual trust, sense of solidarity and willingness to intervene when problems arise. In this reading, Sampson argues that a neighborhood's ability to control the wrong-doing of its residents, its collective efficacy, will protect it from high rates of crime and deviance.

12. *The Urban Ecology of Bias Crime: A Study of Disorganized and Defended Neighborhoods*
    Ryken Grattet
    Grattet contributes to the social disorganization and collective efficacy frameworks by studying bias or hate crimes in Sacramento, California. He finds that intergroup conflict, stemming from intolerance to ethnic and racial diversity, leads to an "ownership" mentality that causes people to defend "their" neighborhoods by committing crimes against those different from them.

13. *Connections: The Prison Community from a Social Disorganization and Collective Efficacy Perspective*
    Lori Sexton
    This connections essay by Lori Sexton advances the social disorganization-collective efficacy continuum by showing its relevance beyond city neighborhoods to places such as prisons. Sexton describes the cultural aspects touched on by Sampson and Grattet to explain the predicament of transgender prisoners. In doing so, she validates the power of both the social disorganization and collective efficacy frameworks to explain a broad range of deviant behaviors.
    Critical Thinking Questions

Section 4. Social Pathology, Degeneracy and Medicalization

Introduction

Tammy L. Anderson

14. *Social Pathology: A Systematic Approach to the Theory of Sociopathic Behavior*
    Edwin Lemert
    In this famous excerpt, Lemert criticizes psychiatrists' efforts to develop a theory of sociopathic behavior throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. He rejects efforts to differentiate between normal and pathological behavior and contests psychiatrists' claims that pathological behavior has a medical basis. He ultimately concludes that "normal" and "pathological" are subjectively defined and contingent on people's reactions.

15. *Whatever Happened to Social Pathology? Conceptual Fashions and the Sociology of Deviance*
    Joel Best
    Joel Best traces the rise and fall of "social pathology" in this article. He notes that the term meant many things over the course of time, including disease and illness in society, but that sociologists abandoned it because they could not agree on a clear, working definition.

16. *The Shifting Engines of Medicalization*
    Peter Conrad
    Conrad explains the social changes and forces that led to a wide variety of behaviors, traits and conditions being defined as "bona fide" medical problems rather than deviant. He describes the transition to medically-based definitions of deviance and validates the new term "medicalization" in sociology.

17. *Connections: Mental Illness as Degeneracy and Disease*
    Victor Perez
    This original connections essay by Victor Perez uses mental illness to trace the "circular thinking" between degeneracy, social pathology and medicalization in the sociology of deviance. His essay shows how sociology has been involved in a love/hate relationship with the fields of medicine and psychiatry and why sociologists ultimately abandoned the concepts of degeneracy and social pathology for the idea of medicalization.
    Critical Thinking Questions

Section 5. Labeling, Resistance, and Edgework

Introduction
Tammy L. Anderson.

18. *Beyond Mead: The Societal Reaction to Deviance*
    Edwin W. Lemert
    In this article, Lemert shows how social control strengthens when, to satisfy our needs for safety, protection, and order, we give up our values and rights to authorities. This process features the identification of harmful acts requiring social control, and the targeting and labeling of those considered harmful.

19. *Edgework: A Social Psychological Analysis of Voluntary Risk Taking*
    Stephen Lyng

In this modern classic, sociologist Stephen Lyng defines a new term called "edgework," which features risking harm for a thrill. Edgework is a manipulation of the boundaries between safety and harm, order and chaos, and norms and deviance. People engage in edgework to resist being oppressed, constrained or socially controlled in the ways Lemert described.

20. *Resistance as Edgework in Violent Intimate Relationships of Drug-Involved Women*
    Rajah Valli
    This article provides another provocative example of edgework. The drug-addicted women Valli studied use certain kinds of intimidation and violence to push back against their abusive male partners. This edgework is thrilling and returns some semblance of control to the women Valli studied, but it also invites retaliation from abusive spouses.

21. *Connections: Labeling, Resistance and Edgework through Parkour*
    John J. Brent
    In this connections essay, Brent uses the youthful activity of parkour, otherwise known as urban free-running, to contrast Lemert's ideas on social control and labeling with Lyng and Valli's perspectives on edgework and resistance. He shows that urban free-runners risk significant injury when violating norms on urban space. They do this to protest social control, earn the respect of their peers, and increase their skills. The essay shows how the labeling perspective is about the loss of freedom, while resistance and edgework are about reclaiming it.
    Critical Thinking Questions

Section 6. Stigma, Carnival, and the Grotesque Body

Introduction
Tammy L. Anderson.

22. *Stigma and Social Identity* from *Stigma*
    Erving Goffman
    Goffman's book made stigma a pivotal term in the sociology of deviance. Stigma is a special relationship between deeply discrediting traits or conditions that, in turn, tarnish reputations and reduce life chances. Goffman specified three types of stigma, including abominations of the body, which are highly relevant to the new field of body deviance discussed in this section. Goffman's term contrasts with Bhaktin's carnival of the grotesque in other readings in this section.

23. *Why do People get Tattoos?*
    Miliann Kang and Katherine Jones
    Kang and Jones write about tattooing in America. They argue that tattoos are a way for young people to resist social pressures to conform. This represents a break from Goffman's approach, which viewed body marks and deformities as a type of stigma that shames people.

24. *Big Handsome Men, Bears and Others: Virtual Constructions of 'Fat Male Embodiment'*
    Lee F. Monaghan

This reading by Monaghan uses Bhaktin's term ***carnival of the grotesque,*** *an alternative to Goffman's stigma, to describe the celebration of outrageous, hairy, obese male bodies that are typically shamed in society. By establishing alternative settings (carnivals) with dramatically different codes and norms about comportment, these big handsome men exaggerate and take pride in their grotesque bodies and their sexual endeavors with people like them.*

25. *Connections: Explaining Body Deviance with Stigma and Carnival of the Grotesque*
    David Lane
    David Lane's original essay focuses on our bodies, our aesthetic traits, and the extent to which we define them as physical or social entities, or both. Lane uses Goffman's stigma and Bhaktin's carnival of the grotesque to understand two types of body deviance: tattooing and obesity. He carefully charts the value and limitations of both concepts, not only for these two cases, but also for the future of body deviance and aesthetic sociology.
    Critical Thinking Questions

Section 7. Deviant Careers, Identity and Lifecourse Criminology

Introduction
Tammy L. Anderson

26. *Kinds of Deviance: A Sequential Model* from *Outsiders*
    Howard S. Becker
    Becker uses a deviant career approach and qualitative methods to explain how people become enmeshed in deviant lifestyles and develop deviant identities. A deciding factor in Becker's view is the official labeling of deviance by authorities. The deviant career perspective, however, does not explain how and why people start smoking marijuana, or engaging in deviant activities in the first place.

27. *Crime and Deviance in the Lifecourse*
    Robert Sampson and John Laub
    Sampson and Laub present another viewpoint on deviance, based on lifecourse trajectories. Their lifecourse approach is concerned with long-term patterns of crime (trajectories) and the events that can alter their pathways (transitions). Unlike Becker's deviant career approach, Sampson and Laub's lifecourse perspective uses quantitative techniques to explain the causes of childhood crime and delinquency and how these behaviors change over time.

28. *Weighing the Consequences of a Deviant Career: Factors Leading to an Exit From Prostitution*
    Sharon Oselin
    Sharon Oselin adopts, both a deviant career, and a lifecourse criminology framework to explain the process of becoming a prostitute, living life as a sex worker, and trying to leave the profession behind for something better. Her work calls attention to the external causes that lead to prostitution (lifecourse criminology) as well as the self- identity issues that work to keep individuals from exiting prostitution (deviant career).

29. *Connections: Understanding Street Prostitution from Deviant Career and Life-Course Criminology Perspectives*
    Emily Bonistall and Kevin Ralston
    This original connections essay by Bonistall and Ralston uses the case of street-level prostitution to illustrate the similarities and differences between the classical deviant career perspective and the more contemporary lifecourse criminology framework. The essay helps us understand how various types of unconventional behavior develop, persist, and terminate.
    Critical Thinking Questions

Section 8- Moral Panics and Risk Society

Introduction
Tammy L. Anderson

30. *Deviance and Moral Panics* from *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*
    Stanly Cohen
    This excerpt by sociologist Stanley Cohen defines and illustrates the classical deviance idea of "moral panic." Cohen identifies two opposing parties involved in the creation and maintenance of these panics. The first group are "moral entrepreneurs," who create the panics, using media outlets, when they fear society or its values and traditions are being compromised. Moral entrepreneurs target a second important group: folk devils, those believed to be responsible for the problem at hand.

31. *Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social Construction*
    Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda
    The article by Goode and Ben-Yehuda expands Cohen's classic statement into a broader theory of moral panics by asking, "how do we know when a threat is real rather than an overblown moral panic?" They answer this question by giving us five determining criteria: concern, hostility, consensus, disproportionality, and volatility.

32. *Moral panic versus the risk society: the implications of the changing sites of social anxiety*
    Sheldon Ungar
    Ungar suggests there may be a better way to understand social threats to society. The idea of "risk society" focuses on events, conditions and phenomena that are unpredictable, unlimited in scope, and not detectable by our physical senses. They originate in complex causes attributable to human decision-making, technological innovation and medical advancements. Risk society is also about social threats, as are moral panics, but the article suggests their origins and nature are more legitimate.

33. *Connections: [A]moral Panics and Risk in Contemporary Drug and Viral Pandemic Claims*
    Philip R. Kavanaugh and R.J. Maratea
    So what are the differences between the moral panic and risk society ideas and how and why do they matter? Kavanaugh and Maratea answer this question with two modern day examples: the methamphetamine epidemic and viral pandemics (bird flu). The connections essay explains that the moral distinction between

methamphetamine addiction (often conceived as a moral panic) and viral pandemics (an example of risk in modern society) is not as clear as we might think.
Critical Thinking Questions

Section 9. Critical Criminology, Culture of Control, Mass Incarceration

Introduction
Tammy L. Anderson

34. *Child Saving Movement in Illinois* from *The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency*
    Anthony M. Platt
    Platt describes the creation of the modern juvenile court system, which was implemented to reverse the severe, and often inhumane, treatment of children in the 19th century. The new juvenile court system acted as a legal guardian to promote the successful development of youth, reasoning that such an approach would best combat deviance and delinquency. But ironically, this juvenile court model was gradually abandoned in the late stages of the 20th century, as youths increasingly began to be tried as adults, received harsher sentences, and the juvenile court returned to the punitive approach of the 19th century.

35. *The Hyper-Criminalization of Black and Latino Male Youth in the Era of Mass Incarceration*
    Victor Rios
    This article by Victor Rios is based on an ethnographic study of Black and Latino boys in San Francisco. In neighborhoods and at school, officials adopt a culture of control in dealing with minority youth. The boys are stigmatized as violent criminals and are referred to criminal justice agencies at rates much higher than their white counterparts. This criminalization of minority male youth contributes to the punitive trend of mass incarceration seen recently in the United States and contradicts the original intent of the juvenile court system Platt describes.

36. *Reforming Education Through Crime* from *Governing through Crime*
    Jonathan Simon
    This reading is about the daily effects we encounter from a society obsessed with surveillance, security, and punitive penal practices. Simon shows how government and other social institutions use punitive policies at schools to manage perceived threats to students' safety and security, what the author terms "governance through crime."

37. *Connections: The Social Control of Youth across Institutional Spheres*
    Aaron Kupchik
    Aaron Kupchik's original connections essay for this section explains the policy approaches to controlling juvenile deviance and crime over time and highlights the recent punitive expansion to school grounds through what the author calls "the school-to-prison pipeline." This causes students to miss school, drop out and earn criminal records, not diplomas. The policy achieves the opposite original intent of the juvenile justice system, outlined by Platt.
    Critical Thinking Questions

Part 2. Emergent Possibilities and the Future of Deviance

Section 10. Queer Theory, Communities and Citizenship

Introduction
Tammy L. Anderson

38. *Coming Out all Over: Deviants and the Politics of Social Problems*
    John I. Kitsuse
    Kitsuse argues that homosexuals—and other marginal groups in society-- form separate communities to retain their unique cultural customs and lifestyles, but also seek the recognition, respect, rights and privileges heterosexuals and other "normal" citizens traditionally enjoy. He calls for sociology to move away from viewing deviant groups through a lens of stigma, discrimination and shame to one of citizenship and empowerment.

39. *There goes the Gayborhood*
    Amin Ghaziani
    Ghaziani's article reports on a new trend within the gay community that breaks with the tradition that Kitsuse and Taylor describe. Ghaziani explains that the decline in separate gay neighborhoods and communities is due to several factors (monogamy, marriage, and parenting to name a few) that have made gays and lesbians more likely to assimilate and integrate with their heterosexual friends and neighbors.

40. *Queer Presences and Absences: Citizenship, Community, diversity–or Death*
    Yvette Taylor
    This article by Taylor adopts a similar viewpoint on deviance and citizenship as Kitsuse, but also notes potential unintended consequences for "marginal groups" of securing equal rights and increased citizenship. One potential consequence is the loss of a unique gay or queer culture because equal treatment and recognition in society requires assimilating to society's dominant standards, ways, and ideals.

41. Connections: HIV and Bug Chasers across Queer Collectives
    Holly Swan and Laura Monico
    This connections essay notes that marginal or deviant communities exist within a spectrum of widely different social contexts. For example, sexual norms and behavior among gay men differ widely between the larger group of gay men who practice safe sex and bugchasers who voluntarily contract HIV so they can be "sexually free." So, when we are tempted to classify homosexuals as a singular group who are either assimilating to heterosexual culture (as Ghaziani contends) or claiming their queer-centric ways (as Taylor argues), what Swan and Monico find instead is wide diversity within the pools of outcasts with multiple definitions of deviant and normal behavior.
    Critical Thinking Questions

Section 11. Critical Race Theory, Multiculturalism, and Identity

Introduction
Tammy L. Anderson

42. *Deviance as Resistance: A new Research Agenda for the Study of Black Politics*
    Cathy J. Cohen
    This article outlines a critical race theory of "intentional deviance," where racial and ethnic minorities or "outsiders" attempt to preserve their cultural heritages while conforming to the white, middleclass mainstream. The author argues this type of deviance is a daily burden for the majority of Black citizens, but is ultimately rewarding. By attending to this intentional deviance by the majority of black citizens, the sociology of deviance can, Cohen argues, move away from its near exclusive focus on the black underclass engaged in crime.

43. *The Battle of Los Angeles: The Cultural Politics of Chicana/o Music in the Greater Eastside*
    Victor Hugo Viesca
    This article describes how Hispanics in Los Angeles resist oppression and social control by participating in Latin Fusion music scenes. Through music, young Hispanics counter the harsh labels, stigma and discrimination they often face while being their authentic selves. Unlike Cohen's focus on cultural balance, Viesca highlights the value of securing an outlet and space for multicultural expression.

44. *I was aggressive for the streets, pretty for the pictures: Gender, difference and the inner-city girl*
    Nikki Jones
    Nikki Jones profiles a young black female—Kiara-- who shows us that race, gender and class are ongoing performances that feature norm violation and consequences. As Cohen notes in his article in this section, Kiara balances her behavior and identity in "legit" white society with her inner-city home by "looking pretty for the pictures, but tough enough for the streets." The article demonstrates that norms and standards for behavior are determined by our demographic and cultural background, thus requiring the field of deviance to attend to diversity.

45. *Connections: Marginality, Identity and Music Scenes*
    Tammy L. Anderson
    In this connections essay I explain how music scenes, such as hip hop, homo hop, rave and EDM, Bhangra, Latin Fusion, and narcocorridos, not only teach us the link between multiculturalism, identity and marginality, but also how these social insights can be extended to the study of deviance. When young people participate in music scenes, they provide powerful lessons from which sociologists have much to learn.
    Critical Thinking Questions

Section 12. Biomedicalization, BioPower and Biocitizens

Introduction
Tammy L. Anderson

46. *The Medicalization of Unhappiness*
    Ronald W. Dworkin

Series Forward

By creatively connecting classical and contemporary perspectives on the study of deviance, *Understanding Deviance* provides what has been missing in the field for too long: a fresh approach to covering a range of theoretical frameworks and topics in a way that renders the study of deviance a coherent and lively field of inquiry. This volume not only covers well-known territory in the study of deviance, including functionalism, anomie, strain theory, social disorganization, labeling, stigma, deviant careers, and moral panics; it also covers comparatively new and unincorporated territory in the study of deviance, including collective efficacy, degeneracy and medicalization, resistance and edgework, carnival and the grotesque body, culture of control and mass incarceration, and queer theory and multicultural identity. By skillfully connecting old and new theoretical frameworks and empirical findings in provocative ways, this book offers a unique perspective on how to interrogate and understand the social organization, construction, and experience of deviance. It does so by bringing the study of deviance into the modern era, providing compelling examples and critical critiques, and effectively engaging the reader in interesting and productive ways of thinking about deviance and the array of related sociological concerns, most notably social rules, norms, boundaries, violations, stigma, sanctions, and stratification systems. Students will enjoy reading the many accounts of deviance in the contemporary era and instructors will appreciate the book's theoretical and conceptual currency. Both will enjoy a journey that covers new terrain, is attentive to patterns and trends as well as nuances and particularities, and arrives at a wholistic and contextual understanding of deviance and deviants in the modern world.

Douglas Hartmann

Valerie Jenness

Jodi O'Brien

PREFACE

> Hello. My name is Gabby. I'm a supercool feedee[1] who loves life and loves pleasing you on and off the camera! I love being naughty with food, in public, and just going all out with snacking and eating. I am a growing girl and I would love if you would join my journey of showing how beautiful fat, soft rolls are and how beautiful fat really is. http://gaininggabi.com/index1.html

Are feedees like Gabby deviant? If yes, how so? *Understanding Deviance: Connecting Classical and Contemporary Perspectives* dares readers to think in new and innovative ways about deviance in society. Many of us, including sociologists who study deviance, would answer "yes" to the first question and assume we could get Gabby to conform to our norms about body size. Our expectations for this are conveyed weekly on TV shows such as "the Biggest Loser." Contestants like Megan (http://www.nbc.com/the-biggest-loser/contestants/megan/bio/) tries to conform to our standards, while feedees like Gabby violate them. On "the Biggest Loser" webpage, we learn that Megan sees herself as:

> "fun-loving, comedic, artistic and high-spirited young adult who is *missing out* on enjoying life" because of her inability to do things that most 21-year-olds can do…Now 21 years old, 259 pounds and tired of her *weight holding her back*, she *wants to get healthy* so she can participate in rodeos again and win, train horses, and shop at *regular clothing stores*[2].

Gabby, on the other hand, is a 5'9," 26 year-old, heterosexual blonde that wears a 38-44 women's pant size—more than four times the average size of women her height (i.e., average is between size 6-10). Sociologists have observed that feedees like Gabby are likely deviant in several respects. First, they purposefully defy norms about body size and society's aesthetic standards. Second, they also reject expectations for how

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[1] . According to Urbandictionary.com, a Feedee is a "male/female (typically female) that wishes to gain weight (to become more attractive to chubby chasers) through means of stuffing one's face with unhealthy food goods" http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=feedee.

[2] Italics added.

individuals should take care of themselves and safeguard their own health and well-being. Third, Gabby and other feedees make no apologies for being sexually charged and assertive. Instead, they celebrate it. Gabby tells us her favorite sexual position is doggy-style and the purpose of her website is to attract chubby chasers who have sexual fetishes for large women. In fact, she is proud to host a pornographic website that invites the public to indulge.

How do we make sense of people like Gabby? Perhaps most of us would focus on the health risks associated with being obese. But putting aside health issues, how does her story provoke us to hold a mirror to the norms, values and beliefs we endorse on a daily basis? At a very basic level, deviance is the violation of norms, a breach of the standards society sets for behaviors, traits, conditions, identities and lifestyles. Gabby proudly violates them while Megan feels shamed, tries to correct her condition, and conform to our norms. Since deviance is usually viewed negatively, e.g., as a threat that can harm people, institutions, and society, it is often met with *social control*. Gabby probably ignores shows like "the Biggest Loser" and talks back to people who criticize her, while Megan buys into the show's world view and gets distraught when people humiliate her for being obese. Gabby is, in effect, a contemporary woman, while Megan is much more traditional. The classic sociological work on deviance has helped us understand Megan and her viewpoints and behaviors, but it doesn't equip us to understand Gabby.

This example illustrates the need to modernize the study of deviance. It also calls attention to one of the central tenets of this book: pairing classic and contemporary viewpoints about deviance and social control is essential because it can sharpen our critical thinking skills and help us better understand our lives and others' today. Not convinced? Let me ask you another question.

Is being called a "bitch" a put-down or a compliment? What do you think? What would your grandmother say? Your mother? The term "bitch" has historically been a pejorative label to control and reprimand outspoken women (Hughes 2006). However, former Saturday Night Live star, Tina Fey, sees things differently. In her "Weekend Update" skit on the 2008 Presidential campaign (http://videosift.com/video/SNL-Tina-Fey-on-Hillary-Clinton-Bitch-Is-The-New-Black), she turns the sexist term "bitch" on its head and argues it is a badge of honor to celebrate and a compliment to those who are called it, including Hillary Clinton and other strong women.

Tina Fey's "resistance" stance challenges gender norms (about women and political power) and the "bitch" stigma that attempts to brand unruly women. Her use of the term seeks to reverse its damaging meaning by invoking an emboldened and opposing viewpoint, which is more consistent with the newer tradition of ***resistance*** (Hollander and Einwohner 2004). Resistance is about the pushback against or rejection of deviant labeling or classification. With resistance, deviant labels act as a badge of honor to celebrate, not as a kiss of death or source of shame. Therefore, while our grandmothers may think being called a bitch is a terrible thing, younger women today might agree with Fey's more modern stance and view it as a compliment.

Objectives and Content. How do these contemporary stories of deviance, labeling, shame, and resistance help explain the rationale and structure of this book for teaching? One way is by showing us how useful it is to draw connections between the old and the new. Not only do we see social life and social processes more clearly when alternative meanings are accorded to similar forms of deviant behavior, but we also learn how to appreciate and interact with those who see things differently from ourselves. This may better equip us to reach common goals in an increasingly diverse and ever-changing world. Connecting the classic with the contemporary allows us to retain traditions while evolving with the times.

Part 1 of *Understanding Deviance* highlights parallels between classic deviance terms and contemporary concepts from a wider range of sociological theories and traditions. Some of these include:

[INSERT TABLE P.1 HERE]

The nine sections in Part 1 each include older and modern reprinted papers considered pivotal in the field of deviance. Connections between them are offered in an original "Connections" essay—written exclusively for this book—that feature a type of deviance to elucidate the differing viewpoints of the reprinted materials. In these "Connections" essays, and the short section introductions, the learning goals of this bookare introduced and developed.

Part 2 includes three sections with readings that raise interesting possibilities for the future study of deviance. They suggest we cease focusing narrowly on individuals and broaden our view to institutions and communities. Moreover, when we do talk about "deviant" or "marginal" people, Section 9 asks us to look at them not simply as "others" to be ostracized or controlled, but instead, as Kitsuse (1980) claims, individuals demanding citizenship for unique cultural and social expressions as well as novel lifestyles and identities. This will require us to employ a multidisciplinary framework that reveals deviance as a political, social, anthropological, psychological, and medical phenomenon.

Taken together, the 12 sections in Parts 1 and 2 cover a wider range of deviant behaviors, traits and conditions. The readings address underage drinking and drunk driving, doping in elite sports, gang behavior, community crime, juvenile delinquency, hate crime, prison violence and transgender prisoners, mental illness, drug-using women and domestic violence, obesity, tattooing, sexual fetishes, prostitution, drug epidemics, viral pandemics, crime control strategies and racial inequality, gay neighborhoods, HIV and bugchasers, and youth, multiculturalism and music scenes.

Enhancing Critical Thinking Skills

A main objective of this book is to sharpen students' critical thinking skills by having them consider that deviant behaviors, traits or conditions can be viewed from opposing or alternative perspectives. By learning to see deviance from multiple perspectives, students will better understand their own and other's behavior and experiences and be able to anticipate future trends. Balancing multiple perspectives may also assist students in their practical work in social service, criminal justice and other agencies and institutions that deal with populations considered "deviant" in one way or another.

The concepts introduced in each of the 12 sections are a useful way to develop and strengthen critical thinking. Embedded in the stories of deviant acts and individuals that run throughout the book, the conceptual parallels and connections often showcase at least two sides of the very stories that characterize our lives. As the building blocks of theory, these concepts also teach us about the present and future, alert us to potential dangers, and help us find solutions to move society forward. In short, they enable us to see patterns and make predictions to improve life. These concepts are also the easiest way for students to see how theory works in everyday life. This novel conceptual approach to the study of deviance, which links classical ideas to conemporary behaviors and identities should, not only serve to help revitalize the field in academic circles, but also increases the value of studying deviance to people's lives in societies near and afar.

Another goal of *Understanding Deviance* is to help students see how social processes work in everyday life, including how various forms of inequality (race, class, and gender) are maintained by defining deviance and administering social control. For example, norms have distinct meaning by race, ethnicity, gender and class identities and status. Because norms are always based on power disparities, certain race, class or gender identities, expressions, or behaviors are favored and often shape what is defined as acceptable or normal in society. "Other" individuals are deemed marginal and subordinated. Therefore, deviance teaches a great deal about social inequality.

One way I provoke my students to think about deviance and inequality is through my term "switch it out." This phrase refers to how people's viewpoints are not primarily about a certain behavior or trait, but more about the demographic characteristics of the person in question. Consider any deviant behavior – for example, promiscuous sex, selling drugs, or cage fighting/mixed martial arts. Does your opinion about these activities differ depending on who commits them? Is it the same thing for males and females to engage in promiscuous sex, sell drugs, and perform mixed martial arts? Are these behaviors less deviant for middleclass white males than they are for poor black ones? What if the main characters in the hit TV series *The Sopranos*, *Dexter*, or *Breaking Bad* were not all white males, but were instead black or Hispanic males or females? Would the public root for them the same way? Put simply, some "deviant behaviors" are not considered bad if the "right" person, (i.e., those having more socially valuable race, class, and gender identities), commits them. *Understanding Deviance* helps to teach students to look at deviance in this way. The development of critical thinking skills also helps students to probe and understand the complexities of deviance, which includes developing a more finely tuned sensitivity to political, cultural, economic, and social matters. The structure and approach of *Understanding Deviance* helps students to acquire these sensitivities, stimulating their intellectual curiosity and promoting their continued learning over time.

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Acknowledgments

This book is a labor of love which could not have been conceived, written or published without the help and support of many people, both inside and outside academia and publishing. It took shape during my years of teaching deviance at the University of Delaware. However, my parents like to remind me that I was always interested in people who didn't do what they were supposed to, especially those called "weirdos," "troublemakers," or "outsiders" (including me). So, let me begin by thanking my parents—Odel and Chrystine Anderson—for their love, patience and support over the years and for listening to and laughing at my stories about deviant behavior. Next, I'd like to express my sincere gratitude to the folks at the University of Delaware- faculty, staff and students alike. Nancy Quillen, Linda Keen, Chris Grott, and Judy Watson provided constant administrative help during the production process. My UD colleagues Joel Best, Anne Bowler, Aaron Kupchik, Victor Perez, Susan Miller, and Ben Fluery-Steiner helped me conceive this book and they provided critical feedback throughout the writing process. I'm indebted to them for their help. I can say the same for the folks at Routledge. I'd like to thank Steve Rutter and Val Jenness for believing in me, assisting me, and pushing me to make this book better. Thanks also to Margaret Moore for all of her editorial assistance. Mostly, however, I want to thank my students. Over the years, many graduate and undergraduate students have opened my eyes to alternative viewpoints and have tuned me into deviance in everyday life. They have indulged my ideas and have offered many of their own to help improve my work. Thus, this book is a collaborative effort. Several of my former and current graduate students – Phil Kavanaugh, R.J. Maratea, David Lane, Holly Swan, Laura Monico, John Brent, Kevin Ralston and Emily Bonistall (along with my faculty colleagues Aaron Kupchik, Victor Perez, and Lori Sexton from the University of Missouri- Kansas City) have contributed excellent connections essays to this book and have provided constant and invaluable input over time. They wrote and re-wrote their essays, always met their deadlines and tolerated my relentless pestering. They have simply been the best team of collaborators any author/editor could ask for. There are still other students to thank as well, but they are too many to list here. I am grateful for the time we spent together in class. Finally, there are other people who supported me in finishing this book. Barret Michalec and Jenn Walters-Michalec, Autumn Bayles, my siblings –Terri Hellman, David Anderson and Tracey Whitney--, and the DiFrancesco family were always there to listen to the joy of this book's journey as well as its bumps in the road. Thanks for being my sounding board, guys. And last, but certainly not least, I'd like to thank my partner—Francki DiFrancesco—for her unwavering love and support –as well as her ideas, insights and commentary throughout this project. Thank you, Francki, for the cover idea, reading and commenting about Gaining Gabbi, bugchasers, prostitutes, free-runners, etc., consoling me in the tough times, and celebrating the good. In short, I thank you all for helping me in Understanding Deviance.

In addition, a thank you to the reviewers for their very helpful feedback:

Angela Henderson	University of Northern Colorado
Richelle Swan	California State University, San Marcos
Randy Myers	Old Dominion University
Rebecca Trammel	Metropolitan State University of Denver
Sharon Oselin	California State University, Los Angeles
Sarah Smith	Elmhurst College
Christopher Faircloth	Xavier University

Jennifer Lois West Washington University

Section 1. Defining Deviance

Introduction

Tammy L. Anderson

> No one has gone where two states in the American West, Washington and Colorado, are now going with the pioneering blueprints for how to sell pot legally. Depending or your view, it's either Lewis and Clark crossing the Continental Divide for the first time, or a step into slow-motion quicksand (Egan, 2013: 1).

Marijuana was outlawed in the US by the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act after years of complaints about it being immoral, lacking medical value and downright dangerous. Now, more than 75 years later, laws against weed are wilting. Two new patterns of control have emerged. One seeks to medicalize marijuana for the private treatment of disease and illness and a second seeks to decriminalize it altogether, making it available to the general public. Both paths will likely redefine laws, norms, social customs, ideology, values and morals about marijuana now and into our future, changing our understanding of marijuana use and sales as deviant behavior.

What is deviance? How is it determined? Who plays a role in defining deviance and who doesn't? How do definitions of deviance matter in our lives? Who benefits? Who loses? Section 1 includes four readings by Durkheim, Erickson, Becker, and Moynihan that begin to answer these questions. They have been pivotal in originating the study of deviance in sociology. In this introduction, I introduce these scholars' positions on deviance through today's debate about marijuana. In my connections essay on youth alcohol use, drunk driving and binge drinking I provide a deeper understanding of them and answers to the questions above.

As you read in the Preface, a central purpose of this book is to compare classic and contemporary concepts that have relevance for the study of deviance today. These pairings and connections will help you think more critically about our society and the interactions and experiences we have with each other daily. The concepts covered here often begin by taking a

certain stance on what deviance is, who gets to say so, and how that impacts our lives. For example, the term deviant career (Section 7) uses a social reaction or labeling theory type of definition, while functionalism and anomie (Section 2) employ a more morally-based one. Critical criminology and culture of control (Section 9) use a conflict orientation to answer the questions above. Section 1 begins, therefore, with a review of the basic ways sociologists have defined deviance in our society and have attempted to answer the questions above.

We begin with a basic idea: *deviance is simply a breach of a socially acceptable standard*. While it's important to understand the types and causes of such breaks, it is also helpful to understand the types of things they regulate. For example, in today's society, standards are created for behavior—like smoking or selling marijuana. However, there are also values and norms for states of being or conditions (i.e., being intoxicated or sober), lifestyles (hedonistic or conventional), speech or language (drug argot, slang or proper English) and even our identities, physical traits and personal styles. Thus, the study of deviance cannot simply focus on behavior. It must, instead, focus on all of these things and how they are controlled in our society.

Once we get a better idea of the range of phenomena that are used to set standards for people in a society, we can also study how those standards originate. In the early days, sociologists articulated a few major ways deviance and social norms could be defined. The Durkheim (1982) reading in this section provides a scientifically-based statistical viewpoint, arguing that deviant behavior is the rare phenomena or the *very infrequent* event. When we hear about how "the majority of people" drink alcohol or that "most" people are heterosexual, we are learning about statistically-defined standards and norms. Deviance then becomes the minority or

rare case. From Durkheim's viewpoint then, marijuana use is normal, since most (65%) American's have tried it and about 17% smoke it almost daily (NSDUH 2012).

Erickson (1962)—author of another reading in this section-- articulated a more morally-based way to define norms and deviance. He relied on morals, customs, and traditions that were often tied to religious doctrine. For example, the classification of inebriated states (drunkenness and being high) as deviant behavior is based in Christian morality and the Bible. Today, religious figures are divided on the morality of marijuana use, but were vehemently opposed to it around the time of the Marijuana Tax Act (Jones 2013). If morally defined deviance works to set boundaries for behavior, build solidarity among citizens and assist the smooth functioning of society, as Erickson contends, then will marijuana decriminalization destabilize and weaken our society?

Howard Becker (1963) spelled out a labeling theory or social reaction approach to deviance. You will read his viewpoints in an excerpt from his classic book in this section. He called deviance anything people in society so label and argued that norm violations had to be witnessed by others in order for deviance to command our attention. Becker's point was that deviance didn't objectively exist. It was in the eyes of the beholder. Becker wrote about marijuana, and the passage and impact of the Marijuana Tax Act, because he was heavily involved in the 1940s and 1950s jazz scene that featured causal marijuana use by musicians and fans.

It is important to note that sociologists have also defined deviance in other ways. Sections 4 and 12 describe medical viewpoints and show that more and more deviant traits, behaviors and conditions are being reclassified as forms of disease and illness in our society eeveryday. In fact, you could argue this is one reason criminal controls against marijuana use

and sales are changing. Marijuana advocates have convinced Americans that the drug is an effective and safe treatment for a variety of ailments and drug experts tell us often that drug addiction, in general, is a disease rather than a moral failing.

Finally, classifying and controlling deviance should also be considered acts of power. This is a basic position of more critical or conflict-oriented theories, covered in Section 9 of this book. Consider that when something or someone is defined as normal or acceptable, it is almost certain that something or someone else is rendered deviant. Moreover, there are consequences for deviant behavior and discrimination against those who engage in it or who possess deviant traits or conditions. And when we look at who and what is classified as deviant in our society and who has done the cataloguing, we see considerable inequality. For example, even though official data sources like the NSDUH (2012) show almost equal rates of marijuana use by race and ethnicity, minority group members—especially African Americans—have been arrested for it and find themselves behind bars much more often than whites (Mauer and King 2007). Thus, there is inequality between racial groups when it comes to thinking about and responding to marijuana-related behavior and drug-related deviance overall.

The reading by Moynihan (1992) in this section cautions us that when we define deviance down, i.e., reclassify unacceptable behaviors as acceptable or trivialize their significance and impact, we wander into dangerous territory and threaten the very stability of our society. In his reading, Moynihan points out a few ways this is done and we can easily see these methods at work with marijuana reform today as drug addicts are treated by healthcare professionals instead of being punished by the criminal justice system and as marijuana industries evolve into profit-making businesses in our economy (Jones 2013).

What do you think? Will marijuana reform define deviance down in ways that endanger society and our way of life? Will it improve things? For whom? As you read the papers in this section, consider what deviance means and how the viewpoints expressed here complement and contradict each other and are relevant to your life. Pay attention to who benefits and suffers from their implementation. Can we see conceptual similarities across types of deviance, e.g., marijuana, drunk driving, and the many other types of non-conforming behaviors, traits and conditions discussed in this book? Attending to questions like these, and those asked by the contributors and I throughout this book, may just show you how relevant the study of deviance is to all of our lives today.

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Reading 1

Rules for the Distinction of the Normal from the Pathological

Emile Durkheim

Observation conducted according to the preceding rules mixes up two orders of facts, very dissimilar in certain respects: those that are entirely appropriate and those that should be different from what they are – normal phenomena and pathological phenomena. We have even seen that it is necessary to include both in the definition with which all research should begin. Yet if, in certain aspects, they are of the same nature, they nevertheless constitute two different varieties between which it is important to distinguish. Does science have the means available to make this distinction?

The question is of the utmost importance, for on its solution depends one's conception of the role that science, and above all the science of man, has to play. According to a theory whose exponents are recruited from the most varied schools of thought, science cannot instruct us in any way about what we ought to desire. It takes cognisance, they say, only of facts which all have the same value and the same utility; it observes, explains, but does not judge them; for it, there are none that are reprehensible. For science, good and evil do not exist. Whereas it can certainly tell us how causes produce their effects, it cannot tell us what ends should be pursued. To know not what is, but what is desirable, we must resort to the suggestions of the unconscious – sentiment, instinct, vital urge, etc., – by whatever name we call it. Science, says a writer already quoted, can well light up the world, but leaves a darkness in the human heart. The heart must create its own illumination. Thus science is stripped, or nearly, of all practical effectiveness and consequently of any real justification for its existence. For what good is it to strive after a knowledge of reality if the knowledge we acquire cannot serve us in our lives? Can we reply that by revealing to us the causes of

phenomena knowledge offers us the means of producing the causes at will, and thereby to achieve the ends our will pursues for reasons that go beyond science? But, from one point of view, every means is an end, for to set the means in motion it requires an act of the will, just as it does to achieve the end for which it prepares the way. There are always several paths leading to a given goal, and a choice must therefore be made between them. Now if science cannot assist us in choosing the best goal, how can it indicate the best path to follow to arrive at the goal? Why should it commend to us the swiftest path in preference to the most economical one, the most certain rather than the most simple one, or vice versa? If it cannot guide us in the determination of our highest ends, it is no less powerless to determine those secondary and subordinate ends we call means.

It is true that the ideological method affords an avenue of escape from this mysticism, and indeed the desire to escape from it has in part been responsible for the persistence of this method. Its devotees were certainly too rationalist to agree that human conduct did not require the guidance of reflective thought. Yet they saw in the phenomena, considered by themselves independently of any subjective data, nothing to justify their classifying them according to their practical value. It therefore seemed that the sole means of judging them was to relate them to some overriding concept. Hence the use of notions to govern the collation of facts, rather than deriving notions from them, became indispensable for any rational sociology. But we know that, in these conditions, although practice has been reflected upon, such reflection is not scientific.

The solution to the problem just posed will nevertheless allow us to lay claim to the rights of reason without falling back into ideology. For societies, as for individuals, health is good and desirable; sickness, on the other hand, is bad and must be avoided. If therefore we find an objective criterion, inherent in the facts themselves, to allow us to distinguish scientifically health from sickness in the various orders of social phenomena, science will be in a position

to throw light on practical matters while remaining true to its own method. Since at present science is incapable of directly affecting the individual, it can doubtless only furnish us with general guidelines which cannot be diversified appropriately for the particular individual unless he is approached through the senses. The state known as health, in so far as it is capable of definition, cannot apply exactly to any individual, since it can only be established for the most common circumstances, from which everyone deviates to some extent. None the less it is a valuable reference point to guide our actions. Because it must be adjusted later to fit each individual case, it does not follow that knowledge of it lacks all utility. Indeed, precisely the opposite is true, because it establishes the norm which must serve as a basis for all our practical reasoning. Under these conditions we are no longer justified in stating that thought is useless for action. Between science and art there is no longer a gulf, and one may pass from one to the other without any break in continuity. It is true that science can only concern itself with the facts through the mediation of art, but art is only the extension of science. We may even speculate whether the practical shortcomings of science must not continue to decrease as the laws it is establishing express ever more fully individual reality.

I

Every sociological phenomenon, just as every biological phenomenon, although staying essentially unchanged, can assume a different form for each particular case. Among these forms exist two kinds. The first are common to the whole species. They are to be found, if not in all, at least in most individuals. If they are not replicated exactly in all the cases where they are observed, but vary from one person to another, their variations are confined within very narrow limits. On the other hand, other forms exist which are exceptional. These are encountered only in a minority of cases, but even when they occur, most frequently they do

not last the whole lifetime of an individual. They are exceptions in time as they are in space.[1] We are therefore faced with two distinct types of phenomena which must be designated by different terms. Those facts which appear in the most common forms we shall call normal, and the rest morbid or pathological. Let us agree to designate as the average type the hypothetical being which might be constituted by assembling in one entity, as a kind of individual abstraction, the most frequently occurring characteristics of the species in their most frequent forms. We may then say that the normal type merges into the average type and that any deviation from that standard of healthiness is a morbid phenomenon. It is true that the average type cannot be delineated with the same distinctness as an individual type, since the attributes from which it is constituted are not absolutely fixed but are capable of variation. Yet it can unquestionably be constituted in this way since it is the immediate subject matter of science and blends with the generic type. The physiologist studies the functions of the average organism; the same is true of the sociologist. Once we know how to distinguish between the various social species – this question will be dealt with later – it is always possible to discover the most general form presented by a phenomenon in any given species.

It can be seen that a fact can be termed pathological only in relation to a given species. The conditions of health and sickness cannot be defined *in abstracto* or absolutely. This rule is not questioned in biology: it has never occurred to anybody to think that what is normal in a mollusc should be also for a vertebrate. Each species has its own state of health, because it has an average type peculiar to it, and the health of the lowest species is no less than that of the highest. The same principle is applicable to sociology, although it is often misunderstood. The habit, far too widespread, must be abandoned of judging an institution, a practice or a moral maxim as if they were good or bad in or by themselves for all social types without distinction.

Since the reference point for judging the state of health or sickness varies according to the

species, it can vary also within the same species, if that happens to change. Thus from the purely biological viewpoint, what is normal for the savage is not always so for the civilised person and vice versa.[2] There is one order of variations above all which it is important to take into account because these occur regularly in all species: they are those which relate to age. Health for the old person is not the same as it is for the adult, just as the adult's is different from the child's. The same is likewise true of societies.[3] Thus a social fact can only be termed normal in a given species in relation to a particular phase, likewise determinate, of its development. Consequently, to know whether the term is merited for a social fact, it is not enough to observe the form in which it occurs in the majority of societies which belong to a species: we must also be careful to observe the societies at the corresponding phase of their evolution.

We may seem to have arrived merely at a definition of terms, for we have done no more than group phenomena according to their similarities and differences and label the groups formed in this way. Yet in reality the concepts so formed, while they possess the great merit of being identifiable because of characteristics which are objective and easily perceptible, are not far removed from the notion commonly held of sickness and health. In fact, does not everybody consider sickness to be an accident, doubtless bound up with the state of being alive, but one which is not produced normally? This is what the ancient philosophers meant when they declared that sickness does not derive from the nature of things but is the product of a kind of contingent state immanent in the organism. Such a conception is assuredly the negation of all science, for sickness is no more miraculous than health, which also inheres in the nature of creatures. Yet sickness is not grounded in their normal nature, bound up with their ordinary temperament or linked to the conditions of existence upon which they usually depend. Conversely the type of health is closely joined for everybody to the type of species. We cannot conceive incontrovertibly of a species which in itself and through its own basic

constitution would be incurably sick. Health is the paramount norm and consequently cannot be in any way abnormal.

It is true that health is commonly understood as a state generally preferable to sickness. But this definition is contained in the one just stated. It is not without good reason that those characteristics which have come together to form the normal type have been able to generalise themselves throughout the species. This generalisation is itself a fact requiring explanation and therefore necessitating a cause. It would be inexplicable if the most widespread forms of organisation were not also – *at least in the aggregate* – the most advantageous. How could they have sustained themselves in such a wide variety of circumstances if they did not enable the individual better to resist the causes of destruction? On the other hand, if the other forms are rarer it is plainly because – *in the average number of cases* – those individuals displaying such forms have greater difficulty in surviving. The greater frequency of the former class is thus the proof of their superiority.[4]

II

This last observation even provides a means of verifying the results of the preceding method.

Since the generality which outwardly characterises normal phenomena, once directly established by observation, is itself an explicable phenomenon, it demands explanation. Doubtless we can have the prior conviction that it is not without a cause, but it is better to know exactly what that cause is. The normality of the phenomenon will be less open to question if it is demonstrated that the external sign whereby it was revealed to us is not merely apparent but grounded in the nature of things – if in short, we can convert this factual normality into one which exists by right. Moreover, the demonstration of this will not always consist in showing that the phenomenon is useful to the organism, although for reasons just

stated this is most frequently the case. But, as previously remarked, an arrangement may happen to be normal without serving any useful purpose, simply because it inheres in the nature of a creature. Thus it would perhaps be useful for childbirth not to occasion such violent disturbances in the female organism, but this is impossible. Consequently the normality of a phenomenon can be explained only through it being bound up with the conditions of existence in the species under consideration, either as the mechanically essential effect of these conditions or as a means allowing the organism to adapt to these conditions.[5]

This proof is not merely useful as a check. We must not forget that the advantage of distinguishing the normal from the abnormal is principally to throw light upon practice. Now, in order to act in full knowledge of the facts, it is not sufficient to know what we should want, but why we should want it. Scientific propositions relating to the normal state will be more immediately applicable to individual cases when they are accompanied by the reasons for them, for then it will be more feasible to pick out those cases where it is appropriate to modify their application, and in what way.

Circumstances even exist where this verification is indispensable, because the first method, if it were applied in isolation, might lead to error. This is what occurs in transition periods when the whole species is in the process of evolving, without yet being stabilised in a new and definitive form. In that situation the only normal type extant at the time and grounded in the facts is one that relates to the past but no longer corresponds to the new conditions of existence. A fact can therefore persist through a whole species but no longer correspond to the requirements of the situation. It therefore has only the appearance of normality, and the generality it displays is deceptive; persisting only through the force of blind habit, it is no longer the sign that the phenomenon observed is closely linked to the general conditions of collective existence. Moreover, this difficulty is peculiar to sociology. It

does not exist, in a manner of speaking, for the biologist. Only very rarely do animal species require to assume unexpected forms. The only normal modifications through which they pass are those which occur regularly in each individual, principally under the influence of age. Thus they are already known or knowable, since they have already taken place in a large number of cases. Consequently at every stage in the development of the animal, and even in periods of crisis, the normal state may be ascertained. This is also still true in sociology for those societies belonging to inferior species. This is because, since a number of them have already run their complete course, the law of their normal evolution has been, or at least can be, established. But in the case of the highest and most recent societies, by definition this law is unknown, since they have not been through their whole history. The sociologist may therefore be at a loss to know whether a phenomenon is normal, since he lacks any reference point.

He can get out of this difficulty by proceeding along the lines we have just laid down. Having established by observation that the fact is general, he will trace back the conditions which determined this general character in the past and then investigate whether these conditions still pertain in the present or, on the contrary, have changed. In the first case he will be justified in treating the phenomenon as normal; in the other eventuality he will deny it that characteristic. For instance, to know whether the present economic state of the peoples of Europe, with the lack of organisation[6] that characterises it, is normal or not, we must investigate what in the past gave rise to it. If the conditions are still those appertaining to our societies, it is because the situation is normal, despite the protest that it stirs up. If, on the other hand, it is linked to that old social structure which elsewhere we have termed segmentary[7] and which, after providing the essential skeletal framework of societies, is now increasingly dying out, we shall be forced to conclude that this now constitutes a morbid state, however universal it may be. It is by the same method that all such controversial

questions of this nature will have to be resolved, such as those relating to ascertaining whether the weakening of religious belief and the development of state power are normal phenomena or not.[8]

Nevertheless this method should in no case be substituted for the previous one, nor even be the first one employed. Firstly it raises questions which require later discussion and which cannot be tackled save at an already fairly advanced stage of science. This is because, in short, it entails an almost comprehensive explanation of phenomena, since it presupposes that either their causes or their functions are determined. At the very beginning of our research it is important to be able to classify facts as normal or abnormal, except for a few exceptional cases, in order to assign physiology and pathology each to its proper domain. Next, it is in relation to the normal type that a fact must be found useful or necessary in order to be itself termed normal. Otherwise it could be demonstrated that sickness and health are indistinguishable, since the former necessarily derives from the organism suffering from it. It is only with the average organism that sickness does not sustain the same relationship. In the same way the application of a remedy, since it is useful to the sick organism, might pass for a normal phenomenon, although it is plainly abnormal, since only in abnormal circumstances does it possess this utility. This method can therefore only be used if the normal type has previously been constituted, which could only have occurred using a different procedure. Finally, and above all, if it is true that everything which is normal is useful without being necessary, it is untrue that everything which is useful is normal. We can indeed be certain that those states which have become generalised in the species are more useful than those which have continued to be exceptional. We cannot, however, be certain that they are the most useful that exist or can exist. We have no grounds for believing that all the possible combinations have been tried out in the course of the process; among those which have never been realised but are conceivable, there are perhaps some which are much more advantageous

than those known to us. The notion of utility goes beyond that of the normal, and is to the normal what the genus is to the species. But it is impossible to deduce the greater from the lesser, the species from the genus, although we may discover the genus from the species, since it is contained within it. This is why, once the general nature of the phenomena has been ascertained, we may confirm the results of the first method by demonstrating how it is useful.[9] We can then formulate the three following rules:

(1) A social fact is normal for a given social type, viewed at a given phase of its development, when it occurs in the average society of that species, considered at the corresponding phase of its evolution.

(2) The results of the preceding method can be verified by demonstrating that the general character of the phenomenon is related to the general conditions of collective life in the social type under consideration.

(3) This verification is necessary when this fact relates to a social species which has not yet gone through its complete evolution.

III

We are so accustomed to resolving glibly these difficult questions and to deciding rapidly, after cursory observation and by dint of syllogisms, whether a social fact is normal or not, that this procedure will perhaps be adjudged uselessly complicated. It seems unnecessary to have to go to such lengths to distinguish sickness from health. Do we not make these distinctions every day? This is true, but it remains to be seen whether we make them appositely. The difficulty of these problems is concealed because we see the biologist resolve them with comparative ease. Yet we forget that it is much easier for him than for the

sociologist to see how each phenomenon affects the strength of the organism and thereby to determine its normal or abnormal charcter with an accuracy which is adequate for all practical purposes. In sociology the complexity and the much more changing nature of the facts constrain us to take many more precautions, as is proved by the conflicting judgements on the same phenomenon emitted by the different parties concerned. To show clearly how great this circumspection must be, we shall illustrate by a few examples to what errors we are exposed when we do not constrain ourselves in this way and in how different a light the most vital phenomena appear when they are dealt with methodically.

If there is a fact whose pathological nature appears indisputable, it is crime. All criminologists agree on this score. Although they explain this pathology differently, they none the less unanimously acknowledge it. However, the problem needs to be treated less summarily.

Let us in fact apply the rules previously laid down. Crime is not only observed in most societies of a particular species, but in all societies of all types. There is not one in which criminality does not exist, although it changes in form and the actions which are termed criminal are not everywhere the same. Yet everywhere and always there have been men who have conducted themselves in such a way as to bring down punishment upon their heads. If at least, as societies pass from lower to higher types, the crime rate (the relationship between the annual crime figures and population figures) tended to fall, we might believe that, although still remaining a normal phenomenon, crime tended to lose that character of normality. Yet there is no single ground for believing such a regression to be real. Many facts would rather seem to point to the existence of a movement in the opposite direction. From the beginning of the century statistics provide us with a means of following the progression of criminality. It has everywhere increased, and in France the increase is of the order of 300 per cent. Thus there is no phenomenon which represents more incontrovertibly all the symptoms of

normality, since it appears to be closely-bound up with the conditions of all collective life. To make crime a social illness would be to concede that sickness is not something accidental, but on the contrary derives in certain cases from the fundamental constitution of the living creature. This would be to erase any distinction between the physiological and the pathological. It can certainly happen that crime itself has normal forms; this is what happens, for instance, when it reaches an excessively high level. There is no doubt that this excessiveness is pathological in nature. What is normal is simply that criminality exists, provided that for each social type it does not reach or go beyond a certain level which it is perhaps not impossible to fix in conformity with the previous rules.[10]

We are faced with a conclusion which is apparently somewhat paradoxical. Let us make no mistake: to classify crime among the phenomena of normal sociology is not merely to declare that it is an inevitable though regrettable phenomenon arising from the incorrigible wickedness of men; it is to assert that it is a factor in public health, an integrative element in any healthy society. At first sight this result is so surprising that it disconcerted even ourselves for a long time. However, once that first impression of surprise has been overcome it is not difficult to discover reasons to explain this normality and at the same time to confirm it.

In the first place, crime is normal because it is completely impossible for any society entirely free of it to exist.

Crime, as we have shown elsewhere, consists of an action which offends certain collective feelings which are especially strong and clear-cut. In any society, for actions regarded as criminal to cease, the feelings that they offend would need to be found in each individual consciousness without exception and in the degree of strength requisite to counteract the opposing feelings. Even supposing that this condition could effectively be fulfilled, crime would not thereby disappear; it would merely change in form, for the very

cause which made the well-springs of criminality to dry up would immediately open up new ones.

Indeed, for the collective feelings, which the penal law of a people at a particular moment in its history protects, to penetrate individual consciousnesses that had hitherto remained closed to them, or to assume greater authority – whereas previously they had not possessed enough – they would have to acquire an intensity greater than they had had up to then. The community as a whole must feel them more keenly, for they cannot draw from any other source the additional force which enables them to bear down upon individuals who formerly were the most refractory. For murderers to disappear, the horror of bloodshed must increase in those strata of society from which murderers are recruited; but for this to happen the abhorrence must increase throughout society. Moreover, the very absence of crime would contribute directly to bringing about that result, for a sentiment appears much more respectable when it is always and uniformly respected. But we overlook the fact that these strong states of the common consciousness cannot be reinforced in this way without the weaker states, the violation of which previously gave rise to mere breaches of convention, being reinforced at the same time, for the weaker states are no more than the extension and attenuated form of the stronger ones. Thus, for example, theft and mere misappropriation of property offend the same altruistic sentiment, the respect for other people's possessions. However, this sentiment is offended less strongly by the latter action than the former. Moreover, since the average consciousness does not have sufficient intensity of feeling to feel strongly about the lesser of these two offences, the latter is the object of greater tolerance. This is why the misappropriator is merely censured, while the thief is punished. But if this sentiment grows stronger, to such a degree that it extinguishes in the consciousness the tendency to theft that men possess, they will become more sensitive to these minor offences, which up to then had had only a marginal effect upon them. They will react with greater

intensity against these lesser faults, which will become the object of severer condemnation, so that, from the mere moral errors that they were, some will pass into the category of crimes. For example, dishonest contracts or those fulfilled dishonestly, which only incur public censure or civil redress, will become crimes. Imagine a community of saints in an exemplary and perfect monastery. In it crime as such will be unknown, but faults that appear venial to the ordinary person will arouse the same scandal as does normal crime in ordinary consciences. If therefore that community has the power to judge and punish, it will term such acts criminal and deal with them as such. It is for the same reason that the completely honourable man judges his slightest moral failings with a severity that the mass of people reserves for acts that are truly criminal. In former times acts of violence against the person were more frequent than they are today because respect for individual dignity was weaker. As it has increased, such crimes have become less frequent, but many acts which offended against that sentiment have been incorporated into the penal code, which did not previously include them.[11]

In order to exhaust all the logically possible hypotheses, it will perhaps be asked why this unanimity should not cover all collective sentiments without exception, and why even the weakest sentiments should not evoke sufficient power to forestall any dissentient voice. The moral conscience of society would be found in its entirety in every individual, endowed with sufficient force to prevent the commission of any act offending against it, whether purely conventional failings or crimes. But such universal and absolute uniformity is utterly impossible, for the immediate physical environment in which each one of us is placed, our hereditary antecedents, the social influences upon which we depend, vary from one individual to another and consequently cause a diversity of consciences. It is impossible for everyone to be alike in this matter, by virtue of the fact that we each have our own organic constitution and occupy different areas in space. This is why, even among lower peoples where individual

originality is very little developed, such originality does however exist. Thus, since there cannot be a society in which individuals do not diverge to some extent from the collective type, it is also inevitable that among these deviations some assume a criminal character. What confers upon them this character is not the intrinsic importance of the acts but the importance which the common consciousness ascribes to them. Thus if the latter is stronger and possesses sufficient authority to make these divergences very weak in absolute terms, it will also be more sensitive and exacting. By reacting against the slightest deviations with an energy which it elsewhere employs against those what are more weighty, it endues them with the same gravity and will brand them as criminal.

Thus crime is necessary. It is linked to the basic conditions of social life, but on this very account is useful, for the conditions to which it is bound are themselves indispensable to the normal evolution of morality and law.

Reading 2

Notes on the Sociology of Deviance

Kai T. Erikson

II

From a sociological standpoint, deviance can be defined as conduct which is generally thought to require the attention of social control agencies—that is, conduct about which "something should be done." Deviance is not a property *inherent in* certain forms of behavior; it is a property *conferred upon* these forms by the audiences which directly or indirectly witness them. Sociologically, then, the critical variable in the study of deviance is the social *audience* rather than the individual *person,* since it is the audience which eventually decides whether or not any given action or actions will become a visible case of deviation.

This definition may seem a little indirect, but it has the advantage of bringing a neglected sociological issue into proper focus. When a community acts to control the behavior of one of its members, it is engaged in a very intricate process of selection. Even a determined miscreant conforms in most of his daily behavior—using the correct spoon at mealtime, taking good care of his mother, or otherwise observing the mores of his society—and if the community elects to bring sanctions against him for the occasions when he does act offensively, it is responding to a few deviant details set within a vast context of proper conduct. Thus a person may be jailed or hospitalized for a few scattered moments of misbehavior, defined as a full-time deviant despite the fact that he had supplied the community with countless other indications that he was a decent, moral citizen. The screening device which sifts these telling details out of the individual's over-all performance, then, is a sensitive instrument of social control. It is important to note that this screen takes a

number of factors into account which are not directly related to the deviant act itself: it is concerned with the actor's social class, his past record as an offender, the amount of remorse he manages to convey, and many similar concerns which take hold in the shifting moods of the community. This is why the community often overlooks behavior which seems technically deviant (like certain kinds of white collar graft) or takes sharp exception to behavior which seems essentially harmless (like certain kinds of sexual impropriety). It is an easily demonstrated fact, for example, that working class boys who steal cars are far more likely to go to prison than upper class boys who commit the same or even more serious crimes, suggesting that from the point of view of the community lower class offenders are somehow more deviant. To this extent, the community screen is perhaps a more relevant subject for sociological research than the actual behavior which is filtered through it.

Once the problem is phrased in this way, we can ask: how does a community decide what forms of conduct should be singled out for this kind of attention? And why, having made this choice, does it create special institutions to deal with the persons who enact them? The standard answer to this question is that society sets up the machinery of control in order to protect itself against the "harmful" effects of deviance, in much the same way that an organism mobilizes its resources to combat an invasion of germs. At times, however, this classroom convention only seems to make the problem more complicated. In the first place, as Durkheim pointed out some years ago, it is by no means clear that all acts considered deviant in a culture are in fact (or even in principle) harmful to group life.[4] And in the second place, specialists in crime and mental health have long suggested that deviance can play an important role in keeping the social order intact—again a point we owe originally to Durkheim.[5] This has serious implications for sociological theory in general.

III

In recent years, sociological theory has become more and more concerned with the concept "social system"—an organization of society's component parts into a form which sustains internal equilibrium, resists change, and is boundary maintaining. Now this concept has many abstract dimensions, but it is generally used to describe those forces in the social order which promote a high level of uniformity among human actors and a high degree of symmetry within human institutions. In this sense, the concept is normatively oriented since it directs the observer's attention toward those centers in social space where the core values of society are figuratively located. The main organizational principle of a system, then, is essentially a centripetal one: it draws the behavior of actors toward the nucleus of the system, bringing it within range of basic norms. Any conduct which is neither attracted toward this nerve center by the rewards of conformity nor compelled toward it by other social pressures is considered "out of control," which is to say, deviant.

This basic model has provided the theme for most contemporary thinking about deviance, and as a result little attention has been given to the notion that systems operate to maintain boundaries. Generally speaking, boundaries are controls which limit the fluctuation of a system's component parts so that the whole retains a defined range of activity—a unique pattern of constancy and stability—within the larger environment.[6] The range of human behavior is potentially so great that any *social* system must make clear statements about the nature and location of its boundaries, placing limits on the flow of behavior so that it circulates within a given cultural area. Thus boundaries are a crucial point of reference for persons living within any system, a prominent concept in the group's special language and tradition. A juvenile gang may define its boundaries by the amount of territory it defends, a professional society by the range of subjects it discusses, a fraternal order by the variety of members it accepts. But in each case, members share the same idea as to where the group

begins and ends in social space and know what kinds of experience “belong” within this domain.

For all its apparent abstractness, a social system is organized around the movements of persons joined together in regular social relations. The only material found in a system for marking boundaries, then, is the behavior of its participants; and the form of behavior which best performs this function would seem to be deviant almost by definition, since it is the most extreme variety of conduct to be found within the experience of the group. In this respect, transactions taking place between deviant persons on the one side and agencies of control on the other are boundary maintaining mechanisms. They mark the outside limits of the area in which the norm has jurisdiction, and in this way assert how much diversity and variability can be contained within the system before it begins to lose its distinct structure, its unique shape.

A social norm is rarely expressed as a firm rule or official code. It is an abstract synthesis of the many separate times a community has stated its sentiments on a given issue. Thus the norm has a history much like that of an article of common law: it is an accumulation of decisions made by the community over a long period of time which gradually gathers enough moral influence to serve as a precedent for future decisions. Like an article of common law, the norm retains its validity only if it is regularly used as a basis for judgment. Each time the community censures some act of deviance, then, it sharpens the authority of the violated norm and re-establishes the boundaries of the group.

One of the most interesting features of control institutions, in this regard, is the amount of publicity they have always attracted. In an earlier day, correction of deviant offenders took place in the public market and gave the crowd a chance to display its interest in a direct, active way. In our own day, the guilty are no longer paraded in public places, but instead we are confronted by a heavy flow of newspaper and radio reports which offer much the same

kind of entertainment. Why are these reports considered “newsworthy” and why do they rate the extraordinary attention they receive? Perhaps they satisfy a number of psychological perversities among the mass audience, as many commentators have suggested, but at the same time they constitute our main source of information about the normative outlines of society. They are lessons through which we teach one another what the norms mean and how far they extend. In a figurative sense, at least, morality and immorality meet at the public scaffold, and it is during this meeting that the community declares where the line between them should be drawn.

Human groups need to regulate the routine affairs of everyday life, and to this end the norms provide an important focus for behavior. But human groups also need to describe and anticipate those areas of being which lie beyond the immediate borders of the group—the unseen dangers which in any culture and in any age seem to threaten the security of group life. The universal folklore depicting demons, devils, witches and evil spirits may be one way to give form to these otherwise formless dangers, but the visible deviant is another kind of reminder. As a trespasser against the norm, he represents those forces excluded by the group’s boundaries: he informs us, as it were, what evil looks like, what shapes the devil can assume. In doing so, he shows us the difference between kinds of experience which belong within the group and kinds of experience which belong outside it.

Thus deviance cannot be dismissed as behavior which *disrupts* stability in society, but is itself, in controlled quantities, an important condition for *preserving* stability.

V

In summary, two new lines of inquiry seem to be indicated by the argument presented above.

First, this paper attempts to focus our attention on an old but still vital sociological

question: how does a social structure communicate its “needs” or impose its “patterns” on human actors? In the present case, how does a social structure enlist actors to engage in deviant activity? Ordinarily, the fact that deviant behavior is more common in some sectors of society than in others is explained by declaring that something called “anomie” or “disorganization” prevails at these sensitive spots. Deviance leaks out where the social machinery is defective; it occurs where the social structure *fails* to communicate its needs to human actors. But if we consider the possibility that deviant persons are responding to the same social forces that elicit conformity from others, then we are engaged in another order of inquiry altogether. Perhaps the stability of some social units is maintained only if juvenile offenders are recruited to balance an adult majority; perhaps some families can remain intact only if one of their members becomes a visible deviant or is committed to a hospital or prison. If this supposition proves to be a useful one, sociologists should be interested in discovering how a social unit manages to differentiate the roles of its members and how certain persons are “chosen” to play the more deviant parts.

Second, it is evident that cultures vary in the way they regulate traffic moving back and forth from their deviant boundaries. Perhaps we could begin with the hypothesis that the traffic pattern known in our own culture has a marked Puritan cast: a defined portion of the population, largely drawn from young adult groups and from the lower economic classes, is stabilized in deviant roles and generally expected to remain there for indefinite periods of time. To this extent, Puritan attitudes about predestination and reprobation would seem to have retained a significant place in modern criminal law and public opinion. In other areas of the world, however, different traffic patterns are known. There are societies in which deviance is considered a natural pursuit for the young, an activity which they can easily abandon when they move through defined ceremonies into adulthood. There are societies which give license to large groups of persons to engage in deviant behavior for certain

seasons or on certain days of the year. And there are societies in which special groups are formed to act in ways "contrary" to the normal expectations of the culture. Each of these patterns regulates deviant traffic differently, yet all of them provide some institutionalized means for an actor to give up a deviant "career" without permanent stigma. The problem for sociological theory in general might be to learn whether or not these varying patterns are functionally equivalent in some meaningful sense; the problem for applied sociology might be to see if we have anything to learn from those cultures which permit re-entry into normal social life to persons who have spent a period of "service" on society's boundaries.

Notes [PLEASE RE-NUMBER SEQUENTIALLY]

4 Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (translated by George Simpson), Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952. See particularly Chapter 2, Book 1.

5 Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method, op. cit.*

6 Cf. Talcott Parsons, *The Social System, op. cit.*

7 For a good description of this process in the modern prison, see Gresham Sykes, *The Society of Captives,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. For views of two different types of mental hospital settings, see Erving Goffman, "The Characteristics of Total Institutions," *Symposium on Preventive and Social Psychiatry,* Washington, D. C.: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1957; and Kai T. Erikson, "Patient Role and Social Uncertainty: A Dilemma of the Mentally Ill," *Psychiatry,* 20 (1957), pp. 263-74.

9 Cf. Harold Garfinkel, "Successful Degradation Ceremonies," *American Journal of Sociology,* 61 (1956), pp. 420-24.

10 Albert K. Cohen, for example, speaking for most sociologists, seems to take the question for granted: "It would seem that the control of deviant behavior is, by definition, a culture

goal." In "The Study of Social Disorganization and Deviant Behavior," Merton, et al., editors, *Sociology Today*. New York: Basic Books, 1959, p. 465.

Reading 3

Outsiders

Definitions of Deviance

Howard S. Becker

The outsider—the deviant from group rules—has been the subject of much speculation, theorizing, and scientific study. What laymen want to know about deviants is: why do they do it? How can we account for their rule-breaking? What is there about them that leads them to do forbidden things? Scientific research has tried to find answers to these questions. In doing so it has accepted the common-sense premise that there is something inherently deviant (qualitatively distinct) about acts that break (or seem to break) social rules. It has also accepted the common-sense assumption that the deviant act occurs because some characteristic of the person who commits it makes it necessary or inevitable that he should. Scientists do not ordinarily question the label "deviant" when it is applied to particular acts or people but rather take it as given. In so doing, they accept the values of the group making the judgment.

It is easily observable that different groups judge different things to be deviant. This should alert us to the possibility that the person making the judgment of deviance, the process by which that judgment is arrived at, and the situation in which it is made may all be intimately involved in the phenomenon of deviance. To the degree that the common-sense view of deviance and the scientific theories that begin with its premises assume that acts that break rules are inherently deviant and thus take for granted the situations and processes of judgment, they may leave out an important variable. If scientists ignore the variable character of the process of judgment, they may by that omission limit the kinds of theories that can be developed and the kind of understanding that can be achieved.[1]

Our first problem, then, is to construct a definition of deviance. Before doing this, let us consider some of the definitions scientists now use, seeing what is left out if we take them as a point of departure for the study of outsiders.

The simplest view of deviance is essentially statistical, defining as deviant anything that varies too widely from the average. When a statistician analyzes the results of an agricultural experiment, he describes the stalk of corn that is exceptionally tall and the stalk that is exceptionally short as deviations from the mean or average. Similarly, one can describe anything that differs from what is most common as a deviation. In this view, to be left-handed or redheaded is deviant, because most people are right-handed and brunette.

So stated, the statistical view seems simple-minded, even trivial. Yet it simplifies the problem by doing away with many questions of value that ordinarily arise in discussions of the nature of deviance. In assessing any particular case, all one need do is calculate the distance of the behavior involved from the average. But it is too simple a solution. Hunting with such a definition, we return with a mixed bag—people who are excessively fat or thin, murderers, redheads, homosexuals, and traffic violators. The mixture contains some ordinarily thought of as deviants and others who have broken no rule at all. The statistical definition of deviance, in short, is too far removed from the concern with rule-breaking which prompts scientific study of outsiders.

A less simple but much more common view of deviance identifies it as something essentially pathological, revealing the presence of a “disease.” This view rests, obviously, on a medical analogy. The human organism, when it is working efficiently and experiencing no discomfort, is said to be “healthy.” When it does not work efficiently, a disease is present. The organ or function that has become deranged is said to be pathological. Of course, there is little disagreement about what constitutes a healthy state of the organism. But there is much less agreement when one uses the notion of pathology analogically, to describe kinds of

behavior that are regarded as deviant. For people do not agree on what constitutes healthy behavior. It is difficult to find a definition that will satisfy even such a select and limited group as psychiatrists; it is impossible to find one that people generally accept as they accept criteria of health for the organism.[2]

Sometimes people mean the analogy more strictly, because they think of deviance as the product of mental disease. The behavior of a homosexual or drug addict is regarded as the symptom of a mental disease just as the diabetic's difficulty in getting bruises to heal is regarded as a symptom of his disease. But mental disease resembles physical disease only in metaphor:

> Starting with such things as syphilis, tuberculosis, typhoid fever, and carcinomas and fractures, we have created the class "illness." At first, this class was composed of only a few items, all of which shared the common feature of reference to a state of disordered structure or function of the human body as a physiochemical machine. As time went on, additional items were added to this class. They were not added, however, because they were newly discovered bodily disorders. The physician's attention had been deflected from this criterion and had become focused instead on disability and suffering as new criteria for selection. Thus, at first slowly, such things as hysteria, hypochondriasis, obsessive-complusive neurosis, and depression were added to the category of illness. Then, with increasing zeal, physicians and especially psychiatrists began to call "illness" (that is, of course, "mental illness") anything and everything in which they could detect any sign of malfunctioning, based on no matter what norm. Hence, agoraphobia is illness because one should not be afraid of open spaces. Homosexuality is illness because heterosexuality is the social norm. Divorce is illness because it signals failure of marriage. Crime, art, undesired political leadership, participation in social affairs, or

withdrawal from such participation—all these and many more have been said to be signs of mental illness.[3]

The medical metaphor limits what we can see much as the statistical view does. It accepts the lay judgment of something as deviant and, by use of analogy, locates its source within the individual, thus preventing us from seeing the judgment itself as a crucial part of the phenomenon.

Some sociologists also use a model of deviance based essentially on the medical notions of health and disease. They look at a society, or some part of a society, and ask whether there are any processes going on in it that tend to reduce its stability, thus lessening its chance of survival. They label such processes deviant or identify them as symptoms of social disorganization. They discriminate between those features of society which promote stability (and thus are "functional") and those which disrupt stability (and thus are "dysfunctional"). Such a view has the great virtue of pointing to areas of possible trouble in a society of which people may not be aware.[4]

But it is harder in practice than it appears to be in theory to specify what is functional and what dysfunctional for a society or social group. The question of what the purpose or goal (function) of a group is and, consequently, what things will help or hinder the achievement of that purpose, is very often a political question. Factions within the group disagree and maneuver to have their own definition of the groups function accepted. The function of the group or organization then is decided in political conflict, not given in the nature of the organization. If this is true, then it is likewise true that the questions of what rules are to be enforced, what behavior regarded as deviant, and which people labeled as outsiders must also be regarded as political.[5] The functional view of deviance, by ignoring the political aspect of the phenomenon, limits our understanding.

Another sociological view is more relativistic. It identifies deviance as the failure to obey group rules. Once we have described the rules a group enforces on its members, we can say with some precision whether or not a person has violated them and is thus, on this view, deviant.

This view is closest to my own, but it fails to give sufficient weight to the ambiguities that arise in deciding which rules are to be taken as the yardstick against which behavior is measured and judged deviant. A society has many groups, each with its own set of rules, and people belong to many groups simultaneously. A person may break the rules of one group by the very act of abiding by the rules of another group. Is he, then, deviant? Proponents of this definition may object that while ambiguity may arise with respect to the rules peculiar to one or another group in society, there are some rules that are very generally agreed to by everyone, in which case the difficulty does not arise. This, of course, is a question of fact, to be settled by empirical research. I doubt there are many such areas of consensus and think it wiser to use a definition that allows us to deal with both ambiguous and unambiguous situations.

Deviance and the Responses of Others

The sociological view I have just discussed defines deviance as the infraction of some agreed-upon rule. It then goes on to ask who breaks rules, and to search for the factors in their personalities and life situations that might account for the infractions. This assumes that those who have broken a rule constitute a homogeneous category, because they have committed the same deviant act.

Such an assumption seems to me to ignore the central fact about deviance: it is created by society. I do not mean this in the way it is ordinarily understood, in which the causes of

deviance are located in the social situation of the deviant or in "social factors" which prompt his action. I mean, rather, that *social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance,* and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is *not* a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an "offender." The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label.[6]

Since deviance is, among other things, a consequence of the responses of others to a person's act, students of deviance cannot assume that they are dealing with a homogeneous category when they study people who have been labeled deviant. That is, they cannot assume that these people have actually committed a deviant act or broken some rule, because the process of labeling may not be infallible; some people may be labeled deviant who in fact have not broken a rule. Furthermore, they cannot assume that the category of those labeled deviant will contain all those who actually have broken a rule, for many offenders may escape apprehension and thus fail to be included in the population of "deviants" they study. Insofar as the category lacks homogeneity and fails to include all the cases that belong in it, one cannot reasonably expect to find common factors of personality or life situation that will account for the supposed deviance.

What, then, do people who have been labeled deviant have in common? At the least, they share the label and the experience of being labeled as outsiders. I will begin my analysis with this basic similarity and view deviance as the product of a transaction that takes place between some social group and one who is viewed by that group as a rule-breaker. I will be less concerned with the personal and social characteristics of deviants than with the process by which they come to be thought of as outsiders and their reactions to that judgment.

Mahnowski discovered the usefulness of this view for understanding the nature of

deviance many years ago, in his study of the Trobriand Islands:

> One day an outbreak of wailing and a great commotion told me that a death had occurred somewhere in the neighborhood. I was informed that Kima'i, a young lad of my acquaintance, of sixteen or so, had fallen from a coco-nut palm and killed himself. . . . I found that another youth had been severely wounded by some mysterious coincidence. And at the funeral there was obviously a general feeling of hostility between the village where the boy died and that into which his body was carried for burial.
>
> Only much later was I able to discover the real meaning of these events. That boy had committed suicide. The truth was that he had broken the rules of exogamy, the partner in his crime being his maternal cousin, the daughter of his mother's sister. This had been known and generally disapproved of but nothing was done until the girl's discarded lover, who had wanted to marry her and who felt personally injured, took the initiative. This rival threatened first to use black magic against the guilty youth, but this had not much effect. Then one evening he insulted the culprit m public—accusing him in the hearing of the whole community of incest and hurling at him certain expressions intolerable to a native.
>
> For this there was only one remedy; only one means of escape remained to the unfortunate youth. Next morning he put on festive attire and ornamentation, climbed a coco-nut palm and addressed the community, speaking from among the palm leaves and bidding them farewell. He explained the reasons for his desperate deed and also launched forth a veiled accusation against the man who had driven him to his death, upon which it became the duty of his clansmen to avenge him. Then he wailed aloud. as is the custom, jumped from a palm some sixty feet high and was killed on the spot. There followed a fight within the village in which the rival was wounded; and the quarrel was repeated

> during the funeral. . . .
>
> If you were to inquire into the matter among the Trobrianders, you would find . . . that the natives show horror at the idea of violating the rules of exogamy and that they believe that sores, disease and even death might follow clan incest. This is the ideal of native law, and in moral matters it is easy and pleasant strictly to adhere to the ideal—when judging the conduct of others or expressing an opinion about conduct in general.
>
> When it comes to the application of morality and ideals to real life, however, things take on a different complexion. In the case described it was obvious that the facts would not tally with the ideal of conduct. Public opinion was neither outraged by the knowledge of the crime to any extent, nor did it react directly— it had to be mobilized by a public statement of the crime and by insults being hurled at the culprit by an interested party. Even then he had to carry out the punishment himself. . . . Probing further into the matter and collecting concrete information, I found that the breach of exogamy—as regards intercourse and not marriage—is by no means a rare occurrence, and public opinion is lenient, though decidedly hypocritical. If the affair is carried on *sub rosa* with a certain amount of decorum, and if no one in particular stirs up trouble—"public opinion" will gossip, but not demand any harsh punishment. If, on the contrary, scandal breaks out—everyone turns against the guilty pair and by ostracism and insults one or the other may be driven to suicide.[7]

Whether an act is deviant, then, depends on how other people react to it. You can commit clan incest and suffer from no more than gossip as long as no one makes a public accusation; but you will be driven to your death if the accusation is made. The point is that the response of other people has to be regarded as problematic. Just because one has committed an infraction of a rule does not mean that others will respond as though this had happened.

(Conversely, just because one has not violated a rule does not mean that he may not be treated, in some circumstances, as though he had.)

The degree to which other people will respond to a given act as deviant varies greatly. Several kinds of variation seem worth noting. First of all, there is variation over time. A person believed to have committed a given "deviant" act may at one time be responded to much more leniently than he would be at some other time. The occurrence of "drives" against various kinds of deviance illustrates this clearly. At various times, enforcement officials may decide to make an all-out attack on some particular kind of deviance, such as gambling, drug addiction, or homosexuality. It is obviously much more dangerous to engage in one of these activities when a drive is on than at any other time. (In a very interesting study of crime news in Colorado newspapers, Davis found that the amount of crime reported in Colorado newspapers showed very little association with actual changes in the amount of crime taking place in Colorado. And, further, that peoples' estimate of how much increase there had been in crime in Colorado was associated with the increase in the amount of crime news but not with any increase in the amount of crime.) [8]

The degree to which an act will be treated as deviant depends also on who commits the act and who feels he has been harmed by it. Rules tend to be applied more to some persons than others. Studies of juvenile delinquency make the point clearly. Boys from middle-class areas do not get as far in the legal process when they are apprehended as do boys from slum areas. The middle-class boy is less likely, when picked up by the police, to be taken to the station; less likely when taken to the station to be booked; and it is extremely unlikely that he will be convicted and sentenced.[9] This variation occurs even though the original infraction of the rule is the same in the two cases. Similarly, the law is differentially applied to Negroes and whites. It is well known that a Negro believed to have attacked a white woman is much more likely to be punished than a white man who commits the same offense; it is only

slightly less well known that a Negro who murders another Negro is much less likely to be punished than a white man who commits murder.[10] This, of course, is one of the main points of Sutherland's analysis of white-collar crime: crimes committed by corporations are almost always prosecuted as civil cases, but the same crime committed by an individual is ordinarily treated as a criminal offense.[11]

Some rules are enforced only when they result in certain consequences. The unmarried mother furnishes a clear example. Vincent[12] points out that illicit sexual relations seldom result in severe punishment or social censure for the offenders. If, however, a girl becomes pregnant as a result of such activities the reaction of others is likely to be severe. (The illicit pregnancy is also an interesting example of the differential enforcement of rules on different categories of people. Vincent notes that unmarried fathers escape the severe censure visited on the mother.)

Why repeat these commonplace observations? Because taken together, they support the proposition that deviance is not a simple quality, present in some kinds of behavior and absent in others. Rather, it is the product of a process which involves responses of other people to the behavior. The same behavior may be an infraction of the rules at one time and not at another; may be an infraction when committed by one person, but not when committed by another; some rules are broken with impunity, others are not. In short, whether a given act is deviant or not depends in part on the nature of the act (that is, whether or not it violates some rule) and in part on what other people do about it.

Some people may object that this is merely a terminological quibble, that one can, after all, define terms any way he wants to and that if some people want to speak of rule-breaking behavior as deviant without reference to the reactions of others they are free to do so. This, of course, is true Yet it might be worthwhile to refer to such behavior as *rule-breaking behavior* and reserve the term *deviant* for those labeled as deviant by some segment of society. I do not

insist that this usage be followed. But it should be clear that insofar as a scientist uses "deviant" to refer to any rule-breaking behavior and takes as his subject of study only those who have been *labeled* deviant, he will be hampered by the disparities between the two categories.

If we take as the object of our attention behavior which comes to be labeled as deviant, we must recognize that we cannot know whether a given act will be categorized as deviant until the response of others has occurred. Deviance is not a quality that hes m behavior itself, but in the interaction between the person who commits an act and those who respond to it.

Whose Rules?

I have been using the term "outsiders" to refer to those people who are judged by others to be deviant and thus to stand outside the circle of "normal" members of the group. But the term contains a second meaning, whose analysis leads to another important set of sociological problems: "outsiders," from the point of view of the person who is labeled deviant, may be the people who make the rules he had been found guilty of breaking.

Social rules are the creation of specific social groups. Modern societies are not simple organizations in which everyone agrees on what the rules are and how they are to be applied in specific situations. They are, instead, highly differentiated along social class lines, ethnic fines, occupational lines, and cultural lines. These groups need not and, in fact, often do not share the same rules. The problems they face in dealing with their environment, the history and traditions they carry with them, all lead to the evolution of different sets of rules. Insofar as the rules of various groups conflict and contradict one another, there will be disagreement about the kind of behavior that is proper in any given situation.

Italian immigrants who went on making wine for themselves and their friends during Prohibition were acting properly by Italian immigrant standards, but were breaking the law of

their new country (as, of course, were many of their Old American neighbors). Medical patients who shop around for a doctor may, from the perspective of their own group, be doing what is necessary to protect their health by making sure they get what seems to them the best possible doctor; but, from the perspective of the physician, what they do is wrong because it breaks down the trust the patient ought to put in his physician. The lower-class delinquent who fights for his "turf" is only doing what he considers necessary and right, but teachers, social workers, and police see it differently.

While it may be argued that many or most rules are generally agreed to by all members of a society, empirical research on a given rule generally reveals variation in people's attitudes. Formal rules, enforced by some specially constituted group, may differ from those actually thought appropriate by most people.[13] Factions in a group may disagree on what I have called actual operating rules. Most important for the study of behavior ordinarily labeled deviant, the perspectives of the people who engage in the behavior are likely to be quite different from those of the people who condemn it. In this latter situation, a person may feel that he is being judged according to rules he has had no hand in making and does not accept, rules forced on him by outsiders.

To what extent and under what circumstances do people attempt to force their rules on others who do not subscribe to them? Let us distinguish two cases. In the first, only those who are actually members of the group have any interest in making and enforcing certain rules. If an orthodox Jew disobeys the laws of kashruth only other orthodox Jews will regard this as a transgression; Christians or nonorthodox Jews will not consider this deviance and would have no interest in interfering. In the second case, members of a group consider it important to their welfare that members of certain other groups obey certain rules. Thus, people consider it extremely important that those who practice the healing arts abide by certain rules; this is the reason the state licenses physicians, nurses, and others, and forbids

anyone who is not licensed to engage in healing activities.

To the extent that a group tries to impose its rules on other groups in the society, we are presented with a second question: Who can, in fact, force others to accept their rules and what are the causes of their success? This is, of course, a question of political and economic power. Later we will consider the political and economic process through which rules are created and enforced. Here it is enough to note that people are in fact always *forcing* their rules on others, applying them more or less against the will and without the consent of those others. By and large, for example, rules are made for young people by their elders. Though the youth of this country exert a powerful influence culturally—the mass media of communication are tailored to their interests, for instance —many important kinds of rules are made for our youth by adults. Rules regarding school attendance and sex behavior are not drawn up with regard to the problems of adolescence. Rather, adolescents find themselves surrounded by rules about these matters which have been made by older and more settled people. It is considered legitimate to do this, for youngsters are considered neither wise enough nor responsible enough to make proper rules for themselves.

In the same way, it is true in many respects that men make the rules for women in our society (though in America this is changing rapidly). Negroes find themselves subject to rules made for them by whites. The foreign-born and those otherwise ethnically peculiar often have their rules made for them by the Protestant Anglo-Saxon minority. The middle class makes rules the lower class must obey—in the schools, the courts, and elsewhere.

Differences in the ability to make rules and apply them to other people are essentially power differentials (either legal or extralegal). Those groups whose social position gives them weapons and power are best able to enforce their rules. Distinctions of age, sex, ethnicity, and class are all related to differences in power, which accounts for differences in the degree to which groups so distinguished can make rules for others.

In addition to recognizing that deviance is created by the responses of people to particular kinds of behavior, by the labeling of that behavior as deviant, we must also keep in mind that the rules created and maintained by such labeling are not universally agreed to. Instead, they are the object of conflict and disagreement, part of the political process of society.

NOTES

1. Cf. Donald R. Cressey, "Criminological Research and the Definition of Crimes," *American Journal of Sociology,* LVI (May, 1951), 546–551.
2. See the discussion in C. Wright Mills, "The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists," *American journal of Sociology,* XLIX (September, 1942). 165–180.
3. Thomas Szasz, *The Myth of Mental Illness* (New York: Paul B. Hoeber, Inc., 1961), pp. 44–45; see also Erving Goffman, "The Medical Model and Mental Hospitalization," in *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1961), pp. 321–386.
4. See Robert K. Merton, "Social Problems aand Sociological Theory," in Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet, editors, *Contemporary Social Problems* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961), pp. 697–737; and Talcott Parsons, *The Social Syastem* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1951), pp. 249–325.
5. Howard Brotz similarly identifies the question of what phenomena are "functional" or "dysfunctional" as a political one in "Functional and Dynamic Analysis." *European Journal of Sociology,* II (1961), 170–179.
6. The most important earlier statements of this view can be found in Frank Tannenbaum, *Crime and the Community* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1951), and E. M. Lemert, *Social Pathology* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1951). A recent

article stating a position very similar to mine is John Kitsuse, “Societal Reaction to Deviance: Problems of Theory and Method,” *Social Problems,* 9 (Winter, 1962), 247–256.

7. Bronislaw Malinowski, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (New York: Humanities Press, 1926), pp. 77–80. Reprinted by permission of Humanities Press and Routledgc & Kegan Paul, Ltd.
8. F James Davis, “Crime News in Colorado Newspapers,” *American Journal of Sociology,* LVII (January, 1952), 325–330
9. See Albert K. Cohen and James F. Short, Jr., “Juvenile Delinquency,” in Merton and Nisbet, *op. cit.,* p. 87.
10. See Harold Garfinkel, “Research Notes on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides,” *Social Forces,* 27 (May, 1949), 369–381.
11. Edwin H. Sutherland, “White Collar Criminality,” *American Sociological Review,* V (February, 1940), 1–12.
12. Clark Vincent, *Unmarried Mothers* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 3–5.
13. Arnold M. Rose and Arthur E. Prell, “Does the Punishment Fit the Crime?–A Study in Social Valuation,” *American journal of Sociology,* LXI (November, 1955), 247–259.

Reading 4

Defining Deviancy Down

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

IN ONE OF THE FOUNDING TEXTS OF SOCIOLOGY, *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1895), Emile Durkheim set it down that "crime is normal." "It is," he wrote, "completely impossible for any society entirely free of it to exist." By defining what is deviant, we are enabled to know what is not, and hence to live by shared standards. This aperçu appears in the chapter entitled "Rules for the Distinction of the Normal from the Pathological." Durkheim writes:

> From this viewpoint the fundamental facts of criminology appear to us in an entirely new light. . . . [T]he criminal no longer appears as an utterly unsociable creature, a sort of parasitic element, a foreign, inassimilable body introduced into the bosom of society. He plays a normal role in social life. For its part, crime must no longer be conceived of as an evil which cannot be circumscribed closely enough. Far from there being cause for congratulation when it drops too noticeably below the normal level, this apparent progress assuredly coincides with and is linked to some social disturbance.

Durkheim suggests, for example, that "in times of scarcity" crimes of assault drop off. He does not imply that we ought to approve of crime—"[p]ain has likewise nothing desirable about it"—but we need to understand its function. He saw religion, in the sociologist Randall Collins's terms, as "fundamentally a set of ceremonial actions, assembling the group, heightening its emotions, and focusing its members on symbols of their common belongingness." In this context "a punishment ceremony creates social solidarity."

The matter was pretty much left at that until seventy years later when, in 1965, Kai T. Erikson published *Wayward Puritans*, a study of "crime rates" in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The plan behind the book, as Erikson put it, was "to test [Durkheim's] notion that the number of deviant offenders a community can afford to recognize is likely to remain stable over time." The notion proved out very well indeed. Despite occasional crime waves, as when itinerant Quakers refused to take off their hats in the presence of magistrates, the amount of deviance in this corner of seventeenth-century New England fitted nicely with the supply of stocks and whipping posts. Erikson remarks:

> It is one of the arguments of the . . . study that the amount of deviation a community encounters is apt to remain fairly constant over time. To start at the beginning, it is a simple logistic fact that the number of deviancies which come to a community's attention are limited by the kinds of equipment it uses to detect and handle them, and to that extent the rate of deviation found in a community is at least in part a function of the size and complexity of its social control apparatus. A community's capacity for handling deviance, let us say, can be roughly estimated by counting its prison cells and hospital bed's, its policemen and psychiatrists, its courts and clinics. Most communities, it would seem, operate with the expectation that a relatively constant number of control agents is necessary to cope with a relatively constant number of offenders. The amount of men, money, and material assigned by society to "do something" about deviant behavior does not vary appreciably over time, and the implicit logic which governs the community's efforts to man a police force or maintain suitable facilities for the mentally ill seems to be that there is a fairly stable quota of trouble which should be anticipated.
>
> In this sense, the agencies of control often seem to define their job as that of keeping deviance within bounds rather than that of obliterating it altogether. Many judges, for

> example, assume that severe punishments are a greater deterrent to crime than moderate ones, and so it is important to note that many of them are apt to impose harder penalties when crime seems to be on the increase and more lenient ones when it does not, almost as if the power of the bench were being used to keep the crime rate from getting out of hand.

Erikson was taking issue with what he described as "a dominant strain in sociological thinking" that took for granted that a well-structured society "is somehow designed to prevent deviant behavior from occurring." In both authors, Durkheim and Erikson, there is an undertone that suggests that, with deviancy, as with most social goods, there is the continuing problem of demand exceeding supply. Durkheim invites us to

> imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary individuals. Crimes, properly so called, will there be unknown; but faults which appear venial to the layman will create there the same scandal that the ordinary offense does in ordinary consciousness. If, then, this society has the power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal and will treat them as such.

Recall Durkheim's comment that there need be no cause for congratulations should the amount of crime drop "too noticeably below the normal level." It would not appear that Durkheim anywhere contemplates the possibility of too much crime. Clearly his theory would have required him to deplore such a development, but the possibility seems never to have occurred to him.

Erikson, writing much later in the twentieth century, contemplates both possibilities. "Deviant persons can be said to supply needed services to society." There is no doubt a tendency for the supply of any needed thing to run short. But he is consistent. There can, he

believes, be *too much* of a good thing. Hence "the number of deviant offenders a community *can afford* to recognize is likely to remain stable over time." [My emphasis]

Social scientists are said to be on the lookout for poor fellows getting a bum rap. But here is a theory that clearly implies that there are circumstances in which society will choose *not* to notice behavior that would be otherwise controlled, or disapproved, or even punished.

It appears to me that this is in fact what we in the United States have been doing of late. I proffer the thesis that, over the past generation, since the time Erikson wrote, the amount of deviant behavior in American society has increased beyond the levels the community can "afford to recognize" and that, accordingly, we have been re-defining deviancy so as to exempt much conduct previously stigmatized, and also quietly raising the "normal" level in categories where behavior is now abnormal by any earlier standard. This redefining has evoked fierce resistance from defenders of "old" standards, and accounts for much of the present "cultural war" such as proclaimed by many at the 1992 Republican National Convention.

Let me, then, offer three categories of redefinition in these regards: the *altruistic*, the *opportunistic*, and the *normalizing*.

The first category, the *altruistic*, may be illustrated by the deinstitutionalization movement within the mental health profession that appeared in the 1950s. The second category, the opportunistic, is seen in the interest group rewards derived from the acceptance of "alternative" family structures. The third category, the normalizing, is to be observed in the growing acceptance of unprecedented levels of violent crime.

II

It happens that I was present at the beginning of the deinstitutionalization movement. Early in 1955 Averell Harriman, then the new governor of New York, met with his new commissioner of mental hygiene, Dr. Paul Hoch, who described the development, at one of the state mental hospitals, of a tranquilizer derived from rauwolfia. The medication had been clinically tested and appeared to be an effective treatment for many severely psychotic patients, thus increasing the percentage of patients discharged. Dr. Hoch recommended that it be used systemwide; Harriman found the money. That same year Congress created a Joint Commission on Mental Health and Illness whose mission was to formulate "comprehensive and realistic recommendations" in this area, which was then a matter of considerable public concern. Year after year, the population of mental institutions grew. Year after year, new facilities had to be built. Never mind the complexities: population growth and such like matters. There was a general unease. Durkheim's constant continued to be exceeded. (In *Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman*, Rudy Abramson writes: "New York's mental hospitals in 1955 were overflowing warehouses, and new patients were being admitted faster than space could be found for them. When he was inaugurated, 94,000 New Yorkers were confined to state hospitals. Admissions were running at more than 2,500 a year and rising, making the Department of Mental Hygiene the fastest-growing, most-expensive, most-hopeless department of state government.")

The discovery of tranquilizers was adventitious. Physicians were seeking cures for disorders that were just beginning to be understood. Even a limited success made it possible to believe that the incidence of this particular range of disorders, which had seemingly required persons to be confined against their will or even awareness, could be greatly reduced. The Congressional Commission submitted its report in 1961; it proposed a nationwide program of deinstitutionalization.

Late in 1961, President Kennedy appointed an interagency committee to prepare legislative recommendations based upon the report. I represented Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg on this committee and drafted its final submission. This included the recommendation of the National Institute of Mental Health that 2,000 community mental health centers (one per 100,000 of population) be built by 1980. A buoyant Presidential Message to Congress followed early in 1963. “If we apply our medical knowledge and social insights fully,” President Kennedy pronounced, “all but a small portion of the mentally ill can eventually achieve a wholesome and a constructive social adjustment.” A “concerted national attack on mental disorders [was] now possible and practical.” The President signed the Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act on October 31, 1963, his last public bill-signing ceremony. He gave me a pen.

The mental hospitals emptied out. At the time Governor Harriman met with Dr. Hoch in 1955, there were 93,314 adult residents of mental institutions maintained by New York State. As of August 1992, there were 11,363. This occurred across the nation. However, the number of community mental health centers never came near the goal of the 2,000 proposed community centers. Only some 482 received federal construction funds between 1963 and 1980. The next year, 1981, the program was folded into the Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse block grant and disappeared from view. Even when centers were built, the results were hardly as hoped for. David F. Musto of Yale writes that the planners had bet on improving national mental health “by improving the quality of general community life through expert knowledge, not merely by more effective treatment of the already ill.” There was no such knowledge.

However, worse luck, the belief that there *was* such knowledge took hold within sectors of the profession that saw institutionalization as an unacceptable mode of social control. These activists subscribed to a re-defining mode of their own. Mental patients were said to

have been “labeled,” and were not to be drugged. Musto says of the battles that followed that they were “so intense and dramatic precisely because both sides shared the fantasy of an omnipotent and omniscient mental health technology which could thoroughly reform society; the prize seemed eminently worth fighting for.”

But even as the federal government turned to other matters, the mental institutions continued to release inmates. Professor Fred Siegel of Cooper Union observes: “In the great wave of moral deregulation that began in the mid-1960s, the poor and the insane were freed from the fetters of middle-class mores.” They might henceforth sleep in doorways as often as they chose. The problem of the homeless appeared, characteristically defined as persons who lacked “affordable housing.”

The *altruistic* mode of redefinition is just that. There is no reason to believe that there was any real increase in mental illness at the time deinstitutionalization began. Yet there was such a perception, and this enabled good people to try to do good, however unavailing in the end.

III

Our second, or *opportunistic* mode of re-definition, reveals at most a nominal intent to do good. The true object is to do well, a long-established motivation among mortals. In this pattern, a growth in deviancy makes possible a transfer of resources, including prestige, to those who control the deviant population. This control would be jeopardized if any serious effort were made to reduce the deviancy in question. This leads to assorted strategies for re-defining the behavior in question as not all that deviant, really.

In the years from 1963 to 1965, the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of Labor picked up the first tremors of what Samuel H. Preston, in the 1984 Presidential Address to the Population Association of America, would call “the earthquake that shuddered

through the American family in the past twenty years." *The New York Times*, recently provided a succinct accounting of Preston's point:

> Thirty years ago, 1 in every 40 white children was born to an unmarried mother; today it is 1 in 5, according to Federal data. Among blacks, 2 of 3 children are born to an unmarried mother; 30 years ago the figure was 1 in 5.

In 1991, Paul Offner and I published longitudinal data showing that, of children born in the years 1967–69, some 22.1 percent were dependent on welfare—that is to say, Aid to Families with Dependent Children—before reaching age 18. This broke down as 15.7 percent for white children, 72.3 percent for black children. Projections for children born in 1980 gave rates of 22.2 percent and 82.9 percent respectively. A year later, a *New York Times* series on welfare and poverty called this a "startling finding . . . a symptom of vast social calamity."

And yet there is little evidence that these facts are regarded as a calamity in municipal government. To the contrary, there is general acceptance of the situation as normal. Political candidates raise the subject, often to the point of dwelling on it. But while there is a good deal of demand for symbolic change, there is none of the marshaling of resources that is associated with significant social action. Nor is there any lack of evidence that there is a serious social problem here.

Richard T. Gill writes of "an accumulation of data showing that intact biological parent families offer children very large advantages compared to any other family or non-family structure one can imagine." Correspondingly, the disadvantages associated with single-parent families spill over into other areas of social policy that now attract great public concern. Leroy L. Schwartz, M.D., and Mark W. Stanton argue that the real quest regarding a government-run health system such as that of Canada or Germany is whether it would work

“in a country that has social problems that countries like Canada and Germany don’t share to the same extent.” Health problems reflect ways of living. The way of life associated with “such social pathologies as the breakdown of the family structure” lead to medical pathologies. Schwartz and Stanton conclude: “The United States is paying dearly for its social and behavioral problems,” for they have now become medical problems as well.

To cite another example, there is at present no more vexing problem of social policy in the United States than that posed by education. A generation of ever-more ambitious statutes and reforms have produced weak responses at best and a fair amount of what could more simply be called dishonesty. (“Everyone knows that Head Start works.” By the year 2000, American students will “be first in the world in science and mathematics.”) None of this should surprise us. The 1966 report *Equality of Educational Opportunity* by James S. Coleman and his associates established that the family background of students played a much stronger role in student achievement relative to variations in the ten (and still standard) measures of school quality.

In a 1992 study entitled *America’s Smallest School: The Family,* Paul Barton came up with the elegant and persuasive concept of the parent-pupil ratio as a measure of school quality. Barton, who was on the policy planning staff in the Department of Labor in 1965, noted the great increase in the proportion of children living in single-parent families since then. He further noted that the proportion “varies widely among the states” and is related to “variation in achievement” among them. The correlation between the percentage of eighth graders living in two-parent families and average mathematics proficiency is a solid .74. North Dakota, highest on the math test, is second highest on the family compositions scale—that is, it is second in the percentage of kids coming from two-parent homes. The District of Columbia, lowest on the family scale, is second lowest in the test score.

A few months before Barton's study appeared, I published an article showing that the correlation between eighth-grade math scores and distance of state capitals from the Canadian border was .522, a respectable showing. By contrast, the correlation with per pupil expenditure was a derisory .203. I offered the policy proposal that states wishing to improve their schools should move closer to Canada. This would be difficult, of course, but so would it be to change the parent-pupil ratio. Indeed, the 1990 Census found that for the District of Columbia, apart from Ward 3 west of Rock Creek Park, the percentage of children living in single-parent families in the seven remaining wards ranged from a low of 63.6 percent to a high of 75.7. This being a one-time measurement, over time the proportions become asymptotic. And this in the nation's capital. No demand for change comes from that community—or as near to no demand as makes no matter. *For there is good money to be made out of bad schools.* This is a statement that will no doubt please many a hard heart, and displease many genuinely concerned to bring about change. To the latter, a group in which I would like to include myself, I would only say that we are obliged to ask why things do not change.

For a period there was some speculation that, if family structure got bad enough, this mode of deviancy would have less punishing effects on children. In 1991 Deborah A. Dawson, of the National Institutes of Health, examined the thesis that "the psychological effects of divorce and single parenthood on children were strongly influenced by a sense of shame in being 'different' from the norm." If this were so, the effect should have fallen off in the 1980s, when being from a single-parent home became much more common. It did not. "The problems associated with task overload among single parents are more constant in nature," Dawson wrote, adding that since the adverse effects had not diminished, they were "not based on stigmatization but rather on inherent problems in alternative family structures"—*alternative* here meaning other than two-parent families. We should take note of

such candor. Writing in the *Journal of Marriage and the Family* in 1989, Sara McLanahan and Karen Booth noted: “Whereas a decade ago the prevailing view was that single motherhood had no harmful effects on children, recent research is less optimistic.”

The year 1990 saw more of this lesson. In a paper prepared for the Progressive Policy Institute, Elaine Ciulla Kamarck and William A. Galston wrote that “if the economic effects of family breakdown are clear, the psychological effects are just now coming into focus.” They cite Karl Zinsmeister:

> There is a mountain of scientific evidence showing that when families disintegrate children often end up with intellectual, physical, and emotional scars that persist for life. . . . We talk about the drug crisis, the education crisis, and the problems of teen pregnancy and juvenile crime. But all these ills trace back predominantly to one source: broken families.

As for juvenile crime, they cite Douglas Smith and C. Roger Jarjoura: “Neighborhoods with larger percentages of youth (those aged 12 to 20) and areas with higher percentages of single-parent households also have higher rates of violent crime.” They add: “The relationship is so strong that controlling for family configuration erases the relationship between race and crime and between low income and crime. This conclusion shows up time and time again in the literature; poverty is far from the sole determinant of crime.” But the large point is avoided. In a 1992 essay “The Expert’s Story of Marriage,” Barbara Dafoe Whitehead examined “the story of marriage as it is conveyed in today’s high school and college textbooks.” Nothing amiss in this tale.

It goes like this:

The life course is full of exciting options. The lifestyle options available to individuals seeking a fulfilling personal relationship include living a heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual single lifestyle; living in a commune; having a group marriage; being a single parent; or living together. Marriage is yet another lifestyle choice. However, before choosing marriage, individuals should weigh its costs and benefits against other lifestyle options and should consider what they want to get out of their intimate relationships. Even within marriage, different people want different things. For example, some people marry for companionship, some marry in order to have children, some marry for emotional and financial security. Though marriage can offer a rewarding path to personal growth, it is important to remember that it cannot provide a secure or permanent status. Many people will make the decision between marriage and singlehood many times throughout their life.

Divorce represents part of the normal family life cycle. It should not be viewed as either deviant or tragic, as it has been in the past. Rather, it establishes a process for "uncoupling" and thereby serves as the foundation for individual renewal and "new beginnings."

History commences to be rewritten. In 1992, the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families of the U.S. House of Representatives held a hearing on "Investing in Families: A Historical Perspective." A fact sheet prepared by committee staff began:

"INVESTING IN FAMILIES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE"

FACT SHEET

HISTORICAL SHIFTS IN FAMILY COMPOSITION CHALLENGING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

While in modern times the percentage of children living with one parent has increased, more children lived with just one parent in Colonial America.

The fact sheet proceeded to list program on program for which federal funds were allegedly reduced in the 1980s. We then come to a summary.

> Between 1970 and 1991, the value of AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] benefits decreased by 41%, In spite of proven success of Head Start, only 28% of eligible children are being served. As of 1990, more than $18 billion in child support went uncollected. At the same time, the poverty rate among single-parent families with children under 18 was 44%. Between 1980 and 1990, the rate of growth in the total Federal budget was four times greater than the rate of growth in children's programs.

In other words, benefits paid to mothers and children have gone down steadily, as indeed they have done. But no proposal is made to restore benefits to an earlier level, or even to maintain their value, as is the case with other "indexed" Social Security programs. Instead we go directly to the subject of education spending.

Nothing new. In 1969, President Nixon proposed a guaranteed income, the Family Assistance Plan. This was described as an "income strategy" as against a "services strategy." It may or may not have been a good idea, but it was a clear one, and the resistance of service providers to it was equally clear. In the end it was defeated, to the huzzahs of the advocates of "welfare rights." What is going on here is simply that a large increase in what once was seen as deviancy has provided opportunity to a wide spectrum of interest groups that benefit from re-defining the problem as essentially normal and doing little to reduce it.

IV

Our *normalizing* category most directly corresponds to Erikson's proposition that "the number of deviant offenders a community can afford to recognize is likely to remain stable over time." Here we are dealing with the popular psychological notion of "denial." In 1965, having reached the conclusion that there would be a dramatic increase in single-parent families, I reached the further conclusion that this would in turn lead to a dramatic increase in crime. In an article in *America*, I wrote:

> From the wild Irish slums of the 19th century Eastern seaboard to the riot-torn suburbs of Los Angeles, there is one unmistakable lesson in American history: a community that allows a large number of young men to grow up in broken families, dominated by women, never acquiring any stable relationship to male authority, never acquiring any set of rational expectations about the future—that community asks for and gets chaos. Crime, violence, unrest, unrestrained lashing out at the whole social structure—that is not only to be expected; it is very near to inevitable.

The inevitable, as we now know, has come to pass, but here again our response is curiously passive. Crime is a more or less continuous subject of political pronouncement, and from time to time it will be at or near the top of opinion polls as a matter of public concern. But it never gets much further than that. In the words spoken from the bench, Judge Edwin Torres of the New York State Supreme Court, Twelfth Judicial District, described how "the slaughter of the innocent marches unabated: subway riders, bodega owners, cab drivers, babies; in laundromats, at cash machines, on elevators, in hallways." In personal

communication, he writes: “This numbness, this near narcoleptic state can diminish the human condition to the level of combat infantrymen, who, in protracted campaigns, can eat their battlefield rations seated on the bodies of the fallen, friend and foe alike. A society that loses its sense of outrage is doomed to extinction.” There is no expectation that this will change, nor any efficacious public insistence that it do so. The crime level has been *normalized.*

Consider the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre. In 1929 in Chicago during Prohibition, four gangsters killed seven gangsters on February 14. The nation was shocked. The event became legend. It merits not one but two entries in the *World Book Encyclopedia.* I leave it to others to judge, but it would appear that the society in the 1920s was simply not willing to put up with this degree of deviancy. In the end, the Constitution was amended, and Prohibition, which lay behind so much gangster violence, ended.

In recent years, again in the context of illegal traffic in controlled substances, this form of murder has returned. But it has done so at a level that induces denial. James Q. Wilson comments that Los Angeles has the equivalent of a St. Valentine’s Day Massacre every weekend. Even the most ghastly re-enactments of such human slaughter produce only moderate responses. On the morning after the close of the Democratic National Convention in New York City in July, there was such an account in the second section of the *New York Times.* It was not a big story; bottom of the page, but with a headline that got your attention. “3 Slain in Bronx Apartment, but a Baby is Saved.” A subhead continued: “A mother’s last act was to hide her little girl under the bed.” The article described a drug execution; the now-routine blindfolds made from duct tape; a man and a woman and a teenager involved. “Each had been shot once in the head.” The police had found them a day later. They also found, under a bed, a three-month-old baby, dehydrated but alive. A lieutenant remarked of the mother, “In her last dying act she protected her baby. She probably knew she was going to

die, so she stuffed the baby where she knew it would be safe." But the matter was left there. The police would do their best. But the event passed quickly; forgotten by the next day, it will never make *World Book.*

Nor is it likely that any great heed will be paid to an uncanny reenactment of the Prohibition drama a few months later, also in the Bronx. The *Times* story, page B3, reported:

9 *Men Posing as Police*

Are Indicted in 3 Murders

Drug Dealers Were Kidnapped for Ransom

The *Daily News* story, same day, page 17, made it *four* murders, adding nice details about torture techniques. The gang members posed as federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents, real badges and all. The victims were drug dealers, whose families were uneasy about calling the police. Ransom seems generally to have been set in the $650,000 range. Some paid. Some got it in the back of the head. So it goes.

Yet, violent killings, often random, go on unabated. Peaks continue to attract some notice. But these are peaks above "average" levels that thirty years ago would have been thought epidemic.

> LOS ANGELES, AUG. 24. (Reuters) Twenty-two people were killed in Los Angeles over the weekend, the worst period of violence in the city since it was ravaged by riots earlier this year, the police said today.
>
> Twenty-four others were wounded by gunfire or stabbings, including a 19-year old woman in a wheelchair who was shot in the back when she failed to respond to a motorist who asked for directions in south Los Angeles.

[“The guy stuck a gun out of the window and just fired at her,” said a police spokesman, Lieut. David Rock. The woman was later described as being in stable condition.

Among those who died was an off-duty officer, shot while investigating reports of a prowler in a neighbor’s yard, and a Little League baseball coach who had argued with the father of a boy he was coaching.]

The police said at least nine of the deaths were gang-related, including that of a 14-year old girl killed in a fight between rival gangs.

Fifty-one people were killed in three days of rioting that started April 29 after the acquittal of four police officers in the beating of Rodney G. King.

Los Angeles usually has above-average violence during August, but the police were at a loss to explain the sudden rise. On an average weekend in August, 14 fatalities occur.

Not to be outdone, two days later the poor Bronx came up with a near record, as reported in *New York Newsday*.

Armed with 9-mm. pistols, shotguns and M-16 rifles, a group of masked men and women poured out of two vehicles in the South Bronx early yesterday and sprayed a stretch of Longwood Avenue with a fusillade of bullets, injuring 12 people.

A Kai Erikson of the future will surely need to know that the Department of Justice in 1990 found that Americans reported only about 38 percent of all crimes and 48 percent of violent crimes. This, too, can be seen as a means of *normalizing* crime. In much the same way, the vocabulary of crime reporting can be seen to move toward the normal-seeming. A teacher is

shot on her way to class. The *Times* subhead reads: “Struck in the Shoulder in the Year’s First Shooting Inside a School.” First of the season.

It is too early, however, to know how to regard the arrival of the doctors on the scene declaring crime a “public health emergency.” The June 10, 1992, issue of the *Journal of the American Medical Association* was devoted entirely to papers on the subject of violence, principally violence associated with firearms. An editorial in the issue signed by former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and Dr. George D. Lundberg is entitled: “Violence in America: A Public Health Emergency.” Their proposition is admirably succinct.

5. Connections:

Definitions of Deviance and the Case of Underage Drinking and Drunk Driving

"Lexington Mom Becomes MADD Advocate After Losing Entire Family In Drunk Driving Accident" (Abubey October 20, 2012[1])

Introduction

Davana Moore – a mother from Kentucky—lost her entire family one tragic day in 2003 when a drunk teen drove onto an interstate the wrong way and plowed into the car driven by her husband, killing him and their two children. Today, Davana Moore is an activist in the Mothers Against Drunk Driving Program (MADD), which seeks to reduce teen drunk driving through public education campaigns, government lobbying, and policy initiatives. Mrs. Moore is not the only person to lose family because of teenage drunk driving. Leo McCarthy also lost family members. In 2007, his 14-year-old daughter, Mariah was killed when an underage drunk driver ran into her as she walked along the sidewalk a block from her house. McCarthy was named a CNN Hero in 2012 for starting the Mariah's Challenge program which asks teens to pledge not to drink and drive (Gumbrecht, 2012).

While these two stories call attention to American tragedies, they can also teach us about how deviance is defined in our society--the subject matter of Section 1 in this book— the ways it has been controlled or addressed overtime, and how that impacts our lives. One of the things that makes teen drunk driving relevant is that our society has a different set of expectations and standards for teens than adults. How so? First, it is illegal for teens to purchase and drink

[1] See http://www.digtriad.com/news/local/article/250627/57/Mom-Loses-Entire-Family-To-Drunk-Driving-Accident.

alcohol of any kind. Second, parents and families have responsibility for the caretaking of children, who are viewed as being "innocent" dependents requiring nurturing. Finally, teens are valued as the future of our society, thus their behavior is heavily monitored, scrutinized, and controlled in ways that adult behavior isn't.

In today's society, standards are created for behavior (such as underage drinking), states of being or conditions, lifestyles, speech or language and even our identities, physical traits or personal styles. These standards represent society's norms and violating them usually amounts to deviance. The two stories about teenage drunk driving can illustrate these definitions and highlight their differences. In this essay, I discuss different perspectives on them and note their variations. I further explain why these disparate definitions are important in understanding underage, binge drinking among young Americans. I begin with Durkheim's (1982) statistical approach, followed by Erickson's focus on morals and Becker's on society's reactions. I then review critical theories and the so-called politics of deviance.

Durkheim : Functionalism and Statistical Definitions of Deviance

Durkheim's groundbreaking *Rules of the Sociological Method* – reprinted in Section 1--features a statistical look at deviance. It focuses on the "prevalence" of behaviors, traits, and conditions in society and claims that deviant behavior is the rare phenomena or the *infrequent* event. Durkheim states:

> Let us agree to designate as the average type the hypothetical being which might be constituted by assembling in one entity, as a kind of individual abstraction, the most frequently occurring characteristics of the species in their most frequent forms. We may then say that the normal type merges into the average type and that any deviation from that standard of healthiness is a morbid phenomenon. (p. 91-92).

Central to this definition is a comparison point, or a referent by which deviation can be measured. Thus, pathology or deviance cannot be established as an objective fact on its own. It

can only be determined by assessing the full range of behaviors, traits or conditions in a population. From this, an "average" can be determined, which will represent the "normal type." Deviance will be that which departs too much from it.

As you might imagine, Durkheim's statistical approach required the collection and measuring of "real" things we could observe. Throughout time, and especially today, our society has collected enormous amounts of information on alcohol-related behaviors, attitudes, and conditions, especially among young people. These data collection efforts allow researchers, policy-makers, practitioners, educators and the general public to determine averages or "normal" alcohol consumption patterns as well as atypical or deviant ones. The data provide answers to such questions as: "How many Americans drive a vehicle while intoxicated and are the Moore and McCarthy cases above typical, yet unfortunate, incidents in our society? If the bulk of Americans did drive intoxicated, then Durkheim would call that "normal" behavior because this majority would set the statistical average or referent point. His definition did NOT cover any legal, moral, or health-related standard, even though driving while intoxicated is a crime.

While it is tragic, official data show drunk driving—responsible for losses suffered by the Moore and McCarthy families-- is NOT the statistical norm for Americans, nor is it for teenagers or any other demographic group. Drunk driving is statistically rare in our society. According to the Department of Transportation (2012), 10,228 people were killed in 2010 in alcohol-impaired driving crashes, accounting for nearly one-third (31%) of all traffic-related deaths in the United States. Death by motor vehicle injury is relatively uncommon compared to death from heart disease (596,339) or cancer (575,313). However, alcohol and drugs play a major role in motor vehicle death (CDC 2012). Moreover, the US Department of Justice (2012) reported 1.4 million arrests for driving under the influence in 2010. The biggest offenders of drunk driving are young

adults, or those between the ages of 21-29. Teen drunk driving, like those responsible for the deaths above, are rarer. In fact, teenage drunk driving has decreased dramatically between 1991 and 2011, such that only a small minority of teens (about 1 million) reported driving while drunk in 2011 (CDC 2012).

From Durkheim's viewpoint, these data show teenage drunk driving is deviant since it is an infrequent behavior. However, the 2011 NSDUH (SAMSHA 2012) shows that almost half (49%) of all 18-20 year olds reported being current drinkers and the 2012 report shows about 54% of high school seniors reported being drunk in the past month (SMASHA 2012). These statistics indicate that alcohol consumption is "normal" for people under 21 by Durkheim's definition, but it raises an interesting contradiction when we consider other ways of classifying deviant behavior. If teen drunk driving is a rare occurrence but underage drinking much more common, does that mean adolescents do or do not accept society's norms about the drinking age and other alcohol-related values and morals?

Erickson: Deviance as a Breach of Morals

Erickson (1962) spelled out a more morally-based definition of deviance in his article reprinted in this section and in his classic book *Wayward Puritans* (1966). He defined deviance as a breach of society's norms, which were defined by its morals, customs, and traditions. A deviant, Erickson maintained, was someone whose actions or identities had moved outside the margins of the group. When society holds him/her accountable for it, it reinforces boundaries of acceptable behavior. Morals are often codified into law, such as those which prohibit alcohol consumption by people under 21 years of age (Gusfield 1984; 1986). Therefore, even though many 18-20 years olds are current drinkers, their behavior is deviant by moral standards. Teenage drunk driving is likely considered even more depraved.

Erickson (1962) argued that such morally-based boundaries for behavior were crucial for society because they increased solidarity among people and groups. This moralistic orientation to deviance was anchored in functionalism, which views society as a complex system whose parts work together to promote solidarity and stability among its population. Agreement about morality and conformity to norms is necessary for society to thrive. Therefore, too much conflict and deviation will hinder solidarity and stability and thus throw society into a state of chaos (Erickson 1962).

Even though too much deviance could be problematic, Erickson also noted it served an important purpose. By establishing clear boundaries for acceptable and unacceptable behavior, i.e., it is unlawful to operate a vehicle while intoxicated, a society would bolster cohesion and solidarity among its citizens, helping to stabilize social life. He stated that if "the rhythm of group life was not punctuated by moments of deviant behavior…social organization would be impossible." (Erikson 1962: 68). Both the Moore and McCarthy cases above elicited the public's sympathy over the tragic loss, reminding it about the value of life and the dangers of alcohol. Beyond this, the 21 year-old drinking laws shore up society's values to protect the young, and by extension the family, against alcohol-related consequences (see Parents: the AntiDrug at http://www.theantidrug.com/drug-information/commonly-abused-drugs/alcohol.aspx and Mothers Against Drunk Drivers). For example, in 1980, Mothers Against Drunk Driving was established to "mobilize victims and their allies to establish the public conviction that impaired driving is unacceptable and criminal, in order to promote corresponding public policies, programs and personal responsibility." (http://www.madd.org/about-us/mission/). The Moore and McCarthy cases, and others, have led to the creation and growth of public and private initiatives designed to combat drunk driving,

which could even help the economy. Erickson also noted that deviance created jobs for many to keep it in check.

Moynihan, Social Acceptance of Drinking and Defining Deviancy Down

In a thought-provoking paper, that garnered much media attention, Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1992) wrote that the sociological positions about deviance, especially those of Durkheim and Erickson, and the liberal public mood of the 1970s, trivialized the significance of deviance and rendered okay unacceptable behaviors and lifestyles. He called this defining deviance down and described it as:

> "The public tolerance of intolerable behavior …We are becoming accustomed to high levels of deviance, crime, disorder and immoral behavior. Political correctness and increased tolerance for stigmatized behaviors is defining deviancy down." (p. 19).

Exactly how did society define deviance down? Moynihan articulated three methods. The first was an "altruistic" redefinition where seemingly well-intentioned people worked to better treat and even humanize problem groups. Moynihan pointed to the deinstitutionalization of mental illness which led to experts and advocates successfully campaigning for the release of mental patients from formal facilities. The current use of biological theories by top federal agencies to explain alcohol abuse and alcoholism as a result of brain chemistry interruptions or genetic makeup may be yet another example of Moynihan's idea. For example, Courtwright (2010) and Anderson, Lane and Swan (2010) have pointed out that new ideas about substance abuse and addiction downplay the moral component behind it and explain them as medical diseases that require treatment rather than more punitive sanctions. Thus, both the victims and the offenders in drunk-driving cases require our compassion and assistance.

Deviance was also being defined downward for opportunistic reasons. Moynihan argued

that some deviant behaviors were permitted to grow in society so that groups, institutions and agencies could justify increased resources. This method required a redefinition of deviance as "not all that bad." For example, Marketdata Enterprises (2000) found that the drug and alcohol abuse treatment industry was valued at $6.8 billion per year. Since their report is more than a decade old, it seems reasonable to speculate that the industry is worth even more money today since rates of alcohol abuse have remained steady or increased since that time. A report like this can be used to justify increased resources for public institutions as well, including local and state agencies handling alcohol problems, as well as federal agencies such as the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism.

Finally, Moynihan said that there was a sort of psychological denial—especially among sociologists—that *normalized* deviance. He took issue with Erickson's and Durkheim's notions that a community could accommodate a certain amount of deviance before its stability would be threatened. Moynihan advocated a return to old traditions and morals (i.e., those which were reflective of a white, middleclass, heterosexual standard) and was troubled when by society's apparent willingness to tolerate deviance.

Moynihan's point may be supported by a recent study on substance use in popular music. Primack et al (2008) studied references to and messages about drugs and alcohol in the most popular songs on Billboard magazine in 2005. They found:

> "The average adolescent is exposed to approximately 84 references to explicit substance use daily in popular songs, and this exposure varies widely by musical genre. The substance use depicted in popular music is frequently motivated by peer acceptance and sex, and it has highly positive associations and consequences." These motivations are

highly important to youth, who are especially susceptible to them given ongoing identity crises in the teenage years.

The Roberts et al study (1999) found similar patterns and messages in movies.

Becker: Deviance as Social Reaction

Howard Becker (1963), as well as Erving Goffman (1963) and Edwin Lemert (1974), articulated labeling theory, or the social reaction theory of deviance. Constructionists employ a subjectivist view, concerning themselves with how traits, conditions, behaviors, etc. get defined as deviant in society. In his classic book *Outsiders* (1963), Becker expressed a social-reaction type of definition calling deviance anything people in society so labeled and argued that norm violations had to be publicly exposed in order for deviance to exist and command our attention. Becker's point was that deviance didn't objectively exist. Instead, it was a subjective response to something objectionable that becomes known to the public. Thus, unless today's 18 year-old is caught drinking or buying alcohol by authorities, he or she can consume it and avoid being called a deviant and penalized accordingly.

Social reactionists like Becker, were concerned with how people reacted to and defined deviance and how those definitions and reactions impacted deviant behavior over time. For example, labeling theory viewed drug and alcohol use as not initially troublesome. Such behaviors only became problematic when society officially branded people as "drug abusers," "drunks" or "troublemakers" and punished them. Such labeling would lead to increased deviant behavior because those branded would accept society's pejorative view of them and act accordingly (Becker 1963). Labeling theorists called this the ***self-fulfilling prophecy*** (Cooley 1922). They argued that once a person was labeled and stereotyped as criminal, or in some other

negative fashion, they would likely be shunned by law-abiding society, have difficulty finding a good job and lose some civil rights.

Critical Theory and the Politics of Deviance.

It is important to note that defining something as deviant can be viewed as an act of power, which may represent yet another way to describe deviance. This is a basic position of more critical or conflict-oriented theories (Pfohl 2009: Quinney 1975) and it plays an important role in newer statements about deviance. Consider that when something or someone is defined as normal or acceptable, it is almost certain that something or someone else is rendered deviant. Deviance is typically devalued and scrutinized. There are consequences for deviant behavior and discrimination against those who engage in it or who possess deviant traits or conditions. Therefore, the act of classifying someone or something as deviant must be viewed as one of power, because the consequences that often accompany it. And when we look at who and what is classified as deviant in our society and who has done the cataloguing, we see considerable inequality. Powerful groups have been able to define deviance and label others in ways that less powerful people have not.

What sorts of things do the powerful and privileged do to make sure they benefit from deviance? The critical theory readings included in this book point to various strategies, ranging from symbolic acts (like using the media to manipulate public opinion and beliefs, e.g., moral panics and crusades) as well as actual mechanisms of social control (e.g., laws and penalties).

If we look back in time, we can find support for the conflict perspective in legislation about alcohol (Gusfield1984; 1986). In the U.S., consumption of alcoholic beverages was once outlawed for everyone via the 18th Amendment or the Volstead Act (1919). The Prohibition Era lasted until 1933, when the 21st Amendment repealed the Volstead Act and made it legal for

people to consume distilled spirits, beer, and wine once again. However, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, Federal government initiatives against drinking by young people (those under 21 years of age) ultimately produced a national drinking age law, making it illegal for those less than 21 years-of-age to buy or consume alcoholic beverages. Scholars have noted that these alcohol policies were the result of political maneuvering by powerful groups, like the Anti-Saloon League, the Women's Christian Temperance and MADD, who sought to protect families from the negative consequences of alcohol. Yet, these laws have also been motivated by a variety of economic interests. For example, labor unions supported Prohibition because they believed workers' alcoholism would disrupt the workplace while stakeholders in the alcohol industry (e.g., US Brewers Association and the German-American Alliance) and local saloons (Musto 1999) all opposed Prohibition to protect their profits.

Today, powerful groups, companies and institutions still control alcohol laws and policies in the US (Gusfield 1984). For example, in addition to running a high-profile website that informs the public about the drunk driving cases noted above, MADD has expanded its mission to preventing underage drinking of all kinds and supporting victims of violent crime. MADD's influence will likely grow into the future given that Congress just awarded them $50 million dollars to fund their efforts (MADD 2013). Its work might be complimented groups like the National Association on Alcohol, Drugs and Dependency or undermined by pro-alcohol associations, such as the Brewers' Association and/or the major beer manufacturers themselves. One thing we can likely bet on is that the maneuvering of such powerful entities will likely impact our own experiences with alcohol.

Conclusion

This essay used underage drinking and drunk driving to describe the major ways

sociologists define deviant behavior, traits and conditions in society. While the perspectives are unique, they share some important assumptions that may render them dated in today's society. For example, each focuses attention on the individual "deviant" subject and views him or her in a negative light. Specifically, deviants are considered misfits or offenders who threaten society (functionalism) or victims forced into deviance by oppressive conditions (critical theory) and then labeled and penalized in a detrimental fashion by punitive institutions and powerful actors (labeling theory). Society and its institutions are the entities with power to define deviance and control individual behavior. Individuals are fairly powerless in all of this. They don't take pride in themselves or their actions and they have little control over their fate. Yet when they do take control, it often backfires with consequences for them and the larger society.

Do you agree with this? Are these assumptions accurate and useful? As you make your way through the readings in this book, it is important to think about these assumptions and to keep in mind how deviance is defined (subjectively versus objectively; positively or negatively; as an individual or structural phenomena) in society. Pay attention to who does the defining, why that matters, and how such definitions might perpetuate inequality. Keep your eye on the relationship between the definition of deviance and the type of social control or remedy advocated.

Most importantly, however, try to take the role or perspective of the "deviant" in question so that you might see how the deviance game both impacts him/her and you, the supposed upstanding member of society. For example, is gang membership always a bad thing? How do members see their activity differently than the law-abiding public? Do gangs somehow benefit society? How so? Can gang members make important contributions? What might they be? By reading these pioneering statements and thinking about them critically, the contributors to this

book and I are betting you will see the continued value of classic work as well as well as the justification for refreshing the field of deviance with more contemporary ideas.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Identify a behavior, condition or trait that could be viewed as moral deviance but is statistically common in our society? Discuss the contradictions between the moral definition of Erickson with the more statistical one that Durkheim discussed.
2. Pick any deviant behavior and discuss how the people who engage in it might not be labeled deviant in society while still others are. What do you think explains the differences between the application of the deviant label to some and not others?
3. In what ways is deviance a positive thing for society? How do you benefit from it personally? Give examples.

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Section 2. Functionalism, Anomie, General Strain Theory

Introduction.

Tammy L. Anderson.

"Everyone is trying to get an edge, and if you can take a pill to study all night and get that grade you need, a lot of people don't see why you wouldn't."
(un-named male college student quoted in Couric, 2010).

"It's crucial, that first two or three weeks out of the penitentiary, very, very crucial. If they don't find a job, what are you gonna say? Oh, man, I can't find a job. I don't know what to do. You know what, let me try to go back to my old way. Maybe I could sell a couple of bags, man, and then I'll just quit, man. Just to make me enough money to buy me some clothes, maybe. Before you know it, he sees a couple dollars in his pocket. Oh man, let me do it again, and again."
(Eugene Kovoda, an ex-con, quoted in Scott 2004: 129).

What do these two quotes have in common? The first is from a white male college student who claims he needs a prescription stimulant to help him get good grades in college. The second is from an ex-con who claims selling drugs is necessary to get money to buy clothes. Both are trying to attain goals that are social approved in our society and both are also using illegitimate or deviant means to attain them.

Section 2—on functionalism, anomie and general strain theory—may provide some answers. Let's begin with the college student. In a 2010 report entitled "Boosting Brain Power" on the popular news program *60 Minutes*, journalist Katie Couric profiled college students who use medications, like Ritalin and Adderall, to enhance their performance on exams and other course requirements because they believed they couldn't obtain the scores they desired, or weree expected of them, on their own. The use of prescribed medications without a doctor's permission is a crime punishable by law (www.dea.gov). However, the students Couric profiles suggest that such "neural-enhancement" is both logical and commonplace in college, as indicated in the young student's statement above.

While official estimates show that ADHD is on the rise in our society (Ellison 2010), the Couric report suggests the non-medical use of prescription stimulants has expanded beyond those officially diagnosed to a broader group seeking help in achieving "respectable" cultural goals. Sociologists have found the non-medical use of prescribed stimulants is easily justified by college students to fix their feelings about others' expectations and their own perceived inadequacies in attaining their academic goals (Loe and Cuttino 2008). How can the sociology of deviance help us understand this and make important connections between the two very different young men described above?

Section 2 covers functionalism, anomie, and general strain theory—three seminal ideas that have shaped the study of deviance over time. Included in this section is a classic reading by Merton (1938) who famously articulated a theory of strain to explain deviant behavior, based in Durkheim's functionalism and theory of anomie. Merton would have called both the ex-con and the students in Couric's video "innovators," a sort of cheater who uses illegitimate means to attain socially desired goods or approved goals, i.e., money for clothes or good grades. Merton warned about such outrageous expectations in a society plagued by anomie. Research shows it's unrealistic to presume ex-cons will quickly find employment in an era of punitive crime policies that mark and disqualify them (Pager 2007). The students profiled in Couric's report are also sensitive to society's expectations and incentives to take deviant shortcuts. Ali explains:

> I wonder, at what level . . . if so many people have ADD . . . at what level it is just because of the standards we hold over everyone and the expectations of the school system and the work world (Ali from Loe and Cuttino, 2008: 311).

Sociologists and criminologists have since challenged Merton and other functionalists' structural or macro-level explanations. One line of criticism has come from those concerned with cultural diversity. To what extent, does anomie theory hold across groups with different

cultural backgrounds, social positions and experiences? The Hagedorn (1997) ethnographic study of drug gangs in Milwaukee, included in this section, lends support to Merton's ideas, but adds racial discrimination as another structural factor that motivates deviance. A second major challenge to Merton's anomie theory comes from those opting for more micro-level approaches that focus on individuals' motivations, feelings, experiences as they accumulate over time. In this section, the reading by Agnew (1999) makes the case for a more individual-oriented General Strain theory (GST) of deviance and crime.

These readings, along with my connections essay on doping in elite sports (another type of "innovator"), will hopefully sharpen students' critical thinking skills by teaching them about how both environmental forces beyond the individual's control, as well as the more personal ones they can shape on a daily basis, impact a wide range of non-normative behaviors across culturally and socially diverse groups. A few brief words about anomie and general strain theory will get us thinking about this micro-macro issue.

Anomie. Robert Merton believed that the key to understanding deviance was in the norms society sets: they are simply unrealistic to achieve or conform to. Deviance arises when goals are too difficult for people to achieve by acceptable standards. Access to the opportunities (educational and economic) to achieve society's goals and live a productive life had to be available to all, yet Merton (1938) found they were not. Instead, their access was unevenly distributed by social class, neighborhood, age, sex, race, and religion. ***Anomie*** or alienation emerged when there was a discrepancy between socially approved goals and access to their legitimate attainment. Merton argued that people could respond to anomie in a variety of ways. Innovation was one. Innovators accepted socially approved goals (.e.g., material comfort or academic scholarships and high GPAs), but would reject conventional means for obtaining them,

opting for more illegitimate avenues, like committing street crime or using prescribed ADHD medications for reasons other than how they were intended.

General Strain Theory (GST). Agnew's (1999) GST is an attempt to clarify how the more structural factors that Merton pontificated about—cultural goals, access to legitimate opportunities—led to individual law-breaking. The link Agnew offered was emotional or social-psychological in nature. People's goals, he argued, are set by their positive experiences in society and when they are unable to attain them, anger, resentment, disappointment, and unhappiness can result and lead to crime.

Agnew specifies three major types of strain in his paper included in this section. Perhaps the one most relevant to the innovators described above is the failure to achieve positively valued goals. For example, if an individual cannot achieve the material things they desire (like the gang members in Hagedorn's study), good grades (students profiled in Couric's report), they may resort to deviant and criminal behavior to achieve them. Delinquent behavior is enacted to reduce feelings of anger and frustration. Thus, Agnew would not have predicted drug-dealing or non-medical stimulant use to simply result from unrealistic social expectations or deprived economic status or blocked opportunities, but rather the individual's psychological reaction to these things and their negative perceptions of their environment. *Therefore, one of the most important distinctions in Agnew's work is the idea that the psychological traits of individuals "condition" or influence the effects of anomie on crime*.

In my connections essay, I draw out the links between these anomie and strain-based theories of deviance with yet another type of illegal activity: doping in elite sports. Above, I asked you to consider what the college student and ex-con had in common. Now, I'd like you to add into that mix a professional athlete, like former Tour de France winner Bjarne Riss, who

many of us might admire. To what extent is his deviance- taking EPO to win the marquee cycling event—similar to the student and ex-con's behavior? Riss gives us some clues in his statement:

> *Once you start you don't reflect on it, you think it's a part of the life, a part of the culture, everybody else is doing it and after a while you think it's just natural. If I want to be at the top I realized this (doping) is what I had to do.* (Former Tour de France winner Bjarne Riis explains in Cyclingnews.com, June 1, 2012)

Taken together, Section 2 discusses several different kinds of innovators or cheaters—if you will—in our society and the sources of anomie or strain that motivate them. Merton wrote about garden variety criminals and juvenile delinqunts. Hagedorn reports on inner-city drug dealers. My connections essay discusses doping among elite athletes and this introduction describes college students' illicit use of prescribed stimulants to achieve their academic goals. While it is true that all of us, despite our backgrounds, are susceptible to some level of anomie and strain, it is also true that there are racial and class patterns to deviant innovations. Merton studied the poor. Hagedorn focused on disadvantaged blacks. Doping in professional sports is a mixed race, privileged group, while the college students popping Adderall to pass their exams are largely middleclass and white.

One question to consider then is if patterns in deviant innovation are related to cultural differences between race and ethnic groups or to economic status and social class position? Perhaps styles of innovation are simply a combination of a variety of social dimensions, including race, ethnicity, class, age, and gender. If so, then another important question to ask is what types of cheating, and by whom, are tolerated in our society and which are not? How would you explain the differences? Which types of innovation and groups would you explain with the more macro-level anomie theory or the more micro-level general strain theory? Would you combine them? I hope the readings in this section help you reach some conclusions.

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Reading 6

Social Structure and Anomie

Robert K. Merton

THERE persists a notable tendency in sociological theory to attribute the malfunctioning of social structure primarily to those of man's imperious biological drives which are not adequately restrained by social control. In this view, the social order is solely a device for "impulse management" and the "social processing" of tensions. These impulses which break through social control, be it noted, are held to be biologically derived. Nonconformity is assumed to be rooted in original nature.[1] Conformity is by implication the result of an utilitarian calculus or unreasoned conditioning. This point of view, whatever its other deficiences, clearly begs one question. It provides no basis for determining the nonbiological conditions which induce deviations from prescribed patterns of conduct. In this paper, it will be suggested that certain phases of social structure generate the circumstances in which infringement of social codes constitutes a "normal" response.[2]

The conceptual scheme to be outlined is designed to provide a coherent, systematic approach to the study of socio-cultural sources of deviate behavior. Our primary aim lies in discovering how some social structures *exert a definite pressure* upon certain persons in the society to engage in nonconformist rather than conformist conduct. The many ramifications of the scheme cannot all be discussed; the problems mentioned outnumber those explicitly treated.

Among the elements of social and cultural structure, two are important for our purposes. These are analytically separable although they merge imperceptibly in concrete situations. The first consists of culturally defined goals, purposes, and interests. It comprises a frame of aspirational reference. These goals are more or less integrated and involve varying degrees of

prestige and sentiment. They constitute a basic, but not the exclusive, component of what Linton aptly has called "designs for group living." Some of these cultural aspirations are related to the original drives of man, but they are not determined by them. The second phase of the social structure defines, regulates, and controls the acceptable modes of achieving these goals. Every social group invariably couples its scale of desired ends with moral or institutional regulation of permissible and required procedures for attaining these ends. These regulatory norms and moral imperatives do not necessarily coincide with technical or efficiency norms. Many procedures which from the standpoint of *particular individuals* would be most efficient in securing desired values, e.g., illicit oil-stock schemes, theft, fraud, are ruled out of the institutional area of permitted conduct. The choice of expedients is limited by the institutional norms.

To say that these two elements, culture goals and institutional norms, operate jointly is not to say that the ranges of alternative behaviors and aims bear some constant relation to one another. The emphasis upon certain goals may vary independently of the degree of emphasis upon institutional means. There may develop a disproportionate, at times, a virtually exclusive, stress upon the value of specific goals, involving relatively slight concern with the institutionally appropriate modes of attaining these goals. The limiting case in this direction is reached when the range of alternative procedures is limited only by technical rather than institutional considerations. Any and all devices which promise attainment of the all important goal would be permitted in this hypothetical polar case.[3] This constitutes one type of cultural malintegration. A second polar type is found in groups where activities originally conceived as instrumental are transmuted into ends in themselves. The original purposes are forgotten and ritualistic adherence to institutionally prescribed conduct becomes virtually obsessive.[4] Stability is largely ensured while change is flouted. The range of alternative behaviors is severely limited. There develops a tradition-bound, sacred society characterized

by neophobia. The occupational psychosis of the bureaucrat may be cited as a case in point. Finally, there are the intermediate types of groups where a balance between culture goals and institutional means is maintained. These are the significantly integrated and relatively stable, though changing, groups.

An effective equilibrium between the two phases of the social structure is maintained as long as satisfactions accrue to individuals who conform to both constraints, viz., satisfactions from the achievement of the goals and satisfactions emerging directly from the institutionally canalized modes of striving to attain these ends. Success, in such equilibrated cases, is twofold. Success is reckoned in terms of the product and in terms of the process, in terms of the outcome and in terms of activities. Continuing satisfactions must derive from sheer *participation* in a competitive order as well as from eclipsing one's competitors if the order itself is to be sustained. The occasional sacrifices involved in institutionalized conduct must be compensated by socialized rewards. The distribution of statuses and roles through competition must be so organized that positive incentives for conformity to roles and adherence to status obligations are provided *for every position* within the distributive order. Aberrant conduct, therefore, may be viewed as a symptom of dissociation between culturally defined aspirations and socially structured means.

Of the types of groups which result from the independent variation of the two phases of the social structure, we shall be primarily concerned with the first, namely, that involving a disproportionate accent on goals. This statement must be recast in a proper perspective. In no group is there an absence of regulatory codes governing conduct, yet groups do vary in the degree to which these folkways, mores, and institutional controls are effectively integrated with the more diffuse goals which are part of the culture matrix. Emotional convictions may cluster about the complex of socially acclaimed ends, meanwhile shifting their support from the culturally defined implementation of these ends. As we shall see, certain aspects of the

social structure may generate countermores and antisocial behavior precisely because of differential emphases on goals and regulations. In the extreme case, the latter may be so vitiated by the goal-emphasis that the range of behavior is limited only by considerations of technical expediency. The sole significant question then becomes, which available means is most efficient in netting the socially approved value?[5] The technically most feasible procedure, whether legitimate or not, is preferred to the institutionally prescribed conduct. As this process continues, the integration of the society becomes tenuous and anomie ensues.

Thus, in competitive athletics, when the aim of victory is shorn of its institutional trappings and success in contests becomes construed as "winning the game" rather than "winning through circumscribed modes of activity," a premium is implicitly set upon the use of illegitimate but technically efficient means. The star of the opposing football team is surreptitiously slugged; the wrestler furtively incapacitates his opponent through ingenious but illicit techniques; university alumni covertly subsidize "students" whose talents are largely confined to the athletic field. The emphasis on the goal has so attenuated the satisfactions deriving from sheer participation in the competitive activity that these satisfactions are virtually confined to a successful outcome. Through the same process, tension generated by the desire to win in a poker game is relieved by successfully dealing oneself four aces, or, when the cult of success has become completely dominant, by sagaciously shuffling the cards in a game of solitaire. The faint twinge of uneasiness in the last instance and the surreptious nature of public delicts indicate clearly that the institutional rules of the game *are known* to those who evade them, but that the emotional supports of these rules are largely vitiated by cultural exaggeration of the success-goal.[6] They are microcosmic images of the social macrocosm.

Of course, this process is not restricted to the realm of sport. The process whereby exaltation of the end generates a *literal demoralization*, i.e., a deinstitutionalization, of the

means is one which characterizes many[7] groups in which the two phases of the social structure are not highly integrated. The extreme emphasis upon the accumulation of wealth as a symbol of success[8] in our own society militates against the completely effective control of institutionally regulated modes of acquiring a fortune.[9] Fraud, corruption, vice, crime, in short, the entire catalogue of proscribed behavior, becomes increasingly common when the emphasis on the *culturally induced* success-goal becomes divorced from a coordinated institutional emphasis. This observation is of crucial theoretical importance in examining the doctrine that antisocial behavior most frequently derives from biological drives breaking through the restraints imposed by society. The difference is one between a strictly utilitarian interpretation which conceives man's ends as random and an analysis which finds these ends deriving from the basic values of the culture.[10]

Our analysis can scarcely stop at this juncture. We must turn to other aspects of the social structure if we are to deal with the social genesis of the varying rates and types of deviate behavior characteristic of different societies. Thus far, we have sketched three ideal types of social orders constituted by distinctive patterns of relations between culture ends and means. Turning from these types of *culture patterning,* we find five logically possible, alternative modes of adjustment or adaptation *by individuals* within the culture-bearing society or group.[11] These are schematically presented in the following table, where (+) signifies "acceptance," (–) signifies "elimination" and (±) signifies "rejection and substitution of new goals and standards."

	Culture Goals	Institutionalized Means
I. Conformity	+	+
II. Innovation	+	–
III. Ritualism	–	+
IV. Retreatism	–	–

V. Rebellion[12] ± ±

Our discussion of the relation between these alternative responses and other phases of the social structure must be prefaced by the observation that persons may shift from one alternative to another as they engage in different social activities. These categories refer to role adjustments in specific situations, not to personality *in toto.* To treat the development of this process in various spheres of conduct would introduce a complexity unmanageable within the confines of this paper. For this reason, we shall be concerned primarily with economic activity in the broad sense, "the production, exchange, distribution and consumption of goods and services" in our competitive society, wherein wealth has taken on a highly symbolic cast. Our task is to search out some of the factors which exert pressure upon individuals to engage in certain of these logically possible alternative responses. This choice, as we shall see, is far from random.

In every society, Adaptation I (conformity to both culture goals and means) is the most common and widely diffused. Were this not so, the stability and continuity of the society could not be maintained. The mesh of expectancies which constitutes every social order is sustained by the modal behavior of its members falling within the first category. Conventional role behavior oriented toward the basic values of the group is the rule rather than the exception. It is this fact alone which permits us to speak of a human aggregate as comprising a group or society.

Conversely, Adaptation IV (rejection of goals and means) is the least common. Persons who "adjust" (or maladjust) in this fashion are, strictly speaking, *in* the society but not *of* it. Sociologically, these constitute the true "aliens." Not sharing the common frame of orientation, they can be included within the societal population merely in a fictional sense. In this category are *some* of the activities of psychotics, psychoneurotics, chronic autists, pariahs, outcasts, vagrants, vagabonds, tramps, chronic drunkards and drug addicts.[13] These

have relinquished, in certain spheres of activity, the culturally defined goals, involving complete aim-inhibition in the polar case, and their adjustments are not in accord with institutional norms. This is not to say that in some cases the source of their behavioral adjustments is not in part the very social structure which they have in effect repudiated nor that their very existence within a social area does not constitute a problem for the socialized population.

This mode of "adjustment" occurs, as far as structural sources are concerned, when both the culture goals and institutionalized procedures have been assimilated thoroughly by the individual and imbued with affect and high positive value, but where those institutionalized procedures which promise a measure of successful attainment of the goals are not available to the individual. In such instances, there results a twofold mental conflict insofar as the moral obligation for adopting institutional means conflicts with the pressure to resort to illegitimate means (which may attain the goal) and inasmuch as the individual is shut off from means which are both legitimate *and* effective. The competitive order is maintained, but the frustrated and handicapped individual who cannot cope with this order drops out. Defeatism, quietism and resignation are manifested in escape mechanisms which ultimately lead the individual to "escape" from the requirements of the society. It is an expedient which arises from continued failure to attain the goal by legitimate measures and from an inability to adopt the illegitimate route because of internalized prohibitions and institutionalized compulsives, *during which process the supreme value of the success-goal has as yet not been renounced.* The conflict is resolved by eliminating *both* precipitating elements, the goals and means. The escape is complete, the conflict is eliminated and the individual is a socialized.

Be it noted that where frustration derives from the inaccessibility of effective institutional means for attaining economic or any other type of highly valued "success," that Adaptations II, III and V (innovation, ritualism and rebellion) are also possible. The result will be

determined by the particular personality, and thus, the *particular* cultural background, involved. Inadequate socialization will result in the innovation response whereby the conflict and frustration are eliminated by relinquishing the institutional means and retaining the success-aspiration; an extreme assimilation of institutional demands will lead to ritualism wherein the goal is dropped as beyond one's reach but conformity to the mores persists; and rebellion occurs when emancipation from the reigning standards, due to frustration or to marginalist perspectives, leads to the attempt to introduce a "new social order."

Notes

1 E.g., Ernest Jones, *Social Aspects of Psychoanalysis*, 28, London, 1924. If the Freudian notion is a variety of the "original sin" dogma, then the interpretation advanced in this paper may be called the doctrine of "socially derived sin."

2 "Normal" in the sense of a culturally oriented, if not approved, response. This statement does not deny the relevance of biological and personality differences which may be significantly involved in the *incidence* of deviate conduct. Our focus of interest is the social and cultural matrix; hence we abstract from other factors. It is in this sense, I take it, that James S. Plant speaks of the "normal reaction of normal people to abnormal conditions." See his *Personality and the Cultural Pattern*, 248, New York, 1937.

3 Contemporary American culture has been said to tend in this direction. See André Siegfried, *America Comes of Age*, 26–37, New York, 1927. The alleged extreme(?) emphasis on the goals of monetary success and material prosperity leads to dominant concern with technological and social instruments designed to produce the desired result, inasmuch as in stitutional controls become of secondary importance. In such a situation, innovation flourishes as the *range of means* employed is broadened. In a sense, then,

there occurs the paradoxical emergence of “materialists” from an “idealistic” orientation. Cf. Durkheim’s analysis of the cultural conditions which predispose toward crime and innovation, both of which are aimed toward efficiency, not moral norms. Durkheim was one of the first to see that “contrairement aux idées courantes le criminel n’apparait plus comme un être radicalement insociable, comme une sorte d’elément parasitaire, de corps étranger et inassimilable, introduit au sein de la société; c’est un agent régulier de la vie sociale.” See *Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique,* 86–89, Paris, 1927.

4 Such ritualism may be associated with a mythology which rationalizes these actions so that they appear to retain their status as means, but the dominant pressure is in the direction of strict ritualistic conformity, irrespective of such rationalizations. In this sense, ritual has proceeded farthest when such rationalizations are not even called forth.

5 In this connection, one may see the relevance of Elton Mayo’s paraphrase of the title of Tawney’s well known book. “Actually the problem *is not that of the sickness of an acquisitive society; it is that of the acquisitiveness of a sick society.” Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization,* 153, New York, 1933. Mayo deals with the process through which wealth comes to be a symbol of social achievement. He sees this as arising from a state of anomie. We are considering the unintegrated monetary-success goal as an element in producing anomie. A complete analysis would involve both phases of this system of interdependent variables.

6 It is unlikely that interiorized norms are completely eliminated. Whatever residuum persists will induce personality tensions and conflict. The process involves a certain degree of ambivalence. A manifest rejection of the institutional norms is coupled with some latent retention of their emotional correlates. “Guilt feelings,” “sense of sin,” “pangs of conscience” are obvious manifestations of this unrelieved tension; symbolic adherence to the nominally repudiated values or rationalizations constitute a more subtle

variety of tensional release.

7 “Many,” and not all, unintegrated groups, for the reason already mentioned. In groups where the primary emphasis shifts to institutional means, i.e., when the range of alternatives is very limited, the outcome is a type of ritualism rather than anomie.

8 Money has several peculiarities which render it particularly apt to become a symbol of prestige divorced from institutional controls. As Simmel emphasized, money is highly abstract and impersonal. However acquired, through fraud or institutionally, it can be used to purchase the same goods and services. The anonymity of metropolitan culture, in conjunction with this peculiarity of money, permits wealth, the sources of which may be unknown to the community in which the plutocrat lives, to serve as a symbol of status.

9 The emphasis upon wealth as a success-symbol is possibly reflected in the use of the term “fortune” to refer to a stock of accumulated wealth. This meaning becomes common in the late sixteenth century (Spenser and Shakespeare). A similar usage of the Latin *fortuna* comes into prominence during the first century B.C. Both these periods were marked by the rise to prestige and power of the “bourgeoisie.”

10 See Kingsley Davis, “Mental Hygiene and the Class Structure,” *Psychiatry*, 1928, I, esp. 62–63; Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, 59–60, New York, 1937.

11 This is a level intermediate between the two planes distinguished by Edward Sapir; namely, culture patterns and personal habit systems. See ☐ “Contribution of Psychiatry to an Understanding of Behavior in Society,” *Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1937, 42:862–70.

12 This fifth alternative is on a plane clearly different from that of the others. It represents a *transitional* response which seeks to *institutionalize* new procedures oriented toward revamped cultural goals shared by the members of the society. It thus involves efforts to *change* the existing structure rather than to perform accommodative actions *within* this structure, and introduces additional problems with which we are not at the moment

concerned.

13 Obviously, this is an elliptical statement. These individuals may maintain some orientation to the values of their particular differentiated groupings within the larger society or, in part, of the conventional society itself. Insofar as they do so, their conduct cannot be classified in the “passive rejection” category (IV). Nels Anderson’s description of the behavior and attitudes of the bum, for example, can readily be recast in terms of our analytical scheme. See *The Hobo,* 93–98, *et passim,* Chicago, 1923.

Reading 7

Homeboys, New Jacks, and Anomie

John M. Hagedorn

> Q. Do you consider it wrong or immoral to sell dope?
>
> A. No
>
> Q. Why not?
>
> A. That's the only upper hand . . . us black folks have. The only jobs that are out there is McDonalds, Burger King, . . . and Kentucky Fried Chicken. If you have kids that's not going to cut it.

African American and Latino male gang members are shown to have basically conventional aspirations and values. Gang drug dealing is explained as the innovative response of young minority males to blocked opportunity, rather than participation in a deviant, oppositional culture. The data from an ongoing Milwaukee study finds gang members adapting in patterned ways to conventional American success goals. Anomie theory is discussed as an alternative to both cultural deviance theory and the more prevalent social disorganization approach.

Gangs are an increasingly important issue in social research, reflecting their stubborn persistence in everyday life. One way to look at criminological explanations of gangs is to divide them between those who see gang members as basically "different than us" and those who see gang members as more "similar to us," to paraphrase Jerome Miller (Pepinsky, 1991). Historically, most sociologists have been firmly in the "similar to us" camp, oppose crude stereotypes, and have supported social reform.

The Chicago School explained gang behavior in the industrial era as resulting from social disorganization. Gangs either derived from a lack of controls over delinquent behavior (Thrasher 1963), were the product of a deviant subculture (Sutherland, 1933), or stemmed from both (Shaw & McKay, 1969; Kornhauser, 1978). The Chicago School ecological perspective sought to humanize gang members by pointing out that delinquency was the product of areas, not ethnic groups. Shaw and McKay's cultural transmission perspective, further developed by Sutherland, claimed that conformity to subcultural norms was not deviant, but "normal" for poor youth under certain conditions. Chicagoans as a whole saw gang members as basically poor neighborhood kids who lacked institutional resources, were improperly socialized, and were influenced by other delinquents or adult criminals.

Later, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) merged Sutherland's differential association concept with Merton's anomie theory to provide a third distinct perspective on gangs. This view differed from social disorganization theory mainly in its understanding of the etiology of delinquency. Gang delinquency arose, not simply from conformity to deviant norms, faulty families, or lack of controls. Rather, the fundamental source of law-breaking lay in the frustrated desires of poor youth to attain American cultural goals, especially the goal of "success."

Social disorganization, differential association, and anomie theories have been similar, however, in that they have historically sought to humanize gang members, and have provided support for progressive social policies.

Today there is a growing literature that portrays gang members and drug dealers as especially deviant, as having a separate culture of poverty or violence which pushes them to commit crime (e.g., Sanchez Jankowski, 1992; Katz, 1988, Sanders, 1994). These perspectives are resurrecting aspects of Shaw & McKay's cultural deviance theory along with culture of poverty concepts propagated by Walter Miller (1969), who asserted that lower

class gangs did not share middle class values. By characterizing African American and Latino male gang members as having separate values—i.e., being "different than us"—these theories reinforce popular stereotypes. While some who hold this view are politically liberal and others are conservative, both look at the underclass from the perspective of those who are shocked by its "aberrant" behavior and desire stronger social controls.

This article reports on research on the conventional and deviant values of adult drug dealing gang members in Milwaukee. It builds on our earlier work (Hagedorn 1994a), which typed gang members on a continuum of conventionality: from conventional "legits" and "homeboys" to more deviant "dope fiends" and "new jacks." Our interview data is examined for evidence of deviant or conventional values on work and violence and the relationship between family structure and antisocial values. Where cultural deviance theory would find deviant values, our research finds gang members adapting in patterned ways to conventional American success goals.[1]

In Merton's (1968) conception, innovation (or crime) is one response of poor people who are not able to conform to conventional success goals by legitimate means. Instead of being arenas for conflicting value systems (Shaw & McKay, 1969) anomie theory would see poor communities as places where residents embrace mainstream values but react in patterned ways to difficulties in attaining success. Cloward and Ohlin extended this view by looking at different types of illegitimate opportunity structures, or varying conditions under which innovators adapt to the lack of jobs.

An updated anomie theory would logically define the current expansion of drug dealing as the innovative response of young minority males to blocked opportunity resulting from economic restructuring. In underclass areas, young women may have had access to welfare, but young men have had few chances at legitimate employment. Gang drug dealers attempt to

attain traditional success goals through participation in an expanding informal economy. “Hustling,” in this view, is a another form of “hard work” (Valentine, 1978). Mainstream values remain, but structural conditions create various innovative behaviors, some of which are violent and destructive (Hagedorn, 1994b).

Contrary to the cultural deviance or culture-of-poverty perspective, anomie theory sees gang violence as a variable, not a constant (Cloward & Ohlin 1960; Moore 1993). The sources of violence are to be found in the conditions of the illegal economy, the frustrations of minority lower-class youth, dysfunctional families, as well as peer group rivalries (Bernard, 1990; Reiss & Roth, 1993). For Moore and Vigil (1987), gang members vary in orientation to *locura,* or wild behavior, as well as in family background and involvement in drug sales. The gang as a whole is seen as “trophocriminal,” or permissive of criminality and violence, not as invariably violent. But while there is a weak gang “subculture” most gang members aspire to conventional success goals and eventually settle down in “square” lives (Moore, 1978; 1991). As Fagan (1989, p. 206) succinctly puts it, “conventional values may coexist with deviant behavior for inner city youths.”

In this vein, Anderson’s value-laden reaction to the hustler who wants only to “get over” and to seek “self-aggrandizement” can be reconceptualized. Anomie theory would see that behavior, in Durkheim’s sense, as *overconformity* to the American goal of success (see Messner & Rosenthal, 1994). After all, what is more American than a “glamorous life-style, fine clothes, and fancy cars”? And are underclass African American males, whom Anderson condemns for their view of women as “so many conquests,” all that different from males of other races and classes? (see Lorber, 1994, p. 44).

Bourgois sees underclass men not as victims, but as people who *resist* a lack of opportunity.

> Nonetheless, street-level inner-city residents are more than merely passive victims of historical economic transformations or of the institutionalized racism of a perverse political and economic system. They do not passively accept their fourth class citizen fate. The are struggling determinedly—just as ruthlessly as the railroad and oil robber barons of the last century and the investment banker "yuppie" of today—to earn money, demand dignity, and lead meaningful lives. Tragically, it is the very process of struggle against—yet within—the system that exacerbates the trauma of their community and destroys hundreds of thousands of lives on the individual level. (Bourgois 1990; 627)

It is in this context that our earlier typology of "homeboys, dope fiends, legits, and new jacks" is best viewed. Just as Merton looked at five universal adaptations to American culture, each of these gang roles is a subtype of innovative adaptation to racism and the lack of good jobs. Similar to John Ogbu's (1991) coping mechanisms of African American students within schools that cannot produce equal opportunity, gang members react in patterned ways to the lack of legitimate employment and racism. A very few "go legit" and escape the ghetto ("legits"); many blame themselves for failure and abuse alcohol or drugs ("dope fiends"); some "overconform" and live out exaggerated fantasies of the success they believe rich white people enjoy ("new jacks"); and most go in and out of drug selling, aspiring to the American dream of success, alternating between jobs in the legitimate and illegitimate world ("homeboys"). New Jacks despised legitimate work and display the outlook of "gangsta" rap groups like NWA who taunt: "It's not about a salary, it's all about reality." Homeboys, on the other hand, spend more time working "legit" jobs than selling dope. While some may consider new jacks particularly deviant, they also can be conceptualized as attempting to attain mainstream cultural goals of success and money "by any means necessary." This is quite close to Durkheim's original meaning of the word

“anomie.”

These roles adopted by adult male gang members do not represent internalized norms, nor an oppositional culture. They are neither stable nor mechanistically determined by family background. They are various lifestyles, or coping mechanisms based on changing experiences of gang members as adolescents and as young adults. Many gang members go through “new jack” and “dope fiend” phases during their youthful years, with predictable behavior patterns. Violence, in an anomic perspective, should not be evenly distributed within the gang, but is both situational (i.e., it is “aleatory”—Short & Strodtbeck 1965), *and* should be related to the “new jack” phase of behavior.

An updated anomie theory would look at the relative stability of American culture, and its pervasive influence on all sectors of the population, including the underclass. As Kornhauser (1978, p. 7) points out, social structure changes rapidly, but culture changes more slowly. While culture is variably strong or weak, it is also important to distinguish cultural adaptation from other learned behavior or “culture will always be the sole cause of behavior” (9–10). It is the inability of gang members to live up to mainstream cultural mandates—basically due to the inequities of the social structure—that causes innovative behavior, not the sudden adoption of a new “culture.” As Kornhauser (15) concludes:

> human beings are so constituted that they do not knowingly construct cultural values from experiences that are obviously destructive of self or society.

Both cultural deviance and social disorganization theory stress aberrant behavior as the consequence of the adoption of oppositional and deviant values. While most social disorganization theorists see the origin of an antisocial value system as lying in joblessness and social isolation, the implication is that those new “old heads” are quite bad people,

culturally “different than us.” An anomic perspective, on the other hand, understands violent and antisocial underclass behavior as patterned reactions to the frustration of conventional aspirations in a world with severe economic constraints and racial discrimination. Anomie theory is one way of emphasizing the common humanity of underclass gang members by looking at the world as they see it and finding familiar and understandable reactions.

This article explores how gang members vary in their orientation to conventionality and the implications of such variation for involvement in violence. It addresses the question of whether most gang members fundamentally hold on to mainstream American cultural values or have adopted deviant oppositional values.

METHODS

The data this article is based on were drawn from the first part of a five-year National Institute on Drug Abuse study of male and female gangs, their drug use, and dealing. Taped interviews with 90 males and 11 females took place in 1992 and 1993. Sixty percent were African American, 37% Latino, and 3% white. Mean age was 28. All respondents were founding members of their gangs and were interviewed only if their name was confirmed as being on a roster of gang members, developed by staff and other gang members. Each respondent was paid $50 for the interview. Further interviews of 73 female gang founders took place in 1995.

The study followed the collaborative model developed by Joan Moore (1978), a co-principal investigator of the study. “Community researchers,” former gang members on the staff of the Drug Posse Study, conducted most of the interviews with gang members with whom they grew up. Staff helped focus the research design, worked with academics to write interview questions, and were trained in interview techniques. Data were coded

collaboratively by gang and academic staff, entered into a computer statistical analysis program (SPSS™) and a qualitative analysis program (Foloviews™)and analyzed. This and all other articles produced by the study were discussed by staff and their conclusions fed back to respondents for a validity check. Our earlier article reported more fully on the work and drug-selling history of our respondents (Hagedorn, 1994a).

To assess the hypothesis derived from qualitative analysis of the existence of a continuum of conventionality within the gang, an index was created out of thirteen questions which gave clear-cut deviant—"new jack"—attitudinal responses. For example, a "new jack" response to the question of what a gang member most regretted in his life was "that he regretted being caught" or he should have tried harder to get away with more criminal behavior. By contrast, "homeboy" responses were mainly regretting "dropping out of school" or "ever using cocaine." The New Jack Attitudinal Index is an unweighted count of "new jack" responses across all thirteen items. In other words, we added the number of times a respondent answered one of the questions in a "new jack" manner and that total number was the respondent's "new jack" score. The intercorrelations between the several component variables comprising the new jack index were reliably high, the alpha statistic value calculated at .8690. Independent designations by staff of their respondents as "homeboys" or "new jacks" were also significantly correlated with our index ($p < .05$).

While most prior research has questioned the link between dysfunctional families and gang membership (e.g., Short & Strodtbeck, 1965; Moore, 1991), others argue that modern gangs come from extremely distressed families (Yablonsky, 1959; Fleisher, 1996). The effects of deindustrialization might indicate gang members are now coming disproportionately from families with intergenerational gang links or a long history of drug abuse or street life.

To test that notion, we created a street family index combining responses to thirteen

questions we believed indicated a “street orientation.” These questions centered on parental history of hustling, attitudes toward gang membership, and drug abuse. For example, someone from a street-oriented family would respond that a father or mother had hustled for a living while he was growing up and the family knew about the hustling and approved of it. By contrast, gang members from a more conventional family would indicate no history of hustling by the father or mother, or if one parent did hustle, the family disapproved. Three family types were then deduced from the distribution.[2] The intercorrelations between the several component variables comprising the street family index were also high, with alpha at .7114.

Finally, we recoded the responses to our questions about violence to create two indices, one representing gang or drug sales-related (“instrumental”) violence and the other all other violence (“expressive”), following the accepted typology used by the Blocks (1991). The index was a count of all instrumental or expressive violence over nine possible items. Respondents had described the last three incidents of fighting they had participated in, the last three times they were shot at, and the last three people they had personally seen killed. We open-coded each of their explanations and then recoded those nine possible responses as either expressive or instrumental. For example, a typical “expressive” violent act might be a respondent who was shot at during a brawl at a bar or on a corner in a jealous rage over a woman. The respondent likely was high from drinking and the fight unrelated to gangs or drug sales. These fights were colorfully called by our staff “40 ounce fights,” describing the crazy actions of people after they have drunk beer from 40 ounce containers (see Oliver, 1994). By contrast, a fight in a bar or corner because the respondent was accosted by a rival gang member would be coded “instrumental.” So, would violence that occurs between a drug seller and a dope fiend who threatens to call police.

[INSERT FIGURE 7.1 HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 7.2 HERE]

A set of theoretically derived questions were then asked, mainly related to Goldstein's (1985) tripartite typology of drug-related violence, eliciting further details about each incident. We also asked each respondent to report the number of times he had ever been shot at and the number of people the respondent had personally seen killed. (Note that our use of "instrumental," including violence dependent on the respondent's gang status, differs from Goldstein's more narrow drug-market related "systemic" term.) The intercorrelations between the several component variables comprising the Instrumental Violence Index had an alpha of .6037 and for the Expressive Violence Index, an alpha of .5195 (the lower alpha represents the wide variety of non-instrumental violence). We also included as indicators of violence the reported total number of times the respondent said he was shot at and the total number of people the respondent said he had personally seen killed.

Cultural deviance theory would predict that "hard core" gang members like those in our study, would give a distribution of answers on our New Jack Attitudinal Index with little variation, answering most of the thirteen questions with a "new jack" response. Our hypothesis was that (1) there would be substantial variation and (2) that most questions would not get a "new jack" response. We also expected similar variation in "street" responses to our thirteen family questions, and we did not believe family type would be associated with violence or new jack attitudes. Finally, we did not expect new jack attitudes to predict expressive violence, arrests, or other criminal behavior, since all gang members experience strain as a result of frustrated ambitions to be successful, almost all sell drugs, and all experience the related ills of underclass life. However, we thought new jacks, with their "don't give a damn" attitude, would be more involved with gang and drug-related, i.e., instrumental, violence.

RESULTS

The distribution on responses to the "new jack" questions was in the predicted direction. Out of thirteen questions indicating deviance, no one gave more than seven "new jack" responses. The distribution was highly skewed to the conventional end, with 91% of the respondents giving five or fewer "new jack" answers with an overall mean of 2.7. Most respondents, for example, indicated they had matured out of the gang, considered drug dealing "immoral," but necessary for survival, regretted dropping out of school, and expected to have a settled-down life within the next five years. Thus, our data give little support to the notion that underclass gang members share strongly deviant values or possess a consistently deviant value system.[3]

[INSERT FIGURE 7.3 HERE]

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The distribution on answers to questions indicating a street orientation of the respondent's family of origin was somewhat surprising. There were twenty-three respondents who gave no answers that would indicate their families had a street orientation. This indicates about a quarter of our sample had very conventional families, i.e., working parents, no drug or alcohol use, and no prior gang involvement. Another quarter of our sample gave five or more "street" answers, generally indicating some family history of hustling and either gang involvement or drug abuse. The mean number of "street" responses was 2.49, with 95% of the respondents giving seven or fewer "street" responses.

About half of the sample, we concluded, had a mixed orientation, with one to four

“street” answers. This indicated that their families had some street characteristics but more conventional ones. This is consistent with our thesis that many of these families may have escaped problems in other cities to migrate to Milwaukee, or had been previously relatively stable, and were not especially “troubled families.” Deindustrialization in the 1980s created severe difficulties for families whose children were less likely to gain access to family-supporting industrial jobs.

Also consistent with our prediction, new jack attitudes had only a weak nonsignificant association with the extent to which a family was oriented to the streets. Neither was family type related to months worked or months a respondent supported himself by hustling. While cultural deviance theories might imply that gang members are likely to come from families with a strong street culture, less than a quarter of our respondents could be seen as having been socialized to the streets by their families.

[INSERT FIGURE 7.4 HERE]

. . . less than a quarter of our respondents could be seen as having been socialized to the streets by their families.

New jack attitudes were also significantly negatively correlated with number of months the respondent held a legitimate job (-.2630; $p<.05$) and nearly significantly associated with number of months the respondent supported himself on “streetfunds” (.2191), mainly selling dope. New jack attitudes have a slight *negative* association with arrests for drugs (-.1938), despite more consistent involvement of new jacks with drug sales.

As expected, there was considerable variation in violence. Violence by gang members was as likely to be instrumental (44.4%) as expressive (43.8%). But rather than violence being normally distributed within the gang, new jack attitudes were significantly correlated

with instrumental violence (.2575. p=.014). New jack attitudes were highly correlated with exposure to violence, i.e., the number of times the respondent was shot at and the number of people the respondent had personally seen killed.[4] However, new jack attitudes had little association with overall violence (.1567), arrests, or expressive violence (.1019).

[INSERT FIGURE 7.5 HERE]

One in every eight shootings were described as motivated by a respondent using a gun because "the drugs were all gone."

There was also considerable variation between the reasons for fist fights, shooting incidents, and homicides. While half of all violence was instrumental, less than a quarter of the last three fist fights described by our respondents were gang or drug-related. At least a third of the fights took place while either the respondent or his antagonist were "high" on drugs or alcohol. The modal fist fight was a "40 ounce fight" at a bar, or over a domestic matter, typically a dispute about a woman (62%).

This distribution changes when we view violence with guns. The majority of the times a respondent was shot at were gang related affairs. One in every eight shootings were described as motivated by a respondent using a gun because "the drugs were all gone." This refers to Goldstein's (1985, 495) psychopharmacological state, or the agitated state of cocaine users after someone comes down from a crack high. On the other hand, only 5% of the shootings were in Goldstein's "systemic" and "economic" categories combined—shooting either as a result of a "deal gone bad" or of "ripping off to get drugs." Still, more than a quarter of shooting incidents were related to 40 ounce fights or other domestic disputes, more than twice the number of shootings related to drug sales.[5]

Family type was not significantly associated with either instrumental or expressive

violence. There is a significant correlation between number of times shot at and street families, indicating some influences from exposure to violence in street families and violence by their children.

DISCUSSION

This study cannot be generalized to gangs in other regions or cities. The findings need to be taken as suggestive, and compared with the findings of others in cities with recent gang problems as well as cities where gangs have long been entrenched (Spergel and Curry, **1990).** Unfortunately, few recent studies have probed gang members' attitudes and allowed them to explain their actions in great detail. My linking of anomie theory with an empirical analysis, as an "orienting theory" (Strauss, 1987) hopefully will prompt renewed theoretical debate.

Our data find adult gang members to have values in common with other Americans, in the classic humanizing tradition of sociology (Short & Strodtbeck, 1965). Our finding that gang members are "like us," is where we part company from some other perspectives. Cultural deviance theories, like those of Jack Katz and Walter Miller, stress how different gang members are from "respectables" and that deviant values have been deeply internalized. Our data cannot support such a notion. The data in this article show most hard-core adult Milwaukee gang members clearly hold conventional values, and our previous work shows how "homeboys" go in and out of legitimate work, and want to settle down (Hagedorn, 1994a). Their departures from conventional behavior can be more easily explained by blocked opportunity than by reference to criminal values or poorly socialized families. Thus, our findings are more optimistic than the pessimistic assertions of cultural deviance theory, which deny that simple changes in opportunity structures—i.e., more good jobs and less racial discrimination—would go very far in solving our country's gang or drug problems.

Our data find adult gang members to have values in common with other Americans, in the classic humanizing tradition of sociology . . .

Violence itself, we found, is not an invariable or immutable characteristic of all gang members, but is related both to situations and the new jack lifestyle. Those gang members with a new jack attitude are more likely to use violence to settle disputes over drugs or engage in gang warfare. This is consistent with Moore's (1991, p. 62) finding that gang cliques with a high number of deaths were related to the number of gang members who considered themselves as "loco" or "muy loco" while in the gang.

Violence, in our data, is not strongly related to the socialization of children to the streets. Our findings imply that new jacks may be more likely to be a product of exposure to violence as children, teens, and adults, as well as perpetrators of violence. New jack attitudes and accompanying street violence may be less a determined outcome from poorly socialized families than the complicated product of random events in adolescent and young adult years or in the hazardous dope game. This adds support for those who would stress the efficacy of interventions in adolescence and in the adult years as well as early childhood programs (Sampson & Laub, 1993).

[INSERT TABLE 7.1 HERE]

New jack attitudes are held by only a minority of Milwaukee's adult gang members. Our study has found that many gang members go through a "new jack" phase where they are involved with amoral conduct and gang and drug-related violence, and then mature, with underlying conventional values reemerging. Outrageous statements and behavior may often

be “poses” for outsiders—like reporters or researchers— rather than deeply held attitudes (Hagedorn, 1996; Majors & Billson, 1992). “New jack” attitudes may be more a role held by some during the teenage years, and shed as they grow up, along with violence and reckless conduct. With Kornhauser (1978, p. 10), I do not label such behavior “cultural,” but see it as a form of learned social behavior, more easily undone. The conventional values of Milwaukee gang members indicate their commitment to the dominant American culture.

Shaw and McKay’s view of a coherent oppositional value system, currently articulated by Anderson, is not supported by our data. I do not find the source of new jack behavior in “oppositional values” or in a new “amoral culture.” Several of our best “community researchers,” for example, categorized themselves as having been “new jacks” when on the streets, but now, over time and with the opportunity of a good job, they have changed. Anderson’s description in a magazine article about “less alienated gang members” who “slip back and forth between decent and street behavior” (1994, p. 94) describes the vast majority of our population of “hard core” Milwaukee gang members. Things may be different in Philadelphia, New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles, but we lack comparable data.

Anomie theory is an obvious approach to explain the expansion of drug dealing in these times of economic restructuring. Nearly all Milwaukee gang members, including some of those we classified as “legits,” engaged in some drug dealing in the absence of good jobs. If gang members have underlying conventional values, then we can conceptualize even new jack behavior not as representing oppositional values, but either as a “stretched” conventional orientation (Rodman, 1963; Liebow, 1967) or as “overconformity” to the American goal of success. Some gang and drug violence may be related to the perceived unfairness of the system, especially by those who by have, at least for a time, given up trying to conform (Reiss & Roth, 1993; Levi, 1980).[6]

This study shares with Wilson and Sampson (1995) a sociological understanding of gang

behavior as a product of macroeconomic forces and ecological processes. We share a common response of “more good jobs” as an underlying solution. We may differ, however, on the nature of the values of most of those who engage in illicit behavior. Characterizing differences within poor communities as the result of value conflict runs the risk of labeling all young men and women who engage in alternative means of economic livelihood—e.g., drug dealing—as holding oppositional values, which is not what this study has found. Those who theoretically divide poor communities into “deviant” and “conventional” in the Shaw and McKay tradition may inadvertently open the door for more prison building, not social reconstruction (Tonry, 1995; Hagedorn, 1988).

The approach of our study, however, is similar in one way to Clifford Shaw’s. He was a strong opponent of those who would impose outside solutions on communities and hired gang members to work in the Chicago Area Project (see Short, 1969). In these times of inner-city joblessness and cutbacks in social programs, we need more criminologists who see gang members as “more like us” and include them and other underclass residents as participants in research. As sociologists, we need to theoretically confront those cultural deviance theories that demonize poor minority young men who have been frustrated in their attempts to have a decent life. Finally, like Shaw, as citizens we need to work with gang members and others in the underclass in fighting for a decent life and solving the problems in poor neighborhoods.

Notes

1. This article mainly critiques the cultural deviance approach for African American and Latino males. I believe the nature of blocked opportunity, as well as the response of female gangs to it, differs significantly from the nature of blocked opportunity and the response to it by males (See Hagedorn and Devitt, 1996; Cloward & Piven, 1979; Leonard, 1983).

2. From the qualitative data, we hypothesized three types of families: [1] street families with histories of hustling, gang activity, and drug and alcohol abuse; [2] conventional families which had no history of street activities; and [3] a declining family type. This latter type was hypothesized as standing between street and conventional families, and representing families with a few problems who may have moved to Milwaukee to escape them and/ or to find economic opportunity. The category of "declining families" is consistent with the macroeconomic perspective of William Julius Wilson (1985; 1987), who found disruptive effects of deindustrialization on previously stable families. Many African American and Puerto Rican families moved to Milwaukee to escape deteriorating conditions in Chicago, New York, Detroit and elsewhere (Hagedorn, 1988). Once in Milwaukee, the 1980s brought economic calamity, a school desegregation plan which loosened ties to neighborhoods (Leake and Faltz, 1993), and a new gang formation. The category may also apply to previously stable families who had lived in Milwaukee for generations.
3. One other incidental note about gang norms. If one measure of the strength of gang norms is the number of times a gang member was bailed out of jail by his homeboys, there appears to be little gang solidarity. Out of 250 reported arrests where the respondent was jailed, only 3 times did gang members say their homeboys bailed them out, compared to 68 times by family or girl friends and 113 times where the respondent "just sat." Apparently those who think the gang represents a coherent value system are referring to gang rhetoric which is not reflected in what would seem to be the most basic action, to get one's homeboy out of jail.
4. Gang member were shot at a mean of 7.9 times with a median of 4.0. A quarter of the sample reported being shot at once (8) or not at all (9). Gang members reported seeing a mean of 2.1 people killed, with a median of 1.0. A third of the sample reported never having seen anyone killed.

5. Exposure to homicides presented a more mixed bag. Drug-related deaths were almost a quarter of all reports of "people you have personally seen killed." This total is fewer than killings from 40 ounce fights (38%), but more than gang-related killings (18%), which is still a higher percentage than the Blocks' (1995) findings in Chicago. Interestingly, one in six killings were described as being due to the psychopharmacological state of the killer, i.e., "because the drugs were all gone." This is consistent with some published findings from Goldstein (1987), but contrary to the assumptions of his tripartite conceptual framework (1985).
6. In that context, it is interesting to note that among gang members arrests for violence, property crimes, and drugs *are* not associated with new jack attitudes. In fact, gang members with a homeboy outlook are slightly *more* likely than new jacks to be arrested for drug offenses. The war on drugs thus increases the difficulties of homeboys to settle down, encourages a view of the criminal justice system as arbitrary and unfair, and in that way may encourage violent rage at a racist "system."

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Reading 8

A General Strain Theory of Community Differences in Crime Rates

Robert Agnew

Several major theories attempt to explain community differences in crime rates. Crime rates are an aggregation of individual criminal acts, so these theories essentially describe how community-level variables affect individual criminal behavior. In the words of Coleman (1990), the focus is on the "movement from macro to micro." It is no surprise, then, that these theories explicitly or implicitly draw on microtheories when they explain how community-level variables lead individuals to engage in crime (and thereby produce crime rates). Social disorganization theory draws on social control theory, with disorganization theorists pointing to those community characteristics that ultimately reduce the level of social control to which individuals are subject. Subcultural deviance theory draws on differential association/social-learning theory, with subcultural theorists arguing that community values and norms lead some individuals to define crime as a desirable or justifiable response in certain situations. Relative deprivation theory draws on Merton's (1938) version of strain theory, with deprivation theorists arguing that high levels of income or socioeconomic inequality lead some individuals to experience strain or frustration. This article draws on Agnew's (1992) general strain theory (GST) to offer another explanation for community differences in crime rates. This explanation encompasses relative deprivation theory but goes beyond this theory by describing additional ways in which community characteristics may generate strain and foster criminal responses to such strain.

Community is broadly defined to include areas of settlement from the block level to standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs). With certain noted exceptions, the theory is best tested with data from smaller areas, such as "face-blocks" and "nominal communities"

(see Bursik and Grasmick 1993). These areas are more homogeneous in terms of most of the independent and intervening variables described in this article. At the same time, there are gross differences in the independent and intervening variables *between* larger aggregates. As such, the theory can also partly explain differences in crime rates across units like cities, SMSAs, and beyond (see Linsky, Bachman, and Straus 1995).

The article begins with a brief overview of previous research and theories on community differences in crime rates—including neighborhood, city, and SMSA differences. The GST is then presented. There is a discussion of the ways in which community-level variables contribute to strain, including the failure to achieve positively valued goals and the loss of positive stimuli/presentation of negative stimuli. The ways in which community-level variables condition the impact of strain on crime are then examined. I note the existence of evidence compatible with GST and point to ways in which GST may be tested.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE GST OF COMMUNITY DIFFERENCES IN CRIME RATES

GST argues that strain or stress is a major source of criminal motivation. The theory explains community differences in crime by community differences in strain and in those factors that condition the effect of strain on crime. In particular, high-crime communities are more likely to select and retain strained individuals, produce strain, and foster criminal responses to strain.

The idea that communities may cause crime through the strain they produce is not new. It is at the heart of relative deprivation theory, and it is a central idea in the theories advanced by Bernard (1990), Hagan (1994), Hagan and McCarthy (1997a), Harvey (1986), Hawkins (1983), Linsky et al. (1995), and numerous conflict theorists. It is also one of the central arguments of Thrasher (1927) and Shaw and McKay (1942; also see Gold 1987), the theorists

most closely associated with the development of social disorganization theory. These theorists indicate that slum communities contribute to several types of strain, most notably the failure to achieve economic goals. The strain elements of Shaw and McKay, however, were cut from their theory by Kornhauser (1978) and others in an effort to construct a pure social disorganization theory.

Although a number of researchers have attempted to explain community differences in crime in terms of strain, such attempts have not considered fully the different ways in which communities may promote strain and the ways in which they may condition the effect of strain on crime. This may explain why certain prominent researchers claim that strain theory has little role to play in the explanation of community differences in crime rates (e.g., Sampson and Wilson 1995:45). The GST explanation that follows draws heavily on the work of the above-mentioned theorists and on the communities and crime research to more fully specify the community-level sources of strain and the community-level factors that condition the impact of strain on crime.

A simplified model of the GST explanation is shown in Figure 1. The left side of the model shows those community characteristics that are associated with higher crime rates. These characteristics contribute to strain and the reaction to strain in several ways.

1. Selection and retention of strained individuals. Communities with these characteristics, especially deprived communities, are more likely to select for and retain strained individuals. Strained individuals, especially those experiencing economic strain, are more likely to move into deprived communities because they cannot afford to live elsewhere and because community residents are less able to resist their migration (Reiss 1993). Furthermore, strained individuals are less able to move out of these communities than nonstrained individuals. Nonstrained individuals,

in fact, may deliberately migrate to other communities (e.g., Anderson 1990; Bursik 1986a; Farrington 1993; Liska and Bellair 1995; Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Reiss 1986, 1993; Stark 1987; Wilson 1987, 1996). GST, however, argues that these communities are higher in crime not only because they are more likely to attract and hold strained individuals but also because they cause strain.

2. The failure to achieve positively valued goals. Communities with these characteristics are more likely to cause goal blockage—the first type of strain in GST. In particular, such communities lead individuals to place a strong emphasis on certain goals and make it more difficult for individuals to achieve these goals through legitimate channels. Three goals are emphasized: money, status/respect, and the desire to be treated in a just or nondiscriminatory manner.
3. Relative deprivation. These community characteristics not only increase one's absolute level of goal blockage but also increase one's feeling of relative deprivation. In particular, these and certain other community characteristics influence whether individuals compare themselves to advantaged others, decide that they want and deserve what these others have, and decide that they cannot get what these others have through legitimate channels. An effort is made to extend relative deprivation theory to shed light on the mixed results of past research.
4. The loss of positive stimuli/presentation of negative stimuli. These community characteristics increase the other two types of strain in GST: the loss of positive stimuli and the presentation of negative stimuli. In particular, these community characteristics (1) increase the sensitivity of residents to certain types of aversive stimuli and (2) increase the likelihood that residents will be exposed to aversive stimuli. Several types of aversive stimuli are considered, including economic

deprivation, family disruption and its correlates like child abuse, signs of incivility, social cleavages, and "vicarious strain."

5. Aggregate levels of negative affect. Goal blockage, relative deprivation, and exposure to aversive stimuli increase the likelihood that community residents will experience a range of negative emotions, including anger and frustration. Aggregated levels of anger/frustration should have a direct effect on crime rates and should *partly* mediate the effect of community characteristics on crime rates (community characteristics may also affect crime rates for reasons related to social control and social learning theories).
6. Increasing the frequency of interaction with angry/frustrated individuals. These community characteristics not only produce angry/frustrated individuals but also increase the likelihood that such individuals will interact with one another. This further increases the level of strain/anger in the community, because these individuals are more likely to mistreat and get into conflicts with one another.
7. Increasing the likelihood of a criminal response to strain. These community characteristics influence several factors that increase the likelihood that individuals will react to strain with anger/frustration and crime. These factors, in particular, condition the effect of strain on anger/frustration and crime.
8. Community crime rates have a direct and an indirect effect on strain. The high rate of crime that results from the above processes functions as a major source of strain in itself. Criminal victimization, in fact, is one of the most serious types of strain to which individuals are subject, and data suggest that it is a major source of subsequent crime (Dawkins 1997). Furthermore, certain data suggest that high crime rates lead to a further deterioration in community characteristics. Crime prompts many individuals—especially those with economic resources—to flee the community. And

crime undermines relationships among those who remain in the community (see Bursik 1986a; Liska and Bellair 1995; Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Reiss 1986, 1993; Sampson and Lauritsen 1993). The result is an amplifying loop. Deprived communities generate strain and crime, whereas crime contributes to a further deterioration in the community and more strain.

The key portions of the GST explanation focus on the effect of community characteristics on individual strain (arguments 2 to 4 and 6). It should be noted that community characteristics might have both a direct and an indirect effect on individual strain. Direct effects are *not* mediated by individual traits or characteristics of the individual's immediate social environment (e.g., family, school, work, peer group). To illustrate, imagine two individuals who are identical in all ways, except that one lives in a deprived community of the type described above and the other does not. The individual in the deprived community will experience more strain. This individual, for example, is more likely to be treated negatively or victimized by others. This argument implies that community characteristics will have a significant direct effect on individual crime after individual-level variables are controlled. Communities also have an indirect effect on strain by influencing individual traits and the individual's immediate social environment. For example, individuals in deprived communities are less likely to develop those skills necessary for successful school and work performance. As a consequence, they are less likely to achieve their economic goals and are more likely to end up in school and work situations that are experienced as aversive. This argument implies that controls for individual-level variables will reduce (but not eliminate) the direct effect of community characteristics on individual crime. The issue of direct versus indirect effects is discussed at certain points in the article.

The GST explanation contributes to the literature on communities and crime in three major ways. First, it integrates much previous theory and research dealing with strain and community crime rates. Second, it extends previous theory by pointing to several new community-level variables that may influence crime, especially intervening and conditioning variables. Third, it offers a new interpretation for the effect of community-level variables on crime. Much data indicate that variables like economic deprivation, mobility, family disruption, and signs of incivility have a large effect on community crime rates. The mechanisms by which these variables affect crime rates, however, are much less clear. GST argues that these variables not only reduce social control but also increase strain. It is important to examine the reasons why community-level variables affect crime rates because these reasons influence the policy recommendations we make. In particular, social disorganization theory suggests that we should help community residents exercise more control over their communities. Strain theorists do not necessarily disagree with this approach, but they argue that we should also focus on reducing the motivation for crime (see Agnew 1995a, 1995c; Brezina forthcoming for a fuller discussion).

[INSERT FIGURE 8.1 HERE]

Selected parts of the GST explanation in Figure 1 are elaborated in the rest of the article. I first describe how community characteristics cause strain (arguments 2-4 and 6) and then describe how community characteristics condition the effect of strain on crime (argument 7). These represent the central and most original parts of the GST explanation.

THE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE POSITIVELY VALUED GOALS

Communities may affect crime rates by influencing the goals that residents pursue and the ability of residents to achieve such goals through legitimate channels. Most research has focused on the inability to achieve the goal of economic success. This source of strain also occupies a central place in GST. GST, however, argues that monetary strain is not the only type of goal blockage experienced by the residents of high-crime communities. GST also focuses on the inability of residents to achieve their status goals and to be treated in a just/fair manner.

Economic Success

Economic status is the factor that most distinguishes high-crime from low-crime communities. GST argues that one reason economically deprived communities are higher in crime is because the residents of such communities have more difficulty achieving their economic goals. This goal blockage creates frustration with one's monetary situation, which, in turn, leads to income-generating crime, aggression, and drug use (see Agnew 1992; Agnew et al. 1996; Wilson 1996).

First, economically deprived communities contribute to goal blockage by encouraging residents to place great emphasis on money. Deprivation in the midst of affluence often encourages an emphasis on monetary success (see below). The individual's own deprivation is further heightened by the deprivation that pervades the community—including the lack of recreational, shopping, health, and other facilities. The individuals in deprived communities are more likely to interact with other deprived individuals who emphasize money. This reinforces the individual emphasis on money and results in the development of a "community culture" stressing money (e.g., Anderson 1994). Deprived communities often lack the organizational and cultural resources to support the pursuit of alternative goals. Although

there are no good community-level data addressing these issues, individual-level data indicate that deprived individuals place more emphasis on their monetary goals and desire proportionately more money than higher socioeconomic status individuals (Agnew 1983, 1995b; Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cook and Curtin 1987; Empey 1956).

Second, deprived communities not only encourage a strong emphasis on money; they also limit the ability of residents to achieve their monetary goals through legitimate channels. In particular, individuals in deprived communities have less access to jobs in general and to stable, well paying, primary-sector jobs in particular. Manufacturing and service-sector jobs are often located at a distance from deprived communities, so they are less accessible. Relatively few individuals in the community have job contacts or job information, and there are relatively few individuals in the community to teach and model those skills and attitudes necessary for successful job performance (for a fuller discussion, see Crutchfield 1989; Hagan 1994; Hagan and Peterson 1995; McGahey 1986; Sampson and Wilson 1995; Wilson 1987, 1996). These economic problems are most severe in inner-city, African American communities for reasons indicated by Wilson (1987, 1996) and others (Bursik 1989; Hagan 1994; Sampson and Wilson 1995).

The employment problems faced by inner-city residents, in turn, create a host of additional problems that serve to further reduce legitimate opportunities for goal achievement. Such problems include poor pre- and postnatal care and family disruption—along with its negative impacts on child care, inadequate preparation for school, and low-quality schools (see Blau and Blau 1982; Bloom, Asher, and White 1978; Hagan and Peterson 1995; Majors and Billson 1992; Sampson 1985b, 1985c, 1986, 1987, 1992; Sampson and Wilson 1995; Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994; Wilson 1987, 1996). These problems not only create economic strain for adults but for adolescents as well. Adolescents

have trouble finding part-time work, and their parents cannot provide them with adequate spending money (McGahey 1986).

GST, then, can easily explain the strong association between economic deprivation at the community level and crime: Residence in a deprived community increases the likelihood of economic strain. This argument is best tested by surveying the residents of different neighborhoods. Neighborhoods rather than cities or SMSAs are the most appropriate unit of analysis, because cities and SMSAs contain more variation in economic level. If this argument is correct, the residents of economically deprived communities should express more dissatisfaction with their monetary situation. Community economic status should have a direct effect on dissatisfaction and an indirect effect through individual economic status. Aggregated levels of dissatisfaction should, in turn, influence aggregated levels of negative affect, particularly anger/frustration. Such negative affect should partly mediate the effect of community characteristics and economic strain on crime rates. No study has directly tested these hypotheses, although several ethnographic and other studies suggest that economic strain is a major motive for crime in deprived communities (see Hagan 1994 for a review; for additional data compatible with these arguments, see Agnew et al. 1996; Hagan and McCarthy 1997a; Jankowski 1995; McCarthy and Hagan 1992; Messner 1983; Williams 1984; Wilson 1996).

Status/Respect

Closely related to the desire for money is the desire for status: “achieving respect in the eyes of one’s fellows” (Cohen, 1955:65). Individuals may desire status in general as well as particular types of status, with the desire for “masculine” status being especially relevant to crime (see Majors and Billson 1992; Messerschmidt 1993). In the United States, status—

including masculine status—is largely a function of income, education, occupation, and race (see Majors and Billson 1992). As a consequence, individuals in deprived communities—especially non-Whites—face status problems more often (see Anderson 1994; Brezina 1995; Cohen 1955; Jankowski 1995; Majors and Billson 1992; Suttles 1968). They may adapt by attempting to achieve status through alternative channels—certain of which involve or are conducive to crime.

One common alternative, particularly among young, African American males, is described by Anderson (1994) in "The Code of the Streets." People attempt to achieve status/respect through their presentation of self, particularly through the display of certain material possessions (e.g., clothing, jewelry) and the adoption of a tough demeanor—which includes the willingness to respond to even minor shows of disrespect with violence. Individuals who lack material possessions may take them from others, and individuals may actively "campaign for respect" by verbally and physically abusing others (also see Bernard 1990; Majors and Billson 1992).

The code of the streets ultimately derives from the inability to achieve status through conventional channels, which is influenced by residence in a deprived community. GST, then, can explain the development of an alternative behavioral/value system that includes criminal elements (also see Cohen 1955). If this argument is correct, individuals in deprived, minority communities should be most likely to adopt or live by the code of the streets. Furthermore, the prevalence of the code should partly mediate the effects of economic deprivation and race on community crime rates.

Class/Race/Ethnic Discrimination

According to GST, individuals not only want to achieve specific goals like monetary success and status/respect; they also have a more general desire to be treated in a just or fair manner. Class, race, and ethnic discrimination represent a fundamental violation of this desire, and for that reason they are discussed as a distinct source of strain. (Such discrimination, of course, also has a major effect on the achievement of the economic and status goals discussed above and on the removal of positive stimuli/presentation of negative stimuli discussed below [e.g., Anderson 1990; Bernard 1990; Hawkins 1983; Mann 1995; Russell 1994; Wilson 1987, 1996].)

Individuals in deprived, inner-city communities—especially communities with high concentrations of African Americans and other minority groups—may be more likely to experience and perceive class and race/ethnic discrimination. The existence of such communities may increase the likelihood that others will form negative stereotypes of the residents who live there and treat them in a discriminatory manner (Cook and Curtin 1987). Some evidence, for example, suggests that this may be the case with the police (Miller 1996). Negative experiences with the police, in turn, may generate feelings of injustice and increase the likelihood of further crime (see Paternoster et al. 1997). Also, the existence of such communities may lead residents to the obvious conclusion that race/ethnicity is strongly correlated with a host of social ills—thereby fostering impressions of discrimination.

Russell (1994) provides some suggestions as to how racial discrimination may be measured at the individual level, and such individual measures may be aggregated to form community-level measures. We would expect these community measures to be positively associated with aggregate levels of anger/frustration and community crime rates, even after controls for economic and other types of strain. The *experience* of discrimination should have a negative impact on individuals over and above whatever other negative consequences result from discrimination.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

As argued above, the residents of deprived communities are more likely to engage in crime because they are more likely to experience goal blockage. But as several strain theorists have argued, individuals do not determine whether they are experiencing goal blockage in isolation from one another. They compare themselves to others; such comparisons influence the goals they pursue and their perceptions about the amount of goal blockage they are experiencing (Cohen 1965, 1997; Passas 1997). In this connection, strain theorists have argued that perceptions of goal blockage should be highest in communities with high levels of income or socioeconomic inequality. In fact, virtually all of the community-level research on strain theory has focused on the relationship between inequality and crime rates. It is assumed that when inequality is high, people compare themselves to advantaged others, decide that they want and deserve what these others have, and decide that they cannot get what these others have through legitimate channels.

As indicated above, the research on relative deprivation theory has produced mixed results. Such research, however, is often rather simplistic. The larger literature on relative deprivation, social comparison, and social justice suggests that inequality only leads to feelings of relative deprivation and crime under certain conditions (for overviews, see Martin 1986; Masters and Smith 1987; Nagata and Crosby 1991; Olson, Herman, and Zanna, 1986; Suls and Wills 1991). In particular, individuals do not always compare themselves to advantaged others; they often avoid comparison, make self-comparisons, or make "downward" or "lateral" comparisons. Comparisons to advantaged others are most likely when such others are very visible, are perceived as similar on relevant dimensions, and there is cultural support for upward comparisons (see Atkinson 1986; Major, Testa, and Bylsma,

1991; Passas 1997; Ross, Eyman, and Kishchuk 1986; Stroebe and Stroebe 1996; Suls 1986; Tesser 1991; Wills 1991; Wood and Taylor 1991). Furthermore, comparisons to advantaged others do not necessarily result in feelings of relative deprivation; individuals often believe that advantaged others *deserve* what they have or they employ other cognitive coping strategies to reduce feelings of deprivation (see Agnew 1992; Folger 1987; Major et al. 1991; Salovey 1991; Wood and Taylor 1991). Finally, feelings of relative deprivation do not always result in crime. The effect of relative deprivation on crime is conditioned by a number of factors (see Agnew 1992).

Drawing on these arguments, we would expect inequality to be most likely to lead to crime in those communities in which advantaged others are very visible, in which they are perceived as similar, in which individuals are encouraged to make upward comparisons, in which the reasons for inequality are perceived as unfair, and in which individuals are constrained or disposed to respond to deprivation with crime. At a more concrete level, we might predict that such conditions are most likely to obtain in urban communities in which (1) there are high levels of inequality within and between neighborhoods; (2) illicit markets are common and there are high levels of social mobility, both of which increase the likelihood of knowing *similar* others who are advantaged (see Hagan 1994; Passas 1997); (3) people hold egalitarian beliefs that stress the similarity between all people and encourage the universal pursuit of monetary success (see Martin 1986; Messner and Rosenfeld 1994; Passas 1997; Suls 1986); (4) inequality is linked to race/ethnicity (see Blau and Blau 1982; Phillips 1997); (5) there are large individual and group differences in the economic returns to education; and (6) people score high on those factors that increase the likelihood of a criminal response to strain (see below). The fact that empirical research only takes account of certain of these factors may help explain the mixed results of such research.

LOSS OF POSITIVE STIMULI/PRESENTATION OF NEGATIVE STIMULI

Agnew (1992) argues that strain not only results when others prevent you from achieving your goals but also when others present you with negatively valued stimuli (e.g., verbally and physically abuse you) or remove positively valued stimuli you possess (e.g., take your possessions). Communities may contribute to these types of strain by influencing the types of treatment that are defined as aversive and by influencing the exposure of residents to such treatment.

Types of Treatment Defined as Aversive

Some types of treatment—such as physical attack—are defined as negative or aversive across virtually all groups. Other types of treatment, however, are defined differently in different groups. Several theorists have argued that the residents of high-crime communities—especially young, African American males—are more likely to define certain types of treatment as aversive. This is, in fact, a central theme in the leading subcultural theories of violence (Bernard 1990; Luckenbill and Doyle 1989; Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967; also see Harvey 1986). Luckenbill and Doyle (1989), for example, claim that the subculture of violence "enjoins individuals to be highly sensitive and boldly responsive to affronts"—especially to affronts in which "fundamental properties of the self are attacked." Ethnographic accounts confirm such views. Anderson (1994), for example, states that

> many of the forms that dissing [disrespectful treatment] can take might seem petty to middle-class people (maintaining eye contact for too long, for example), but to those invested in the street code, these actions become serious indications of the other person's

> intentions. Consequently, such people become very sensitive to advances and slights. (P. 82)

Residents of high-crime communities, then, are more likely to view a range of slights and provocations as aversive. This may partly explain the fact that lower-income individuals are more likely to experience psychological distress in response to a given stressor (e.g., Thoits 1982, 1991).

There are several explanations for such sensitivity, certain of which derive from strain theory. Most notably, certain theorists have argued that the continued experience with adversity may heighten one's sensitivity to slights. The residents of deprived communities must often tolerate aversive treatment from others, including racial discrimination and the "frustrations of persistent poverty" (Anderson 1994:83). In the words of Balkwell (1990), this leads them to develop a "short fuse" (also see Anderson 1994; Bernard 1990; Harvey 1986; Majors and Billson 1992). If this argument is correct, the residents of deprived communities—particularly the young males—should be more likely to report that they are upset or angered by a range of slights and provocations. In particular, the community characteristics listed in Figure 1 should have both a direct and indirect effect on sensitivity to aversive stimuli, because they have a direct and indirect effect on the individual's exposure to aversive stimuli (more below).

Exposure to Aversive Stimuli

Not only are individuals in deprived communities more sensitive to certain types of treatment, but they are more exposed to aversive treatment as well—including undesirable life events and chronic strains (e.g., Thoits 1982). Many data suggest that this greater

exposure largely is due to the economic deprivation of the community and its residents (with the community contributing to individual deprivation in the ways listed above). Economic deprivation is, itself, a major source of strain, and it directly or indirectly contributes to such additional strains as family disruption, exposure to a host of "incivilities" in the community, and social cleavages.

Economic deprivation. Individuals in deprived communities suffer from a range of economic hardships, including inadequate financial resources, unemployment, and employment in secondary sector jobs—which are poorly paid, sporadic, and characterized by adverse working conditions (see Crutchfield 1989; Crutchfield and Pitchford 1997). These hardships may cause stress/strain because they interfere with the desire for money and status, as described above. They may also cause strain because the conditions of life associated with these hardships are experienced as aversive, regardless of individual goals. Data, for example, suggest that the conditions associated with work in the secondary labor market contribute to psychological distress, with these conditions including low autonomy or control and low use of capacities (Greenberg and Grunberg 1995; Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Ross and Huber 1985). More generally, data suggest that economic hardship is a major source of psychological distress, including depression, anxiety, and anger (e.g., Aneshensel 1992; Horwitz 1984; Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Ross and Huber 1985; Thoits 1982).

Given the above, we would expect economic hardship to have at least a moderate direct effect on community crime rates. As indicated, the data in this area are mixed. Although studies indicate a strong zero-order relationship between economic deprivation and community crime rates, not all studies find evidence of significant direct effects. As numerous authors have noted, however, problems of multicollinearity often make it difficult to estimate such direct effects. Measures of economic hardship are strongly correlated with one another and with many of the other key correlates of crime. Nevertheless, recent data

suggest that at least certain measures of economic hardship may have a direct effect on community crime rates. There is some evidence, for example, that unemployment increases crime rates, although its effect may be partly offset by a decrease in criminal opportunities (Land, Cantor, and Russell 1995; Phillips 1997). And Crutchfield (1989) found that employment rates in the secondary sector were the best predictor of neighborhood crime rates (also see Crutchfield and Pitchford 1997).

Family disruption and related problems. Economic deprivation should also have a large indirect effect on community crime rates because it increases the exposure of community residents to other types of strain. One especially important type of strain is family disruption and the problems associated with such disruption. Data suggest that economic problems are perhaps the major cause of family disruption (e.g., Jankowski 1995; Sampson 1987; Wilson 1987). Family disruption, in turn, has a large direct effect on crime rates—particularly juvenile crime rates—in most studies. Furthermore, family disruption partly or fully mediates the effect of other variables on crime—like percentage African American and economic variables (e.g., Sampson 1987; Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994).

The effect of family disruption on crime rates, however, is usually explained in terms of social disorganization rather than strain theory. Family disruption is said to reduce informal social control (e.g., supervising neighborhood kids and watching out for strangers) and participation in community organizations. GST, however, offers an additional explanation for the effect of family disruption. As Blau and Blau (1982) state, family disruption is a major source of strain as well as low social control: “marital breakups entail disruptions of profound and intimate social relations, and they generally occur after serious estrangement, if not prolonged conflicts” (p. 124). Sampson (1986:279-80; 1987:354) also notes the association between family disruption and strain. Nevertheless, no one has interpreted the effect of family disruption on crime rates in terms of strain theory.

Ample data support such an interpretation. Family disruption has been linked empirically to a wide range of strains. Family disruption is often preceded by high levels of interpersonal conflict in the family, and the divorce/separation often precipitates additional conflict, especially between the mother and children. The children make more demands on the mother at a time when she is less able to meet them, and an escalating cycle of conflict often results (Martens 1993; McGahey 1986; Sampson 1986). Among other things, family disruption is highly correlated with rates of child abuse (Sampson 1992, 1995). Child abuse, in turn, is an important cause of crime and delinquency, with part of the effect of abuse being explained in terms of strain theory (Brezina 1998). Family disruption also has been linked to such strains as financial difficulties, housework burdens, sexual problems, and feelings of shame and failure (Bloom et al. 1978; Thoits 1982). It is no surprise, then, that family disruption is associated with higher levels of psychological distress (Mirowsky and Ross 1989). It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that communities with high rates of family disruption are higher in crime for reasons related to strain as well as social disorganization theory.

Signs of incivility. Economic deprivation and family disruption also contribute to one of the strongest community correlates of crime: signs of incivility, such as vandalism, street harassment, and the presence of unsupervised teenage peer groups. Miethe and McDowall (1993) found that the most important contextual factor predicting victimization was a measure indicating whether the respondent had the following problems within four blocks of their home: teenagers hanging out on the street, litter and garbage on the street, abandoned houses and buildings, poor lighting, and vandalism. Data from Sampson and Groves (1989) suggest that unsupervised peer groups in the community are perhaps the best predictor of community crime rates (also see Sampson et al. 1997). Such groups mediate much of the effect of family disruption on crime. Although unsupervised peer groups and other signs of incivility may contribute to crime for a number of reasons, a strain theory explanation readily

suggests itself. Signs of incivility index the aversive or negative treatment that community residents must endure. The presence of unsupervised peer groups, for example, increases the likelihood that neighborhood residents—including the members of these peer groups—will be subject to negative treatment.

Social cleavages. At a more general level, several researchers have noted that factors like deprivation, heterogeneity, density, overcrowding, and population mobility undermine social relationships in a community. Among other things, they are said to lead to "social cleavages," "exploitative and manipulative relationships," "mutual mistrust and estrangement," and "disruptive social demands" (e.g., Chamlin and Cochran 1997; Gove, Hughes, and Galle 1979; Kornhauser 1978; Sampson 1993; Suttles 1968). Such negative relations are a major source of strain, with some data suggesting that they contribute to anger and community crime rates (see Gove et al. 1979 and the review in Bellair 1997).

For example, Sampson et al. (1997) found that deprived communities are lower in "collective efficacy." This measure partly indexes how well community residents get along with one another (it contains items like "people in this neighborhood generally get along well with one another," and "people in this neighborhood can be trusted"). Collective efficacy not only has a large impact on crime, but it also mediates a substantial portion of the effect of community deprivation on crime rates.

Vicarious strain. The residents of deprived communities are not only more likely to directly experience the above types of strain, they are also more likely to witness family members, friends, and others—including members of their racial/ethnic group—experience such strains (see Russell 1994). So, community residents are higher in both direct and "vicarious" strain. It is uncertain whether vicarious strain has an effect on crime, although data from the stress literature suggest that it has an effect on one's psychic well-being (e.g., Turner, Wheaton, and Lloyd 1995).

Other strains. Deprived communities may expose individuals to still other types of negative treatment, many of which have been linked to crime (see Bernard 1990). In fact, one could easily compile a long list of community-related factors that might reasonably be expected to increase individual strain (see Linsky et al. 1995 for a list of state-level factors).

Testing the Above Arguments

Testing these arguments will require that we examine certain variables that have been neglected in previous community-level research, like rates of child abuse and vicarious strain. More important, it will require that we devote special attention to intervening processes. It is reasonably well established that there is an association between crime rates and community characteristics like economic deprivation, family disruption, the presence of unsupervised peer groups, and the quality of social relationships. The issue is the extent to which these associations are best explained in terms of social disorganization, subcultural deviance, or strain theory. We cannot answer this question until we measure intervening variables like anger/frustration, perceptions of formal and informal sanctions, and beliefs regarding crime (see Agnew 1995c). Unfortunately, the macrolevel research has paid only limited attention to intervening processes (Bursik 1986a, 1986b; Byrne and Sampson 1986:13; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson and Lauritsen 1993; Simcha-Fagan and Schwartz 1986). If GST has any merit, aggregated levels of anger/frustration should partly mediate the effect of variables like family disruption and unsupervised peer groups on community crime rates. A preliminary test of this proposition can be conducted with cross-sectional data, although a full test should employ longitudinal data so as to better estimate the causal ordering between variables (e.g., see Brezina 1996).

Although no study has attempted to test the above proposition, the Youth in Transition (YIT) data set contains a measure of anger/frustration that can be aggregated to the school level. We can, therefore, estimate the percentage of angry/frustrated individuals in each school. The YIT data also allows us to construct rough measures of school disorganization and school values conducive to crime/violence (see Felson et al. 1994). If GST is correct, we would expect the aggregate measure of anger/frustration to be related to school crime rates even after school disorganization and values are controlled. (We would also expect the aggregate measure of anger/frustration to be related to individual crime, even after individual anger/frustration and other individual-level variables were controlled.)

INCREASING THE FREQUENCY OF INTERACTION WITH ANGRY/FRUSTRATED INDIVIDUALS

High-crime communities not only produce more strained and angry/frustrated individuals, they also increase the likelihood that such individuals will interact with one another. This contributes to a further increase in strain, negative affect, and crime because these individuals are more likely to mistreat and victimize one another.

An angry/frustrated person in a high-crime community is more likely to interact with other angry/frustrated people partly because high-crime communities contain a greater percentage of angry/frustrated individuals. Beyond that, the characteristics of high-crime communities foster frequent interaction between certain community residents—especially the young males most subject to the above types of strain. Young males spend much idle time in public settings. This partly stems from family disruption, which creates a large pool of unsupervised teenagers and unattached males (McGahey 1986; Reiss 1986; Sampson 1986; Stark 1987). It partly stems from high rates of unemployment and sporadic work. It partly

stems from overcrowded living arrangements, which make street life more attractive (Stark 1987). And it partly stems from the mixed-used nature of many deprived communities, which provides more opportunities for congregating outside the home (Stark 1987). In this connection, Miethe and McDowell (1993) found that victimization was higher in busy places, that is, places available for public activity, like stores, bars, and parks (also see R. Felson 1993; Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger 1989). Finally, overcrowded living conditions increase the likelihood of contact with angry individuals in the home setting. The end result is that large numbers of strained/angry people are in frequent contact. Furthermore, the deprived nature of the community increases the likelihood that such contact may occur in the context of competition over scarce resources. In the words of Wikstrom (1990), we have an environment that is likely to "provoke friction."

This argument may be tested by asking individuals about the extent to which they encounter angry/upset individuals and get into conflicts with others in their neighborhood. We would expect such encounters and conflicts to be more frequent among the residents of deprived communities, even after individual characteristics are controlled. Such encounters/conflicts, in turn, should partly mediate the effect of neighborhood characteristics on crime rates.

FACTORS INCREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A CRIMINAL RESPONSE

As noted in GST, there are a variety of ways to cope with strain, only some of which involve crime. Individuals may employ cognitive coping strategies in an attempt to minimize the subjective strain or adversity they experience. For example, they may reduce their monetary strain by focusing on alternative goals, convincing themselves that they will soon achieve monetary success or blaming themselves for their misfortune. They may employ behavioral

coping strategies that attempt to reduce their objective strain; that is, they may attempt to achieve positively valued goals, protect or retrieve positively valued stimuli, or terminate or escape from negative stimuli (Agnew 1992). Such strategies may involve conventional or criminal behavior, and they may employ emotional coping strategies that attempt to alleviate the negative emotions they feel. Such strategies may also involve conventional (e.g., exercise) or criminal (e.g., illicit drug use) behavior.

Whether people respond to strain with crime depends on a number of factors, many of which are influenced by community characteristics. Certain of these factors are listed below. Although these factors are correlated with community deprivation, the correlations are not perfect; ideally, researchers should obtain independent measures of these factors and treat them as conditioning variables. In most cases, independent measures can be obtained by aggregating individual responses within communities.

Limited Range of Alternative Goals/Identities

Evidence suggests that individuals often cope with goal blockage or attacks on their identity by focusing on new goals that they can achieve or new identities they can successfully manage (Agnew 1992). Several theorists have argued that this coping strategy may be more difficult in deprived communities, because such communities provide less cultural and structural support for alternative goals/identities (Gans 1968; Kornhauser 1978; Wilson 1987:183). The fact that this coping strategy is less available in deprived communities increases the likelihood of a criminal response to strain.

The Public Nature of One's Adversity

As indicated above, individuals in deprived communities spend much time interacting with one another in public and private settings. Also, there is a greater interest in the personal affairs of community residents, partly because conventional markers of moral character like educational and occupational success are unavailable (Suttles 1968). The result is that one's aversive experiences are more likely to be witnessed by or known to others. As Hagan and Peterson (1995) state, the "press of people in dense underclass areas imposes upon residents a unique kind of community organization characterized by a high level of mutual surveillance. This restricts residents' privacy, making their activities, both legal and illegal, more frequently 'public'" (p. 27) (also see Stark 1987).

The public nature of one's adversity increases the likelihood of a criminal response to strain for several reasons. First, it increases the likelihood that individuals will have their attempts at cognitive reinterpretation challenged. Because others are often aware of the adversities that individuals have experienced, it is more difficult for individuals to cognitively minimize their adversity without being challenged. Second, others may remind individuals of the adversities they have experienced. This may cause individuals to "cognitively relive" their aversive experiences, thereby increasing their level of subjective strain (Bernard 1990). Third, it increases the likelihood that individuals will feel pressure to respond to mistreatment with crime to "save face" and prevent future predation by others (Anderson 1994; Felson 1993; Felson et al. 1994; Luckenbill and Doyle 1989; Stark 1987).

The External Attribution of Blame

The residents of deprived communities also may be more likely to blame their strain on others, thereby increasing their level of anger and tendency to respond to strain with crime (see Agnew 1992). According to Bernard (1990) and others, the chronic strains that

characterize life in deprived communities increase the likelihood of external attributions. Furthermore, such communities are more likely to develop subcultures that encourage the external attribution of blame. Such subcultures result from a combination of chronic strain, social isolation, and a tendency to blame one's aggressive acts on others (also see Luckenbill and Doyle 1989).

Ability to Engage in Legitimate Behavioral Coping

Not only are the residents of deprived communities less able to employ cognitive coping strategies, they are also less able to engage in legitimate behavioral coping. They are less able to cope as individuals, due to their limited coping resources and skills—like money, power, and problem-solving skills. These individual deficits are partly a function of community characteristics. For example, deprived communities provide fewer models of effective coping (Anderson 1990). Also, they are less able to cope as a community. In particular, they are less able to unite with one another to solve community-wide problems. The reasons for this are described by social disorganization theorists. In fact, social disorganization essentially refers to the inability of communities to cope successfully with the problems that confront them (see Bursik 1988; Kornhauser 1978; see also Grant and Martinez 1997 for data suggesting that a community's perceived ability to cope with problems through legitimate channels has an influence on that community's crime rate).

Lack of Social Support/Capital

Not only are the residents of deprived communities less able to cope on their own behalf, they are less likely to receive social support from others. This is especially true in recent

decades as the concentration of poverty has increased. In particular, there has been a dramatic decline in social support in deprived inner-city communities as working- and middle-class African Americans have moved to more affluent areas (Sampson 1992; Tonry, Ohlin, and Farrington 1991; Wilson 1987, 1996). This migration has not only resulted in a loss of supportive individuals but has weakened educational, religious, recreational, and other institutions in the community. Increased levels of family disruption have also contributed to a reduction in social support (Thoits 1982). The same is true of government cutbacks, which have resulted in a decline in social services. In this area, recent data suggest that higher welfare expenditures are associated with lower crime rates (DeFronzo 1997; Grant and Martinez 1997). More generally, data from Hagan and McCarthy (1997a) suggest that community differences in social support have an important effect on the ability of individuals to cope with strain and that such differences in social support are linked to differences in crime rates (also see Cullen 1994; Cullen and Wright 1997; Hagan 1994; Hagan and McCarthy 1997a, 1997b; Sampson 1992, 1993; Wilson 1996).

Low Social Control

As social disorganization theorists have argued, deprived communities are lower in social control. Community residents, in particular, are less likely to be taught values that condemn crime, to be sanctioned for criminal behavior, and to develop a “stake in conformity.” Although low social control may lead directly to crime, it also increases the likelihood that community residents will respond to strain with crime.

Opportunities for Crime

As Felson (1998) and others argue, certain communities provide more opportunities for crime than other communities; that is, they increase the likelihood that strained individuals (motivated offenders) will encounter attractive targets in the absence of capable guardians. Many of the characteristics of deprived communities have been linked to an increase in criminal opportunity—although the relationship between community deprivation and criminal opportunity is far from perfect. The effect of criminal opportunity on community crime/victimization rates has been examined in several studies. The results of such research are somewhat mixed, perhaps because of the questionable validity of certain of the measures of criminal opportunity. Nevertheless, we would expect measures of criminal opportunity to condition the effect of strain on crime rates (see Birkbeck and LaFree 1993; M. Felson 1998; Massey, Krohn, and Bonati 1989; Messner and Blau 1987; Miethe and McDowall 1993; Miethe and Meier 1994; Sampson and Wooldredge 1987; Sherman et al. 1989).

Values Conducive to Crime

As indicated above, there is reason to believe that the residents of deprived communities—particularly young, minority males—are more likely to hold or live by values conducive to crime. The origin of such values can be at least partly explained in terms of strain theory (see above; also see Bernard 1990; Harvey 1986; Luckenbill and Doyle 1989; Wilson 1996). Although such values may have a direct effect on crime, they also increase the likelihood that one will respond to strain with crime. In fact, a central component of such values is that disrespectful treatment by others often requires an aggressive response. Using state-level data, Linsky et al. (1995) found that values conducive to deviance sometimes condition the effect of stressors on crime/deviance rates.

Presence of Criminal Others/Groups

Finally, the increased presence of criminal others and groups in deprived communities increases the likelihood that residents will respond to strain with crime. Such others are more likely to both model and reinforce criminal responses, among other things (see Reiss 1986; Stark 1987; Wilson 1987, 1996). The more public nature of life in deprived communities, described above, makes such modeling especially likely. The idea that crime is an appropriate or justifiable response to certain strains may spread or diffuse throughout the community—or at least certain segments of the community.

SUMMARY

The GST described in this article argues that communities differ in their level of crime partly because they differ in the extent to which they produce strain and foster criminal responses to strain.

Communities contribute to strain in several ways. First, they influence the goals that individuals pursue and the ability of individuals to achieve these goals. Economic goals, status goals, and the desire for just/fair treatment occupy a central place in GST. Second, they influence the individual's sense of relative deprivation as well as absolute level of goal blockage. Third, they influence definitions of aversive stimuli and the degree of exposure to such stimuli. A range of aversive stimuli was considered, including economic deprivation, family disruption, child abuse, signs of incivility, social cleavages, and vicarious strains. Fourth, they increase the likelihood that strained and angry/frustrated individuals will interact with one another, which further increases levels of strain and negative affect.

These types of strain, in turn, influence aggregated levels of negative affect in the community—with the emotions of anger/frustration receiving special attention. Aggregated levels of anger/frustration have a direct effect on community crime rates and partly mediate the effect of community characteristics on crime rates. Communities, however, may condition the impact of strain on crime in a number of ways. In particular, communities may make it more difficult for individuals to "define away their strain" through the use of cognitive coping strategies, engage in legitimate behavioral coping, and obtain support from others. Communities may also reduce the costs of criminal coping and increase the disposition to engage in such coping. Relevant community-level variables in these areas were described.

There was a brief overview of the evidence compatible with these arguments, and several strategies for testing these arguments were suggested. At the most general level, it was argued that empirical tests need to devote more attention to intervening processes. With respect to goal blockage, researchers should determine the extent to which the community characteristics in Figure 1 are associated with the experience of monetary strain, status deprivation, and discriminatory treatment by others. These factors influence aggregated levels of negative affect—especially anger and frustration. Negative affect, in turn, influences community crime rates. With respect to relative deprivation, one should examine the extent to which the community characteristics listed in Figure 1 and certain other community characteristics mentioned in the discussion influence perceptions of relative deprivation. Such perceptions, in turn, should influence levels of negative affect. With respect to the loss of positive stimuli/presentation of negative stimuli, one should examine the extent to which the community characteristics in Figure 1 influence exposure to aversive stimuli. Such exposure, in turn, should influence levels of negative affect. With respect to interactional patterns, one should examine the extent to which community characteristics influence the level of

interaction with angry/frustrated individuals. Such interaction should influence negative affect.

Finally, one should examine the extent to which community characteristics influence those variables said to condition the effect of strain on anger/frustration and crime. Such variables, however, may not be a complete function of those community characteristics in Figure 1. Therefore, researchers also should obtain independent measures of these variables and examine the extent to which they condition the effect of strain on aggregated levels of negative affect and crime rates.

GST represents a major alternative to those theories that now dominate the research on communities and crime. In particular, GST provides another explanation for the effect of previously examined variables on community crime rates—variables like economic deprivation, mobility, family disruption, and signs of incivility. The effect of these variables is usually explained in terms of social disorganization and, to a lesser extent, subcultural deviance theory. As argued above, one can also explain the effect of these variables in terms of strain theory.

It is important to emphasize, however, that GST is proposed as a supplement rather than as a replacement for social disorganization and subcultural deviance theories. As exemplified in the work of Thrasher (1927) and Shaw and McKay (1942), a full explanation of community differences in crime rates must draw on a range of theories, including those that examine the ways in which communities *motivate* as well as *control* crime.

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9. *Connections:*

Understanding Doping in Elite Sports through

Anomie and General Strain Perspectives

> In competitive athletics, when the aim of victory is shorn of its institutional trappings and success in contests becomes construed as "winning the game" rather than "winning through circumscribed modes of activity," a premium is implicitly set upon the use of illegitimate but technically efficient means (Merton, 1938: 675).

Introduction

On October 10, 2012, Travis T. Tygart, CEO of the National Anti-Doping Agency of the United Stated, released a statement announcing the doping case against champion cyclist Lance Armstrong and his US Postal Service Team, which included other notable cyclists and admitted dopers Floyd Landis and Jonathan Vaughters. An excerpt from Tygart's statement reads:

> "The USPS Team doping conspiracy was professionally designed to groom and pressure athletes to use dangerous drugs, to evade detection, to ensure its secrecy and ultimately gain an unfair competitive advantage through superior doping practices. A program organized by individuals who thought they were above the rules and who still play a major and active role in sport today." (Tygart 2012).

Doping scandals, like that of the USPS, have increasingly dampened the world's affection for sports and elite athletes, rendering the Tour de France more of a *Tour of Shame* (Petroczi 2007). In this essay, I discuss doping among elite athletes to illustrate what the classic anomie approach and the more modern General Strain Theory (GST) can teach us about deviance in society today.

In the first quote above, Merton (1938) articulates a fundamental premise of anomie theory: the ethic of achieving cultural goals, like the Tour de France, at any cost breeds illicit behavior. In other words, the goals society sets for its people or athletes must be realistic and attainable through legitimate channels. If there are discrepancies between them, people will detach from norms (anomie) and engage in deviance, e.g., doping.

Noted cyclist and US Postal Service teammate Jonathan Vaughters seems to agree with Merton nearly 70 years later when describing the difficulty in achieving his childhood dream of winning races through his own hard work and training. He states:

> Imagine you've paid the dues, you've done the work, you've got the talent, and your resolve is solid as concrete. At that point, the dream is 98 percent complete but there is that last little bit you need to become great. THEN, just short of finally living your childhood dream, you are told…. by some coaches, mentors, even the boss, that you aren't going to make it, unless you cheat. Unless you choose to dope. (Vaughters, New York Times, Aug 11, 2012).

Still, Vaughters suggests unrealistic cultural goals – e.g., constantly breaking world records-- aren't sufficient in explaining doping in elite sports. It also has to do with the day-to-day pressures and feedback important others give you on the prizes you value. Such strain undercuts social norms and leads to deviance. This more personal experience of "strain" can alter our feelings and perceptions in negative ways, leading to doping among athletes like Vaughters.

Herein lies an important distinction not only between Merton's more structural theory of anomie and Agnew's more individual-level GST, but in how we view deviance in society today: *to what extent is deviance the product of environmental factors (macro-level) that constrain us*

or the more immediate dynamics (micro-level) we can see, feel, and manipulate on a daily basis?

Historically, the fields of sociology and criminology have debated the value of both macro and micro-level explanations in understanding crime, deviance and social problems. In this section, Merton's classic statement on anomie and two more recent papers by Hagedorn and Agnew are featured. The Hagedorn ethnographic study of drug gangs in Milwaukee lends support to Merton's more macro-level theory of anomie, but adds racial discrimination as an additional structural factor that motivates deviance. The reading by Agnew, on the other hand, makes the case for the more individual-oriented GST in explaining crime. The goal of this essay, then, is to help students see how each approach can inform doping in elite sports today. Secondarily, students will learn how both environmental forces beyond the individual's control, as well as the more personal ones they can shape, impact an even wider range of non-normative behavior.

Merton, Anomie and Crime

Like Durkheim, Erickson and other functionalists (see Section 1), Robert Merton (1938) viewed society as a complex system whose parts worked together to promote ***solidarity*** and stability among its citizens. He believed that efficient societies required agreement about morality and conformity to norms (Durkheim 1982). Merton maintained the key to understanding deviance was in the institutions and structural arrangements of society, including the norms it set for its people. He believed social structures exerted pressure on people to violate norms. Deviance appeared when goals were too difficult for people to achieve by acceptable standards, much like the quotes above indicate.

Two types of structural conditions set the stage for anomie and deviance. The first were goals, interests or social aspirations and the second were the socially approved means or

opportunities for attaining them. Merton noted that cultural goals were often unrealistic or too celebrated in society and the avenues to obtain them were lacking or not available to enough people. Goal attainment and access to legitimate means (e.g., economic or educational) were unequally distributed in society. Furthermore, a person's status set, or their occupation, neighborhood, age, sex, race, and education religion seemed to matter more in achieving goals than their initiative and hard work. These discrepancies produced anomie in society and could result in crime and deviance.

Numerous responses to anomie were possible, Merton contended. Some people would conform to social conventions even if they experienced anomie. He called these folks "conformists." On the other hand, "innovators" accepted cultural goals (.e.g., material comfort, winning, trophies etc.), but would reject conventional means for obtaining them, opting for more illegitimate avenues. Ritualists were those who embraced cultural goals and legitimate means even while not believing in them. Retreatists and rebels, on the hand, rejected both goals and legitimate means. Rebels actively tried to change things in society, while retreatists simply faded into the background and disconnected from social institutions and ideals.

The Merton reading discusses professional sports and athletes' behavior as a case of innovation and deviance. He anticipated athletes might be "pressured" to use illegitimate means to win their contests because of the "cultural exaggeration of success goals" (Merton 1938: 675). While he did not foresee doping techniques as a means to those ends, he did discuss another "innovative" method athletes might use to achieve their goals, such as:

> "The star of the opposing football team is surreptitiously slugged; the wrestler furtively incapacitates his opponent through ingenious but illicit techniques; university alumni covertly subsidize "students" whose talents are largely confined to the athletic field." (p,

675).

Hagedorn, Anomie, Drugs, and Gang-Banging

John Hagedorn studied gang members in Milwaukee extensively in the 1980s. Even though his research is about minority gang members and drugs, not elite athletes and doping, it raises some useful insights about how different groups experience and respond to anomie. For example, Hagedorn's endorsement of Merton's anomie theory is clear when he quotes a young gang member on the discrepancy between cultural goals (providing for your family) and socially approved means (working) to obtain them.

> Question: Do you consider it wrong or immoral to sell dope?
>
> Answer: No
>
> Question: Why not?
>
> Answer: That's the only upper hand ... us black folks have. The only jobs that are out there is McDonalds, Burger King,..and Kentucky Fried Chicken. If you have kids that's not going to cut it (p. 7).

Like Durkheim, Hagedorn sees deviance—drug dealing in this case—as a normal response to anomie in society and like Merton, he attributes it to blocked opportunities to achieve the American Dream. Hagedorn states:

> "An anomic perspective, on the other hand, understands violent and antisocial underclass behavior as patterned reactions to the frustration of conventional aspirations in a world with severe economic constraints and racial discrimination." (p. 15).

Hagedorn's take on Durkheim's and Merton's ideas, however, adds racial discrimination as another structural obstacle for poor minority group members, one that further limits their

opportunities to attain culturally approved goals, or the American Dream. He anchors his typology of gang members in several innovative responses to racism. Hagedorn states:

> "It is in this context that our earlier typology of *"homeboys,* dope fiends, legits, and new jacks" is best viewed. Just as Merton looked at five universal adaptations to American culture, each of these gang roles is a subtype of innovative adaptation to *racism* and the lack of good jobs." (p. 13).

Research shows that racial minorities in the US might view sports as a vital and legitimate avenue to attain the cultural goals from which they are otherwise blocked, as Hagedorn contends. For example, Melnick and Sabo (1994) reviewed several studies showing African American's and other minority groups sought upward mobility in America through sports. This raises an important question: If racial minorities believe sports is one way to achieve culturally approved goals from which they are otherwise blocked, wouldn't we expect higher rates of doping among them?

Contrary to this expectation, few studies to date have found racial differences among athletes in doping practices. However, researchers have found less use of mood- altering drugs, like alcohol and marijuana, for recreational purposes among minority athletes than their white counterparts (Green et al. 2001: Durant et al. 1993). This reminds us about Merton's point: not all adaptations to anomie will be deviant. Conformity remains a possibility in the face of anomie. Alternatively, the failure to find more doping among minority athletes- despite their higher levels of anomie in society—could indicate that Merton's structural approach is not sensitive enough to capture the more individual-level reasons for it. Agnew's GST just might complete the picture.

Agnew, GST, and Community Crime.

The reading by Agnew moves the functionalist discussion of anomie closer to the individual by focusing on his/her attitudes, feelings and perceptions related to the sorts of structural constraints discussed above. Thus, an important difference between the anomie work of Merton and Hagedorn and the GST of Agnew has to do with their different levels of analysis. Merton and Hagedorn used a more structural approach to explain deviance—highlighting things like institutions, policies and culture —whereas Agnew's GST is more concerned with individual-level traits, e.g., emotions and perceptions. The reading by Agnew in this section attempts to link both structural characteristics of communities WITH those of individuals.

Consider the first three propositions Agnew puts forth on page 127. He acknowledges that community-level characteristics like poverty, unemployment, and high crime (structural factors) trap individuals in problematic neighborhoods, block them from achieving positively valued goals and, consequently, expose them to strain. However, it is the relative deprivation that individuals feel from these conditions that leads to deviant behavior. Agnew states:

> Goal blockage, relative deprivation, and exposure to aversive stimuli increase the likelihood that community residents will experience a range of negative emotions, including anger and frustration. Aggregate levels of anger/frustration should have a direct effect on crime rates" (p. 127).

Agnew's (1999) GST, for example, claims that important "affect" or psychological variables influence the strain/deviance relationship. Strain was likely to result if people placed a high value on money, did not view adherence to legit norms as a source of status or prestige, and felt unable to achieve financial success through legal channels. This predicament would breed anger for some and could lead to problematic behavior. For example, the innovative response of

selling drugs to attain goods or the retreatist response of using drugs to escape negative feelings would depend on the individual's emotional response to strain. Unlike Merton and Hagedorn, Agnew would not have predicted drug-dealing to simply result from deprived economic status or blocked opportunity, but rather the individual's psychological reaction to it or their negative perceptions of their environment. *Therefore, one of the most important distinctions in Agnew's work is the idea that the psychological traits of individuals "condition" or influence the effects of anomie on crime*.

There is another important distinction between Agnew's GST and Merton and Hagedorn's more structural notion of anomie. It has to do with the *types* of goals and opportunities/means to attain them. For example, Merton and Hagedorn focused on societal-level goals, while Agnew identified more personal ones (e.g., winning a scholarship, becoming captain of a football team, etc.) and everyday obstacles (e.g., the loss of a loved one or a treasured object). When people experience something negative, or are threatened with it (a type of blocked opportunity), they might engage in deviance to retrieve what was lost or retaliate against those who offended them. Figure 9.1 below, then, summarizes the main differences between functionalism, anomie, and GST and the positions on deviance offered by Durkheim, Erickson, Merton, Hagedorn and Agnew.

[Insert Figure 9.1 Here]

Anomie, Strain and Doping in Elite Sports

In 1928, the International Association of Athletics Federation officially banned the use of stimulants by competitors in world sporting events. This would mark the first doping regulation in sporting history. Since then, tests for doping have expanded significantly across type of sports (e.g., football or soccer, cycling, baseball and track and field to name a few). However, prohibitions have escalated most recently following the International Olympic Committee's (IOC) banning of steroids and blood doping technologies in 1976 and 1986 respectively, and the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 2000.

Since that time, famous athletes, such as Olympic sprinters Ben Johnson (1988) and Marion Jones (2000), have had their medals taken away from them due to doping scandals. Home-run kings Barry Bonds, Mark McGwire, and Roger Clemens have also found themselves in doping trouble. However, the most notable and stunning case of doping to date may be cyclist Lance Armstrong. After many years of lying, Armstrong admitted to Oprah Winfrey in a televised interview in January of 2013 that he has doped throughout his career. He has since been stripped of his Olympic medals and seven Tour de France titles. We have also learned from the Armstrong case that doping in elite sports is executed by a complex and coordinated network of institutional and business actors who support the illegal behavior (Tygart 2012).

But just how prevalent is this form of deviant behavior in sports today? Estimates show doping in elite sports today is fairly low despite our sense that it is widespread. According to Streigel, Ulrich and Simon (2010), WADA tests show an average of 1% of Olympic Athletes testing positive for some form of doping over the past five years. Pitsch and Emrich (2012) claim the WADA reports between 2004-2008 show about 2% of athletes testing positive for

PEDs (performance enhancing drugs and techniques). However, both research teams estimate the WADA rates are conservative and far below the true prevalence of doping among athletes. Using an anonymous survey method, where athletes "reported" on doping practices, Streigel et al (2010) found about 7% of elite athletes reported doping for competition. Thus, the "real" rate of doping among elite athletes, Streigel et al (2010) concluded, was likely to be 8 times the rate found by WADA. Using a similar self-report methodology, Pitsch and Emrich (2012) estimated doping rates between 10-35% among elite athletes.

Doping is not equal across sport (UKAD -- see http://www.ukad.org.uk/new-to-anti-doping/story-of-anti-doping/). The UK Anti-Doping Agency (UKAD) found that an average of about 3.5% of all tests yielded doping among cyclists like Vaughters and Armstrong. This rate was one of the highest for Olympic athletes; however, doping was at similar levels for triathletes, weightlifters, boxers and basketball players. According to the UKAD report, sports such as gymnastics, fencing, football (or soccer), badminton and canoeing/kayaking have the lowest rates.

An understanding the anomie or GST approach would explain doping in elite sports must begin with a discussion of the cultural goals in society. Many have observed the goals of elite sports today are not simply winning the race, game, fight or contest; they are also setting world records (Streigel, Ulrich and Simon 2010; Hughes and Coakley 1991). While many concede winning is more realistic, the public's and stakeholders' demand for persistent record-breaking, as well as the growing corporatized world of sports (Wenner 1998), may be pushing those goals beyond athletes' honest capacities to attain them. Thus, the pressure to cheat and dope will likely increase in the future.

Merton, Anomie and Doping. Given the above text and Figure 1, Merton would likely explain doping among elite athletes as a result of societal pressure to constantly win and set records. When the public attends a baseball game, for example, they want to see homeruns. America's affection for the homerun derby is classic and even today, sports fans are so eager to catch a homerun ball, that some may jeopardize their health or that of other spectators to get one (Marshall, 7/12/11). This cultural obsession signifies the sort of outrageous goals—and potentially deviant adaptations— Merton described. Think back to 1998. Then, Mark McGwire of the St. Louis Cardinals and Sammy Sosa of the Chicago Cubs thrilled fans by racing to beat Roger Maris's long-standing (38 years) and highly coveted record of 61 home runs in one season. McGwire won the race, breaking Maris's record on September 8 with 70 home runs. Three short years later, in 2001, Barry Bonds would break McGwire's record by hitting 73 homeruns in one season. In fact, McGwire, Sosa, and Bonds have reset the single season homerun record six times between 1998 and 2001. Bonds is currently the homerun king of all-time.

Goals like these are extremely difficult to achieve through the legitimate channels of diet, training, and coaching, much like Vaughters described above. This creates anomie and leads to cheating or innovation via doping. Sure enough, the homerun races of the late 1990s and early 21st century have been mired in disgrace. In 2010, McGwire publicly admitted to using performance-enhancing drugs throughout his career. In 2007, Bonds found himself ensnared in the Balco steroids scandal. He testified under oath that he never used steroids or other doping techniques and was later charged with obstruction of justice and perjury. Today, too many homeruns in baseball are met with suspicion by fans, thus indicating the doping techniques used to secure them have tainted the cultural obsession with them.

Hagedorn, Racial Inequality and Doping. Doping knowledge and opportunities, themselves, may be beyond the reach of some athletes and less so for others. Recall that Hagedorn endorsed Merton's structural explanation of anomie and deviance, but added an additional layer of blocked opportunity for minority group members due to racial discrimination in society. Prejudice and discrimination against blacks blocks legitimate opportunities to attain culturally approved goals, leading to higher rates of deviance among minorities. Yet, as the text above indicates, there is little evidence of higher levels of doping among minority athletes in the US. Still, media reports around the world show doping is especially prevalent in some countries, e.g., Australia and Germany, suggesting there may be important differences in goal/mean discrepancies by nationality or culture.

Agnew, Strain, and Doping. Agnew's GST approach takes a more personal viewpoint on goals, opportunities, strain and deviance. For him, athletes experience discrepancies between their goals and methods to attain them, but much more so on an individual and immediate level with direct impact in their lives. Peers, coaches and sponsors pressure athletes to attain impossible goals and may threaten to take away the things they value about the sport or penalize them for not performing a certain way. This pressure creates negative emotions, like anger and frustration, and is relieved only when the athlete succumbs to illegitimate means of doping. Due to these pressures and feelings, athletes justify doping in many ways—to keep up with their peers, alleviate their own stress and anxiety, satisfy coaches and sponsors on which they are dependent. Vaughters (2012: 2) describes some of these threats, penalties and consequences for not doping in elite cycling:

> "And think about the talented athletes who did make the right choice and walked away [*from doping*]. They were punished for following their moral compass and being left behind. How do they reconcile the loss of their dream? It was stolen from them."

Vaughters also links the cultural goals of winning to his own emotional state, in a way fitting to Agnew's GST:

> "If the message [cultural goal] I was given had been different, but more important, if the reality of sport then had been different, perhaps I could have lived my dream without killing my soul." (p. 2).

Hughes and Coakley (1991) have spent many years studying doping in elite sports. They conclude that athletic deviance is less about outlandish cultural goals of winning and record-setting and much more about the micro-level factors Agnew and others have raised as part of GST. For example, Hughes and Coakley (1991) note that the athletes at greatest risk for doping are those with low self-esteem, those most vulnerable to demands and pressures from others, those who see no other route to success, and those prepared to make great personal sacrifices for their achievements. Therefore, these more interpersonal influences – often emotional in nature—play an important part in the relationship between strain and doping in elite sports.

Conclusions

By comparing the structural anomie position of Merton and Hagedorn with the more micro-level viewpoint by Agnew, we can see an evolution of ideas about what causes deviant behavior in society. Both approaches remind us that deviance – too much of it anyway-- has the possibility of harming society, its functioning, ideology, and culture—all of which are extremely

important. While the structural approaches of Merton and Hagedorn have been debated, the extension of their work to the more individual level by scholars like Agnew, represents an important evolution in thinking about deviance. Taken together, we can only surmise that deviant behavior is the result of BOTH the environmental factors that shape cultural goals and opportunities as well as our own interactions, perceptions and feelings about them. Moreover, the exact combination of macro and micro-level influences on deviance will vary across our race, gender and social class in ways Merton and others have long specified.

Critical Thinking Questions:

1. If racial minorities believe sports is one way to achieve culturally approved goals from which they are otherwise blocked, why aren't their rates of doping higher than whites? What differences would expect to see between male and female athletes? Why?

2. Given that doping in elite sports or joining a gang result from both environmental factors and more interpersonal ones, what sorts of solutions do you think would be successful in curbing them?

3. Imagine you are a researcher studying gang involvement. How would you gather information on the environmental factors behind it? What would be the obstacles to your research?

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Section 3. Social Disorganization and Collective Efficacy

Introduction.

Tammy L. Anderson.

Neighborhood Watch programs have been successful in preventing crime and deviance in neighborhoods across our nation over time. They bring citizens together with law enforcement officials to deter crime and make communities safer. State Trooper Stefani Plume understands their value well. She recently told her fellow citizens of Bullskin Township in Fayette County, Pennsylvania that their neighborhood watch program is doing a great job keeping their township safe. Compared to places close by, Bullskin has lower rates of crime. Plume attributes the success to the joint partnership between the police and residents. She states "I think that you folks here in Bullskin Township have gone above and beyond and you are doing really well." Crime watch organizer Edwin Zylka agrees, explaining that "The major purpose of our organization is to bring people together to talk about their problems and to keep looking out for one another."

Section 3 covers social disorganization theory and the newer concept of collective efficacy in readings by Shaw and McKay (1969), Sampson (2006), and Grattet (2009). They outline some of the fundamental ideas about crime control and safety that Neighborhood Watch programs—like that in Bullskin Township—find so useful in helping communities reduce violence, property crime, and vandalism. Such critical points include that deviance can be an feature of the environment —a neighborhood effect-- rather than simply a matter of individual traits, decisions and actions. Thus, collective action and inaction can both cause and eliminate it.

Social Disorganization Theory. In their study of crime and delinquency in Chicago, Shaw and McKay (1969) found patterning in the distribution of crime and delinquency across

different neighborhoods or zones—like the townships references above-- based mostly on ***land use patterns*** (i.e., business, commercial, residential). By pouring over official crime statistics and conducting local observations , they found crime rates were higher in communities experiencing social changes that disrupted key dimensions of social control. High rates of transience, neighborhood decay, poverty, crowding, and population diversity (e.g., mixing of various ethnic and racial groups) they argued, threatened moral consensus and weakened local social institutions, like churches, voluntary organizations, and parent-teach associations. Such "social disorganization" was found to increase neighborhood crime.

Social disorganization theory has helped sociologists understand the causes of violent and property crime, as well as juvenile delinquency, since the early 20th century. It was innovative because it focused on the ***characteristics of places***—or more precisely neighborhoods—rather than the traits of individual offenders to explain things like homicide, robbery, arson, illegal drug sales, truancy and vandalism.

Collective Efficacy. The idea of collective efficacy came along much later in the 20th century when sociologists employing social disorganization-like studies discovered that a more symbolic feature of environments—the ties between community members—also played an important role in the amount of crime and deviance a neighborhood contained. Both Trooper Plume and Crime Watch organizer Zylka believe such bonds between community members and officials are the key to Bullkin Township's recent success in decreasing crime and disorder.

According to the Sampson reading in this section, collective efficacy refers to the degree to which neighborhood residents share a mutual trust, sense of solidarity and are willing to intervene when problems arise in the community. Sampson notes that a neighborhood's ability to control the wrong-doing of its residents (especially younger ones) will protect it from high

rates of crime and deviance. Socially disorganized neighborhoods disallow this sort of strong bonding needed among residents—like those in Bullkin Township-- to block crime. So, while attending to things like crowding, residential turnover, urban decay, and ethnic heterogeneity are important in fighting crime, Sampson and others propose that goal is likely better achieved through promoting collective efficacy among community residents.

Until recently, the neighborhood approach used by proponents of the social disorganization and collective efficacy frameworks typically studied street crime, e.g., property and violent crime, and relied heavily on official data from police departments to track or map offending across city neighborhoods. While many officials and policy-makers find this approach quite valuable in fighting crime, it has limited the utility of the social disorganization and collective efficacy theories in explaining other types of non-normative behavior in other settings or contexts. Could they be useful, for example, in helping us understand deviance beyond the city's streets? The reading by Grattet and the connections essay by Sexton in this section show us they can.

To begin, Grattet (2007) offers an important contribution to the social disorganization and collective efficacy framework because his study targets bias or hate crimes, i.e., a category of offending based on how people's prejudices motivate them to commit crimes against others. The FBI (2011) defines hate crimes as "those motivated by biases based on race, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity/national origin, and disability." In Sacremento, Grattet finds intergroup conflict, stemming from intolerance to ethnic and racial diversity in neighborhoods, best explains bias crimes. Residents attempt to "soil" their neighborhoods or define them as territories exclusive to certain ethnic and racial groups and their heritages. Whites are especially likely to do this, i.e., use "defended neighborhood" arguments to manage intergroup conflict that arise

from the in-migration of unwanted minorities. Grattet's study, therefore, shows that culturally-based prejudices among racial and ethnic groups are the driving force to the crimes community residents commit against each other. Such biases amplify social disorganization and weaken collective efficacy such that some locations and groups simply cannot adapt to diversity and come together to fight crime.

The connections essay by Lori Sexton in this section advances the social disorganization-collective efficacy continuum in yet another way by showing that it can also help us understand crime and deviance in locations beyond the city, such as prisons. Sexton's essay invites us to:

> Re-envision the concepts of social disorganization and collective efficacy by plucking them from the comfortable trappings of neighborhood analysis and transplanting them into a decidedly different context: the prison. Through a focus on multiple, overlapping communities, we have problematized the demarcation of communities based purely on physical boundaries, instead allowing for communities to be rooted in common experiences and identity.

Sexton picks up on the cultural aspects touched on by the other readings in this section to explain the predicament of transgender prisoners. While estimates of transgender inmates in our nation's prisons are difficult to come by, the media is filled with reports about numerous problems they encounter while incarcerated. One of the most comprehensive studies of this topic was conducted in California by Jenness, Sexton and Sumner (2011). Jenness and her research team found abuse, intimidation and violent victimization were daily experiences of transgender inmates. In theorizing about the causes of violent victimization of transgender inmates, Sexton links Grattet's idea of defended neighborhoods and Sampson's point about collective efficacy, stating:

> Perhaps a lesson can be taken from Grattet's (2009) work that combines social disorganization with a "defended neighborhoods" argument. According to this perspective, transgender prisoners—who are often visibly different from the larger inmate population—might be viewed as unwelcome others by non-transgender prisoners. Thus, despite higher levels of collective efficacy among the transgender prisoner community, cultural conflict between transgender prisoners and non-transgender prisoners within a prison "neighborhood" might yield higher levels of victimization for transgender prisoners.

While the prison transgender community does not have a neighborhood watch group—like Bullskin Township-- to bring its members or residents together to help prevent victimization, numerous human rights groups have emerged to stop hate crimes within prison walls. For example, Stop Prisoner Rape (http://spr.igc.org) and the Black and Pink organization (www.blackandpink.org) provide online support for transgender inmates and advocate for their protection. Such action and support from "outside" the prison community is critical for transgender inmates and others suffering sexual assault and intimidation behind prison walls. However, would a more effective solution be to foster collective efficacy within the prison community itself by physically and culturally integrating prison groups who are in conflict with each other? To what extent do you think such a physical and cultural integration approach like this would work to reduce hate crimes across our country? What obstacles can you think of that might disallow them from happening? Hopefully, the readings in this section will help you find some answers.

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Reading 10

Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas

Clifford R. Shaw & Henry D. McKay

Chapter I: Introduction

DURING the past century many studies have been made which indicate that the incidence of officially recorded delinquency and crime varies from one locality to another. One such study, *Delinquency Areas*, was published in 1929 by the authors and their colleagues.[1] This monograph reported a study of the distribution of the home addresses of approximately 60,000 male individuals in Chicago who had been dealt with by the school authorities, the police, and the courts as actual or alleged truants, delinquents, or criminals. It was clearly demonstrated in this report that the rates of all three groups varied widely among the local communities in the city. The low-income communities near the centers of commerce and heavy industry had the highest rates, while those in outlying residential communities of higher economic status were more or less uniformly low.

The present volume brings the delinquency data for Chicago up to date, provides comparative data for several other large American cities, and includes much new material on the differential characteristics of local communities with varying rates of delinquents. Specifically, in this volume an attempt is made further to explore the following questions in regard to the ecology of delinquency and crime in American cities:

1. To what extent do the rates of delinquents and criminals show similar variations among the local communities in different types of American cities?

2. Does recidivism among delinquents vary from community to community in accordance with rates of delinquents?

3. To what extent do variations in rates of delinquents correspond to demonstrable

differences in the economic, social, and cultural characteristics of local communities in different types of cities?

4. How are the rates of delinquents in particular areas affected over a period of time by successive changes in the nativity and nationality composition of the population?

5. To what extent are the observed differences in the rates of delinquents between children of foreign and native parentage due to a differential geographic distribution of these two groups in the city?

6. Under what economic and social conditions does crime develop as a social tradition and become embodied in a system of criminal values? Structure → Culture

7. What do the rates of delinquents, when computed by local areas for successive periods of time, reveal with respect to the effectiveness of traditional methods of treatment and prevention?

8. What are the implications, for treatment and prevention, of wide variations in rates of delinquents in different types of communities?

It is not assumed that this study will provide an answer to all of these questions. Certain facts are presented, however, which are useful in analyzing the nature of the problem of delinquency in urban communities and which have definite implications for the development of control techniques. Although it long has been recognized that the social conditions in low-income areas are such as to give rise to delinquency among a disproportionately large number of boys and young men, this fact has not been given the attention which its importance warrants in the development of therapeutic and preventive programs. It is hoped that the data in this volume will help to serve this purpose by focusing attention upon the need for broad programs of social reconstruction and community organization. It would appear from the findings of this study that successful treatment of the problem of delinquency in large cities will entail the development of programs which seek to effect changes in the conditions of life

in specific local communities and in whole sections of the city. Diagnosis and supervision of individual offenders probably will not be sufficient to achieve this end. As Plant suggests:

The effects of social institutions upon the personality—those ways in which the cultural pattern in one or another way affects the working out of the individual's problem—are of only academic importance unless we can in one way or another alter the environment to meet the needs that appear.[2]

Alter the turn of the century many students became interested in the ecological study of delinquency in American cities. In 1912 Breckinridge and Abbott published a study showing the geographic distribution of cases of juvenile delinquency in the city of Chicago. They utilized for this purpose the cases of boys and girls brought before the Juvenile Court of Cook County on petitions alleging delinquency during the years 1899–1909. Among other things they prepared a map showing the location of the homes of these children. This map indicated that a disproportionately large number of the cases were concentrated in certain districts of the city. In this connection they state:

> A study of this map makes possible several conclusions with regard to "delinquent neighborhoods." It becomes clear, in the first place, that the region from which the children of the court chiefly come is the densely populated. West Side, and that the most conspicuous centers of delinquency in this section have been the congested wards which lie along the river and the canals. . . . .
>
> . . . . The West Side furnished the largest quota of delinquency across the river. These are chiefly the Italian quarter of the Twenty-Second Ward on the North Side; the First and Second Wards, which together include the district of segregated vice and a portion of the so-called "black belt" of the South Side; and such distinct industrial communities as the districts near the steel mills of South Chicago and near the stockyards.[3]

It should be noted that this study did not relate the number of delinquents to the population in the various districts of the city. While the distribution map served to localize the problem of delinquency and to show the absolute number of cases in the various districts, rates by geographic units were not computed. Hence, it was not possible to conclude from this study that the observed concentration of cases was due to anything other than a greater density of population in these areas. Since the publication of the findings of Breckinridge and Abbott, studies have been carried on in which the [rate of delinquents (ratio between the number of delinquents and the appropriate population group)] has been used as a basis for comparisons among unit areas within the city.

In 1915 Ernest W. Burgess, under the direction of Professor F. W. Blackmar, conducted a survey of social conditions in Lawrence, Kansas. This survey included a study of the geographic distribution of alleged delinquent children for the city as a whole, the absolute number of delinquents in the various districts, and the rates of delinquents for the several areas. Both the number of cases and the rates of delinquents show wide variations among the several areas. The ratio between the number of alleged delinquent children and the total population aged 5–16 years varied from 8.36 to 0.82 for the 6 wards of the city. In this connection Burgess states:

> The significant fact to be gathered from the records of the children of Lawrence is the large proportion of juvenile delinquents in the entire child population in the fourth ward. One child out of every twelve children five and over, but under seventeen years old, appeared in the juvenile court in the two-year period studied. If this proportion were maintained for a twelve-year period, comprising the age groups between five and seventeen, the presumption is that at least one-half of the children in the fourth ward

> would have appeared before the juvenile judge before reaching seventeen years. Since the proportion of juvenile delinquency in the fourth ward is three times as large as that in any other ward, the conclusion naturally follows that certain factors are at work here which are absent elsewhere in Lawrence. . . . .

and classes of areas, zero-order correlations, and, in a few instances, higher-order correlations. While these maps and statistical data are useful in locating different types of areas, in differentiating the areas where the rates of delinquency are high from areas where the rates are low, and in predicting or forecasting expected rates, they do not furnish an explanation of delinquent conduct. This explanation, it is assumed, must be sought, in the first place, in the field of the more subtle human relationships and social values which comprise the social world of the child in the family and community. These more distinctively human situations, which seem to be directly related to delinquent conduct, are, in turn, products of larger economic and social processes characterizing the history and growth of the city and of the local communities which comprise it.

In this study the Chicago delinquency data are dealt with in a much more detailed manner than in the other cities for which data are presented. All of chapters ii–vii (Part II) are concerned with Chicago. These give a description of the growth and configuration of the city; the geographic distribution of delinquents and criminals, rates of infant mortality, tuberculosis, and insanity; and indexes of the variations in the economic, social, and cultural characteristics of local areas for which rates of delinquency have been computed.

CHAPTER II

GROWTH OF CHICAGO AND DIFFERENTIATION OF LOCAL AREAS

CHICAGO is a large industrial and commercial city located on the western shore of Lake Michigan near its southern extremity. It is the second largest city in the United States and the largest included in this study. Within a period of a little over a century it has grown from a small town, with a population of about 200 and an area of 2½ square miles, to a great industrial metropolis, with a population of over 3,300,000 people and a corporate area of 211 square miles, extending some 25 miles along the lake front and from 8 to 10 miles inland.

During its growth a differentiation of areas has taken place within Chicago. Even a casual observation reveals that certain districts are occupied largely by industry and others used exclusively for residential purposes; that certain areas are occupied by persons of low economic status and others by the very rich; and that certain neighborhoods are characterized by a native white population, and others by the foreign born, whose dominant languages are still those of the Old World. It is generally known, also, that among areas in the city there are wide differences in the rates of truants, of delinquents, and of adult criminals, as well as in disease and mortality rates and other indexes of well-being. More subtle are the differences in standards and cultural values, in community organization, and in the nature of social life; but that they exist there can be no question.

Why do these variations exist? Why has the city assumed this configuration, with this particular distribution of poverty and wealth and of racial and national groups? Why are there such wide differences in standards and cultural values among areas within the city?

This volume is based on the assumption that the best basis for an understanding of the development of differences among urban areas may be gained through study of the processes of city growth. Areas acquire high delinquency rates neither by chance nor by design but rather, it is assumed, as an end-product of processes in American city life over which, as yet, man has been able to exercise little control. This elaboration of the differentiation of areas in

city growth is presented, then, as a frame of reference, a basis for analysis of the problem of delinquency not only in relation to the processes of urban expansion but also in relation to the whole complex of urban life.

In the present chapter an effort will be made (1) to outline and describe the processes of growth involved in the differentiation of areas in large cities; (2) to analyze the growth and expansion of Chicago with reference to these processes; and (3) to present some evidence of this differentiation, with the characteristics of the different types of areas resulting.

PROCESSES OF CITY GROWTH

The general processes of growth underlying segregation and differentiation of areas within cities have long been the subject of investigation by students of urban life. Professor Robert E. Park and others have pointed out the general character of these processes, noting that every American city of the same class tends to reproduce in the course of its expansion all the different types of areas and that these tend to exhibit, from city to city, very similar physical, social, and cultural characteristics, leading to their designation as "natural areas."[1]

In his description of the processes of radial expansion Professor E. W. Burgess has advanced the thesis that, in the absence of opposing factors, the American city tends to take the form of concentric zones.[2] zone I in this conceptual scheme is the central business and industrial district; zone II, the "zone in transition," or slum area, in the throes of change from residence to business and industry; zone III, the zone of workingmen's homes; zone IV, the residential zone; and zone V, the outer commuters', zone, beyond the city limits. The same general pattern of areas tends to appear in any major industrial center, even though such a "center" may be on the outskirts of a large city. This ideal or schematic construction furnishes a frame of reference from which the location and characteristics of given city areas may be

studied at any moment, as well as the changes that take place as time goes on. [In a growing city, zones are continuously expanding, which means that each inner zone must invade[3] the next beyond.] The result of this process is observable in our large cities, where the central business and industrial areas, now largely uninhabited except by a transient population, at one time included within their limits all gradations of areas in the city.

The starting-point for a discussion of the processes of expansion and differentiation within the city, as indicated above, is the concentration of industry and commerce, especially the configuration including the central business district. “Even if the city were not growing, and its internal organization were assumed to be static, the residential neighborhoods adjacent to industrial and commercial areas would be considered, no doubt, physically less desirable than those farther removed.” This would be true especially of residential areas near the central business district, for in most cities these are the sections built up first in the development of the city and for that reason are characterized by the oldest homes. Generally speaking, the largest proportion of new dwellings are to be found in the outlying sections of any city, while the areas with the most old dwellings are close to the points of early settlement.

More directly, the presence of either industrial or commercial districts affects the desirability of adjacent residential areas, making life in them less pleasant, according to prevailing standards. The smoke and soot from heavy industrial plants soon render near-by residential structures dirty and ugly in appearance. Noise from factory machinery may be distracting; and the odors of certain industries, notably slaughtering and rendering, are often very disagreeable. These conditions, together with the fact that they soon become associated with undesirable social status, would tend to create wide differences in the distribution of areas even if the basic structure of the city were permanently fixed.

“In an expanding city these differences among areas are exaggerated because invasion or

the threat of invasion from inner-city areas results in more active deterioration, with subsequent demolition of the structures in those sections adjacent to industry and commerce. As the city grows, the areas of commerce and light industry near the center encroach upon areas used for residential purposes. The dwellings in such areas, often already undesirable because of age, are allowed to deteriorate when such invasion threatens or actually occurs, as further investment in them is unprofitable." These residences are permitted to yield whatever return can be secured in their dilapidated condition, often in total disregard of the housing laws, until they are demolished to make way for new industrial and commercial structures. Even if invasion has not taken place, these processes are evident when the area is zoned for purposes other than residence.

The same general trends are seen in residential districts adjacent to outlying industrial centers. The distinctions may not be so noticeable, the dwellings so old, or the threat of invasion so active; yet the sections closest to industry are, in general, considered least desirable.

When residential areas are being invaded or threatened by invasion, there is apparently little possibility of reconstruction without public subsidy. The physical undesirability of these areas and the ever present prospect of change in land use make it improbable that any first-class residences will be constructed from private funds without the enactment of some special protective legislation.[4] "The result is that persons living in these areas move out as soon as possible." The general effect of this process has been the gradual evacuation of the central areas in all large American cities, leading to the expression frequently heard: "The city is dying at its heart."

"The differentiation of areas within the city on the basis of physical characteristics is co-ordinate with a segregation of the population on an economic basis. The relentless pressure of economic competition forces the group of lowest economic status into the areas which are

least attractive, because there the rents are low, while the economically most secure groups choose higher-rental residential communities, most of which are near the periphery of the city. Between these two extremes lie communities representing a wide variety of economic levels."

This segregation according to the distribution of economic goods implies also a distribution of the population on an occupational and vocational basis. The persons in those occupations which command the lowest wages—the unskilled and service occupations—are forced to live in the areas of lowest rents, while those in the professions and the more remunerative occupations are concentrated in the more attractive sections of the city.

The segregation of population on an economic and occupational basis results, in turn, in the segregation of racial and nativity groups if, within these groups, different economic levels are represented. In northern industrial cities the group of lowest economic status has, until recently, comprised the most recent immigrants. This fact has resulted in the concentration of the foreign born in areas of lowest economic status and, conversely, in the concentration of native whites in the areas of higher economic status; but this separation does not mean that a given group of their descendants are permanently segregated, when the distinction is based on cultural differences only. The national groups which comprise the foreign born in one era may prosper and move; or they may follow their grown children, most of whom are native born, into outlying areas. Their places are taken by newer immigrant groups, who in turn are replaced by still more recent arrivals, and so on, as long as immigration continues. The result tends to be that, while the segregation of the foreign born in the areas of lowest economic status persists, the nationality groups predominating change from decade to decade. Similarly, the native white population living in areas of high economic status are, at any given time, the descendants of those who constituted the bulk of the foreign born in previous generations.

This segregation of population groups on an economic basis does not always proceed in the manner described, because it may be complicated by conditions which serve as barriers to the free movement of population within the city. In northern cities, barriers of racial prejudice and established custom have prevented the Negroes, the group now in the least advantageous position economically, from occupying certain low-rent areas, into which they otherwise would have been segregated by the economic process, and from moving outward into communities of their choice when economically able to do so. As a result, many have been restricted to neighborhoods which have most of the characteristics of inner-city areas but where often the rentals are disproportionately high, partly because of increased congestion and the resulting demand for homes. In southern cities the segregation of the Negro and white population corresponds in general to differences in economic status but is sustained by more elaborate caste mores and taboos.

THE GROWTH AND EXPANSION OF CHICAGO

An effort will next be made to trace the processes of city growth as they have operated in the city of Chicago and to describe briefly the characteristics of the areas differentiated.

The original plot of Chicago, surveyed about 1830, contained roughly ½ square mile of territory, centered about the forks of the Chicago River. This area was extended to approximately 1 square mile in 1833 and to 2½ square miles in 1835, when the town of Chicago was incorporated. Geographically, the site of Chicago was low and swampy but so level that elevation has been a negligible factor in determining the direction of metropolitan expansion. Two geographic barriers have been important, however—Lake Michigan and the Chicago River.

An effect of Lake Michigan is seen in the fact that the central business district is located

on the lake shore—geographically not in the center of the city. The study of the growth of Chicago, diagramed schematically in terms of concentric circles, is at once modified, therefore, to a study in terms of semicircles. The Chicago River, likewise, has been significant both because it has interfered with transportation along the diagonals from the point of original settlement and the present business center and because early in the history of Chicago heavy industry was concentrated along the two branches of the river. This development was accompanied by the location of groups of industries in the areas surrounding this industrial section along the river, while high-class residential districts developed north, south, and west of the central business district.

The internal pattern of Chicago was determined largely by the section lines of the government survey. Dividing the city into square-mile areas, these lines have become the important streets which extend throughout the city from north to south and from east to west, tending to facilitate transportation and, consequently, to accelerate radial expansion along those arterial routes running at right angles and to retard radial expansion in those areas at oblique angles to the streets of the central business district. This basic tendency has been lessened somewhat by the presence of diagonal streets to the northwest and southwest, which originally were Indian trails and later became plank roads leading to Chicago from outlying suburbs.

The growth of Chicago is revealed by the changes between decennial census years. In 1840, 10 years after the original town was plotted, the population numbered 4,470. The population expanded nearly six times between 1840 and 1850, two and one-half times between 1850 and 1860, and nearly three times between 1860 and 1870. It reached 500,000 in 1880, 1,000,000 by 1900, and was well over 2,000,000 by 1910. The rate of increase between 1910 and 1920 was 23.6 per cent; between 1920 and 1930, 24.8 per cent; and between 1930 and 1940, 0.6 per cent. The drop in the rate of increase between 1930 and 1940

is due in part to the fact that during this period the areas of most rapid growth were outside the political boundaries of the city.

The territorial expansion corresponded roughly to population increase. In 1889, when Chicago comprised 44 square miles, an area of 126 square miles was annexed at one time, quadrupling the area of the city and increasing the number of square miles within the political boundaries to 170. This area included Kenwood, Hyde Park, South Chicago, Pullman, and many other small towns, as well as much unoccupied territory. From that time to the present, annexations have been relatively small but have increased the total city area to 211 square miles. Although some of the land within the political boundaries is as yet unpopulated, the metropolitan area extends far beyond these boundaries in every direction and includes many contiguous cities and towns located chiefly along transportation lines toward the north, south, and west.

In the course of this expansion, marked changes have taken place in the character of some sections of the city. This is especially true around the central business district, where early residential areas have been invaded by industrial and commercial developments and have therefore been extended farther and farther out from the center. Similarly, single-family dwellings have been replaced by the characteristic two-flat dwellings in many neighborhoods or by large apartment houses along the important transportation routes. Exclusive residential districts of single homes are now to be found only in the outlying districts and in the suburbs.

The general configuration of Chicago resulting from growth and expansion within the limits set by Lake Michigan, the Chicago River, checkerboard streets, and the early distribution of industry is outlined in Map 10.1, which shows the areas either occupied by or zoned for industrial and residential purposes.

Today the central business district covers much of the area included in the city as incorporated in March, 1837. This district of approximately 10.6 square miles has primarily a

hotel and transient population near its center, but on the outer edge the land is in transition from residential to industrial and commercial uses. This change has not progressed at the same rate in all parts of the area. In some places light industrial plants, business houses, and garages have replaced dwelling-houses almost completely, while in other parts the land still is used primarily for residential purposes. The fact that it is zoned for light industry and commerce, however, makes it subject to occupancy for these uses as the central business district expands.

[INSERT MAP 10.1 HERE]

While practically all of the exclusive residential neighborhoods of early Chicago now are included in the areas either zoned for or occupied by industry and commerce, one small area on the Near North Side has withstood successfully the threats of industrial and commercial invasion. This district, occupied by large residences and exclusive apartment houses and known locally as the "Gold Coast," stands in vivid contrast to the adjoining areas of deteriorated dwellings and industrial development.

In contrast with the areas zoned for light industry and commerce, located for the most part in a semicircle surrounding the central business district, the districts of heavy industry in Chicago are widely distributed. They tend to be located at points strategic for industrial development because of natural advantages, such as the lake, trunk lines of railroads, or abundance of cheap land. The most extensive industrial areas in Chicago lie along the two forks of the Chicago River. The areas zoned for heavy industry on the North Branch extend some 4 miles northwest from the central business district, while the southern extension follows the south fork to the city limits, after broadening out to include the Union Stock Yards and the so-called "central manufacturing district."

Between these forks of the Chicago River lie two large industrial areas which extend westward from the central business district along railroad trunk lines. These, in turn, are

intersected by industrial areas along trunk lines running north and south, so that in a very real sense the Near West Side, the Near Southwest Side, and, to a lesser extent, the Near Northwest Side are bounded by industrial establishments.

The Union Stock Yards and affiliated industries, clearly indicated on Map 10.1, were opened in 1863. The site was chosen both because of its industrial advantages and because at that time it was far outside the city limits. In the general annexation of 1889, however, this area was brought within the corporate boundary of the city, so that today the Union Stock Yards occupy a position not far from the geographic center of the city.

The South Chicago steel-mill center and the industrial centers indicated by the large areas zoned for industry in the southeastern section were also originally outside the city limits. South Chicago, located on Lake Michigan at the mouth of the Calumet River, was founded almost as early as Chicago, and for several decades remained an independent city. Although annexed to Chicago in 1889, it is still a more or less independent commercial and industrial center. The town of Pullman, located just west of Lake Calumet, likewise was annexed in 1889 and, like South Chicago, has retained its name and essential industrial characteristics. Much of the remaining area zoned for industry in the Calumet district at present is unoccupied waste land. Similarly, on the Southwest Side, the large sections marked in solid black on Map 10.1 are zoned for, but not yet occupied by, industrial establishments.

EVIDENCES OF DIFFERENTIATION RESULTING FROM CITY GROWTH

Demolition of Substandard Housing.—Evidence of physical change and deterioration in Chicago within the general framework of the industrial configuration is seen first in the high proportion of buildings in certain districts which have been condemned either for demolition or for repair. Map 10.2, showing the location of dilapidated or dangerous buildings

demolished as of December, 1935, reveals that a large proportion of these buildings are adjacent to the central business district. It is within this district, known sociologically as an "area in transition," that the change in land use has been most rapid.

Increase and Decrease of Population.—Indirect evidence of the processes of invasion and differentiation in Chicago is seen in the decrease of population in areas adjacent to industry and commerce and the increase in outlying areas. In a rapidly growing city it is natural that a large number of areas should be increasing in population. For purposes of differentiating among communities it is much more significant that, even while the city of Chicago

> The low percentages of delinquency in wards 5 and 6, in North Lawrence, is to be accounted for by the semi-rural character of the community, with its opportunities for play, and by the distance from the industrial and business part of the community. . . .[5]

Two years after the publication of the Lawrence survey R.D. McKenzie conducted a general study of Columbus, Ohio. In addition to showing the actual geographic distribution of the homes of delinquent children, this study also included rates of delinquents by wards, along with certain indexes of neighborhood situations and an intensive study of a local community. The rate of delinquency, which in this study represented the ratio between the number of delinquents and the number of registered voters, ranged from 1.66 to 0.35 for the 16 wards of the city.[6]

During recent years additional studies of the ecology of delinquency and crime have been made in a number of American cities.[7] All of these revealed rather wide variations in the rates of delinquency by local areas. In some instances attention was focused almost exclusively upon variations in rates among areas while in others the rates were correlated with indexes of

varying community backgrounds. In general, these studies support the findings reported in the authors' earlier publication, *Delinquency Areas*.[8] Brief reports of a few of these studies are included in this volume.

It may be observed that some of the studies presented are not of recent date. This fact does not detract from their theoretical value, since the primary interest is in the study of the relationship between the community and delinquency. A study completed ten years ago may serve this purpose as adequately as a current one. Whenever possible, data representing different periods of time have been utilized as a means of studying long-time trends in the relationship between volume of delinquency and local community characteristics.

In this attempt to analyze the variations in rates of delinquents by geographic areas in American cities a variety of statistical data are utilized for the purpose of determining the extent to which differences in the economic and social characteristics of local areas parallel variations in rates of delinquents. The methods employed include spot maps, statistical tables showing the rates of delinquents and economic and social variables computed for large zones was growing at a very rapid rate, large areas constantly were being depopulated.

[INSERT MAP 10.2 HERE]

Between 1920 and 1930, a period of rapid growth, there were great changes in the distribution of the population in Chicago. The percentage of increase or decrease of population for this period in each of the 113 areas[9] into which the city was divided is shown in Map 10.3. It will be noted that the areas of decreasing population, delimited by heavy shading, almost completely surround the central business district, while practically all of the areas of rapid increase are near the periphery. Between these two extremes there is a continuous variation. The areas of greatest decrease in population are near the center. Beyond, in order, are the areas where there was a small decrease, then a small increase, then a substantial increase, and finally, at the city's periphery, a zone where the increase was very

great. It is this continuum rather than the division into areas of decreasing and increasing population that is significant in showing the essential nature of the processes of city growth.

From Table 10.1 and Map 10.3 it will be seen that the population in 10 square-mile areas decreased more than 20 per cent between 1920 and 1930, and that in 26 additional areas the drop was between 1 and 20 per cent. The decrease reveals the fact of expansion more vividly when analyzed in conjunction with the rates of increase and decrease of population for the previous and subsequent decades. Between 1910 and 1920 the population decreased in 23 square-mile areas; while between 1930 and 1940, a period of comparatively slight growth in total city population, a drop occurred in 68 out of the 140 square-mile areas. It will be noted that the outward movement from the 36 areas that decreased in population between 1920 and 1930 reduced the proportion of the total population in these areas from 40.0 per cent in 1920 to 27.7 per cent in 1930 and to 25.3 per cent in 1940.

[INSERT MAP 10.3 HERE]

This change in population in the different areas of Chicago establishes the rapidity with which the population is being evacuated from the center of the city. As the areas near the central business district are taken over for industry and commerce, the depopulated district extends farther and farther outward from the Loop; and new residential areas, characterized by very rapid growth of population, are pushed back to the city limits or into the suburbs beyond. On a smaller scale a similar process can be noted in the areas adjacent to each of the major outlying industrial centers.

[INSERT TABLE 10.1 HERE]

Although the continuous decrease in population in the inner-city areas indicates a great drop in the number of persons per acre in these areas, this should not be interpreted to mean

that there has been any increase in the number of rooms per family or decrease in the number of persons per room. It indicates rather that certain areas are being depopulated as they are abandoned for residential purposes, and either are allowed to remain unoccupied or are taken over for industrial or commercial use.

Segregation of Population on an Economic Basis.—The segregation of groups of low economic status into areas of physical deterioration and decreasing population is clearly indicated when rates of increase and decrease of population are related to indexes of economic status, such as percentage of families on relief, home ownership, median rentals, and occupation. These relationships as of 1930 and 1920 are presented in Table 10.2.

Families on Relief.—Economic segregation in Chicago is likewise indicated by Map 10.4, which shows the percentage of families on relief in 1934 in each of the 140 square-mile areas. These rates are based on the 115, 132 families reported by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission to be receiving relief and on the total number of families as given in the 1930 census. The range in the percentage of families on relief is from 1.4 in square mile 121 to 55.9 in square mile 87. The median is 10.6, and the percentage for the city 13.7.

It will be noted from Map 10.4 that the areas with the highest percentage of families on relief are the areas of physical deterioration and decreasing population. The lowest percentages, on the other hand, are found in the outlying and newer districts of the city, where the population is increasing and where there is comparatively little deterioration. Between these two extremes the gradations correspond closely with the gradations in the physical characteristics of the areas as already presented. A notable exception to this tendency is seen in certain Negro areas, where the rate of families on relief is high but where the population is increasing, probably as a result of the restrictions to free movement of Negro population into other areas.

Median Rentals.—Another index of economic status is presented in Map 10.5, which

shows for 1930 the median equivalent monthly rental for each of the 140 areas. These rentals are based on the monthly rentals and home values as presented in the 1930 federal census, in relation to the total number of homes in each square mile.[10] From Map 10.5 it will be seen that the; areas of lowest rentals are concentrated around the central business district and the industrial areas along the two forks of the Chicago River. Outside these inner-city areas and in the South Chicago industrial district are the areas of slightly higher rents. In general, the rentals are successively higher as one moves outward, from the central business district or away from the heavy industrial centers. With the exception of several Negro areas, where the rentals are disproportionately high, the configuration presented by the variations in median rentals corresponds closely with the variation in the percentage of families on relief as presented in Map 10.4.

[INSERT TABLE 10.2 HERE]

[INSERT MAP 10.4 HERE]

[INSERT MAP 10.5 HERE]

Occupation Groups.[11]—Other evidence of economic segregation is to be seen in the differential distribution of occupation groups. These data are included in Table 10.2. They indicate that a disproportionate number of industrial workers are concentrated in the areas of physical deterioration and decreasing population, and a disproportionate number of professional and clerical workers in outlying residential communities, where the population is increasing most rapidly. Since these occupational groups reflect variations in economic status, the facts constitute further evidence of economic segregation.

Segregation of Racial and Nationality Groups as a Product of Economic Segregation.—The segregation of population on an economic and occupational basis in American society brings about, in turn, a segregation of racial and nativity groups. Throughout most of the history of Chicago the groups of lowest economic status—that is, the foreign born and, more

recently, the Negroes —have been concentrated in the areas of physical deterioration and low rentals. On the other hand, the native white population has been centered in the outlying communities, for collectively this group has a higher economic status. Together, the foreign-born and Negro groups furnish a large proportion of the unskilled industrial workers and a comparatively small proportion of the professional and clerical groups. [The foreign born have been concentrated, therefore, in the areas adjacent to industrial establishments not only because it is economical and convenient for these workers to live closer to their work but also because they often cannot afford to live elsewhere.] [The same distribution among low-rent areas would probably characterize the Negroes were it not for the fact that racial barriers prevent their movement into many such areas and, in effect, operate to raise rents in the Negro area.]

This segregation of population on an economic basis is again clearly indicated in Table 10.3. Especially noticeable is the concentration of Negro population in the areas where more than 21 per cent of the families are on relief. This concentration was not so apparent in 1920, when the highest proportion of Negro population was found in the areas with intermediate rates of dependent families, based on number receiving relief from private charities.

Concentration of Most Recent Immigrants and Migrants.—As indicated by the previous discussion, those nationality groups which represent the newest immigration constitute the largest proportion of the population in areas adjacent to the central business and industrial districts, while the so-called “older immigrant groups” are more widely dispersed. If citizenship is taken as an indication, more positive evidence of the segregation of the newest immigrants is to be seen in the differential distribution of the alien population, both in 1930 and in 1920. These variations in the proportion of aliens in the white population are presented in Table 10.4. This table indicates that the areas of lowest economic status are occupied not only by the highest proportion of foreign born in the white population but also by the highest

proportion of aliens in the foreign-born white population 21 years of age and over. The range in 1930 was from 15.9 per cent in the areas of lowest economic status to 3.8 per cent in the areas of highest status.

[INSERT TABLE 10.3 HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 10.4 HERE]

In his study of the Negro family Frazier similarly found the most recent Negro migrants to the city concentrated in the most deteriorated sections of the Negro areas. He states:

Although nearly four-fifths of all the Negroes in Chicago were born in the South, the proportion of southern-born inhabitants in the population diminishes as one leaves those sections of the Negro community nearest the heart of the city. It is in those zones just outside of the Loop where decaying residences and tottering frame dwellings presage the inroads of industry and business that the southern migrant is able to pay the cheap rents that landlords are willing to accept until their property is demanded by the expanding business area.[12]

The results of this process of segregation in Chicago as of 1930 are revealed in Map 10.6, which shows nativity and race of family heads. In those census tracts where a predominant number of the heads of families were foreign born, the leading nationality group is indicated.[13]

On this map the areas in solid black are those predominantly occupied by Negroes. Since only the numerically dominant group is indicated in each area, it should be remembered that there are Negroes in many of the other tracts in the city. This is especially true on the Near North Side, where large numbers of Negro families are to be found.

Several facts are immediately apparent from Map 10.6. In the first place, a large proportion of tracts where the foreign-born heads of families constitute the predominant group are clustered around the city's point of original settlement or are distributed in the areas where heavy industry has been located. Secondly, symbols designating the country of

birth of the foreign-born heads of families show that in some instances large areas are dominated by one national group and that the most recent immigrants are concentrated in the least desirable sections of the city.

[INSERT MAP 10.6 HERE]

This map represents the distribution of racial and national groups as of 1930, but it does not even suggest the nature of the process that brings about this segregation—the continuous succession of national groups in these immigrant areas. Similar maps for earlier decades would reveal a more decided concentration of foreign born, but the nationalities included would be different.[14] In short, nationality groups have succeeded one another in the areas of lowest economic status, while the concentrations of older immigrant groups are now to be found beyond the inner-city areas. Each new nationality group; was segregated into the low-rent areas during the period of its adjustment to the New World. As they have moved out, their places have been taken by other newcomers from abroad until recent years, when part of this inner-city area has been occupied by the newly migrated Negro people.

Thus, in the process of city growth, areas within Chicago have been differentiated in such a way that they can be distinguished from one another by their physical or economic characteristics or, at any given moment, by the composition of the population. Associated with these differences and with the more subtle variations in the attitudes and values which accompany them are found marked variations in child behavior. These are reflected in differential rates of delinquents, as presented in subsequent chapters.

Notes

Chapter 1

1 Clifford R. Shaw, Frederick Zorbaugh, Henry D. McKay, and Leonard S, Cottrell, *Delinquency Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929).

2 *Life and Labor in London* (London, 1891), Vol. II, Appen., "Showing Map of London Poverty by Districts."

3 Sophonisba P. Breckinridge and Edith Abbott, *The Delinquent Child and the Home* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1912), pp. 150–53.

Chapter 2

1 Robert E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *The City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925).

2 Ernest W. Burgess (ed:), *The Urban Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926).

3 The terms "invade" and "invasion" are here used in their technical ecological sense, meaning to "encroach upon."

4 Legislation in Illinois in 1941, authorizing privately financed neighborhood redevelopment corporations with limited condemnation powers, has been termed by planning experts as the "first effective attack on the slum problem undertaken in any large city." These experts are confident that "the tide of decentralization can be turned." The question of rentals within reach of low-income groups, however, remains unanswered, constituting the main argument for federal low-rent housing.

5 F. W. Blackmar and E. W. Burgess, *Lawrence Social Survey* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1917), pp. 71–72.

6 *The Neighborhood: A Study of Local Life in the City of Columbus, Ohio* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923).

7 The following is a partial list of these studies: (*a*) Irwin W. Halpern, John N. Stanislaus, and Bernard Botein, *A Statistical Study of the Distribution of Adult and Juvenile Delinquents in the Boroughs of Manhattan and Brooklyn* (New York: Polygraphic Co. of America, 1934); Norman S. Hayner, "Delinquency Areas in the Puget Sound Region," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXXIX; Calvin F. Schmid, *Social Saga of Two Cities* (Minneapolis: Minneapolis Council of Social Agencies, 1937); R. Clyde White, "The Relation of Felonies to Environmental Factors in Indianapolis," *Social Forces,* Vol. X, J. B. Lottier, "Distribution of Criminal Offenses in Metropolitan Regions," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,* Vol. XXIX; Herman Adler, Frances Cahn, and Johannes Stuart, *The Incidence of Delinquency in Berkeley, 1928–32* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934); Donald Trauger, L. Kral, and W. Rauscher, *Social Analysis of Des Moines* (Des Moines: Iowa State Planning Board, 1935); Vernon E. Keye, "Survey of Juvenile Delinquency in Evanston, Illinois" (Work Projects Administration Report, 1940); Emil Frankel, "New Brunswick Delinquency Areas Study" (Work Projects Administration Report, 1936); Donald R. Taft, "Testing the Selective Influence of Areas of Delinquency," *American Journal of Sociology,* XXXVIII, 1933; M. C. Elmer, "Maladjustment of Youth in Relation to Density of Population," *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society,* Vol. XXII; Howard Whipple Green, *Population Characteristics by Census Tracis, Cleveland, Ohio* (Cleveland: Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 1931); Sophia M. Robison, *Can Delinquency Be Measured?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936); H. D. Shelden, "Problems in the Statistical Study of Juvenile Delinquency," *Metron,* XII, 1934; E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), pp. 204–19; William J. Ellis, *Delinquency Areas in Essex County Municipalities* (New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies, Trenton, 1938); Clarence W. Schroeder, *Delinquency in Peoria* (Peoria,

Illinois: Bradley Polytechnic Institute, 1939); Edwin H. Sutherland, "Ecological Survey of Crime and Delinquency in Bloomington, Indiana," Indiana University, 1937; J. B. Maller, *Maladjusted Youth* (Report of the Children's Court Jurisdiction and Juvenile Delinquency Committee [Legislative Document No. 75 (1939), 201 pages]); J. B. Maller, *Juvenile Delinquency in the State of New York* (Report of the Children's Court Jurisdiction and Juvenile Delinquency Committee [Legislative Document No. 62 (1940), 115 pages]); Kimball Young, John L. Gillin, Calvert L. Dedrick, *The Madison Community* ("University of Wisconsin Studies," No. 62 [Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1934]); and W. Wallace Weaver, *West Philadelphia: A Study of Natural Social Areas* (Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1930).

8 *Op. cit.*

9 These areas represent the basic units into which the city of Chicago was divided for the presentation of rates of delinquents and other data based on the 1920 census. In the more densely populated sections of the city these are square-mile areas bounded on all four sides by the section lines of the government survey. In the more sparsely settled outlying areas, it was necessary, in many instances, to combine two or more contiguous square-mile areas until a minimum population base was secured. For the earliest delinquency series further combinations in the outlying areas reduced the number of areas to 106. For 1930 data many of the larger, more populous outlying areas were redivided, and the total number of areas increased to 140. Although some of these units contain more than 1 square mile, they will be referred to throughout this study as "square-mile areas."

10 The computation of the median rental on the basis of the total number of homes was necessary both because in some areas only a small proportion of the homes was rented and because the rented homes often were not representative of the area.

There are probably some inherent errors in these data on monthly rentals. In

apartment houses, for example, rentals usually included heat, water, and janitor service, whereas none of these is included in the rental of single homes. These differences may be even greater in furnished-apartment areas where all furnishings, and sometimes gas and light, are included in the rent. It was for the purpose of compensating for these variations that the monthly rentals for homes owned were calculated at 1 per cent of the total value.

These median rentals, calculated from the 1930 federal census, are approximately twice as high as the rentals in the same areas from the Civil Works Administration census for 1934, and it is probable that even these 1934 median rentals are higher than the median rent actually paid. However, for our purpose these variations are not important. We are interested in rentals as indications of the differences among areas rather than in the absolute amount of rent paid.

11 The federal census of 1920 includes the best data for this analysis, since it was a census of occupations, whereas the census of 1930 was a census of gainful workers by industrial groups, in which "all persons whose services are employed in a given industry are classified under that industry." Even the general divisions of occupations used in 1920 are, in several instances, too general to serve as an adequate basis for a study of the differential distribution of occupations. Manufacturing includes, for example, the executives, superintendents, and technicians as well as the unskilled personnel. While it is obvious that, from the point of view of the study of economic segregation, executives should be separated from unskilled workers, these classifications can be used to show general tendencies, because the number of executives and managers is relatively small, as compared with the number of laborers.

12 E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), pp. 98–100.

13 The effects of a large European immigration on Chicago over a long period of time and of

a more recent migration of Negroes are shown in an analysis of the composition of the population. In 1930, 92.3 per cent of the population were white, 6.9 per cent were Negro, and 0.8 per cent were classified as “other races.” At the time, 24.9 per cent of the population were foreign born, 39.4 per cent were classified “native white of foreign or mixed parentage,” and 29.9 per cent as “native white of native parentage.”

Since 1900, significant population changes have taken place. One trend indicating migration of Negroes to Chicago is the increase in the proportion of Negroes in the total population from 2.0 per cent in 1910 to 6.9 per cent in 1930. Another trend is a decrease in the foreign born in the total population from 35.7 to 24.9 per cent, while the percentage classified “native white of native parentage” increased from 20.4 in 1910 to 27.9 in 1930. In spite of this transition, in 1930 the foreign born and the children of the foreign born constituted 69.8 per cent of the total white population in the city. In 1940, 91.7 per cent of the population were white and 8.3 per cent non-white.

Of the foreign-born white, 17.8 per cent were born in Poland; 3.2 per cent in Germany; 13.0 per cent in Russia and Lithuania; 8.8 per cent in Italy; 7.8 per cent in Sweden; 6.5 per cent in the Irish Free State and North Ireland; and 5.8 per cent in Czechoslovakia.

14 Paul F, Cressey, “The Succession of Cultural Groups” (Ph.D. dissertation-Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1930).

Reading 11

Collective Efficacy Theory: Lessons Learned and Directions for Future Inquiry

Robert J. Sampson

In this essay I consider the role of neighborhoods in the modern city. Despite our increasingly global and interconnected world, neighborhoods show remarkable continuities in patterns of criminal activity. Indeed, for at least a hundred years, criminological research in the ecological tradition has continually confirmed the non-random concentration of crime in certain neighborhoods, especially those characterized by poverty, the racial segregation of minority groups, and the concentration of single parent families. But why? By focusing primarily on correlates of crime at the level of community social composition—especially poverty and race—traditional neighborhood research has tended toward a risk-factor rather than an explanatory approach. The aim of this paper is to move away from community-level correlations, or markers, to a theory of the underlying *social mechanisms* theoretically at work. I conceptualize a social mechanism as a theoretically plausible (albeit typically unobservable) contextual process that accounts for or explains a given phenomena (Sorenson 1998), in this case crime rates.

I specifically "take stock" of the social-mechanistic theory of collective efficacy with which I have been associated. I begin with a brief review of its intellectual legacy and the basic ideas that animate collective efficacy theory. I then turn to a synthesis of relevant empirical literature, although I do not intend this as a comprehensive review. Fortunately, independent scholars have undertaken the task of summarizing the evidence to date through rigorous meta-analysis, leaving me the opportunity to make a case for the larger patterns and implications. After laying out the main ideas and the empirical regularities, I then turn to the future—where do we go from here? Science advances through the reasoned criticism of

received knowledge and so my goal is to lay out the challenges to collective efficacy theory and, potentially, fruitful avenues of future work. Along the way I introduce key methodological issues and work in progress that I hope sharpens our theoretical approach to community level theories of crime.

Collective Efficacy

To address these challenges and new urban realities, my colleagues and I have proposed a focus on mechanisms of social organization that may be facilitated by, but do not necessarily require, strong ties or associations. This move allows us to reject the outmoded (and normative) assumption that the ideal neighborhood is characterized by dense, intimate, emotional bonds. Instead, neighborhoods are defined in ecological terms where analytic properties of social organization are allowed to vary. We have also introduced a science of studying community processes—ecometrics—that is rooted in the idea that we have to take seriously the measurement of community properties in its own right (Raudenbush and Sampson 1999).

A key form of social organization that I will focus on here is *collective efficacy*. The concept of collective efficacy unites social cohesion, the "collectivity" part of the concept, with shared expectations for control, the social action or efficacy part of the concept (Sampson et al. 1997). In other words, we combine a particular kind of social structure (cohesion, with an emphasis on working trust and mutual support) with the culturally tinged dimension of *shared expectations* for social control. Moreover, we argue that just as self efficacy is situated rather than general (one has self-efficacy relative to a particular task), a neighborhood's efficacy exists relative to specific tasks. We therefore conceive of collective efficacy as a higher-order or organizing theoretical framework that draws attention to

variations in the nexus of social cohesion with shared expectations for control. Viewed another way, collective efficacy theory unites the constructs of mutual support (Cullen 1994), which largely defines cohesion, with a collective-action orientation, in this case the activation or generation of community social order.

One reason I believe cohesion and support are important is that they are fundamentally about *repeated* interactions and thereby expectations about the future. There is little reason to expect that rational agents will engage in sanctioning, or other acts of social control or support, in contexts where there is no expectation for future contact or where residents mistrust one another. The insight of collective efficacy theory is that repeated interactions may signal or generate shared norms outside the "strong tie" setting of friends and kin. Another conceptual move of collective efficacy theory is its emphasis on agency. Moving away from a focus on private ties, use of the term collective efficacy is meant to signify an emphasis on shared beliefs in a neighborhood's capability for action to achieve an intended effect, coupled with an active sense of engagement on the part of residents. Some density of social networks is essential, to be sure, especially networks rooted in social trust. But the key theoretical point is that networks have to be activated to be ultimately meaningful. Collective efficacy, therefore, helps to elevate the 'agentic' aspect of social life over a perspective centered mainly on the accumulation of stocks of social resources as found in ties and memberships (i.e., social capital). This conceptual orientation is consistent with the redefinition by Portes and Sensenbrenner (1998) of social capital in terms of "expectations for action within a collectivity."

Distinguishing between the resource potential represented by personal ties, on the one hand, and the shared expectations for action among neighbors represented by collective efficacy on the other, therefore, helps clarify the dense networks paradox: *social networks foster the conditions under which collective efficacy may flourish, but they are not sufficient*

for the exercise of control. The theoretical framework I propose recognizes the transformed landscape of modern urban life, holding that while community efficacy may depend on working trust and social interaction, it does not require that my neighbor or local police officer be my friend.

Collective efficacy theory also addresses the valence of social ties and, ultimately, collective action by applying the 'non-exclusivity requirement' of a social good to judge whether neighborhood structures serve collective needs. Does consumption of a social good by one member of a community diminish the sum available to the community as a whole? I would argue that safety, clean environments, quality education for children, active maintenance of intergenerational ties, the reciprocal exchange of information and services among families, and the shared willingness to intervene on behalf of the neighborhood are capable of producing a social good that yields positive 'externalities' of benefit to all residents—especially children. As with other resources that produce positive externalities, I believe that collective efficacy is widely desired but much harder to achieve, owing, in large part, to social constraints.

Empirical Results: Taking Stock

My colleagues and I tested the theory of collective efficacy in a survey of 8,782 residents of 343 Chicago neighborhoods in 1995. Applying ecometric methods, a five-item Likert-type scale was developed to measure shared expectations about social control. Residents were asked about the likelihood that their neighbors could be counted on to take action if: (i) children were skipping school and hanging out on a street corner; (ii) children were spray-painting graffiti on a local building; (iii) children were showing disrespect to an adult; (iv) a fight broke out in front of their house; and (v) the fire station closest to home was threatened

with budget cuts. Our measurement relied on vignettes because of the fundamental unobservability of the capacity for control—the act of intervention is only observed under conditions of challenge. If high collective efficacy leads to low crime, then at any given moment no intervention will be observed precisely because of the lack of need. Like Bandura's (1997) theory of self efficacy, the argument is that expectations for control will increase behavioral interventions when necessary, but the scale itself taps shared expectations for social action—in our case ranging from informal intervention to the mobilization of formal controls. The emphasis is on actions that are generated "on the ground level" rather than top down.

The "social cohesion/trust" part of the measure taps the nature of community relationships and was measured by coding whether residents agreed that "People around here are willing to help their neighbors"; "People in this neighborhood can be trusted"; "This is a close-knit neighborhood"; "People in this neighborhood generally get along with each other"; and "People in this neighborhood share the same values." As hypothesized, social cohesion and social control were strongly related across neighborhoods and, thus, combined into a summary measure of collective efficacy, yielding an aggregate-level reliability in the .80 to .85 range.

In our research we found that collective efficacy was associated with lower rates of violence, controlling for concentrated disadvantage, residential stability, immigrant concentration, and a comprehensive set of individual-level characteristics (e.g., age, sex, SES, race/ethnicity, home ownership) as well as indicators of dense personal ties and the density of local organizations (Sampson et al. 1997; Morenoff et al. 2001). Whether measured by official homicide events or violent victimization as reported by residents, neighborhoods high in collective efficacy consistently had significantly lower rates of violence. This finding held up controlling for prior neighborhood violence which was negatively associated with

collective efficacy. This pattern suggests a reciprocal loop where violence depressed later collective efficacy (e.g., because of fear). Nevertheless, a two-standard deviation elevation in collective efficacy was associated with a 26 percent reduction in the expected homicide rate (1997: 922).

Another finding is that the association of disadvantage and stability with violence is reduced when collective efficacy is controlled, suggesting a potential causal pathway at the community level. This pathway is presumed to operate over time, wherein collective efficacy is undermined by the concentration of disadvantage, racial segregation, family disruption, and residential instability, which, in turn, fosters more crime (Sampson et al. 1997, 1999). Morenoff et al. (2001) also showed that the density of personal ties and organizations were associated with higher collective efficacy and, hence, lower crime, even though the former did not translate directly into lower crime rates. These findings are consistent with, although do not prove, the hypothesis that collective efficacy mediates the effect of both structural resources (e.g., affluence, home ownership, organizations) and dense systemic ties on later crime.

As noted at the outset, neighborhoods are, themselves, nodes in a larger network of spatial relations. Contrary to the common assumption in criminology of analytic independence, neighborhoods are interdependent and characterized by a functional relationship between what happens at one point in space and what happens elsewhere. The idea of spatial dependence challenges the urban village model which implicitly assumes that neighborhoods represent intact social systems, functioning as islands unto themselves. Our findings support the spatial argument by establishing the independent effects of spatial proximity—controlling for all measured characteristics internal to a neighborhood, collective efficacy and violence are significantly and positively linked to the collective efficacy and violence rates of surrounding neighborhoods, respectively (Sampson et al. 1999; Morenoff et

al. 2001). This finding suggests a diffusion, or exposure-like process, whereby violence and collective efficacy are conditioned by the characteristics of spatially proximate neighborhoods, which, in turn, are conditioned by adjoining neighborhoods in a spatially linked process that ultimately characterizes the entire metropolitan system. The mechanisms of racial segregation reinforce spatial inequality, explaining why it is, that despite similar income profiles, black middle-class neighborhoods are at greater risk of violence than white middle-class neighborhoods (Sampson et al. 1999).

An oversimplified sketch of the major argument made to this point is shown in Figure 11.1. This model makes clear that collective efficacy theory is not merely an attempt to push the burden of social control or support onto residents, “blaming the victim” as some have claimed. Inequality in resources matters greatly for explaining the production of collective efficacy. Concentrated disadvantage and lack of home ownership, for example, predict lower levels of later collective efficacy, and, vice versa, the associations of disadvantage and housing instability with violence are significantly reduced when collective efficacy is controlled (Sampson et al. 1997). These patterns are consistent with the inference that neighborhood resources influence crime and violence, in part, through the mediating role of neighborhood efficacy. The capacity to exercise control under conditions of trust is, thus, seen as the most proximate to explaining crime. Collective efficacy theory has also been extended to explain community well-being and population health, although I do not cover that here (Sampson 2003; Morenoff 2003).

In theoretical terms, Figure 11.1 posits that organizations and institutional strength represent a mechanism that can sustain capacity for social action in a way that transcends traditional personal ties (see also Tripplet et al. 2003). In other words, organizations are, at least in principle, able to foster collective efficacy, often through strategic networking of their own. Whether garbage removal, choosing the site of a fire station, school improvements or

police responses, a continuous stream of challenges faces modern communities, challenges that no longer can be met (if they ever were) by relying solely on individuals. Action depends on connections among organizations that are not necessarily dense, or reflective of, the structure of personal ties in a neighborhood. Our research supports this position, showing that the density of local organizations and voluntary associations predicts higher levels of collective efficacy, controlling for prior crime, poverty and the social composition of the population (Morenoff et al. 2001).

[INSERT FIGURE 11.2 HERE]

What about evidence from beyond Chicago? Rather than provide a narrative review of the evidence on collective efficacy theory that might be biased by my priors, I rely on an independent assessment. Recently, Pratt and Culten (2005) have undertaken a painstaking review of more than 200 empirical studies from 1960 to 1999 using meta-analysis. The bottom line is that collective efficacy theory fares well with an overall correlation of -.303 with crime rates across studies (95 percent confidence interval of -.26 to -.35). By meta-analysis standards this is a robust finding; and the authors' rank collective efficacy number 4 when weighted by sample size, ahead of traditional suspects such as poverty, family disruption, and race. Although the number of studies and, hence, empirical base, is limited and, while there is considerable variability in operationalization across studies, the class of mechanisms associated with social disorganization theory and its offspring, collective efficacy theory, shows a robust association with lower crime rates (see also reviews in Sampson et al. 2002: Kubrin and Weitzer 2003).

Advances in Community-Level Theory

Turning it Around: "Structure" as Endogenous

I now turn to the frontiers of collective efficacy theory. I consider first the rather fundamental possibility that the standard account of mediation in community-level theories of crime may simply be wrong. The standard view, one that I have advocated, is that social processes, like collective efficacy, "mediate" the effects of social structure, especially concentrated disadvantage (Sampson et al. 1997). This account is so plausible and hegemonic that no one has really challenged its logic. Yet why should collective efficacy, or any other social process, necessarily be endogenous to structure? Weber and the endogeneity of capitalism aside, the whole point of Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* (1993) was to reverse the causal chain and posit social capital as the driver of economic development in Italy. Rather than see poverty as the cause of declining economic fortunes, Putnam argued that the lack of civil society was the key ingredient that held back the southern provinces of Italy (see also Banfield 1958).

A similar logic can be applied to present day America and the neighborhoods of Chicago. Areas low in trust, cooperation, and the fundamentals of collective efficacy may lead to the out-migration of those who can afford to live in more harmonious environments. As a recent mover, I can attest to the fact that real estate brokers are attuned to the cohesion of neighborhoods, a subtle, but nonetheless salient, factor that gains special currency among families with children. (It is not a coincidence that the city I chose to live in is endowed with considerable social capital and collective efficacy.) Moving beyond personal anecdotes, collective efficacy, by the terms of the theory, is expected to be correlated with the production of a number of collective goods that matter to residents, including the allocation of city services (e.g., road repair, economic development and investment). Bryk and Schneider's (2002) recent work also shows collective efficacy in the schools is a major predictor of student achievement, a point surely not lost on some parents. In short, there is

reason to believe that collective efficacy is a causal factor bound up in the structural disadvantage of a community. If so, then traditional models may have gotten it backwards by controlling for disadvantage in estimating the "direct" effect of collective efficacy—under the above scenario the effect of collective efficacy *should* vanish.

There is preliminary evidence to support this position. Consider the simple prediction of future poverty from the current state of collective efficacy. Figure 11.2 demonstrates a correlation that is surprising even by social science standards—for all intents and purposes the relationship is about as strong as one could expect (R^2 = 75 percent). Areas with high collective efficacy are strongly *predictive* of where that community will end up in the stratification hierarchy. But is this just due to past poverty? The answer is no, for when we control for poverty in 1990, socioeconomic status in 1995, racial composition in 1995 *and* the violent crime rate in 1995, the direct association of collective efficacy in 1995 is strong and significant (B = - 25, t-ratio = -4.36). The magnitude of prediction is second only to prior poverty and almost its equal.

[INSERT FIGURE 11.2 HERE]

These results undermine the simplistic models that are often specified in the criminological literature. As the late Allen Liska warned us, reciprocal structural dynamics are at work in urban social systems, such that crime, itself, can be considered a path in the causal chain (see also Bellair 2000; Markowitz et al. 2001). We have already found evidence that crime and collective efficacy are reciprocally related in a self-reinforcing process (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999). Taken a step further, there is reason to argue that collective efficacy is an independent factor in the future economic trajectory of a community. If so, then structural disadvantage is, in some sense, endogenous to collective efficacy, completely the reverse of current practice. Although this hypothesis cannot be easily established, the key point for consideration is that the status of collective efficacy, as other

social processes (culture), is ambiguous under the traditional model specification in criminology. Indeed, if collective efficacy has any role in the determination of prior values of structural disadvantage, then controlling that effect serves to partial out part of the causal pathway by which it leads to crime.

Discriminant Validity and the Role of Theory

A second problem, that is at once theoretical and methodological, turns on the discriminate validity of the concept of collective efficacy. Thomas Cook and his colleagues (1997) have argued that researchers of community need to pay increased attention to the "lumping" among social processes. In its simplest form, the question is whether there is just one big factor that underlies the correlations among seemingly disparate social processes. A similar point was made about the lumping among structural covariates by Land et al. (1990)—disentangling and estimating independent effects within a set of highly collinear predictors is a recipe for methodological confusion. More recently, Taylor (2002) has correctly pointed out the strong empirical overlap among many indicators of social disorganization, informal social control, and collective efficacy.

Unfortunately, resolution of this legitimate issue is not easy. The critics are right that many community concepts overlap empirically, but that does not mean they tap the same concept or that statistical methods necessarily help to resolve the problem. It is instructive to recall the debate between Bernard Lander and his critics some fifty years ago. In using factor analysis, Lander (1954) identified a concept he called anomie, which carried high loadings for home ownership, percent black, and crime, among others. As Kornhauser (1978) argued, however, Lander included in the explanatory factor (anomie) the outcome itself—crime. From Lander's perspective, the indicators could not be separated empirically (there was a

lack of “discriminant validity”), but from a theoretical perspective, we would not want to say that crime is the same construct as home ownership. Rather, they are ecologically intertwined in a social process.

Fast forwarding to the present, ecological scholars are well aware that percent black typically loads on a factor defined by poverty. We can complicate this even more by adding in violent crime, reminiscent of Lander. As a simple exercise, I entered the percent poverty, unemployment, percent black and the violent crime rate in a principal components analysis for Chicago neighborhoods in 1990 and 2000. Only one factor emerged! Surely we would not want to interpret this factor as saying crime is the *same concept* as race or poverty. What the factor taps is the empirical entwinement of the multiple indicators—the factor tells us nothing about causality, sequential order, mediation or anything else of ultimate interest. The same goes for social processes. If we throw in a series of indicators from the PHDCN Community Survey, it turns out disorder loads with collective efficacy (negatively). Again, does this mean they are the *same* construct? As earlier, I would argue no—I believe disorder is a marker for low collective efficacy, like crime, but my argument derives from logic and theory, not simply from the data. All this goes to say that ecological mechanisms of allocation and segregation create groupings of variables that are difficult to interpret and even harder to study with respect to crime. No statistical method can solve what is fundamentally a theoretical issue about causal mechanisms.

Although resolution of this complex issue is surely beyond this paper, I should like to emphasize one point, however, that speaks in favor of collective efficacy theory. As I have been at pains to argue, one of the distinguishing features of collective efficacy theory is its insistence that agency and control are not redundant with dense personal ties. In point of fact, this assertion is supported despite the otherwise lumpy nature of the data when it comes to factor or principal components analysis. Specifically, indicators of control and cohesion (and

yes, disorder) consistently load together on a separate factor from density of personal and friendship ties. This finding has recently been confirmed with a repeated cross-sectional replication of the 1995 Chicago Community Survey in 2002. There is also evidence that collective efficacy is highly stable over time, as is the separate construct of dense ties. Based on theory and empirical evidence, then, we have some confidence to maintain the core analytical distinction between efficacy (social action) and dense ties, all the while recognizing that there the correlations among social processes, just as among structural covariates, are high. The larger point is that neither statistical methods (e.g., LISREL) nor the correlations among social processes and structural features of the city ("the data") speak for themselves—an organizing theoretical model is needed.

Comparative Studies

A third concern I have about extant community research is its seeming disregard for the establishment of generality in causal mechanisms. The prime example is that most of our knowledge has been gained from U.S. cities and only a few of them at that. Yet nothing in the logic of collective efficacy is necessarily limited to specific cities, the United States or any country for that matter. Just how far can we push collective efficacy theory? Is it applicable in societies like France, where republican values and strong norms of state intervention, rather than individual responsibility, might conflict with the notion of neighbors intervening? Does it hold in welfare states where concentrated disadvantage is less tenacious, or in former Soviet states where public spiritedness is allegedly on the wane? Our comparative knowledge base is, unfortunately, limited—very few multi-level studies have been carried out with the explicit goal of cross-national comparison of crime rates and community social mechanisms.

An exception is found in a recent comparison of leading cities in Sweden and the U.S.

Although Chicago and Stockholm vary dramatically in their social structure and levels of violence, this does not necessarily imply a difference in the processes or mechanisms that link communities and crime. In fact, Sampson and Wikström (2004) show that rates of violence are significantly predicted by low collective efficacy in Stockholm as in Chicago. Furthermore, collective efficacy is fostered by housing stability and undermined by concentrated disadvantage—again, similarly, in both cities. These findings are rather remarkable given the vast cultural and structural differences between the countries in question. Sweden is a modern welfare state with highly planned residential communities. "Race" groups are non-existent and immigration comes primarily from Turkey and Morocco. Chicago is the quintessential American city, rank with inequality and the segregation of African Americans and with neighborhoods that are emblematic of unplanned market sorting. Immigration flows are also very different, coming primarily from Mexico rather than Europe or Africa.

That the data show an almost invariant pattern despite these differences is, thus, consistent with the general theoretical approach of this paper that emphasize neighborhood inequality in social resources and contextual conditions that foster the collective efficacy of residents and organizations. But this is only one study. The empirical application of neighborhood studies to other societal contexts is badly needed if we are to make further progress in understanding the generalizability of the link between community social mechanisms and crime rates.

Technology Mediated Efficacy

My final point of emphasis is the most speculative but it circles back to the issue raised at the outset: What produces collective efficacy if not (or besides) dense personal ties? I have

offered two general hypotheses thus far that I believe are supported by the data, one in the form of structural resources (e.g., home ownership; stability, economic status) and the other in terms of the density of non-profit organizations. But this seems insufficient in the world I described at the outset, one of fleeting social ties. My speculative answer is that a partial solution may well lie in technology, although its realization will take time. My argument is that rather than undermining social organization, modern technology has *the potential to* knit together weak community ties for the purposes of building collective efficacy. We have all heard anecdotally about how the internet was effectively used to mobilize protests against the International Monetary Fund in Seattle a few years back. Internet use was also widely used in the Howard Dean campaign and on both sides of the political spectrum in the recent presidential election.

What about in the more prosaic neighborhood? Three lines of evidence suggest an interesting scenario. One, Barry Wellman and his colleagues show that, contrary to common belief, the more "wired" local residents are with respect to computer technology, the more their local contacts and involvement in community issues (Hampton and Wellman 2003; Wellman 2004). For example, compared to non-wired residents, wired residents of the Toronto community they studied recognized three times as many of their neighbors, visited 50 percent more often and more often made use of email for local contacts. Second, Keith Hampton, in an intriguing project called E-Neighbors (see http://www.i-neighbors.org/), is attempting to use technology as a means to increase community well being. Although the results are preliminary, some of the trial neighborhoods he is studying are showing positive results, such as a significant increase in the number of local social ties, more frequent communication on and offline and higher levels of community involvement. The I-Neighbors website is an attempt to apply this model to neighborhoods across the U.S. and Canada.

Third, in an on-going collaborative research project directed by Bob Putnam at Harvard,

we are looking at the potential social-capital inducing effects of Meetup-Com, a technology that organizes not chat rooms in cyber or virtual space, but real meetings between people in physical spaces (see http://www.meetup.com/). From book clubs to politics to lovers of Golden Retrievers, Meetup.com brings people together in physical space to share common interests. Although many of the groups seem trivial at the outset (dog lovers, knitting, Goths), it appears that political action, in fact, generates many of the meetups. Besides, if Putnam (2000) is right and social interaction has spin-off externalities for collective action, and possible the generation of collective efficacy, then even the trivial groups should not be dismissed out of hand.

Fourth, it is now possible to imagine how the rapid spread of technology can be harnessed to improve dissemination of crime data and the mapping of "hot spots" of crime. Already some cities allow citizens to access police data and map when and where incidents of crime are occurring, almost in real time (e.g., http://12.17.79.6/ctznicam/ctznicam.asp). Although knowledge about the realities of crime's distribution and frequency might be alarming at first, such knowledge ultimately could lead to a sense of increased collective efficacy and community participation on the part of residents and, perhaps, demands that ameliorative efforts be undertaken by the appropriate authorities. After all, one of the things that research has taught us is that even in high crime areas, most areas are safe most of the time (St. Jean 2005).

It is too soon to know, of course, but rather than taking the stance of Luddites and assuming in a Wirthian manner that community automatically declines in the era of cell phones and instant messaging, these lines of evidence suggest that we need to add networks of technology to our theoretical toolkit of community social organization and collective efficacy.

Conclusion

In this paper I have "taken stock" of the theory of collective efficacy and considered four agendas that I believe are crucial to the advancement of theoretical knowledge—collective efficacy as a potential cause rather than simply mediator of structural disadvantage; discriminant validity of social-processes that constitute collective efficacy; the need for comparative studies and general theory; and role of technology in promoting collective efficacy. There are others of course, but these seem to me to cut to the core of questions that have been raised about collective efficacy. What causes it? Is collective efficacy a theoretically distinct concept? Is it doomed to be impotent in mass, modern society? What is the association with concentrated disadvantage and is it cause or consequence? Is collective efficacy merely a "Chicago" phenomenon? If this paper is any guide, progress has been made on all these fronts even though there is much work to be done. I would argue that collective efficacy does have unique theoretical value, is general in import, may be fostered under conditions of modernity and predicts not only crime but possibly community social structure itself through reciprocal, self-reinforcing processes.

In one way or another, social networks cut across all these agendas, right down to considering technology as another form of network. We live in a network society we are told, but not all networks are created equal and many lie dormant. A key mistake has been to equate the existence of networks with mechanisms of effective social control. As Arthur Stinchcombe (1989) put it in a useful analogy, just as road systems have their causal impact through the flow of traffic, so systems of links among people and organizations (and in this case, neighborhoods) have their causal impact through *what flows through them.* The problem, then, becomes obvious—through networks (whether personal, spatial, organizational or technological) flow the full spectrum of life's realities, whether criminal

knowledge, friendship, or social control.

The basic theoretical position articulated in this article is that collective action for problem-solving is a crucial causal mechanism that is differentially activated under specific kinds of contextual conditions. The density of personal networks is only one, and probably not the most important, characteristic of neighborhoods that contributes to effective social action and mutual support. Attacking the agendas outlined in this paper will hopefully move us a bit closer to a better understanding of the causes and effects of collective efficacy in the modern city.

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Reading 12

The Urban Ecology of Bias Crime: A Study of Disorganized and Defended Neighborhoods

Ryken Grattet

The last decade has witnessed sustained growth in research and policy attention to bias crimes, or as they are more frequently called "hate crimes" (Bell 2002; Jacobs and Potter 1998; Jenness and Grattet 2001; Jenness and Broad 1997; Lawrence 1999; Levin and McDevitt 2002; Perry 2001). As a novel social problem, bias crime has generated a research community that divides roughly into scholars who specialize in the study of bias crime, whose main research goal is to elaborate an understanding of the phenomena on its own terms, and scholars who study bias crime to illustrate broader social processes and dynamics.[1] As the literature on bias crime has matured, a discernible shift from the former to the latter has taken place. To urge this maturation along, Donald Green, Lauren McFalls, and Jennifer Smith (2001) conclude their review of hate crime scholarship by discussing the relationship between bias crime and other forms of social conflict. "The challenge before hate crime researchers is to demonstrate both conceptually and empirically how hate crimes differ from other manifestations of conflict. In what way are the causal forces that precipitate hate crime different from those that lead to other forms of bigoted conduct?" (p. 499). To this we might add: how are the causes of bias crime different from or similar to those that lead to other forms of criminal conduct? Both questions prompt investigations into how research on intergroup conflict and discrimination might be united with research on criminality to yield greater insight into the phenomena of bias crime and contribute to broader theoretical debates and cumulative research findings on related topics.

Bias crime is itself a hybrid phenomenon, containing elements of intergroup *bias*, on the

one hand, and *crime*, on the other. And while separately both bias (or prejudice) and crime have been the subjects of sociological research for some time, very little work has tried to link these traditions. With this in mind, I combine ideas about the social ecology of crime with notions of intergroup conflict and neighborhood ethnic transition to account for the distribution of bias crime across communities.[2] I focus specifically on two theoretical perspectives: social disorganization theory (Bursik and Gramsick 1993; Kubrin and Weitzer 2003; Sampson and Wilson 1995; Shaw and McKay 1942), a general macrosociological model of criminal deviance, and the "defended neighborhoods" perspective, developed by urban and race relations scholars to account for neighborhood intergroup conflicts (Blalock 1967; DeSena 1990; Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998; Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1967; Pinderhughes 1993; Suttles 1972). Although these two research traditions aim to account for different phenomena, they share a common ancestry in Chicago school social ecology and, as I describe below, contain points of both commonality and difference.

Empirically, I focus on the relationship between neighborhood demographic characteristics and biased criminal behavior. Using Sacramento, California, "America's most diverse city,"[3] as a study site, this study uses data on bias crime and other kinds of criminal offending, specifically robbery, assault, and vandalism, to investigate the commonalities and differences between bias crimes and other types of offending.

Next I discuss the theoretical concerns in more detail. After that, I describe the case of Sacramento, the data, and the methods employed in the quantitative analyses. Then I explain the results of an investigation of the distribution of bias crimes across Sacramento neighborhoods. Finally, I conclude with a consideration of the implications of these findings for research and theory on bias crime and intergroup conflict.

Disorganized and Defended Neighborhoods

Criminological research has long emphasized the community conditions associated with criminal behavior (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Kubrin and Weitzer 2003; South and Messner 2002; Warner 2007). Since the 1980s, researchers have returned to and revitalized the arguments of social disorganization theory (Bursik 1988; Byrne and Sampson 1986). Social disorganization theory highlights the conditions that affect the ability of a neighborhood to realize the common values of its residents or solve commonly experienced problems (Kornhauser 1978).

How social disorganization arguments apply to bias crime is not entirely clear. On the one hand, because bias crime always contains conduct that is already criminalized we might expect that bias crime is generated from the same conditions of disorganization as other crime. Early research on bias crime tended to make this kind of argument, although proponents relied more on strain theory than social disorganization. For example, Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt (2002) note that bias crimes frequently emerge in circumstances where economic pressures, such as job scarcity and manufacturing decline, exist and generate community tensions that devolve along racial or ethnic lines. This can lead to "scapegoating" violence, where specific individuals are targeted because they appear to threaten the economic position of the dominant group (see Perry 2001). Green, Dara Strolovitch, and Jannelle Wong (1998), however, refuted a simple poverty argument in their study of bias crime in New York City. They found that poverty did not affect the incidence of bias crime, but they did not go further to explore other aspects of social disorganization. Thus, the argument about the relationship between social disorganization and bias crime remains untested.

On the other hand, we might expect that bias crime is different from other kinds of crime and perhaps requires a different theoretical lens. Recall that Shaw and McKay (1942) saw the

regulatory capacity of neighborhoods as exhibited through a resistance of the neighborhood residents from outsiders. Bias crime could be construed as a manifestation of such resistance. As Jeannine Bell (2002) points out in her study of the policing of bias crime in "Central City," one white neighborhood was extremely well organized in using intimidation and violence in countering newcomers (see also DeSena 1990; Reider 1985,). A few white residents, backed by tacit support from other whites, targeted racial and ethnic newcomers for "move-in" violence and scare tactics. This echoes Pinderhughes (1993) findings about the racial views of youths in south Brooklyn.

> For these young people, establishing a strong cohesive individual and group identity required showing the rest of the group that they were "down with the program." In this case, the program includes concrete proof of being tough, hating the appropriate enemies, and a readiness to take those enemies on to defend principles and turf (p. 487).

In this sense, defense of turf emerges and is reinforced through peer group interactions.

More recently, Green and associates (1998) linked the defense of turf argument to the much older notion of the "defended neighborhood," a concept most clearly articulated by Gerald Suttles in his book on *The Social Construction of Communities* (1972). However, as Suttles (1972) himself acknowledges, the basic underlying idea was expressed in earlier Chicago school social ecology work, specifically that of Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Roderick McKenzie (1967) in the 1920s as part of their studies of the ecological processes that operate within cities. Park and colleagues (1967) saw neighborhoods as ethnically homogenous units that, when facing natural processes of invasion from ethnic others, react with defensive tactics. By contrast, Suttles (1972) maintains that defended neighborhoods are frequently not homogeneous and, in fact, ethnicity does not form the primal basis along

which neighborhood defenses occur (p. 27). He cites instances of intra-ethnic neighborhood defenses among blacks in adjacent neighborhoods in Chicago and emphasizes the panethnic solidarities that arise in other neighborhoods as examples of how the defense of neighborhood is not exclusively or even primarily rooted in ethnic identifications (pp. 27–28).

Suttles (1972) also understood neighborhood defenses as composed of a variety of actions, such as the creation of restrictive covenants, the use of private security guards and doormen, vigilantism, and, perhaps most importantly, the emergence of delinquent street gangs (p. 21). Although he did not address them specifically, it is clear that Suttles would see bias crimes as one manifestation of a neighborhood defense. Moreover, going beyond Suttles, it seems likely that bias crime would occur when other more socially legitimate defensive strategies, like private security and restrictive covenants, are unavailable or unaffordable by residents. Thus, the kind of defensive tactic used by residents might be predicted by other neighborhood characteristics, such as the level of social organization. More socially organized neighborhoods might favor tactics like restrictive covenants and private security forces and less socially organized communities might rely more on delinquent gangs to do the same work of excluding rival others. This, then, indicates another possible compatibility between social disorganization and defended neighborhood perspectives.

When Green and associates (1998) invoke the idea of defended neighborhoods in their analyses of bias crime in New York City, they do so with some modifications to the earlier usage. They argue:

> Studies of defended neighborhoods suggest that higher rates of racially motivated crime will occur in areas where whites enjoy numerical superiority . . . From the vantage point of defended neighborhoods studies, growing minority populations undermine the

> preexisting social networks that both foster whites' sentimental attachment to a racially homogeneous image of the community (Suttles 1972:35) and facilitate acts of hostility against outsiders by the most belligerent community members (Green et al. 1998:376).

This formulation elevates white neighborhoods as the main kind of community that experiences neighborhood defenses.[5] Neither Suttles nor the earlier Chicago school sociologists interpreted neighborhood defenses as solely or even primarily a phenomena occurring within white neighborhoods. Indeed, Suttles (1972) explicitly argues that ethnic-based defenses, while possible, are less common than other kinds of neighborhood defenses. Both Suttles and the earlier Chicago school researchers also treated defended neighborhoods as a discrete type of neighborhood. A key assumption made by Green and associates' (1998) work on defended neighborhoods is that neighborhoods can be more or less defensive.

Nonetheless, what Green and associates' (1998) formulation lacks in fidelity to the earlier usage it gains in terms of being a clear testable proposition in regards to bias crime. The centerpiece of their argument—that the effects of in-migration of various nonwhite groups leads to greater bias crimes against those groups in more homogeneously white neighborhoods— remains highly plausible.

As Green and associates (1998) point out, the defended neighborhood idea incorporates the central notion of the minority group threat hypothesis—that bias crimes occur when majority groups face large and growing minority populations (Blalock 1967; King 2007). The defended neighborhood perspective is similar to various strands of realistic group conflict theory in that it conceives of demographic processes that heighten intergroup contact and proximity as underlying bias crime (Green et al. 1998:373–78). The defended neighborhood argument highlights the importance of change, particularly the influx of minority population and the rate at which white homogeneity diminishes.

Green and associates (1998) reconceptualize defended neighborhoods by returning to Park and colleagues' (1967) idea that ethnicity is a central basis for neighborhood defenses. They (Green et al. 1998) also shift attention from viewing defended neighborhoods as a discrete type of neighborhood to conceiving of the "defendedness" of a neighborhood as a quantitative variable. And, finally, Green and associates (1998) specifically highlight white neighborhoods as especially prone to neighborhood defenses enacted through bias crime.

The existing literature thus presents various expectations about how bias crime might be related to demographic conditions and how similar bias crime is to other kinds of crime in terms of its community correlates. If bias crime is like other kinds of crime, it should be more prevalent in communities with high residential turnover, concentrated disadvantage, and ethnic heterogeneity. If bias crime is different from other crime, variables associated with the defended neighborhoods perspective should affect bias crime but not other kinds of crime. A third option is also possible: bias crime is affected by structural social disorganization, but is also more likely in defended neighborhoods regardless of their level of disorganization. If so, social disorganization and defended neighborhoods perspectives need to be combined to explain bias crime.

Data and Methods

The present study[9]—bias crime reports—are subject to three levels screening. The responding officer files an incident report and checks a box indicating that the incident was bias motivated. Typically, officers substantiate the bias designation in their narrative comments in the report. A supervising officer then makes a determination to support or disconfirm the bias designation. Finally, the records personnel at the California Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics Center determine whether the incident is confirmed as a

hate crime and officially recorded in the state publications as a bias crime.

The impact of screening can be seen by comparing data made available by the City of Sacramento Police Department and the California Criminal Justice Statistics Center. At the first responder level, from 1995 to 2002, Sacramento police officers reported 622 bias crime incidents. The screening process at the second and third levels removed 374 incidents and included another 34 incidents that were not reported by first responders. The former represent incidents that were screened out either by the second level of review (i.e., the supervisor) or at the state level. The latter represent 34 incidents that were not initially identified as bias crimes but were identified as such by either a supervisor or the state data collectors. Over time the agreement between first responders and the third tier of review converged. For example, from 1995 to 1997, Sacramento police officers identified 114, 90, and 51 cases as bias crimes that were rejected in higher levels of review. From 2000 through 2002, rejections dropped to 38, 21, and 26. These patterns suggest that officers were learning about which incidents would be accepted and adjusted their reporting behavior accordingly.

[INSERT TABLE 12.1 HERE]

A total of 248 cases survived the three tiers of review and therefore represent the most reliable measure of bias crime. However, the Sacramento Police Department does not always disclose addresses for crimes involving sexual assault or crimes involving minors and, thus, three cases that omitted address information were dropped to make the final total of incidents 245.

The over time trends in bias crimes display no particular upward or downward trajectory. The highest level occurred in 1996 when 41 incidents were reported. The next highest was 38, which occurred in 1999 and 2000. The lowest levels were 20 in 2002 and 22 in 1997. Table 1 presents a comparison of the characteristics of Sacramento bias crimes during the observation period with those of the nation as a whole. Race-based bias crimes are the most

common in both Sacramento and the U.S. totals. Sexual orientation is proportionally similar to other parts of the country. Religious-based bias crimes in Sacramento make up a smaller proportion as compared with other parts of the county. The Sacramento bias crime rate for the period is 6.9 crimes per 10,000, as compared to 4.5 for California as a whole, and 7.3 for Los Angeles. Thus, Sacramento is generally similar to other California and American communities in terms of its bias crime rate and distribution among types of bias crime. In the coming analyses, data on Sacramento bias crimes is divided into three variables: total bias crimes, anti-black bias crimes, and violent bias crimes. Anti-black crimes are given special attention because several studies have focused specifically on blacks as targets of bias crime and to address the concern that grouping bias crimes together obscures the important differences between the different manifestations of the phenomena. Violent bias crimes were given special attention under the assumption that they, like other kinds of violent crime, would be more reliably reported. Analyses were conducted to see whether the basic patterns hold for the more reliably reported bias crime.

Data were also collected on reported robbery, assault, and vandalism from the Sacramento Police Department. Robbery was selected because it is one of the most reliably reported crimes and thus serves as a good comparison crime. Assault and vandalism were tracked because they are most similar to bias crimes in terms of the conduct involved. In fact, 75 percent of the bias crimes in Sacramento were simple or aggravated assault, or vandalism.

Independent variables were drawn entirely from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census. *Ethnic heterogeneity* was computed using Blau's (1977) method, an index that measures the expected chance that any two individuals drawn from the population would be of different groups taking into consideration the number of groups and their relative size (Blau 1977). *Concentrated disadvantage* is based on Sampson and colleagues' (1997) conceptualization. It is a factor score composed of 2000 data on the number of female-headed households,

unemployed persons, non-Hispanic blacks, persons below the poverty level, and males under the age of 17. *Percent of new residents* is a measure of residential turnover and is based on the number of residents who say they did not live in their current residence in 1995. The variables related to the "defended neighborhood" argument are *percent white*, measured in 1990, and the *percent change in nonwhite population* between 1990 and 2000, calculated by subtracting the percentage of non-white population in 2000 from the percentage of nonwhite population in 1990. Following Green and associates (1998), I use an interaction term between percent white and the change in the nonwhite population to assesses the effects of nonwhite in-migration on neighborhoods with different levels of white homogeneity.[10] The defended neighborhood hypothesis is that bias crimes will be more frequent in more homogenously white neighborhoods that are experiencing heavy in-migration from nonwhites. The means and standard deviations for these variables are given in Table 2.

[INSERT TABLE 12.2 HERE]

The theoretical unit of analysis for the social disorganization and defended neighborhoods arguments is the neighborhood, which I approximate using U.S. Census tracts. With a few exceptions (Tita, Cohen, and Engberg 2005) census tracts have been used as proxies for neighborhoods in previous research on crime (Miles-Doan 1998; Krivo and Peterson 1996). Sacramento has 114 census tracts that touch some portion of the city limits, and by extension, the jurisdictional boundaries of the Sacramento Police Department. Several of these tracts contain one hundred or less residents of the City of Sacramento. A few tracts had zero Sacramento residents. These tracts were merged with their nearest neighboring tracts to yield a total of 103 units. Only two bias crimes occurred in low population tracts that were subsequently merged to an adjacent tract.

Many tracts, particularly in the older midtown and downtown, relate quite closely to historically identified neighborhoods (e.g., Southside Park, Poverty Ridge, and Boulevard

Park). A gay and lesbian neighborhood, known as “Lavender Heights,” exists in midtown. The most homogenously white neighborhoods lie in East Sacramento (a.k.a., the MacKinley Park area) and Land Park, where whites make up between 80 to 87 percent of the residents.

Between 1995 and 2002, at least one bias crime occurred in 77 percent of Sacramento census tracts. Whereas race-based bias crime occurred throughout the city, roughly one-third of the sexual-orientation-based offenses occurred in the environs of “Lavender Heights” in midtown (see Figure 12.1). The concentration of anti-gay bias crime fits a pattern identified in previous research in which assaults, vandalism, or threats occur in close proximity to gay and lesbian bars and other visible symbols of gayness (e.g., the LAMBDA community center) (Moran et al. 2001).

[INSERT FIGURE 12.1 HERE]

Latinos make up 50 percent of one census tract in the northern part of the city called Gardenland. A historically black neighborhood, Oak Park, which lies southeast of downtown has between 30 and 35 percent black residents. Similarly, a historically Chinese and Japanese neighborhood near downtown continues to have 44 percent Asian residents. Despite these concentrations, groups are fairly evenly distributed across the city (Dingemans and Datel 1995). The mean ethnic heterogeneity for the city is .61, which indicates that the chance that any two individuals drawn from the same census track would be of different races is 61 percent.

The dependent variables for the following analysis are *counts*, which are nonnegative and distributionally skewed. A nonlinear model is recommended for such data and I selected the negative binomial model because test statistics revealed that the more rigid assumptions of the Poisson model do not hold and because previous work has used the negative binomial on similar data (Green et al. 1998). In other words, the alpha statistic that measures over- and under-dispersion was significantly different from zero, meaning that the Poisson assumption

of the equality of means and standard deviations was violated by the data.[11] To aid interpretation I transform the coefficients into factor or percentage changes in the expected counts using the methods described by Long (1997:228–29).[12]

Findings

In terms of bivariate relationships, robbery, vandalism, and assault are all highly correlated (between .75 and .86), suggesting that similar causal circumstances underlie each of them. The correlations between total bias crime, anti-black bias crime, and violent bias crime are not as high as the correlations for other kinds of crime, ranging between .27 and .52. Thus, it is unclear whether the same causal precursors generate both ordinary crime and bias crime from simply looking at the correlations.

Table 3 presents results of negative binomial regressions. Models for bias crime are presented incrementally to show the additive effects of considering the defended neighborhood variables.[13] Model 1 shows that concentrated disadvantage and residential turnover—two social disorganization variables—increase bias crime, while ethnic heterogeneity has no effect. The defended neighborhoods variables in Model 2 do not alter these basic findings. As expected, ethnic heterogeneity and percent white are strongly correlated (r = -.93) and produce inconsistent estimations of both coefficients when they are both present in the model. Ethnic heterogeneity was dropped in favor of percent white because percent white is central to the calculation of the interaction term that is the centerpiece of the defended neighborhoods argument and because Model 1 shows that ethnic heterogeneity does not have a marginal effect on bias crime. Dropping ethnic heterogeneity has no effect on the fit of the model.

Model 3 thus provides the best basis for interpreting the relationships between bias crime

and the arguments about social disorganization and defended neighborhoods described above. The effect of concentrated disadvantage is quite large. A two unit change in concentrated disadvantage, which is the difference between one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean (i.e., low disadvantaged neighborhoods versus high disadvantaged neighborhoods), is associated with a doubling of bias crime. This finding contrasts with Green and colleagues (1998), who found little support for the effects of unemployment and other indicators of economic strain on bias crime.[14] The effect of new residents is also reasonably large. A 20-percentage-point change in the percent of new residents, which is roughly the difference between one standard deviation above (60 percent) and below the mean (40 percent), increases expected bias crime counts by 38 percent.

[INSERT TABLE 12.3 HERE]

In addition to providing support for the idea that at least some portion of the variation in bias crime across neighborhoods is attributable to ecological variables found to affect all kinds of crime, the processes associated with the defended neighborhoods also operate. Despite the nonsignificance of the main effect for percent white, the improvement in fit of the model including the defended neighborhood variables is significant (LR statistic = –11.488, $p < .01$).

These effects are summarized graphically in Figure 12.2. The disorganization variables are set to their means, the percent increase in nonwhite population ranges from 0 to 40 percent (e.g., the maximum amount of change in the sample), and high and low values for the percent white variable are defined as 90 percent white in 1990 (e.g., a mixed neighborhood), and 60 percent white in 1990. The interaction effect is apparent in that the nonwhite influx is dependent upon whether a neighborhood is homogeneously white or mixed. Homogeneously white neighborhoods experiencing a large nonwhite influx have a much greater expected number of bias crimes. Conversely, in mixed neighborhoods the effect of on nonwhite influx

is actually negative, such that the greater the increase in nonwhite residents the lower the number of bias crimes.

These findings are consistent with those found in Green and colleagues' (1998) analyses of various race-based bias crime in New York City neighborhoods. In their words: "in-migration leads to the sharpest upturn in hate crimes in predominately white neighborhoods" (p. 338). In terms of the size of the effects, among Sacramento neighborhoods characterized by high nonwhite in-migration (a change from 50 percent white to 80 percent white), the number of bias crimes increases by a factor of 2.6. Neighborhoods with low nonwhite in-migration experiencing the same change would be expected to see an increase by a factor of 1.16 or 16 percent.

[INSERT FIGURE 12.2 HERE]

Table 4 investigates the determinants of the three comparison crimes: robbery, assault, and vandalism. Because these models contain the percent white variable the heterogeneity measure is again excluded, which substantially overlaps with one another in terms of the variation they explain. As both theories would predict, Models 1 and 2 show that the social disorganization variables affect robbery and assault and that the defended neighborhoods variables do not. The vandalism model shows somewhat different results. Unlike the other crime variables, including bias crime, vandalism is affected by the population size. However, it is lower population tracts that have a higher incidence of vandalism than more populated ones. This could be the result of the fact that, having controlled for other factors that affect crime, vandalism is more likely in sparsely populated areas where there are less witnesses around to detect the crime in progress. Of the social disorganization variables, concentrated disadvantage does not have effects when other factors are controlled, but the effect of new residents persists. Among the defended neighborhood variables only the increase in the non-white population affects vandalism. The increase in nonwhite population is also negative and

significant in the assault model. Both results suggest that, *ceteris paribus*, neighborhoods with large increases in nonwhite residents have less of both assault and vandalism. However, the central implication of the defended neighborhood argument is the interaction term, which does not affect assault or vandalism.[15]

[INSERT TABLE 12.4 HERE]

Anti-Black and Violent Bias Crimes

The final set of analyses divides bias crime into different components. The first model gauges whether the influences on the aggregate counts of bias crime are also relevant to specifically anti-black bias crime. Previous research by Green and colleagues (1998) and Steven Messner, Suzanne McHugh, and Richard Felson (2005) examined bias crime disaggregated by race under the very plausible assumption that different factors operate for different kinds of bias crime targets. I have taken the opposite approach by first assuming that many of the neighborhood dynamics associated with bias crime would operate regardless of the characteristics of the specific targets. I also relied on the aggregated figures because of the sample size in this study is smaller than the previous studies.

Model 1 in Table 5 tests whether the same ecological processes operate to predict specifically anti-black bias crime. The findings suggest that there are minor differences. As was the case in the models using aggregate bias crime counts, concentrated disadvantage remains a strong determinant. However, the residential turnover measure (i.e., percent of new residents) does not affect anti-black bias crimes. Bias crimes against blacks are no more likely in neighborhoods experiencing high levels of residential turnover than they are in stable neighborhoods. Thus, of the structural sources of social disorganization, disadvantage emerges as the key determinant in predicting anti-black bias crime.

The defended neighborhoods perspective also receives support with respect to specifically

anti-black bias crimes. The increase in nonwhite residents and the interaction term shows that anti-black bias crimes are more likely in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of nonwhites. The effects are quite large here as well. For example, using the 60 percent and 90 percent white thresholds relied upon above, the model predicts an increase of bias crime in high nonwhite in-migration neighborhoods by a factor of 2.9 as compared with an increase of 1.34 in low nonwhite in-migration neighborhoods. It is tempting to infer that these findings suggest that the environmental conditions that generate bias crime do not differ depending upon who the target is. However, the data from Sacramento are simply too limited to show anything definitive along these lines. Thus, at best, these results should be viewed as suggestive of potential patterns.[16]

[INSERT TABLE 12.5 HERE]

A second way of examining bias crime is to focus solely on the violent incidents. To the extent that more serious bias crimes are more likely to be reported, focusing on the most serious kinds of incidents would arguably provide a more reliable measure of the underlying phenomena. If so, then analyses of violent bias crimes serve as a test of the reliability of the findings reported in Table 3 on a subsample of the data that is assumed to represent the most certain bias incidents. Model 2 shows that, indeed, the same pattern of relationships observed in the aggregate data are present in the subsample of violent bias crimes. The effects of concentrated disadvantage remain large. A one-unit change, which for a factor score variable like this one is the difference between the mean and one standard deviation above the mean, is associated with a 61 percent increase violent bias crime. In addition, the defended neighborhood effects are consistent with total bias crime and anti-black crime models.

Conclusion

The urban ecology of bias crime reflects the dynamics previously identified in research on more generic crime. As with crime in general, the evidence from Sacramento suggests that ethnic conflicts are likely to erupt in settings where there is little capacity for informal social control to manage or mediate tensions between groups. More socially disorganized contexts are prone toward having tensions boil over into moments of sporadic crime and violence. In this sense, the study of neighborhood ethnic conflicts has something to gain from criminological research on the relationship between informal social control and crime.

And yet, evidence from Sacramento suggests that even when poverty and residential turnover—two of the three key measures of social disorganization—are held constant, bias crimes remain affected by the demographic dynamics Green and colleagues (1998) refer to as a "neighborhood defense." Moreover, the defended neighborhood dynamic does not operate with respect to robbery, assault, and vandalism, although those crimes are affected by the social disorganization variables. The fact that generic crime in Sacramento neighborhoods varies in ways predicted from research conducted on midwestern and eastern cities suggests that there is nothing particularly anomalous about the empirical setting that should undermine the generality of the conclusions.

As opposed to the emphasis that many scholars and policymakers have placed on the unique features of bias crime, the emerging picture of bias crimes is that they share many things in common with other kinds of offending behavior. This point parallels Messner and associates' (2005) findings that bias criminals are not "specialists" whose bias-motivated behavior represents the sole form of their criminal involvement. While Messner and associates' (2005) study is conducted at the individual level and the present study is conducted at the neighborhood level, both show that some of the same criminogenic circumstances that lead to other kinds of crime also engender bias crime.

However, this is only half the picture. Bias crime is also reflective of broader social

processes of intergroup conflict. In this sense, bias crime in Sacramento neighborhoods resembles patterns found in research on ethnic group conflict in a number of settings throughout the world (Harden 1995; Pinderhughes 1993). While there is no single unified set of circumstances that account for all or even most ethnic conflicts, one recurring theme in much political and anthropological writing has been the link between collective ethnic identity and territory (Horowitz 2000). Territory becomes coextensive with ethnic identity and a group's claim to its territory is frequently couched in moral terms. When that claim appears or is threatened, defensive actions, by at least some members of the community, are likely—and, perhaps, morally required. As Donald Horowitz (2000) writes:

> Ethnic claims to priority or exclusion are supported by appeals to moral principles. The principles are invoked to justify departures from strict equality. The moral basis for ethnic claims lies in group legitimacy within a territory . . . To understand the concept of group legitimacy, it is necessary to link it to ownership. Legitimacy goes to one's right place in the country. To be legitimate is therefore to be identified with the territory. Georg Simmel notes that the ethnic stranger is "'no owner of the soil'—soil not only in the physical but also in the figurative sense of life-substance which fixed, if not in a point in space, at an ideal point in the social environment (pp. 201–2).

Neighborhood defenses grow out some ethnic groups' claims to "soil." But not all groups. It tends to occur in white communities facing in-migration of blacks or other ethnic minorities. Historian Stephen Meyer Grant documents numerous instances of "move-in" violence by whites directed specifically at blacks in his book *As Long As They Don't Move Next Door* (2000). In Sacramento and New York City (i.e., Green and associates' [1998] study site), homogeneously or nearly homogenously white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of

nonwhites have the highest rates of bias crime. Neighborhoods with a mix of ethnic groups or those that are more homogenously a single nonwhite group (which is rare in Sacramento) tend to have lower bias crime levels. This suggests that white neighborhoods possess a greater sense of entitlement to the defense of place than other neighborhoods. Although there are some cases, such as in Central City in Jeannine Bell's *Policing Hatred* (2002), where bias crime and biased behavior was explicitly supported within a white community and by some white police officers, it may be that the support for neighborhood defense through means of bias crime is more often tacit or concentrated within particular peer networks (see also Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Suttles 1972).

This view points toward the need to examine local cultural processes that generate neighborhood defenses and, more specifically, to comprehend the efforts or lack of efforts of neighborhood elites in white communities to manage the behavior of segments of the neighborhood who engage bias-motivated intimidation. This requires a shift in focus from structural to cultural processes that parallels the shift in focus in the study of communities and crime represented by Warner's (2003) work on attenuated culture and Kubrin and Weitzer's (2003) work on the connections between concentrated disadvantage and neighborhood culture. A key issue for future work is whether informal social control in white neighborhoods erodes in the face of attenuated culture or because of a heterogeneity of cultural frameworks, or both conditions. Such work has the potential to go beyond simply applying social disorganization theory to neighborhood ethnic conflicts and could contribute to the theoretical advancement of the disorganization perspective as well.

In addition, we need to know how bias crime fits within a neighborhood residents' tool kit of defensive strategies and how the social disorganization of a neighborhood shapes the kinds of defenses mobilized by residents. Such work would situate bias crime within Suttles's (1972) broader conception of neighborhood defenses and would provide a better

understanding why bias crime emerges as a strategy in some communities and not others.

Like many other social problems, bias crime is a public issue that can be approached from several theoretical viewpoints and traditions of inquiry. As with other problems, it is important to search for points of convergence and divergence within these traditions and to identify common generative processes that underlie seemingly different behavior and outcomes. The key to building sociological theory of social problems like bias crime lies in integrating those traditions and resisting the temptation to see the phenomena as requiring a theory of its own.

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Notes

1. The tendency to emphasize the unique features of bias crime is perhaps most prominent in scholarship that advocates on behalf of bias crime laws. Proponents depict bias crime as a unique form of criminal activity and, in doing so provide a foundation for justifying harsher criminal penalties for such crimes (Lawrence 1999). Craig (2002) recently listed the underlying arguments as follows: bias crime is distinctive because of (a) the unique symbolic aspects of the crime, (b) the amount of physical violence involved, (c) the special psychological harms for victims, (d) the presence of multiple perpetrators, (e) the unique contribution such crimes make to the deterioration of social relations, and (f) because it typically involves the victimization of already marginalized and negatively stereotyped groups (see also Broekman and Turpin-Petrosino 2002; Garofalo 1991; Leonard and Taylor 1981).

The author is grateful to Carlos Bravo, Angela Quach, Fernando Murrain, Robert Vercoe, and Julie Siebens for their research assistance. Julie Young at the UCD College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences, Informatics Center assisted with the GIS mapping.

Valerie Jenness and Carl Grindstaff provided extensive feedback on early drafts. Randy Gainey, Eric Grodsky, Bill McCarthy, and Charles Tittle provided help with the early formulation of the research project. The anonymous reviewers and the editors for *Social Problems* also contributed greatly to the improvement of the manuscript. Direct correspondence to: Ryken Grattet, Department of Sociology, University of California, Davis, CA 95616. E-mail: rtgrattet@ucdavis.edu.

2. This is only one point of potential crossfertilization between scholarship on bias crime and research on crime more generally. Another is Messner, McHugh, and Felson's (2005) article on whether bias crime perpetrators are specialist versus generalists. Broader still, a small body of work has begun to expose the gendered nature of bias crime. Like other kinds of criminal behavior, bias crime expresses conformity to conventional cultural norms about masculinity (Bufkin 1999; Ferber 1998; Perry 2001).
3. In August of 2002, *Time Magazine* made this declaration, basing it on the conclusions of a Harvard Civil Rights Project study, and asked: "why is there still racial tension?" (Stodghill and Bower 2002).
4. Krivo and Peterson (1996) found that measures of concentrated disadvantage have consistent effects on property and violent crime in Columbus. Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) showed that a factor score based upon the number of female headed households, unemployed persons, non-Hispanic blacks, persons below the poverty level, and males under age 17 affects the level of violent crime in Chicago. Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) show that concentrated disadvantage and cultural adaptations to extreme poverty, such as subcultures supportive of violence and distrust of the police, combine to affect retaliatory homicides in St. Louis.
5. Defended neighborhoods is by no means the only possible argument about the relationship between bias crime and ethnic composition. Several other theories and

arguments exist regarding such factors as ethnic competition over resources (Olzak Shanahan, and West 1994) racial threat (Blalock 1967; King 2007; Tolnay, Beck, and Massey 1989), strain (Levin and McDevitt 2002; Perry 2001), tipping points (Galster 1990), the consequences of white flight (Wilson 1978), social distance and contact (Blau 1977), and different kinds of arguments about the relative balance of power between groups (see Horowitz 2000).

9. City data was retrieved from the City of Sacramento crime report database (http://www.sacpd.org/databases. asp) and the state data was provided by the California Criminal Justice Statistics Center.
10. It is important to note that both social disorganization and defended neighborhoods theories share the idea that neighborhood in-migration affects crime. However, the defended neighborhoods perspective is different in two ways. First, it focuses specifically on nonwhite in-migration, because the threat to neighborhood purity is specifically rooted in an ethnically based claim to territory. In-migration of blacks into a black neighborhood would not be expected to generate a neighborhood defense. Social disorganization theory, on the other hand, uses the concept of residential turnover, a broader phenomenon that also includes out-migration and that can involve any ethnic groups. Second, the defended neighborhood argument is that in-migration is more threatening to specifically white neighborhoods. As a result, the nonwhite in-migration effect must be interpreted along with the effects of percent white within a neighborhood.
11. All models presented below were tested for spatial autocorrelation based on least squares residuals. No such tests exist for negative binomial models. In every case, the test statistic, *Moran's I*, was not significant at the .05 level. The specific method used involved the calculation of a binary weights matrix based upon the connectivity of each tract with its surrounding tracts.

12. In the negative binomial regression model, factor changes are computed by exponentiating the unstandardized coefficient. Percentage changes are computed using the formula: $100[\exp(\beta)-1]$.
13. The 1990 population size was controlled in initial models in logged and unlogged forms. It had no effect in either bivariate or multivariate models. Likewise, Green and colleagues (1998) found no effect of population size on bias crime in New York City.
14. Green and colleagues (1998) used economic measures, not as part of a test of social disorganization theory, but to gauge the effects of economic strain and resource competition. The fact that these effects are present in Sacramento could be interpreted as providing some support for strain and ethnic competition models, as well as a key pillar of social disorganization theory.
15. The positive effect of percent white on vandalism may highlight a difference between predominantly white neighborhoods and other neighborhoods in the propensity to report less serious crimes like vandalism. Holding the other factors constant, neighborhoods with lower percent white may be less likely to invoke formal social control to deal with minor problems. The fact that the percent white variable is not significant in the assault and robbery models suggests that when the crime is more serious white and nonwhite neighborhoods respond similarly.
16. While it would be instructive to learn whether social disorganization and neighborhood defenses operate similarly with respect to other kinds of bias crime, the frequencies are too small to draw any strong conclusions. The exception may be anti-gay crimes. Twenty-nine of the 48 anti-gay bias crimes (60 percent) occurred within a dozen census tracts located in midtown or downtown Sacramento (i.e., near Lavender Heights, the “gay” neighborhood in the city). This is a degree of concentration not reflected in the distribution of anti-black bias crime across the city and may indicate that neighborhood

dynamics operate differently with respect to anti-gay bias crime. Moreover, models of anti-gay bias crime reveal no defended neighborhood effects and only the percent of new residents is significant among social disorganization predictors. However, with only 48 events to predict, these models need to be interpreted with some caution. It is very possible that effects are present, but the small sample size makes it exceedingly difficult to detect them.

13. Connections: The Prison Community from a Social Disorganization and Collective Efficacy Perspective

Lori Sexton

Introduction

When Shaw and McKay (1942) wrote *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*, Chicago was the second largest city in the United States. Today, if the population of America's prisons were taken from inside prison walls and concentrated into an urban setting, it would create the second largest city in the United States (Gopnik, 2012). This hypothetical situation may seem outlandish, but it sparks in the imagination parallels between prisons and cities that might not otherwise come to mind. If we think of prison as a city, or at least of prison settings as similar in some ways to today's urban centers, we can begin to see the potential applications of social disorganization and collective efficacy theories inside prison. In fact, prison settings have much in common with cities: they bring a large number of people together in close proximity; the people who live within them form communities (Clemmer, 1940); they are primarily populated with people—predominantly young men of color—who have lived in urban settings (Western & Pettit, 2010); and they can be characterized by varying levels of disorder (Carrabine, 2005).

Commonalities aside, prisons remain different from cities in a very fundamental way: they are what Goffman (1961) refers to as "total institutions"—rigidly structured, closed systems that isolate a group of similarly situated people from larger society. As total institutions, prisons differ from cities along numerous dimensions: prisons are not formed by the same social ecological processes that characterize the development of cities; the prisoners they hold are captive in their environment to a degree not evident in the outside world (although social and geographic mobility outside of cities is but a distant dream for many urban dwellers); and formal social control is more pervasive in prisons than in even the most heavily policed urban settings.

It is these striking differences—readily evident on the face of things—that have perhaps prevented social disorganization and collective efficacy scholars from turning their analytic lens toward a prison setting. In this essay, however, I invite you to look beyond these differences—not to set them aside, but rather to find within them conceptual similarity in the face of stark empirical difference—in order to examine the potential for dynamics generally understood to play out at a neighborhood level to also exist inside prison walls.

In order to examine social disorganization and collective efficacy in a prison setting, we need to be creative and flexible in our approach. There are two primary ways to do this: 1) by importing spatially-defined understandings of neighborhoods into a prison setting, and 2) by reconceptualizing the meaning of "community" along cultural lines. The first, and perhaps most straightforward, way is to locate the prison equivalent of neighborhoods. Research on social disorganization and collective efficacy breaks down larger geographic units like cities into smaller, discrete units like neighborhoods. These neighborhoods are commonly measured at the level of the census tract (Hipp, 2007). In a prison setting, the "neighborhood" equivalent to census tracts would be individual housing units: the buildings, cell blocks, pods, or dormitories that constitute discrete areas of the prison where inmates are housed. Viewing prison housing units as neighborhoods allows us to employ the common tactic of spatial demarcation of neighborhoods in a novel setting. Just as cities are comprised of geographically-bounded neighborhoods that contain clusters of residents, prisons are comprised of geographically-bounded housing units that contain clusters of prisoners.

The second way to bring the study of social disorganization and collective efficacy into a prison setting requires a shift from an emphasis on neighborhoods to a focus on community. Whereas neighborhoods are defined by their geographic boundaries, communities can be defined more flexibly. A cultural approach to studying communities, for instance, considers a community

to be a group of people tied together by a common identity or other mutually-shared characteristics, rather than geographic proximity. In a prison setting, this identity- and commonality-based reconceptualization of community prompts us to move beyond looking at prison housing units as discrete neighborhoods, and instead offers the "prisoner community" as a whole, or separate sub-communities (e.g., transgender inmates, prison gangs, lifers, or sex offenders), as the unit of analysis for social disorganization and collective efficacy.

Spatial Demarcation of Prison Neighborhoods

Let's begin our exploration of social disorganization and collective efficacy in prisons with spatially defined prison "neighborhoods." As noted earlier, there are key ways in which the prison, as a total institution, differs from urban neighborhoods. These differences have profound implications for the examination of social disorganization and collective efficacy in a prison setting. Primary among these factors is the degree of social control evident in prison "neighborhoods." Formal social control is much stronger and more pervasive in total institutions than in the outside world. Prisoners live their lives under constant supervision, whether in the form of surveillance by correctional officers, enforcement of rules and regulations by prison staff, or the looming threat of sanctions for disciplinary infractions. In short, prisons amplify formal social control in that they exert near total control over the prisoners in their charge (Goffman, 1961). The degree of formal social control in prisons and the oppositional relationship between those wielding formal control (prison staff) and those subject to it (prisoners) also have interesting implications for the extent and nature of *informal* social control exercised by prisoners (Sykes & Messinger, 1960). In communities in the free world, formal and informal social control are often complementary means toward the same end. In a prison setting, however, formal social control on the part of prison staff and informal social control among prisoners coexist in an uneasy tension, each striving toward its own end. For example, it is well

documented in the literature that prison gangs are a major source of informal social control. Prison gangs rely on hierarchical organization (with “shot callers” at the top of the chain and “associates” at the bottom) to control their members, and use violence as a means of control over both gang members and prisoners outside their ranks (Trammel, 2009). Prison staff, on the other hand, use the formal control that they exert over prisoners to maintain the very safety and security that are jeopardized by prisoners’ means of informal social control.

Another significant way in which prisons differ from cities is that they are not characterized by the radial expansion patterns of urban centers described by Burgess (1925) and Shaw and McKay (1942). Prisons simply do not “grow” in the same way that cities do, nor do their populations shift from one area to another according to the same general patterns. As total institutions, prisons allow their residents neither voluntary exit from prison nor unconstrained movement within the prison. This does not mean that prison populations are static, however. There are set rules (admission and release procedures) that pattern the flow of people into and out of prisons, but the location and function of the prison remain the same. Similarly, although the population within a prison moves around on a very regular basis, the “neighborhoods” (housing units) that house this population remain constant, absent some alteration to the physical design such as construction or demolition of housing units or the repurposing of a dining hall or gym into housing space. Thus, prisons as total institutions once again complicate the application of social disorganization to a prison setting, this time with regard to the social ecological underpinnings of the social disorganization framework. The implications of this departure from a social ecological model are most notable in what is absent from prisons: slums. The city’s social ecological process of radial expansion produces a “zone in transition” in which undesirable characteristics (e.g., nuisance from nearby industry, deteriorating housing conditions, and key measures of social disorganization) push out all but the least fortunate residents (Burgess, 1925).

Prisons, in contrast, have no such zone in transition. Broadening our lens, however, and seeing the prison not as an autonomous entity, but rather as situated within a larger ecological sphere, many scholars have likened prisons themselves to slums (Wacquant, 2000; 2001). Prisoners are largely pulled from urban centers, primarily zones in transition, and transplanted into prisons. In this way, although social ecological dynamics do not affect the structure of prisons themselves, the composition of their populations is decidedly similar to that of the zones in transition described by social disorganization scholars.

Viewing prisons not just as neighborhoods, but as particularly depressed and challenged neighborhoods, provides the opportunity to examine specific structural markers of social disorganization in a prison setting. Research on social disorganization in neighborhoods has consistently demonstrated the relationship between poverty—specifically concentrated disadvantage—and crime. In a prison setting, inmates both import disadvantage (in the form of low socioeconomic status) into prison with them, and experience new disadvantage in the forms of their limited ability to earn a fair or reasonable wage while incarcerated and their decided inability to significantly improve their living conditions. When construed more broadly, prisoners also embody concentrated disadvantage in other influential ways. Prisoners as a group are disadvantaged within the prison system, as evidenced by their subordinate status and the extreme degree of control exercised over them by the prison (Goffman, 1961). Thus, prisoners find themselves disadvantaged in a hierarchy of power as much as a hierarchy of financial means.

Another major indicator of social disorganization in neighborhoods is ethnic heterogeneity. Measurement of ethnic heterogeneity in prison “neighborhoods” presents an interesting dilemma. In some states, policy-mandated or de facto racial segregation in prisons is common, and generally justified as necessary to the maintenance of safety and security in the face of gang-related threats (Henderson, Cullen, Carroll, & Feinberg, 2000). For instance,

California state prisons were racially segregated as a matter of course, beginning at inmates' initial point of entry into prison reception centers, until the state's policy of racial segregation was discontinued in 2005 after a protracted legal battle (Goodman, 2008). The degree to which prisoners self-segregate along racial or ethnic lines—in ways that may or may not correspond to formal or institutional racial segregation in prison—provides another layer of data on ethnic heterogeneity. A wealth of empirical literature on life in prison has demonstrated that grouping of inmates occurs primarily along racial lines, even in prisons with relatively low rates of gang activity (Jacobs, 1979). Thus, the intersection of formal and informal social control in prison once again complicates what is a fairly straightforward measure in urban settings.

Residential instability is also a major component of life in prison. Despite the static nature of prison housing units as "neighborhoods," there can be a great deal of fluctuation in the residents of these neighborhoods. It is not uncommon for prisoners to be moved across housing units within a single prison or even transferred between prisons over the length of their sentence, due to factors as diverse as administrative penalties for disciplinary infractions, changes in custody or security levels, programming needs, legal issues or health concerns. The commonality across these varied reasons for residential instability in prison is that they are rarely, if ever, initiated by prisoners. Once again, we see the formal control of the total institution constricting what would be ordinarily be voluntary behavior in neighborhoods. These distinct forces produce residential instability in prison that follows markedly different patterns than in a neighborhood characterized by social ecological processes of relatively voluntary in- and out-migration.

Social Disorganization and Prison Violence

Given that social disorganization is associated with higher levels of crime in cities, the question naturally follows: Is social disorganization similarly associated with crime in a prison setting? If so, the indicators of social disorganization discussed above—concentrated

disadvantage, racial segregation, and residential instability—would lead us to expect prison neighborhoods to be rife with crime and victimization. To determine whether this is the case, we can turn to decades of empirical research on violence in prisons. Prisons have long been demonstrated to be environments defined by the threat and reality of violence (Trammel, 2012). Johnson (1987, p. 75) summed it up succinctly when he explained that "the reality of violence [is a fact] of everyday life." While official statistics tell us that 28 out of every 1,000 inmates—just under three percent—have been physically assaulted by another inmate (Stephan & Karberg, 2003), unofficial estimates paint a far more vivid picture of violence. One recent self-report study revealed that approximately one in five prisoners has been the victim of physical violence while incarcerated—a figure that far exceeds the 2.8% reported by official figures (Wolff, Blitz, Shi, Siegel, & Bachman, 2007). In fact, self-report data on violent victimization in prison routinely provide estimates of inmate-on-inmate assault that are at least ten times higher than officially reported figures (Byrne & Hummer, 2007).

Taken together, the image of prisons as violent settings and the markers of social disorganization evident in prison "neighborhoods" suggest rudimentary empirical support for a social disorganization hypothesis in prison. In fact, this hypothesis is quite compatible with a leading explanation of inmate culture: the structural functionalist or deprivation perspective. According to structural functionalism, the distinctive inmate culture that arises in prison—complete with its acceptance of and reliance on violence—is attributable to characteristics of the prison environment. Facets of the institutional environment that have commonly been implicated in the development of inmate culture include the losses and deprivations of a life of confinement known as the "pains of imprisonment" (Sykes, 1958) and the constraints imposed by the prison regime (Goffman, 1961). The markers of social disorganization that we have considered here fall neatly under the rubric of institutional factors; concentrated disadvantage, ethnic heterogeneity,

and residential mobility are largely components of prisoners' lives *in prison*, rather than attributes that they bring into prison with them.

The structural functionalist perspective has resulted in a body of empirical research that describes prison culture in rich detail. We know, for instance, that inmate culture is organized around an informal code that demands strict opposition to prison staff, loyalty to other inmates, and a somewhat paradoxical distrust of prisoners and staff alike (Sykes & Messinger, 1960). This prison culture—including its uneasy relationship with trust—becomes pivotal as we move from social disorganization's focus on the association between structural conditions and crime, to a collective efficacy framework that emphasizes the underlying social mechanisms that explain this relationship.

Collective Efficacy, Transgender Prisoners and a Cultural Approach to Community

Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls' (1997) work on collective efficacy has examined the mediating role of social ties in the relationship between social disorganization and crime. Collective efficacy operationalizes these ties as the interplay between social cohesion (based on mutual trust among neighbors) and a shared commitment to intervention for the common good. When examined in a prison setting, the fraught nature of social ties among prisoners adds an interesting twist to the fabric of collective efficacy. The structural conditions of social disorganization are clearly evident in a prison setting, as is the key dependent variable, crime, but the degree to which a relationship between the two is mediated by disrupted social ties among prisoners remains to be seen. On the one hand, our knowledge of inmate culture paints a picture of solidarity against officers and expectations for mutual cooperation among inmates in this regard. On the other hand, the mandate to "trust no one" indicates a complicated and contingent quality of social ties among prisoners and a corresponding norm of nonintervention within the prisoner community. To determine the influence of these social ties—strained or otherwise—in

the social disorganization framework, we must first define and measure them in terms of collective efficacy.

One potential way to examine collective efficacy among prisoners—and to determine its mediating role in the relationship between social disorganization and crime—is to move beyond the spatial demarcation of prison "neighborhoods" to an identity- or commonality-based conceptualization of community. Recall from earlier in this essay that such an approach focuses not on geographic boundaries between housing units, but rather emphasizes communities bounded by commonality of identity and experience, regardless of physical location. In this way, all prisoners belong to the "prison community" no matter where they are housed, based on the overarching similarities in the inmate culture (Clemmer, 1940). By this same logic, discrete groups of prisoners can be part of smaller prison subcultures, corresponding to unique prisoner communities nested within the larger prison community. This cultural approach to community may be particularly conducive to an examination of collective efficacy because it relies on ties between community members rather than mere expectations for future interaction based on geographic proximity.

One particular population provides a unique opportunity to examine the existence of cultural communities within prison: transgender prisoners. Transgender prisoners are inmates whose gender identities or presentations do not fit neatly with their biological sex—for instance, biologically male inmates who identify as female and present themselves in feminine ways. Until very recently, transgender prisoners were what Tewksbury and Potter (2005) deemed a "forgotten group." In 2013, ABC News brought to light the story of one such "forgotten" prisoner: Kelly McAllister, a transgender woman with "fully developed breasts, long hair, and feminine features," who was housed in a cell with a male inmate in the Sacramento County Jail (Libaw, 2003, p. 1). Despite her female identity and feminine appearance, Kelly is biologically

male, and considered a male inmate by correctional staff. Like most transgender women who have run afoul of the law, Kelly was placed in a facility for male inmates—a decision that the Sacramento Sheriff's Department acknowledged put her at risk of victimization, and resulted in her placement in protective custody. Over the past few years, a number of highly visible transgender prisoners like Kelly have received increased attention from the media, correctional practitioners, policymakers, and researchers alike. National news outlets have run stories about transgender women in prisons for men who have lobbied—and at times sued—for hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery (e.g., Sweet, 2013); high-profile lawsuits in both federal and state courts have been brought forth by transgender prisoners alleging rampant sexual assault behind bars (*Farmer v. Brennan*, 1994*; Giraldo v. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation*, 2007); and recent empirical research has revealed the extent to which transgender prisoners are victimized in men's prisons (Jenness, Sexton, & Sumner, 2011).

This increased media, policy, and academic attention reveals that transgender prisoners like Kelly McAllister face a number of challenges: officials' disregard of their gender identity, denial of gender-specific medical care and garments (like bras), and heightened risk of victimization, to name a few. These experiences set transgender prisoners apart from the larger inmate population and bind them together as a discrete group. Recognizing the potential that these common experiences have for the development of community, Sexton and Jenness (2013) conducted a study to examine the presence, extent and nature of a sense of community among transgender inmates in California prisons for men. They assessed the degree to which transgender prisoners affiliated with two separate "communities" in prison: the transgender inmate community and the inmate community writ large. They utilized the concepts of collective identity—a individual's shared sense of commitment or connection to a broader community—

and collective efficacy to measure affiliation, cooperation, and a shared sense of agency among transgender prisoners.

Sexton and Jenness' findings revealed that transgender inmates expressed a sense of collective identity and collective efficacy with other transgender inmates as well as with the larger inmate population, regardless of their physical location within a given prison. This provides evidence for a cultural conceptualization of community, where similarly situated prisoners feel a connection that transcends the physical boundaries of individual prison "neighborhoods." Further, it demonstrates that collective efficacy—a concept based explicitly on group cohesion, trust and shared expectations of intervention on behalf of others—can exist within a prison culture organized around distrust and nonintervention. Although transgender inmates affiliated themselves with both the transgender inmate community and the larger inmate community, their sense of collective identity and perceived collective efficacy was stronger with other transgender inmates than with the inmate community as a whole. As one transgender inmate in their study explained, "The transgenders are all in one group. We get along. We're like community. We have to stick together in here" (Sexton & Jenness, 2013, p. 22). These findings demonstrate the importance of commonality of identity and experience in the configuration of communities, and have implications for the examination of violence and victimization among these communities.

Given a relatively high degree of collective efficacy among the transgender prisoner community, and collective efficacy's demonstrated attenuating effect on crime in neighborhoods, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that members of the transgender community might experience lower levels of victimization in prison. Anecdotal evidence from stories like Kelly McAllister's would suggest otherwise—a conclusion confirmed by empirical research. Although Sexton and Jenness (2013) did not directly examine the effect of transgender inmates' perceived

collective efficacy on violence, data collected from the same population of transgender prisoners reveals a picture of transgender inmates' heightened vulnerability to both physical and sexual victimization in prison. Jenness, Sexton and Sumner (2011) found that transgender prisoners' rate of sexual victimization exceeds that of male prisoners by a factor of 13, with 59% of transgender inmates reporting having experienced sexual assault while incarcerated. The prevalence of physical victimization was even higher among transgender inmates: 80% reported being a victim of physical assault while incarcerated—a rate that far exceeds statistics for male prisoners (Jenness, Maxson, Matsuda, & Sumner, 2007; Jenness, Sexton, & Sumner, 2011). Whether and to what extent these high levels of violence are related to indicators of social disorganization or collective efficacy is an empirical question that has not been directly tested, but high levels of collective efficacy among transgender inmates and strikingly high levels of victimization in this community suggest that there are other factors at play.

What might these other factors be? And perhaps more importantly for our discussion here, can they be considered under the rubric of social disorganization and collective efficacy—or do they detract from the applicability of the social disorganization framework to a carceral setting? The answer to this last question may lie in our dual conceptualization of community, which renders the dynamics of social disorganization and collective efficacy quite complex. Because communities can be understood as both spatially and culturally bounded, there exists the potential for these different forms of community to be quite at odds with one another. Transgender inmates comprise a distinctive community in terms of common identity and experience, but like Kelly McAllister, they are also frequently housed in prison "neighborhoods" with non-transgender inmates. Thus, the victimization experienced by transgender prisoners is not necessarily intra-community in the cultural sense. Instead, it is quite possible that transgender prisoners experience violence within their housing unit "neighborhood," despite the fact that this

violence is most often perpetrated by inmates outside the transgender inmate community (Jenness, Sexton, & Sumner, 2011). To better understand the driving force behind this intra-neighborhood, but inter-community, violence, perhaps a lesson can be taken from Grattet's (2009) work that combines social disorganization with a "defended neighborhoods" argument. According to this perspective, transgender prisoners—who are often visibly different from the larger inmate population—might be viewed as unwelcome others by non-transgender prisoners. Thus, despite higher levels of collective efficacy among the transgender prisoner community, cultural conflict between transgender prisoners and non-transgender prisoners within a prison "neighborhood" might yield higher levels of victimization for transgender prisoners. This indicates that, although collective efficacy may be higher among culturally-bounded communities in prison, spatially-bounded prison neighborhoods remain an important unit of analysis for measures of disorganization and crime.

Conclusion: Implications of Social Disorganization and Collective Efficacy in Prison

This essay has invited you to re-envision the concepts of social disorganization and collective efficacy by plucking them from the comfortable trappings of neighborhood analysis and transplanting them into a decidedly different context: the prison. Through a focus on multiple, overlapping communities, we have problematized the demarcation of communities based purely on physical boundaries, instead allowing for communities to be rooted in common experiences and identity. These shifts—from cities to prisons, and from neighborhoods to communities—have taken us away from the original tenets of social disorganization as envisioned by Shaw and McKay (1942), but have provided an opportunity to examine these dynamics in new and interesting, albeit complicated, ways. By interpreting social disorganization in the context of prison "neighborhoods," we glimpsed the relationship between characteristics of the prison environment and violence in prison in a new light. By reconceptualizing

community, we were able to examine more directly the dynamics of social cohesion and inter-group agency, and hypothesize their potential effect on violence. Through a discussion of transgender inmates' location at the intersection of culturally-based prison communities and physical prison "neighborhoods," we expanded the social disorganization and collective efficacy frameworks to allow for the possibility of multiple, overlapping communities within a single, spatially-defined neighborhood.

We have also seen that these innovations are not without complication. As research in the structural functionalist tradition has long demonstrated, prisons are "special places" (Bottoms & Sparks, 1997, p. 16) in terms of their structure, culture, and the context that they provide for concepts like social disorganization, collective efficacy, and even crime. The characteristics that distinguish prisons from the free world may prove influential to the ways in which dynamics of social disorganization and collective efficacy play out in a prison setting and the effect that they have on crime. For instance, the tension between informal and formal social control, and the oppositional nature of the two—both recurring themes throughout this essay—complicate the examination of social disorganization and collective efficacy. The existence of an oppositional inmate code suggests that social networks in prison have a powerful potential to serve negative or criminogenic functions, rather than positive or prosocial functions—potential that is heightened by the frequent use of violence as an informal social control mechanism among prisoners (Bottoms, 1999; Johnson 1987). This phenomenon is not without parallel in the neighborhoods literature, however. Sampson (2006) noted the potential for social networks in neighborhood settings to have negative or criminogenic effects, rather than protective effects against crime. In this way, the prison community can perhaps be likened to the oppositional subcultures in found in some "underclass" neighborhoods (Wilson, 1987), in which distinctive belief systems arise that endorse crime rather than proscribing it (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). In

fact, even the term “oppositional subculture” mirrors the “solidary opposition” to the prison regime that Sykes and Messinger (1960) found to characterize inmate culture. Once again, the existence of similarities such as these amidst a backdrop of stark difference, leads us to conclude that prisons, “special places” as they are, still have much in common with cities.

Despite the fraught nature of “community” in prison and the complex interplay of formal and informal social control that render the examination of social disorganization in a prison setting challenging, the pursuit is ultimately worthwhile. A rich history of empirical research in prisons has yielded a detailed body of knowledge about prison environments, the inmate culture that arises within them, and the pervasive atmosphere of violence that they create. A similarly venerable line of research on the social ecology of cities has shown us that social disorganization is a major force in understanding crime in the free world. Thus, transferring our knowledge of social disorganization to a prison setting is both logical and potentially fruitful. This essay is a first step toward the application of social disorganization and collective efficacy to a prison setting. It presents a selective review of the literature that examines components of social disorganization and collective efficacy in a piecemeal fashion, oftentimes in ways that were not originally foreseen by the researchers. But such a post-hoc analysis of social disorganization and collective efficacy in prisons can only take us so far. In order to fully understand the applicability and merit of examining social disorganization and collective efficacy in a prison setting, researchers must design studies that specifically examine these dynamics. Doing so would help to bridge disparate—but at the same time, quite complementary—literatures on communities, neighborhoods, prison culture, and prison management in a way that would benefit policymakers, correctional practitioners, prisoners, and anyone with a vested interest in understanding the dynamics of prisons and increasing safety within them.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. In this essay, Sexton makes a case for the study of social disorganization and collective efficacy in prisons. How could these frameworks be applicable to other settings that are equally far removed from cities? For instance, Goffman's notion of the "total institution" encompasses not just prisons, but also orphanages, convents, nursing homes, and mental hospitals. You might also consider settings that are not total institutions, like schools or workplaces. Could the study of social disorganization and collective efficacy have purchase in these settings as well? How so?

2. Sexton describes two different ways of examining social disorganization and collective efficacy in prison: spatially-defined neighborhoods and culturally-defined communities. How might we apply the cultural conception of community to a traditional urban setting? For instance, consider whether a street gang, a community of faith, or an immigrant community might be an interesting unit of analysis.

3. Despite their high levels of collective efficacy, transgender prisoners are at far greater risk for victimization than their non-transgender counterparts. Sexton suggests that this may be due to the overlap between the culturally-defined transgender community and the spatially-defined prison "neighborhoods" in which they live. What are some other possible explanations for this departure from the traditional protective function of collective efficacy? Are these explanations compatible with the examination of social disorganization and collective efficacy in prison, or do they call it into question?

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Section 4. Social Pathology, Degeneracy and Medicalization

Introduction

Tammy L. Anderson

> When held accountable, the so-called "compulsive" gambler may claim he has become "addicted." This means that he has immersed himself so deeply that quitting is hard to do. Yet, just as people struggle to give up many bad habits once these habits have cost them dearly, the "addicted" gambler can do the same (Samenow 2010: 1).

Do you agree with this statement by renowned psychiatrist Stanton E. Samenow? Is there such a thing as gambling addiction and, if so, is it a biologically-based form of mental illness or is it the result of bad habits and poor choices as Samenow claims? How would our responses to compulsive gambling differ if we viewed it as a medical disease versus a lifestyle choice? What would be the impact on gamblers?

Over time, our society has increasing viewed a growing number deviant behaviors and conditions as medical problems, which were formerly considered moral failings or lifestyle choices. Gambling is one of them. Today, we are constantly being told that problem or pathological gambling is a disease, rooted in some internal biological process and that it should be dealt with by some medical practitioner. This is what Samenow is commenting on above even though his psychiatrist colleagues are some of the most active advocates of “pathological gambling” as a medical condition. How and why does some behavior or condition shift from being viewed as a lifestyle choice made by an immoral person to a disease or illness afflicting him or her?

Section 4 includes four readings that discuss how deviant behaviors have been viewed, explained, and dealt with as biologically-based or medical conditions over the course of time. Readings by Lemert (1951) and Best (2006) discuss the rise and fall of degeneracy and social

pathology, which were the initial concepts sociologists used to explain deviance in medical terminology. The Conrad (2005) paper describes more contemporary efforts to "medicalize" deviance, or to describe gambling as an "addiction" and form of mental illness that should be treated, rather than stigmatized and punished. The connections essay in this section by Victor Perez uses mental illness, of which pathological gambling is one variety according to the DSM-V (Ferentzy and Turner, 2013), to trace the "circular thinking" between these divergent ideas over time. His essay shows how sociology has been involved in a so-called love/hate relationship with the field of medicine and psychiatry, agreeing and disagreeing with Samenow's position above, and abandoning the once favored concepts of degeneracy and social pathology for the more politically correct and scientifically-supported idea of medicalization and genetically-informed sociology.

By comparing these terms and profiling various forms of mental illness, we hope to get you thinking about how some behaviors and traits come to be defined as medical matters beyond individual control while others are considered the result of bad choices, poor morals or other social influences that people can regulate. Moreover, as more and more behaviors and conditions become medicalized in our society, how will you "see" and "treat" those having the conditions? How will you support them? Later in Section 12 of this book, we will discuss biomedical treatments for deviance and their availability in society. That section not only shows how the medicalization trend will become increasingly salient for the study of deviance in the future, but will challenge our principles of fairness and equality. Before proceeding, we'll quickly review this section's terms.

Degeneracy. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, sociologists and criminologists viewed non-normative and criminal behavior as the result of genetic inferiority that was passed on

through the family. As Perez notes in his connections essay, deviant behaviors like mental illness, were believed to be caused by biological defects that were inherited. As part of the eugenics movement at the time, theorists and policy-makers interpreted individual law-breakers as sub-human and advocated strict social control of them, including denying them the right to propagate and confining them in institutions. Over time, degeneracy theory was abandoned, as Perez details in his essay, and sociologists shifted to a social pathology framework to understand non-normative behavior.

The Lemert reading describes s***ocial pathology*** as a "sick society," one plagued by various social problems like crime, alcoholism, and mental illness, which could destabilize society if left unaddressed. Social pathology is an older concept rooted in French positivism, which considered conditions as absolute or objective facts. In this sense, then, social pathology is like functionalism (i.e., macro-level and more objectivist-oriented) discussed in Section 2 and different from symbolic interactionism and labeling theory, covered in Sections 5, 6, and 7. Social pathology was considered "scientific:" valued for adopting a statistical framework that would objectively describe deviance and abstain from individual moral judgments. This was critically important because, at the time, sociology sought increased recognition as a "science" to gain legitimacy and influence in society (Sutherland 1945).

Medicalization is a term coined in recent times and was first used in studies of deviance by Conrad and Schneider (1980). In its most general form, it refers to how human conditions and behaviors get transformed into medical disorders. Conrad (2005) calls it a process whereby problems are defined in medical terms, described using medical language, understood by adopting a medical framework, and treated with medical interventions. Conrad and Schneider (1980) first discussed the process toward the medicalization of deviance with mental illness.

Since then, many other types of deviant behavior or conditions, e.g., drug addiction, ADHD and pathological gambling, have also become medicalized in our society.

Consider the matter of gambling. Gambling was an illegal activity in the US until right after the Great Depression of the 1930s and during that time, it was considered sinful and a moral failing by corrupt individuals (Sallaz 2009). This included casino owners and operatives as well as the garden-variety gambler who spent the family's fortune and fell into other forms of deviance, e.g., alcoholism. Today, 48 states and the District of Columbia have at least one legal form of gambling and new forms of gambling (e.g., online poker and sports betting) are being actively legislated on by state and federal governments (American Gaming Association 2011). Yet pathological gambling – now a bona fide form of mental illness on the DSMIV and V—proliferates in our society, leading experts and policy-makers to classify it as a neurological disease or obsessive-compulsive disorder that inflicts sick people. Gambling in the US, therefore, illustrates the shift toward medicalizing deviance in the latter 20th and early 21st century. The medicalization trend, Conrad (2006) argues, is being used to explain and redefine more and more types of behaviors, traits and conditions deemed deviant by moral standards in the past.

To recap, degeneracy and social pathology considered deviance as a sort of illness that endangered society. Degeneracy blamed the problem on defective individuals who were biologically inferior, while social pathology only used the illness metaphor to describe chaos from a wide variety of social problems. Social pathology was, during its time, a way for sociologists to move past the fallout from degeneracy and the eugenics movement. It had potential to be a lasting sociological theory of deviance, but as Best (2006: 535) observes, sociologists abandoned the term instead:

> Imagine early sociologists developing metaphoric comparisons with medical pathology, theorizing about how social ailments might attack the components of a healthy society, and promoting the idea that sociology offered diagnostic tools to understand these processes and perhaps even suggest cures. Had they taken the concept seriously, perhaps they might have been able to construct a better theory of social pathology. But the discipline didn't take that path.

Today, the term social pathology has limited use in sociology and typically refers to the study of sociopaths and other psychiatric topics (Horwitz 1984).

The medicalization perspective dominates not only the sociological study of deviance today, but also our well-being more generally. On the surface, it may appear as though it has much in common with degeneracy from the past, but there are important differences. Returning to our example above, degeneracy theorists of the past and neurologists of the present might agree on the biological bases of "pathological gambling." So if we have gone full circle in understanding mental illness as a medical disease, as Perez contends, how will we view those with gambling problems? Which among those "afflicted" with this type of mental illness will be considered a threat to society and which will garner our empathy? For sure, degeneracy lent a cruel lens to the mentally ill, while medicalization attempts humanize them and drum up resources on their behalf. So, as our society increasingly relies on medicine to explain and address more and more behaviors, to what extent will our newfound benevolence land us in a "sick society?"

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Reading 14

Social Pathology

Chapter 1: Introduction

Edwin Lemert

Early Viewpoints on Social Problems

In the earlier history of sociology the basis for judging what constituted society's ills was candidly and uncritically moralistic. By this we mean that sociologists bothered little or not at all about the method by which they placed their ethical tags of "good" or "bad" on various social conditions or behaviors. They simply drew upon their own sense of the rightness of things or took their cue from social reformers of the time — usually the social workers (from whom they were not always distinguishable) — and condemned poverty, crime, prostitution, alcoholism, and related behavior as evils to be stamped out. Like General Custer's, their tactics were simple; they "rode to the sound of the guns."

Generally speaking, these late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century sociologists grouped together under the heading of "social pathology" those human actions which ran contrary to ideals of residential stability, property ownership, sobriety, thrift, habituation to work, small business enterprise, sexual discretion, family solidarity, neighborliness, and discipline of the will. In effect, social problems were considered to be any forms of behavior violating the mores from which these ideals were projected. The mores behind the ideals, for the most part, were those of rural, small-town, and middle-class America, translated into public policy through the rural domination of county boards of supervisors and state legislatures and through the reform activities of humanitarian social workers and Protestant religious federations. In this connection we note with special interest that many of the early writers on social pathology lived their more formative years in rural communities and small

towns; often, too, they had had theological training and experience, so that it was only natural that they should look upon many forms of behavior associated with urban life and industrial society as destructive of moral values they cherished as universally good and true.[1]

Although some few sociologists still adhere to this point of view in one form or another, there has grown up among many of them a scientific sophistication — even cynicism — about the reform movements which flourished around the turn of the present century. Many sociologists would now agree that reform movements often create more problems than they solve and that in such cases the "problem" turns out to be the reform action itself. It is likewise beginning to be plain to some of these sociologists that the sanctioned values of the culture have an important function in producing the behaviors which reform groups disapprove of and seek to eliminate. From the recognition of such facts has come the newer emphasis in the field of social pathology — the tendency to look upon problem-defining behavior as an integral part of the data to be studied as well as the objective conditions which strike reformers as being "problems."

TOWARD A SYSTEMATIC THEORY OF SOCIOPATHIC BEHAVIOR

It is our intention in this work to set up a systematic theory of sociopathic behavior. If this seems to be an ambitious project, we may say that it is done with an awareness that it is somewhat tangential to the strong empirical interests of many American sociologists and also that it is being done with an awareness of the difficulties to be met. The problem at hand is a special phase of the larger problem of conceptual integration which has occupied sociologists for many years. The latent danger of zealous pursuit of conceptual integration is that such industry will degenerate into system building alone, or into an exercise in abstraction with but indifferent attention to the possibilities of empirical demonstration of the theoretical system.

It is perhaps for this reason that the word "system" has collected barnaclelike many unfavorable connotations since the days when Comte, Spencer, Ward and Ross created their systematic sociologies.

In reacting against the grandiose system building of early sociologists later critics undoubtedly were correct in claiming that architectonic integration of all sociological knowledge is likely to lose in value because of its world-girdling inclusiveness. However, we should be careful not to follow the lead of those who would throw the baby out with the bath water by discarding theory in all forms in favor of pure empiricism. It is hard to see any valid objections to the creation of abbreviated conceptual systems which are data orientations within delimited fields of human behavior. Indeed, this seems to be the direction of much sociological development today.[2] Thought of in this way, theory is no less important than the gathering of facts and information. It can be urged strongly that empirical research is as much dependent upon sound theoretical work as theory is obviously dependent upon sound empirical research.

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A SYSTEMATIC THEORY

A systematic theory, as might be expected, is not constructed in a random or purely intuitive fashion. There are certain rules which serve as guides in taking up the task. Thus, while sociologists, in building a system of concepts, will keep one eye on the evidence behind them, they will have a strong preliminary interest in the epistemological qualities of their theory. They will ask certain questions having usefulness for research purposes. These questions are a way of setting up requirements or criteria for the critical evaluation of the theory and other theories from a methodological standpoint. Armed with these criteria, sociologists are able to make explicit the bases upon which their theoretical criticisms rest.

Communication between them becomes more precise, and their comparison of different theories in an objective manner is facilitated.[3]

Among the criteria of a systematic theory some may be thought of as absolute requirements, while others are merely desirable or recommended. We choose to list here only those criteria which are minimum requirements and to express them in terms of the particular study area with which we are concerned, *i.e.*, sociopathic behavior:[4]

1. The field of study, sociopathic behavior, must be strictly delimited.
2. The systematic conceptualization of the field should be derived from a limited number of postulates.
3. The conceptual system should be not only internally consistent but should also be consistent with and an integral part of a general theory of human behavior.
4. The concepts should be necessary and sufficient, *i.e.*, they should explain the bulk of the facts classified as "sociopathic."
5. The hypotheses must be the logical consequences of the postulates.
6. Concepts should be sufficiently detailed to explain the phenomena studied without the use of analogies. Processual analysis must be explicit.

MAKING USE OF THE CRITERIA

The criteria which we have enumerated can be drawn into our discussion in a number of different ways. However, we plan to use them primarily to raise a priori questions as to whether several nonsociological approaches, about which we have said nothing up to the present time, can be sanctioned as systematic theory for the study of sociopathic behavior. Following this, we shall state in contrast what we deem to be the indispensable features of a

sociological approach to the study of this field. As an immediate sequel to this it will be our job to set forth the propositions or postulates which have been evolved by us in the effort to meet the requirements for a systematic theory. Let us now turn to the first application of the criteria.

THE BIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF SOCIOPATHIC BEHAVIOR

While biologists have shown a lively interest in social pathology, we may question whether their conceptualizations can be dignified with the classification of "systematic theory." Mostly, the generalizations in the field of biology which pertain to pathological deviants, or to the "defective classes" as they tend to be called, are parenthetical observations found usually in chapters appended to treatises on human genetics, with only the odd book completely devoted to social biology. Biologists interested in social pathology, and those who defer to their opinions, believe that certain forms of socially disapproved behavior, like homosexuality, chronic alcoholism, or mental disorder, arise in one of the following ways: (1) through the inheritance of a gene or a gene combination (or its absence) which directly causes the behavior, (2) through the inheritance of an unspecified type of tendency to behave in these ways, or (3) through the inheritance of an unspecified type of constitutional weakness which produces the sociopathic behavior.

Apart from the general criticism that they are not presented in the form of systematic theory, biological concepts of social pathology fail to satisfy the first of our criteria in that the field of study is not strictly delimited. Thus such widely divergent anatomical and physiological facts as brachydactylism and diabetes insipidus are included along with socially and culturally defined phenomena such as crime and mental disease to be understood as expressions of genetic factors. Furthermore, the biological position on social pathology is

compromised by such explicit admissions that "Some forms of mental disease are inherited but others are not," or that "while some epileptics become psychotic others become geniuses." Consequently, the biological attempts at explanations of sociopathic behavior also fail to satisfy criterion number four, *i.e.*, that they should explain the bulk of the phenomena classified as "social pathology." It may be that a small percentage of cases of certain forms of sociopathic behavior is caused by the fact that the structural and physiological foundations of behavior have been congenitally destroyed, and for these select cases biological explanations become directly relevant. However, beyond these, biological factors are only indirectly important in explaining deviant behavior. To press direct explanations of sociopathic behavior within a biological frame of reference also violates criterion number six: the necessity of making clear the details of the process of effective causation. Thus, for example, where writers claim that mental disorder is hereditary, they provide no description of how the hereditary factors become elaborated into a demonstrable structure or function which produces the mental symptoms. The application of biological theories to the collective aspects of social pathology, such as organized or professional crime, results in an even grosser disregard for the details of causation.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF SOCIOPATHIC BEHAVIOR

Psychological and psychiatric viewpoints on social pathology more commonly take the form of systematic theory than is true of biological conceptions. They also go much farther in explaining the facts at hand, undeniably shedding much light upon the subjective dynamics of pathological human behavior. Consequently, they often supply us with necessary, although not always sufficient, concepts to account for many aspects of social pathology. In their

search for the key to why people transgress social norms, psychologists have variously stressed such things as general or abstract intelligence, personality traits, thought processes, motives, attitudes, and “vectors” of the mind. Psychiatrists have been somewhat less versatile in their explanations, mainly looking for emotional conflicts or “psychopathology” behind the misconduct of deviants.

The points at which many psychological and psychiatric theories reveal their inadequacies are in respect to criteria numbers four and six. The concepts they advance are seldom if ever sufficient to give us useful explanations of pathological behavior in its collective aspects and often they fail to make sense out of many actions of the individual deviant. To follow those psychologists who have conceived of such things as crime, prostitution, and drug addiction as cumulative or summated expressions of discrete, individual intelligence capacities, personality traits, thought precesses, or motives leaves us with too many significant questions about the pathologies unanswered. Likewise, to follow the lead of traditional psychiatric thought in these matters shunts us into intellectual by-passes. For example, imputing psychopathic mental processes to individuals in order to account for their criminal behavior is illuminating only in some few of the more unusual cases of crime. Such a procedure obviously ignores the commission of crime by persons who are in no way pathological mentally. Rare, indeed, is the person who at one time or another has not committed a felony. To ascribe this to mental pathology is to make the term lose its meaning, for most of us would have to be called “episodic psychopaths.”

The designation of crime as a psychopathic symptom obscures rather than clarifies how criminal activity becomes integrated into forms of social organization which are participated in by persons with a wide variety of personal motives and psychological orientations. Criminals may operate illegal gambling establishments, but their patrons include the respectable citizens of the community. Bankers operate banks for non-criminal use, but many

such bankers in the past have knowingly accepted deposits of money gained dishonestly by criminals. Lawyers, labor unions, insurance companies, and newspapers have been known to enter into collusion with criminals. Even presidents of the United States have appointed members of criminally corrupt political machines to high offices. Unless we wish to diagnose all their patrons or customers and those who cooperate economically or politically with criminals as psychopathic, we are driven to the conclusions that "reductionist" psychiatric theories of organized crime in terms of abnormal mental processes are insufficient. The same criticism is applicable to psychiatric theories applying to other forms of sociopathic deviation.

The failure of psychological and psychiatric schema to satisfy the sixth criterion for systematic theory can be traced back to the failure to meet our fourth requirement. The general tendency of men in these fields to think of cultural phenomena as aggregate manifestations of individual psychic factors leaves them with no detailed explanation of the collective or organized aspects of social pathology. Hence, they have often fallen back upon implicit or explicit analogies. Oddly enough, if logically pursued, these analogies take us back to a variety of group-mind concepts, which have been the object of vigorous criticism among the psychologists themselves. Society and social organization become like individuals in that what happens socially is taken as epiphenomena of the mind. The details of the process by which psychological factors lead to social pathology are ignored or they are assumed to be unnecessary. Even in the more dynamic psychological formulations where the concepts of "person field" and "social field" have been brought in to make room for collective factors, the relationship between the two is left unclear.

A Sociological Approach to the Study of Sociopathic Behavior

The early tendency to regard sociology as a synthetic discipline which combines items of biological, psychological, psychiatric, geographic, and demographic knowledge in order to explain human behavior has pretty well disappeared. Sociologists now hold to the notion that theirs is a separate field of study requiring concepts and generalizations which are unique to this field. Sociologists now generalize at "their own level" rather than trying to reduce their generalizations to the level of other fields. The only remnants of the synthetic tradition, if it can be called that, lie in a certain amount of confusion over how to reckon theoretically with non-sociological factors which have a marginal or indirect bearing upon human behavior.

Our own position on this matter is that the direct or significant factors of sociopathic behavior are sociological or sociopsychological in nature, expressible by such concepts as social structure, group, role, status, and symbolic interaction. To the extent that factors falling outside of those which are strictly sociological must be taken into consideration in analyzing pathological human behavior they must be related in a verifiable way to the sociological variables. Such factors as physical size and strength, biological anomalies, aggressiveness, hallucinations, monetary income, age, sex, and position in space can be applied in only a limited way to explain variation in social and cultural factors, which in turn are the chief interacting determiners of human behavior. Where variables such as the former must be taken into account, it must be shown how they affect social organization, role, status, social participation, self-definitions, and the other variables which we define as "sociological." The actual details of effective causation can be given at this last, a sociological or sociopsychological level. Starting with these assumptions as to the nature of the sociological approach and guided by the criteria of a systematic theory, we can now proceed to the series of propositions or postulates which are the elements of our theory of sociopathic behavior.

A General Statement of Our Theory

Stated in the most general way, our theory is one of social differentiation, deviation, and individuation. For a summary description we may turn to an excerpt from a paper by the present writer:[5]

We may pertinently ask at this juncture whether the time has not come to break abruptly with the traditions of older social pathologists and abandon once and for all the archaic and medicinal idea that human beings can be divided into normal and pathological, or, at least, if such a division must be made, to divest the term "pathological" of its moralistic unscientific overtones. As a step in this direction, the writer suggests that the concepts of social differentiation and individuation be rescued from the limbo of older textbooks on sociology, dusted off, and given scientific airing, perhaps being supplemented and given statistical meaning with the perfectly usable concept of deviation. There seems to be no cogent reason why the bulk of the data discussed in textbooks and courses on social pathology cannot be treated as a special phase of social and cultural differentiation and thus conveniently integrated with general sociological theory as taught in courses in introductory sociology. . . .

Because some method must be found to distinguish that portion of differentiation which can be designated as appropriately falling within the field of social pathology, the second necessary postulate is that there is a space-time limited societal awareness and reaction to deviation, ranging from strong approval through indifference to strong disapproval. Thus, by further definition, sociopathic phenomena simply become differentiated behavior which at a given time and place is socially disapproved even though the same behavior may be socially approved at other times and in other places.

To recapitulate, then, we start with the idea that persons and groups are differentiated in various ways, some of which result in social penalties, rejection, and segregation. These penalties and segregative reactions of society or the community are dynamic factors which

increase, decrease, and condition the form which the initial differentiation or deviation takes. This process of deviation and societal reaction, together with its structural or substantive products, can be studied both from its collective and its distributive aspects. In the first instance, we are concerned with sociopathic differentiation; and, in the second, our concern is with sociopathic individuation.

BREAKING DOWN THE THEORY INTO ITS POSTULATES

In order to give further precision to the above statement, it can be resolved into a series of postulates. These postulates are simple statements of fact for which the writer feels no obligation to supply proof. They differ from axioms, upon which mathematical and symbolic systems are constructed, in that they contain empirical elements. They are the building blocks for the theory of this treatise and *ipso facto* they must be accepted as points of departure for the analysis which follows. The question as to whether these postulates are the relevant ones or whether they are too few must await answer until after the theory has been tested. The postulates are as follows:[6]

1. There are modalities in human behavior and clusters of deviations from these modalities which can be identified and described for situations specified in time and space.
2. Behavioral deviations are a function of culture conflict which is expressed through social organization.
3. There are societal reactions to deviations ranging from strong approval through indifference to strong disapproval.
4. Sociopathic behavior is deviation which is *effectively* disapproved.
5. The deviant person is one whose role, status, function, and self-definition are

importantly shaped by how much deviation he engages in, by the degree of its social visibility, by the *particular* exposure he has to the societal reaction, and by the nature and strength of the societal reaction.

6. There are patterns of restriction and freedom in the social participation of deviants which are related directly to their status, role, and self-definitions. The biological strictures upon social participation of deviants are directly significant in comparatively few cases.

7. Deviants are individuated with respect to their vulnerability to the societal reaction because: *(a)* the person is a dynamic agent, *(b)* there is a structuring to each personality which acts as a set of limits within which the societal reaction operates.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have briefly described and criticized the general points of view of sociologists toward social pathology. We have enumerated criteria for a systematic theory of sociopathic behavior. Following these discussions we delimited the field of study and put down the postulates of our theory. In the next three chapters we shall attempt to develop this theory in greater detail. We shall take up in order, deviation, the societal reaction to deviation, and the process by which the deviant becomes individuated.

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1 Mills, C. W., "The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists," *American Journal of Sociology*, 49, September, 1943, pp. 165–180.

2 Merton, R., "Sociological Theory," *American journal of Sociology*, 50, May, 1945, pp. 462–473; also Merton's discussion of T. Parson's paper in the *American Sociological Review*, 13, April, 1948, pp. 165*f*.

3 Levine, S., and A. Dornblum, "The Implications of Science as a Logical System," *American Sociological Review*, 4, June, 1939, pp. 381–387; Stafford, A. B., and H. Phelps, "Criteria of a Systematic Sociology," *ibid.*, p. 388; Bain, Read, discussion of Leonard Cottrell's paper, "Situational Fields in Social Psychology," *ibid.*, 7, June, 1942, pp. 383–387.

4 The criteria are adapted from Bain, *op. cit.*

5 Lemert, Edwin M., "Some Aspects of a General Theory of Sociopathic Behavior,"

Proceedings of the Pacific Sociological Society, 1948, Research Studies, State College of Washington, 16, No. 1, pp. 24*f*.

6 While in general we found the social problems and the social disorganization viewpoints lacking in theoretical fulfillment, it is not our intention here to insist that all recent treatments of social pathology are without value and that "ours is the only theory." Several books on social pathology have presented fairly defensible theoretical positions. L. Guy Brown's *Social Pathology* is distinguished in the main for its internal consistency and interrelated framework of ideas, and for the integrity with which its central scheme is made the basis for each successive discussion of problem behavior. *Social Pathology*, by Stuart Queen and Jeannette Gruener, merits favorable comment for the simplicity and economy of its conceptual presentation, features which, as we have shown, are desirable in all theory. Whether their attempt to study social pathology exclusively in terms of social participation is an oversimplification remains to be seen. Certainly it is a necessary concept, as we shall try to show; but alone, at least as it has been used by others, it remains an incomplete formulation. Another position which deserves comment here because of its obvious bearing upon certain phases of our theory is the value-conflict conception of social problems. In this conception, chief emphasis is placed upon the clash of ideals, opinions, judgments, and meanings as the source of social problems. In our estimation this is a special variety of culture-conflict theory, and we freely recognize its importance in studying deviation. However, the value-conflict theory remains a highly generalized statement which fails to make a sharp delimitation of the field. For example, it does not tell us how much or what kind of conflict is necessary in order to have a social problem. No distinction is struck between effective value-conflicts and those which are purely spurious and have little or no effect upon the organization and interaction of groups and participating individuals. Furthermore, it makes no allowance for cultural

inconsistencies or contradictory value systems within the same culture which are reciprocals or necessary derivatives of each other. For statements of the value-conflict view see Waller, W., “Social Problems and the Mores,” *American Sociological Review*, 1, December, 1936, pp. 922–933; Fuller, R., and R. Myers, “Some Aspects of a Theory of Social Problems,” *ibid.*, 6, February, 1941, pp. 24–32; Cuber, J., and R. Harper, *Problems of American Society*, 1948.

Reading 15

Whatever Happened to Social Pathology? Conceptual Fashions and the Sociology of Deviance

Joel Best

WHAT HAPPENED TO SOCIAL PATHOLOGY

The term "social pathology" was on its way out by the end of the Second World War. C. Wright Mills (1943) published his critique, "The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists" in 1943. Two years later, Edwin H. Sutherland wrote:

> The term "social pathology" refers to an area of knowledge which is designated also by the terms "social disorganization," "social problems," "applied sociology," "practical sociology," and "social technology." Although these terms have variations in shades of meaning, they are commonly used as synonyms. . . . The terms "social disorganization" and "social problems" seem to be supplanting the others. (1945, p. 429)

In its heyday the term "social pathology" suggested prestigious scientific and medical connotations; just as pathologists studied the diseases that damaged people's bodies, so might sociologists examine the pathologies inflicting the body social. Social pathology became a popular course title during the early twentieth century and several textbooks shared the title (e.g., Queen and Mann 1925; Smith 1911). However, another term soon emerged as a rival. As early as the 1920s, many courses were using the more modern label "social problems"; although, Queen and Mann's *Social Pathology* remained the leading text in those courses

(Reinhardt 1929) and a few textbook authors continued to use the older title until Lemert published his book in 1951.

Why did sociologists stop using the term? Many concepts display a standard trajectory of usage: they are introduced, are adopted by a growing number of people until usage peaks, and then they gradually fall out of favor. These are fads or fashions in the use of particular concepts (Peng 1994; Placier 1996). For example, sociologists' usage of the concept "folkway" appears to have peaked in the 1940s (Best and Schweingruber 2003).

But why does the use of concepts decline in this way? In part, they lose their fashionable aura and begin to seem antiquated, as some newer term (say, social problem or deviance) begins to gain favor and pushes the older term (social pathology) aside. The process is abetted to the degree that the older concept's usefulness has fallen into doubt. And social pathology had accumulated plenty of doubters. Mills (1943, p. 166) criticized social pathology textbooks: "The level of abstraction which characterizes these texts is so low that often they seem to be empirically confused for lack of abstraction to knit them together." Similarly, Sutherland (1945, pp. 430–431) noted: "One of the persistent and perplexing problems has been the definition of social pathology. . . . At the turn of the century the meaning of pathology was assumed to be obvious. . . ." However, he continued, sociologists increasingly recognized that people tended to disagree about what was pathological and why: "Because of the absolutistic connotations of the term 'pathology,' it is not an appropriate designation for these relativistic phenomena, and on that account it is being supplanted by other terms, such as 'social disorganization"' (Sutherland 1945, p. 431).

In other words, the real problem that bedeviled social pathology—and that has plagued its conceptual cousins, including social problems, social disorganization, and (as we shall see) deviance—is that its proponents could not agree on a workable way to define the concept. On the one hand, the term implied that it referred to an objectively definable set of social

conditions—those phenomena that could be recognized as diseases of society. Yet, on the other hand, the identification of social pathologies proved to be highly subjective, dependent upon the interests of those members of society who identified some conditions as pathological and upon the prejudices and presumptions of the authors who selected topics for inclusion in their texts (Mills 1943).

This confusion meant that the concept of social pathology had little analytic utility. It may have been a popular title for courses and textbooks, but it was not a concept that sociologists actually used—partly because they couldn't agree on its meaning and partly because they never saw it as a base upon which they might develop a theoretical approach. We might now view this as a lost opportunity. Imagine early sociologists developing metaphoric comparisons with medical pathology, theorizing about how social ailments might attack the components of a healthy society, and promoting the idea that sociology offered diagnostic tools to understand these processes and perhaps even suggest cures. Had they taken the concept seriously, perhaps they might have been able to construct a better theory of social pathology. But the discipline didn't take that path; social pathology remained just a term, not a serious concept within an elaborated theory. And there were rival terms, less beset by critics. In the competition for sociologists' favor, social pathology had little to recommend it, and it gradually fell out of style.

WHAT'S HAPPENED TO DEVIANCE

Which brings us to the recent debate regarding the vitality of the concept of deviance. A variety of critics have pronounced deviance "dead;" although, they cannot agree on whether its demise was due to (a) the failure of sociologists of deviance to embrace a radical sociological agenda (Sumner 1994), or (b) those sociologists of deviance having fallen into

the grip of a radical sociological agenda (Hendershott 2002). These claims have been most vigorously challenged by sociologists who happen to produce well-regarded deviance textbooks, and who insist that courses in deviance continue to draw big enrollments and that society is filled with examples of deviance for sociologists to study (Adler and Adler 2006; Goode 2003).

My own view (Best 2004a, 2004b) is that the concept of deviance—like its predecessors social pathology and social problems—poses awkward definitional problems that have never been successfully resolved. Basically, sociologists have tried to define deviance according to three distinct principles:

1. Statistics: Here, sociologists argue that deviance can be defined as outliers from common patterns of behavior. The once-popular term "deviation" had this statistical connotation and it is worth remembering that Lemert's (1951, p. 22) first postulate begins: "There are modalities in human behavior and clusters of deviations from these modalities. . . ." This approach to defining deviance quickly fell out of favor; although, it occasionally resurfaces in discussions of "positive deviance" when analysts argue that deviance may be found at both ends of some normal distribution (e.g., if we regard those of very low intelligence as deviant, then we should also define as deviant those of very high intelligence).
2. Morality: Far more common are efforts to define deviance as normative violations. But which norms? It seems to depend, and the variety of answers reveals the weaknesses of defining deviance this way. Some analysts presume that the key norms are those social control agents uphold (i.e., deviants are people whose normative violations risk serious sanctions); others seem to favor a broader definition of what counts as a normative violation. Still other analysts are willing to designate those norms that they believe ought

to be upheld and to declare as deviant “the robbery of the corporate world” (Liazos 1972, p. 107) or assisted suicide (Hendershott 2002).

3. Societal Reaction: The labeling theorists thought they could circumvent these problems by focusing on the creation or construction of categories of deviance and upon the application of those categories to individuals. In fact, this approach seemed—at least for a time—to be workable: a substantial body of research sought to explore and extend the labeling approach. This definition inspired, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, a far more articulated view of deviance than had previously developed for either social pathology or social problems. The sociology of deviance flourished as a fashionable, highly visible area for research.

TOWARD A NATURAL HISTORY OF CONCEPTUAL FASHION

Clearly, social life has a lot of features that attract attention because people view them as troublesome. There is no reason to imagine that humans will soon attain some utopian plane where no one will be bothered by any aspects of social life. These troubling conditions raise interesting, albeit obvious questions: What causes that? Why do people do those things? What should we do it about it? It is no surprise that sociologists—eager to interest other people, to demonstrate the importance of their enterprise—want to study and teach about these topics. These are subjects that promise sociologists a steady supply of topics that will strike others as interesting and important.

Most obviously, we can choose to study some topic that bothers people under the particular name those people use. Some of those native terms are very old (rape); some are newer and may not last (road rage). Alternatively, we can group a set of troubling conditions under some heading, such as “social pathology,” “social problems,” or “deviance.”

Traditionally, these headings have really been categorical conveniences: instructors devise some list of troubling conditions that are attracting contemporary attention and then devote each week's lectures to reviewing sociological studies about rape or road rage or whatever (just as textbook authors use the same approach to organizing their chapters).

The problem arises when sociologists try to insist that the currently fashionable category name for troubling conditions is a genuine concept which offers theoretical leverage by allowing us to devise broader, more powerful theories. There are basically two ways to attempt this. The first—which seems so intuitively obvious—is to argue that the troubling conditions encompassed within the current category name are the same sort of *condition*—that is, these are all phenomena that somehow interfere with society's operations, or they are all violations of social norms. These condition-based definitions tend to work well enough during the introductory lecture in an undergraduate course. If one begins by declaring that this is what we mean by social pathology/social problems/deviance and then promptly turns to discussing the various troubling conditions one at a time, it will probably never be necessary to refer back to that original definition.

The problem, of course, is that anyone who sits back and considers that definition of conditions soon becomes dissatisfied. The numerous exceptions call the definition's value into question: one can always point to phenomena that seem to fit the definition yet never get mentioned as instances of the category; people may also disagree about whether particular instances that are conventionally included within the category really fit the definition and belong in the category. Moreover, because the category encompasses a diverse set of phenomena, it isn't clear how to actually use the concept of social pathology/social problems/deviance to develop any sort of general theory. There turn out to be few theories using condition-based definitions of social pathology/social problems/deviance and few efforts to do research guided by those concepts.

The second approach to turning a category name for troubling conditions into a useful concept is to focus on the conditions' *troubling* qualities. Although recommended by critics of condition-based definitions throughout the twentieth century, these efforts have only gained traction twice: first, with the emergence of the labeling approach to deviance; and then, somewhat later, with the rise of the constructionist stance toward social problems. Neither developed as a genuinely elaborated theory, but both served a sensitizing orientation that inspired large bodies of both empirical research and inductive theorizing. If we look for works that actually try to use the concepts of deviance or social problems, we will discover that most come out of the labeling and constructionist traditions, respectively.

We have already examined the fate of labeling. It drew a lot of attention—and a lot of critics whose attacks had the effect of once more calling the definition of deviance into question and, thereby, discouraging further use of the concept, so that it undoubtedly contributed to the pattern of decline. Thus far, the social constructionist approach to social problems hasn't suffered the same fate, but we may suspect this is because so few sociologists actually try to use the concept of "social problems" that constructionists have no real rivals.

Thus, we can see a sort of natural history: sociologists want to teach about the troubling conditions of the day; they devise some rubric under which to group together the issues which they want to address; they offer some definition—either a condition-based definition that proves to be useless in guiding further research, or a troubling-based definition that inspires researchers, at least until it attracts critics. Those critics, of course, worry that a focus on the processes that lead to a condition being defined as troubling is too narrow, that it cannot address important issues (e.g., What are the conditions' causes? How can the conditions be eradicated?). This critique is true—focusing on those processes doesn't help

address those questions. But, of course, the critics don't really have an alternative definition that can be used to guide analyses.

And this leads to the final stage in the natural history. People begin to doubt that that old, established category name is all that useful. The debates over its definition keep circling the same conceptual bushes and the name begins to sound a little dated. Maybe the solution lies in junking the old term and devising some shiny new term to encompass the study of troubling conditions. Thus, we can understand the final demise of social pathology more than fifty years ago, as well as the recent sniping about the death of deviance.

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Reading 16

The Shifting Engines of Medicalization

Peter Conrad

Social scientists and other analysts have written about medicalization since at least the 1970s. While early critics of medicalization focused on psychiatry (Szasz 1970) or a more general notion of medical imperialism (Illich 1975), sociologists began to examine the processes of medicalization and the expanding realm of medicine (Freidson 1970; Zola 1972). As sociological studies on medicalization accumulated (see Conrad 1992, 2000) it became clear that medicalization went far beyond psychiatry and was not always the product of medical imperialism, but of more complex social forces. *The essence of medicalization became the definitional issue: defining a problem in medical terms, usually as an illness or disorder, or using a medical intervention to treat it.* While the medicalization process could be bidirectional and partial rather than complete, there is strong evidence for expansion rather than contraction of medical jurisdiction.

RISE OF MEDICALIZATION

Most of the early sociological studies took a social constructionist tack in investigating the rise of medicalization. The focus was on the creation (or construction) of new medical categories with the subsequent expansion of medical jurisdiction. Concepts such as moral entrepreneurs, professional dominance, and claims-making were central to the analytical discourse. Studies of the medicalization of hyperactivity, child abuse, menopause, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and alcoholism, among others, broadened our understanding of the range of medicalization and the attendant social processes (see Conrad

1992).

If one conducted a meta-analysis of the studies from the 1970s and 1980s several social factors would predominate. At the risk of oversimplification, I suggest that three factors underlie most of those analyses. First, there was the power and authority of the medical profession, whether in terms of professional dominance, physician entrepreneurs, or, in its extremes, medical colonization. Here, the cultural or professional influence of medical authority is critical. One way or another, the medical profession and the expansion of medical jurisdiction was a prime mover for medicalization. This was true for hyperactivity, menopause, child abuse, and childbirth, among others. Second, medicalization sometimes occurred through the activities of social movements and interest groups. In these cases, organized efforts were made to champion a medical definition for a problem or to promote the veracity of a medical diagnosis. The classic example here is alcoholism, with both Alcoholics Anonymous and the "alcoholism movement" central to medicalization (with physicians reluctant, resistant, or irresolute). But social movements were also critical in the medicalization of PTSD (Scott 1990) and Alzheimer's disease (Fox 1989). Some efforts were less successful, as in the case of multiple chemical sensitivity disorder (Kroll-Smith and Floyd 1997). In general, these were organized grassroots efforts that promoted medicalization. Third, there were directed organizational or inter or intra professional activities that promulgated medicalization, as was the case with obstetricians and the demise of midwives (Wertz and Wertz 1989) or the rise of behavioral pediatrics in the wake of medical control of childhood diseases (Pawluch 1983; Halpern 1990).

To be sure, there were other contributing factors that were implicated in the analyses. Pharmaceutical innovations and marketing played a role with Ritalin and hormone replacement therapy (HRT) in the medicalization of hyperactivity and menopause. Third-party payers were factors in the medicalization in terms of whether insurance would pay for

surgery for “gender dysphoria,” obesity, or detoxification and medical treatment for alcoholism. However, it is significant that in virtually all studies where they were considered, the corporate aspects of medicalization were deemed secondary to professionals, movements, or other claims-makers. By and large, the pharmaceutical and insurance industries were not central to the analyses.

CHANGES IN MEDICINE

By the 1980s we began to see some profound changes in the organization of medicine that have had important consequences for health matters. There was an erosion of medical authority (Starr 1982), health policy shifted from concerns of access to cost control, and managed care became central. As Donald Light (1993) has pointed out, countervailing powers among buyers, providers, and payers changed the balance of influence among professions and other social institutions. Managed care, attempts at cost controls, and corporatized medicine changed the organization of medical care. The “golden age of doctoring” (McKinlay and Marceau 2002) ended and an increasingly buyer driven system was emerging. Physicians certainly maintained some aspects of their dominance and sovereignty, but other players were becoming important as well. Large numbers of patients began to act more like consumers, both in choosing health insurance policies and in seeking out medical services (Inlander 1998). Managed care organizations, the pharmaceutical industry, and some kinds of physicians (e.g., cosmetic surgeons) increasingly saw patients as consumers or potential markets.

In addition to these organizational changes, new or developed arenas of medical knowledge were becoming dominant. The long-influential pharmaceutical companies comprise America’s most profitable industry and became more so with revolutionary new

drugs that would expand their influence (Public Citizen 2003). By the 1990s the Human Genome project, the $3 billion venture to map the entire human genome, was launched, with a draft completed in 2000. Genetics has become a cutting edge of medical knowledge and has moved to the center of medical and public discourse about illness and health (Conrad 1999). The biotechnology industry has had starts and stops, but it promises a genomic, pharmaceutical, and technological future that may revolutionize health care (see Fukuyama 2002).

Some of these changes have already been manifested in medicine, perhaps most clearly in psychiatry where the cutting edge of knowledge has moved in three decades from psychotherapy and family interaction to psychopharmacology, neuroscience, and genomics. This is reinforced when third-party payers will pay for drug treatments but severely limit individual and group therapies. The choice available to many doctors and patient-consumers is not whether to have talking or pharmaceutical therapy but rather which brand of drug should be prescribed.

Thus, by the 1990s these enormous changes in the organization of health care, medical knowledge, and marketing had created a different world of medicine. How have these changes affected medicalization?

In a recent paper, Adele Clarke and her colleagues (2003) argue that medicalization is intensifying and being transformed. They suggest that around 1985 “dramatic changes in both the organization and practices of contemporary biomedicine, implemented largely through the integration of technoscientific innovations” (p. 161) coalesced as an expanded phenomena they call biomedicalization. By biomedicalization they mean “the increasingly complex, multisited, multidirectional processes of medicalization that today are being reconstituted through the emergent social forms and practices of a highly and increasingly technoscientific biomedicine” (Clarke et al. 2003:162). Clarke et al. paint with a very broad brush and create a

concept that attempts to be so comprehensive and inclusive—incorporating virtually all of biotechnology, medical informatics and information technology, changes in health services, the production of technoscientific identities, to name just a few—that the focus on medicalization is lost. This new conception, in my judgment, loses focus on the definitional issues, which have always been a key to medicalization studies.[1]

Along with Clarke et al. (2003), I see some major changes in medicalization in the past two decades (cf. Gallagher and Sionean 2004). I see shifts, where they see transformations. I see medicalization as expanding and, to a degree, changing, but not morphing into a qualitatively different phenomena. My task remains narrower and more focused on the medicalization process.

EMERGENT ENGINES OF MEDICALIZATION

In the reminder of this article, I want to examine how three major changes in medical knowledge and organization have engendered a shift in the engines that drive medicalization in Western societies: biotechnology, consumers, and managed care.

Biotechnology

Various forms of biotechnology have long been associated with medicalization. Whether it be technology such as forceps for childbirth (Wertz and Wertz 1989) or drugs for distractible children (Conrad 1975), technology has often facilitated medicalization. These drugs or technologies were not the driving force in the medicalization process; facilitating, yes, but not primary. But this is changing. The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries are becoming major players in medicalization.

Pharmaceutical industry. The pharmaceutical industry has long been involved in promoting its products for various ills. In our 1980 book *Deviance and Medicalization* (Conrad and Schneider [1980] 1992) the examples of Ritalin, Methadone, and psychoactive medications were all a piece of the medicalization process. However, in each of these cases it was physicians and other professionals that were in the forefront. With Ritalin there were drug adevertisements promoting the treatment of "hyperactivity" in children and no doubt "detailing" to doctors (e.g., drug company representative's sales visits to doctor's offices). But it was the physicians who were at the center of the issue.

This has changed. While physicians are still the gatekeepers for many drugs, the pharmaceutical companies have become a major player in medicalization. In the post-Prozac world, the pharmaceutical industry has been more aggressively promoting their wares to physicians and especially to the public. Some of this is not new. For most of the twentieth century the industry has been limited to promoting its wares to physicians through detailing, sponsoring medical events, and advertising in professional journals. However, since the passage of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Modernization Act of 1997 and subsequent directives, the situation has changed.

Revisions in FDA regulations allowed for a wider usage and promotion of off-label uses of drugs and facilitated direct-to-consumer advertising, especially on television. This has changed the game for the pharmaceutical industry; they can now advertise directly to the public and create markets for their products. Overall, pharmaceutical industry spending on television advertising increased six-fold between 1996 and 2000, to $2.5 billion (Rosenthal et al. 2002), and it has been rising steadily since. Drug companies now spend nearly as much on direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising as in advertising to physicians in medical journals, especially for "blockbuster drugs that are prescribed for common complaints such as allergy, heart burn, arthritis, 'erectile dysfuction,' depression and anxiety" (Relman and Angell

2002:36). The brief examples of Paxil and Viagra can illustrate this, but there are many others (see Conrad and Leiter 2004).

Male impotence has been a medical problem for many years. In March 1998, the FDA approved Viagra (sildenafil citrate) as a treatment for erectile dysfunction (ED). When introduced, Viagra was intended primarily for the use of older men with erectile problems or ED associated with diabetes, prostate cancer, or other medical problems (Loe 2001). A demand for a drug for erectile problems surely existed before Pfizer began advertising Viagra. However, it was Pfizer who tapped into this potentially large market and shaped it by promoting sexual difficulties as a medical problem and Viagra as the solution. The initial Viagra promotion was modest (Carpiano 2001), but Pfizer soon marketed very aggressively to both physicians and the general public. At first it was with Bob Dole as a spokesman for elders, but soon it was with baseball star Rafeal Palmeiro and the sponsorship of a Viagra car on the NASCAR circuit, expanding the audience and the market for the drug. Virtually any man might consider himself to have some type of erectile or sexual dysfunction. “Ask your doctor if Viagra is right for you,” the advertisements suggest.

Viagra sales were sensational. In the first year alone, over three million men were treated with Viagra, translating into $1.5 billion in sales (Carpiano 2001). In 2000, Viagra was ranked sixth in terms of DTC spending and sales. By 2003 Viagra reached $1.7 billion in sales and was taken by six million men, which may not include all those who purchased it from Internet sites. By 2003, Levitra and Cialis were introduced as improvements and competitors for a share of this large market. The drug industry has expanded the notion of ED and has even subtly encouraged the use of Viagra-Iike drugs as an enhancement to sexual pleasure and relationships. Recent estimates suggest a potential market of more than 30 million men in the United States alone (Tuller 2004). The medicalization of ED and sexual performance has significantly increased in the past six years and shows no signs of abating.

When Prozac was introduced in 1987, it was the first wave of new antidepressants called selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). SSRIs had the same or better efficacy than older antidepressants, with fewer disturbing adverse effects. These drugs caused a bit of a revolution in the pharmaceutical market (Healy 1998), and with $10.9 billion in sales in 2003 have become the third best selling class of drugs in the United States (IMS Health 2004). When Paxil (paroxetine HCl) was approved by the FDA in 1996 it joined a very crowded market for antidepressants. The manufacturer of Paxil, now called GlaxoSmithKline, sought FDA approval to promote their product for the "anxiety market," especially Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) and Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD). SAD and GAD were rather obscure diagnoses in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM):* SAD (or "Social Phobia") is a persistent and extreme "fear of social and performance situations where embarrassment may occur," and GAD involves chronic, excessive anxiety and worry (lasting at least six months), involving multiple symptoms (American Psychiatric Association 1994:411, 435−36).

Marketing diseases, and then selling drugs to treat those diseases, is now common in the "post-Prozac" era. Since the FDA approved the use of Paxil for SAD in 1999 and GAD in 2001, GlaxoSmithKline has spent millions to raise the public visibility of SAD and GAD through sophisticated marketing campaigns. The advertisements mixed expert and patient voices, providing professional viability to the diagnoses and creating a perception that it could happen to anyone (Koerner 2002). The tag line was, "Imagine Being Allergic to People." A later series of advertisements featured the ability of Paxil to help SAD sufferers brave dinner parties and public speaking occasions (Koerner 2002). Paxil Internet sites offer consumers self-tests to assess the likelihood they have SAD and GAD (www.paxil.com). The campaign successfully defined these diagnostic categories as both common and abnormal, thus needing treatment. Prevalence estimates vary widely, from 3 to 13 percent of the

population, large enough to be a very profitable pharmaceutical market. The marketing campaign for Paxil has been extremely successful. Paxil is one of the three most widely recognized drugs, after Viagra and Claritin (Marino 2002), and is currently ranked the number six prescription drug, with 2001 U.S. sales approximately $2.1 billion and global sales of $2.7 billion. How much Paxil was prescribed for GAD or SAD is impossible to discern, but by now both Paxil and SAD are everyday terms. While there have been some concerns raised about Paxil recently (Marshall 2004), it is clear that GlaxoSmithKline's campaign for Paxil increased the medicalization of anxiety, inferring that shyness and worrying may be medical problems, with Paxil as the proper treatment.

Children's problems constitute a growing market for psychotropic drugs. Ritalin for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) has a long history (Conrad 1975) but perhaps now can be seen as a pioneer drug for children's behavior problems. While the public may be ambivalent about using drugs for troubled children (McLeod et al. 2004), a wide array of psychotropic drugs are now prescribed for children, especially stimulants and antidepressants (Olfson et al. 2002). Whatever the benefits or risks, this has become big business for the drug industry. According to a recent survey, spending on behavior drugs for children and adolescents rose 77 percent from 2000 through 2003. These drugs are now the fastest growing type of medication taken by children, eclipsing antibiotics and asthma treatments (Freudenheim 2004).

At the other end of the life spectrum, it is likely that the $400 billion Medicare drug benefit, despite its limits, may increase pharmaceutical treatments for a range of elder problems as well. This policy shift in benefits is likely to encourage pharmaceutical companies to expand their markets by promoting more drug solutions for elders.

Genetics and enhancement. We are at the dawn of the age of genomic medicine. While there has been a great investment in the Human Genome Project and a celebration when the

draft of the human genome was completed in 2000, most of genetic medicine remains on the level of potential rather than current practice. For example, we have known about the specific genes for cystic fibrosis and Huntington's disease for a decade, but these have yet to translate into improvements in treatment. Thus far, genetics has made its impact mostly in terms of the ability to test for gene mutations, carriers, or genetic anomalies. Despite the publicity given to genetic studies (Conrad 1997), we have learned that only a few disorders and traits are linked to a single gene, and that genetic complexity (several genes operating together, gene-environment interactions) is the rule (Conrad 1999). But I have little doubt that genomics will become increasingly important in the future and impact medicalization.

Although the genetic impact on medicalization still lies in the realm of potential, one can imagine when some of the genetic contributors to problems such as obesity and baldness are identified, genetic tests and eventually treatments will soon follow. Obesity is an increasing problem in our society and has become more medicalized recently in a number of ways, from a spate of epidemiological studies showing the increase in obesity and body fat among Americans to the huge rise in intestinal bypass operations. Today physicians prescribe the Atkins or South Beach diet and exercise; it is possible in the future that there could be medical interventions in the genes (assuming they can be identified) that recognizes satiation. Gene therapy has not yet succeeded for many problems, but one could imagine the rush to genetic doctors if there were a way to manipulate genes to control one's weight. We know that baldness often has a genetic basis, and with Rogaine and hair transplants it has already begun to be medicalized. However, with some kind of medical genetic intervention that either stops baldness or regenerates hair, one could see baldness move directly into the medical sphere, perhaps as a genetic "hair growth disorder."

A large area for growth in genetics and medicalization will be what we call biomedical enhancement (Conrad and Potter 2004; Rothman and Rothman 2003; Elliott 2003). Again,

this is still in the realm of potential, but the potential is real. There is a great demand for enhancements, be they for children, our bodies, or our mental and social abilities. Medical enhancements are a growing form of these. One could imagine the potential of genetic enhancements in body characteristics such as height, musculature, shape, or color; in abilities such as memory, eyesight, hearing, and strength; or in talents (e.g., perfect pitch for music) and performance. Enhancements could become a huge market in a society where individuals often seek an edge or a leg up. While many genetic improvements may remain in the realm of science fiction, there are sufficient monetary incentives for biotechnology companies to invest in pursuing genetic enhancements.

The potential market for genetic enhancements is enormous. To get a sense of the possible impact, I recently examined human growth hormone as an existing biomedical enhancement (Conrad and Potter 2004). Synthetic human growth hormone (hGH) became available in 1985, and it was approved for some very limited purposes, including growth hormone deficiency (a rare hormonal disorder). Shortness can be devalued and engender social problems for individuals. There is evidence that shorter people earn less money, get fewer promotions, can be stigmatized, and can have problems with such mundane tasks as finding proper fitting adult clothes (Conrad and Potter 2004; Rothman and Rothman 2003). Parents often have concerns that their children will be too short and now have the option of going to physicians for growth hormone treatments. Genentech, manufacturer of Protropin, a brand of hGH, encouraged “off-label” uses of hGH for children who were extremely short but had no growth hormone deficiency. In a real sense these children with idiopathic short stature (ISS) can be called “normal” shorts; they are just short, from short parents or genetic makeup. Although hGH therapy can be very expensive ($20,000 a year for perhaps five years) and yield only moderate results (2−3 inches), in 1994 13,000 children with ISS were treated in the United States. These numbers are undoubtedly greater now, since the FDA

recently approved an Eli Lilly growth hormone, Humatrope, for use for short statured children in the lowest 1.2 percent of the population. There are several lessons for biomedical enhancement here. First, a private market for enhancements for children, even involving significant expense, exists and can be tapped by biotechnology companies. Second, biotechnology companies, like pharmaceutical companies, will work to increase the size of their markets. Third, the promotion and use of biomedical enhancements will increase medicalization of human problems, in this case short stature. Imagine if genetic interventions to increase a child's height were available.

We do not yet have biotechnology companies promoting genetic enhancements, but we will. Biotech companies are already poised to use DTC advertising to promote genetic tests. They will employ many of the same marketing strategies as the pharmaceutical companies, which is no surprise, since many of them are the same or linked. The promotion of genetic tests may also contribute to medicalization. A positive finding on a genetic test—that one has a gene for a particular problem (cancer, alcoholism)—may create a new medicalized status, that of "potentially ill." This can have an impact on one's identity, social status, and insurability, and it may create new categories of pre-cancer, pre-alcoholism, or similar labels. This could expand medical surveillance (Armstrong 1995) and the medical gaze.

Consumers

In our changing medical system, consumers of health care have become major players. As health care becomes more commodified and subject to market forces, medical care has become more like other products and services. We now are consumers in choosing health insurance plans, purchasing health care in the market-place, and selecting institutions of care. Hospitals and health care institutions now compete for patients as consumers.

I will briefly cite several examples about how consumers have become a major factor in medicalization: cosmetic surgery, adult ADHD, hGH therapy, and the rise in pharmaceutical advertisements.

Cosmetic surgery is the exemplar of consumers in medicine (Sullivan 2001). Procedures from tummy tucks to liposuction to nose jobs to breast augmentation have become big medical business. The body has become a project, from “extreme makeover” to minor touch ups, and medicine has become the vehicle for improvement. In a sense, the whole body has become medicalized, piece by piece. To use just one example, from the 1960s through 1990 two million women received silicone breast implants, 80 percent for cosmetic purposes (Jacobson 2000; Zimmerman 1998). In the 1990s a swirling controversy concerning the safety of silicone implants became public when consumer groups maintained that manufacturers had mislead women about silicone implant safety, leading the FDA in 1992 to call for a voluntary moratorium on the distribution and implantation of the devices (Conrad and Jacobson 2003). The market for implants plummeted. In 1990 there were 120,000 implants performed; by 1992 there were 30,000. But with the introduction of apparently safer saline implants, breast augmentation increased by 92 percent from 1990 to 2000. According to the American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery (2004), in 2003 there were 280,401 breast augmentations in the United States, making this procedure the second most popular cosmetic surgery following liposuction. While plastic surgeons do promote breast augmentation as a product (current cost around $3,000), the medicalization of breasts and bodies is driven largely by the consumer market. Overall, 8.3 million Americans had cosmetic medical procedures in 2003, a 20 percent rise from the previous year and a whopping 277 percent rise since 1997 (American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery 2004). While the media and professional promotion fuel demand, virtually all of these procedures are paid for directly out of the consumer’s pocket.

Since the early 1970s, Ritalin has been a common treatment for ADHD (formerly known as hyperactivity) in children. However, in the 1990s a new phenomenon emerged: adult ADHD. Researchers had shown for years that whatever ADHD was, it often persisted beyond childhood, but in the 1990s we began to see adults coming to physicians asking to be evaluated for ADHD and treated with medication. This was in part a result of several books, including one with the evocative title *Driven to Distraction* (Hallowell and Ratey 1994), along with a spate of popular articles that publicized the disorder. Adults would come to physicians and say, "My son is ADHD and I was just like him," "I can't get my life organized, I must have ADHD," or "I know I'm ADHD, I read it in a book." Since Ritalin for adult attention problems is an off-label use of the medication, the pharmaceutical companies cannot directly advertise either the disorder or its treatment, but there are other ways to publicize the disorder: There are any number of Internet web sites describing adult ADHD and its treatment, and the advocacy group Children and Adults with Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder (CHAAD) has become a strong advocate for identifying and treating adult ADHD. It is well known that CHAAD gets most of its funding from the drug industry. Even so, CHAAD is a consumer-oriented group and, along with adults seeking ADHD treatment, has become a major force in what I have called elsewhere "the medicalization of underperformance" (Conrad and Potter 2000).

Adult ADHD is only one example of what Barsky and Boros (1995) have identified as the public's decreased tolerance for mild symptoms and benign problems. Individuals' self-medicalization is becoming increasingly common, with patients taking their troubles to physicians and often asking directly for a specific medical solution. A prominent example of this has been the increasing medicalization of unhappiness (Shaw and Woodward 2004) and expansive treatment with antidepressants.

Nonprofit consumer groups like CHAAD, National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI),

and the Human Growth Foundation have become strong supporters for medical treatments for the human problems for which they advocate. These consumer advocacy groups are comprised of families, patients, and others concerned with the particular disorder. However, these consumer groups are often supported financially by pharmaceutical companies. CHAAD received support from Novartis, manufacturer of Ritalin; the Human Growth Foundation is at least in part funded by Genentech and Eli Lilly, makers of the hGH drugs; and NAMI receives over $6 million a year from pharmaceutical companies (Mindfreedom Online 2004). Spokespeople from such groups often take strong stances supporting pharmaceutical research and treatment, raising the question of where consumer advocates begin and pharmaceutical promotion ends. This reflects the power of corporations in shaping and sometimes co-opting advocacy groups.

The Internet has become an important consumer vehicle. On the one hand, all pharmaceutical companies and most advocacy groups have web sites replete with consumer-oriented information. These often include self-administered screening tests to help individuals decide whether they may have a particular disorder or benefit from some medical treatment. In addition, there are thousands of bulletin boards, chat rooms, and web pages where individuals can share information about illness, treatments, complaints, and services (Hardey 2001). This has for many individuals transformed illness from a privatized to a more public experience. On these web sites people suffering from similar ailments can connect and share information in new ways, which, despite the pitfalls of misinformation, empower them as consumers of medical care. Both corporate and grassroots web sites can generate an increased demand for services and disseminate medical perspectives far beyond professional or even national boundaries.

In our current medical age, consumers have become increasingly vocal and active in their desire and demand for services. Individuals as consumers rather than patients help shape the

scope, and sometimes the demand for, medical treatments for human problems.[2]

Managed Care

Over the past two decades, managed care organizations have come to dominate health care delivery in the United States largely in response to rising health care costs. Managed care requires preapprovals for medical treatment and sets limits on some types of care. This has given third-party payers more leverage and often constrained both the care given by doctors and the care received by patients. To a degree, managed care has commercialized medicine and encouraged medical care organizations and doctors to emphasize profits over patient care. But this is complex, for in some instances managed care constrains medical care and in other cases provides incentives for more profitable care.

In terms of medicalization, managed care is both an incentive and a constraint. This is clearly seen in the psychiatric realm. Managed care has severely reduced the amount of insurance coverage for psychotherapy available to individuals with mental and emotional problems (Shore and Beigal 1996), but it has been much more liberal with paying for psychiatric medications. Thus managed care has become a factor in the increasing uses of psychotropic medications among adults and children (Goode 2002). It seems likely that physicians prescribe pharmaceutical treatment for psychiatric disorders knowing that these are the types of medical interventions covered under managed care plans, accelerating psychotropic treatments for human problems.

In the 1980s I would frequently say to my students that one of the limits on the medicalization of obesity is that Blue Cross/Blue Shield (then a dominant insurance/managed care company) would not pay for gastric bypass operations. This is no longer the case. Many managed care organizations have concluded that it is a better financial investment to cover

gastric bypass surgery for a “morbidly obese” person than to pay for the treatment of all the potential medical sequelae including diabetes, stroke, heart conditions, and muscular skeletal problems. The number of gastric bypass and similar surgeries in the United States has risen from 20,000 in 1965 to 103,000 in 2003, with 144,000 projected for 2004 (Grady 2003). In the context of the so-called obesity epidemic (Abelson and Kennedy 2004), bypass operations are becoming an increasingly common way to treat the problem of extreme overweight, with the threshold for treatment decreasing and becoming more inclusive. The recent Medicare policy shift declaring obesity as a disease could further expand the number of medical claims for the procedure. As the *New York Times* recently reported, “the surgery has become big business and medical centers are scrambling to start programs” (Grady 2003:D1).

But managed care organizations affect medicalization by what they don’t cover as well. When there is a demand for certain procedures and insurance coverage is not forthcoming, private markets for treatment emerge (Conrad and Leiter 2004). As noted earlier, prior to this year, hGH was only approved for the very few children with a growth hormone deficiency. The FDA approval of Humatrope expanded the number of children eligible for growth hormone treatment by 400,000. It will be interesting to see whether managed care organizations will cover the expensive hGH treatments for these children.

In effect, managed care is a selective double-edged sword for medicalization. Viagra and erectile dysfunction provides an interesting example; some managed care organizations’ drug benefits cover (with co-pays) either four or six pills a month. While it is unclear how these insurance companies came up with these figures, it seems evident that managed care strictures both bolster and constrain the medicalization of male sexual dysfunction. Increasingly, though, managed care organizations are an arbiter of what is deemed medically appropriate or inappropriate treatment.

NOTES

1. While this ambitious and analytically dense paper has many virtues, in my judgement, Clarke et al. (2003) lose sight of the process of medicalization itself. The authors are certainly correct in many of their contentions. It seems clear that the biotechnological and pharmaceutical industries—especially in the areas of scientific and commercial discoveries in genetics, neuroscience, and pharmacology—will have an increasing impact on the medicalization of human problems. The extension of "medical jurisdiction over health itself and the commodification of health" are seen as parts of medicalization, especially through risk factors and medical surveillance. They see the shift to biomedicalization as moving from medical control over external nature to controlling and transforming inner nature. These all seem to me to be astute observations. However, in the Clarke et al. conception one is hard pressed to identify something related to biotechnology and medicine that is not part of biomedicalization. Further, the claim that the biomedicalization change represents a shift from modernity to postmodernity depends entirely on what one considers as postmodern. As Anspach (2003) points out, "Efforts to rationalize health care through data banks and practice guidelines may actually represent new forms of bureaucratizaton, a quintessentially modern, rather than post modern, phenomenon" (unpaged). Given its reliance on a scientific knowledge base and its bureaucratic organization, it is difficult to see biomedicine as predominantly a postmodern enterprise.
2. It is my contention that the consumer orientation toward medical care has expanded, subsuming or reorienting some of the social movements promoting medicalization. Moreover, there is an increasing amount of public and media promotion of health care

products, procedures, and services that further spurs medicalization (including medications, surgical procedures, and other treatments). These are aimed at individuals, not as patients but as consumers.

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17. Connections: Mental Illness as Degeneracy, Disease, and Genetics

By Victor Perez

A 22-year-old unmarried white man…spends most of his time in the house and refuses to go out at night alone. He used to live independently and worked until a few months ago. The patient states he made an error on his taxes and is convinced the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) hired detectives to gather information about his whereabouts. He states that since his mistake he uncovered an essential flaw in the taxation algorithm, which may expose the underpinning of IRS, and is convinced they hired assassins disguised as bikers. After moving in with his mom, he did not see the bikers, but they are trying to trace his "mental activity". Also, he hears them outside of his house talking about how they will kill him… (Epocrates.com)

Is the young man in the opening vignette mentally ill? Most people would unequivocally say 'yes,' but what allows us to come to that conclusion so easily? How would a sociologist respond to this vignette and what criteria do they use to identify and explain mental illness?

Mental illness has been a societal concern for centuries and a primary subject for sociologists for the past 50 years. Today, we are beginning to use genetics and gene-environment interactions to help explain mental illness, arguing that individuals with a genetic predisposition and the right environmental trigger(s) or stressors may develop the condition. Sociologists are also exploring *epigenetics*, examining how stressful social environments are even capable of changing gene expression and genetic makeup of individuals, making them prone to developing mental illness and passing this on to future generations (Ledger 2009).

These contemporary explorations of mental illness parallel the field's earlier ways of understanding mental illness as a form of deviance. In the past, sociology embraced explanations that pointed to degenerate, or inferior, human bodies and minds. Though there are very important differences between early ideas of degeneracy and the contemporary understanding of the genetic underpinnings of mental illness, by way of the "genetic turn in sociology," the field is nonetheless returning to the makeup of the body for an explanation (Shea 2009).

This essay explores the historical roots and contemporary status of mental illness within the field of sociology, comparing how it has been understood as a form of medical deviance over time through five major paradigms: degeneracy, social pathology, labeling, medicalization, and genetics. With assistance from Section 4 readings by Lemert, Best and Conrad, I offer a comparison of these varied historical and contemporary perspectives. This essay suggests that the sociological understanding of mental illness has followed a circular trajectory that reflects our endorsement and rejection of medical and psychiatric models for it at different time periods.

What is Mental Illness?

While contemporary explanations for mental illness are beginning to incorporate new genetic research unavailable to our predecessors, it is important to make clear that mental illness is foremost a social definition. A key observation in sociology is that people's reactions to norm violations are central to labeling something as deviant, either formally (i.e., officially) or informally (Becker 1963). It is important to distinguish, therefore, the difference between mental illness as a *form of deviance* and mental illness as a *cause of deviance*. Since this essay explores how sociological frameworks identify and explain mental illness over time, it focuses on mental illness as a *form* of deviance; that is, behaviors recognized as deviant and used to distinguish mental illness from other types of deviance.

This essay uses the term mental "illness" as it better represents the medical metaphor that is present in the perspectives in this analysis, moving from degeneracy, to social pathology, to disease/medicalization and modern genetics. Others have argued the need for conceptual clarity in delineating the terms "mental illness," "mental disease," "mental health," and "mental disorder" from each other (Horwitz 2002), so this essay focuses on mental *illness* for its medical leaning and its presence as a term in mainstream American culture.

So, what is it? At its core, mental illness is best understood as a social designation based on the reactions of others, be they laypersons (e.g., your friends, co-workers, family members) or formal agents of social control with the authority to professionally label people (e.g., psychiatrists, social workers, counselors, pediatricians). Since reactions and labels can vary across different social contexts, pinning down a precise definition is challenging because exactly what constitutes mental illness can change from time to time and from place to place. In other words, mental illness as some sort of deviance is not absolute. In an attempt to provide a working template for defining mental illness, Tausig and colleagues (2004) suggested: "we may define mental illness as descriptive of certain kinds of deviant behavior. Some deviant behavior is defined as criminal or bad manners…,but the deviant behavior we associate with mental illness often does not fit these categories and is distinguished by its incomprehensibility…" (pp.114-115).

Therefore, mental illness as a form of deviance presents itself through the reactions of others to undesirable, incomprehensible behavior within a specific setting. Remember the young man in the opening vignette? His behavior, which included staying inside because of delusions about assassins and a secret IRS algorithm, is bewildering to those around him and simply cannot be understood as reasonable or rational. Using this working definition for mental illness, we move on to the task of how sociologists have tried to understand it.

The Roots of Mental Illness in Degeneracy

Degeneracy theory was an explanation for social problems that pointed to the innately inferior individuals who caused them. This approach dates back to the late 19th and early 20th century with American sociology's attention to social maladies and the concern about

“degenerate” individuals passing on their deviant traits through heredity. At this time, mental illness was grouped together with other troubling social conditions (such as crime and substance use) and degeneracy was a way to understand and explain all of these varied forms of difference or deviance (Best 2004). However, exactly *what* constituted mental illness was not the primary focus of sociology at the time; sociology often borrowed definitions and measures of mental illness from other specialty fields. At the time, what sociologists were paying attention to was explaining the source of the mental illness in people so defined.

This approach did not have the luxury of today’s genetic technologies to detect biological differences between those labeled mentally ill and those who weren’t. Any perceived difference was considered a result of differences in the physical body and mind, but there was no way to provide evidence of this beyond rudimentary studies of body shape, size, and similarly visible physical characteristics. Consequently, violations of social norms deemed mental illness were explained with the degenerate body, where physiological evidence was crude and unlike today’s sophisticated understanding of the human genome.

Derived from the field of medicine and propelled by the growth of the American Medical Association (Curra 2000), degeneracy was borne of the biological determinism of the late 1800s in the work of European scholars such as criminologist Cesare Lombroso. In an early discussion of the physical traits of the insane and the criminal, Yonge (1898) argued “…common to both criminals and the insane…are similarities and agreements in the physical peculiarities of the two classes which appear to point to a common origin in defective or disordered brains” (quoted in Horton 2000:198).

Though it was largely applied to the issues of race and crime (Gould 1981), degeneracy was used to explain the wider collection of society’s problems, and some specific statements on

mental illness came directly from the field of sociology. In one of the earliest published sociological statements about the biological foundations of social outcomes, Reid (1906) suggested that: “The huge brain of man is a very complex and delicate machine. A defect (an unfavorable variation) in any of its parts is apt to throw the whole out of gear; and, like other variations, such a defect, such a predisposition to insanity, tends to be inherited” (p.553). These ideas played heavily in explanations of mental illness: it was the result of degenerate individuals and was passed on through heredity.

Degeneracy theory began to lose favor quickly in the early 20th century, as both European psychoanalytic approaches to mental illness and American quantitative sociology were moving towards the study of how social influences were important catalysts to people developing mental illness. At the University of Chicago, for example, documenting patterns in mental illness prevalence across geographic spaces was a precursor to the school of thought known as *social pathology*. Based on the burgeoning approach known as “social disorganization,” social pathology evoked a medical analogy of a “sick society,” which could be documented by mapping areas dense with the era’s most troubling conditions (Best 2004). This was the beginning of a more sociologically informed “ecological” approach to explaining problems in society.

The Sick Society

Pointing to patterns of social problems as evidence of a “sick society,” the broader term “social pathology” was used concurrently with degeneracy and psychopathology in the early 20th century, with social pathology becoming the favored sociological approach. Social pathology was a different way of discussing problems that involved a perspective focused on social environments, in addition to the individuals that resided and interacted therein. Prominent social

problems such as crime, mental illness, and drug use revealed patterns and these patterns were evidence of a "pathogenic" society (Durkheim 1982), but it was strictly a metaphor: *there was nothing medical about the approach*. In his reading in this section, Best (2006) argues that it was an attempt to document objective conditions in society that could be considered pathological and thus warrant intervention, and in so doing it provided a robust new sociological approach to mental illness that was a radical departure from the perspective of degeneracy.

At the time, some explanations of the patterns in mental illness still involved degenerate (innately inferior) or psychopathological individuals, but social structural characteristics of certain areas were coming under scrutiny as contributing to problems of crime, drug use, and mental illness. As both Lemert (1951) and Best (2006) showed, this was important because early American sociology was heavily reformist, and patterns of mental illness, madness, and other social problems were evidence that the society was sick and needed to be made well. Lemert (1951) noted that mental illness became a primary subject for sociologists around the mid-20th century because this form of deviance represented a threat to the normative social order, usually defined in very moralistic terms. Furthermore, the work of Lemert (1951) formally stated that if social pathology, as an approach to understanding society's problems, was to be useful it needed to take into account how groups were differentiated in ways that resulted in penalties and sanctions. It was, in hindsight, the birth of the labeling perspective to come.

At the time, sociologists borrowed definitions of mental illness from psychoanalysis and psychiatry when studying social pathologies (Endleman 1990). A classic example of this is the work of Faris and Dunham (1939) in studying "mental disease" in urban Chicago. Mapping the prevalence of mental illnesses such as schizophrenia in the city, they documented social pathology by noting that certain areas had higher rates of hospitalization for mental illness and

that this was the result of social disorganization, or more transient areas that had differing/conflicting social and cultural value systems.

Though the work of Faris and Dunham (1939) and others allowed for a more sociological approach to explaining the prevalence of mental illness in a community, they still based their work on how psychiatry defined mental illness. Furthermore, as Best (2006:535) shows, the marked relativity of the term "social pathology" and the variety of social problems it was supposed to represent stood in stark contrast to its absolutist character in denoting "pathology" in society. The term, therefore, lacked any real analytical utility to be useful if it could be applied to so many different types of social problems. As Best (2006) noted:

> On the one hand, the term implied that it referred to an objectively definable set of social conditions—those phenomena that could be recognized as diseases of society. Yet, on the other hand, the identification of social pathologies proved to be highly subjective, dependent upon the interests of those members of society who identified some conditions as pathological and upon the prejudices and presumptions of the authors who selected topics for inclusion in their texts. [P.535]

This issue, along with the disparaging connotation that "degeneracy" took on after WWII, set the stage for a radical departure from the medical orientations and medical analogies of the past towards a new sociological approach suggesting that mental illness was nothing more than a label.

Labeling and the Social Reactions of Others

Beginning in the 1960s, sociologists offered their own notion of mental illness that was a stark divergence from anything that they had utilized in the past. In short, mental illness was not something located within an individual's inferior or deficient body, nor was an objective trait of a pathological society, but a label applied to persons and behaviors for norm violations that were not easily categorized (Scheff 1966). This new way of thinking about mental illness as a label

was the first widespread *original* formulation of the concept in sociology and it was based on an overall critique of psychiatry.

The labeling perspective in sociology is a combination of the symbolic interactionist school of thought and the conflict theoretical perspective, which suggests powerful groups shape the world to their advantage and impose their viewpoints on the less powerful, thus maintaining the status quo. However, labeling theory was not solely focused on those who lacked the power to thwart official designations of deviance; it held that anyone could be defined as mentally ill if their behaviors violated the expectations of societal norms (Rosenberg 1984). Demonstrating labeling's departure from previous conceptions and perspectives of mental illness, Curra (2000:173) noted: "Finding mental illness is an ineradicable social process of deciding who is normal and who is not that has little to do with a diagnosed individual's physical characteristics." This illustrates how mental illness, during the height of labeling theory in sociology, was not located within the individual but rather in social processes of labeling people deviant.

In 1966, Thomas Scheff provided one of the most lucid descriptions of this sociological view of mental illness as *residual rule breaking*. He argued that mental illness is best understood through the study of social roles, de-emphasizing any medical model of mental illness that focused on the body. For Scheff, mental illness was a label, and people successfully deemed mentally ill committed "residual deviance:" This approach to mental illness took hold during the 1960s and, though it has encountered considerable resistance, it is still active today. It shifted the focus from looking to explain the sociological *causes* of mental illness (stress, difficult social arrangements, social disorganization, social class, etc.) to how some people, because of their behaviors in certain social circumstances, were defined as mentally ill in the first place.

Labeling theory was not without opposition. One of the key critiques t was that it fundamentally denied mental illness as a real, biological condition within the individual. This debate crystallized the rift between labeling theory and the biologically/organically based psychiatric understandings of mental illness. With this critique, the increasing dominance of psychiatry and medicine over mental illness in mainstream culture, and the burgeoning use of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) to legitimate the condition, labeling theory was seriously weakened. Soon, though, sociologists responded in turn with a critical perspective that both acknowledged and disparaged the notion of mental illness as a biological phenomenon: *medicalization*.

How the Mentally Ill Became Sick: "The DSM as a Categorical Touchstone"

The success and subsequent critique of labeling theory paved the way for sociologists to develop a perspective that examined how social deviance such as mental illness comes to be *defined* as having medical *origins*. As Conrad (2005) shows, over time there have been several key claimsmakers who posit that deviance is not merely a social construct, but that it has a physiological basis and thus can be explained and controlled using medical interventions. From doctors, to ordinary people, to psychiatrists, and more recently pharmaceutical companies and their "informed consumers," the engines driving the medicalization of mental illness have shifted in sociologically important ways.

A consistent theme in this essay is that, historically, sociology has either adopted the use of psychiatric/medical conceptions of mental illness in its studies or has been critical of biological and medical approaches to defining and understanding mental illness. Medicalization, a perspective still very active in the sociology of mental illness and articulated clearly in the Conrad reading in this section, is somewhat of a middle ground: it provides an examination of

the definitional process by which labels from psychiatry are created and successfully applied to individuals, transforming their *badness* into *sickness* (Conrad and Schneider 1980).

The medicalization of mental illness is in large part a criticism of diagnosis through taxonomy: the process of defining clinical criteria that, taken together, indicate the presence of an underlying biological mental disorder. Much of the criticism had to do with the increasing dominance of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III (DSM) (APA 1980) and its implied justification for psychopharmacology to "treat" mental illness, which it saw as an organic (i.e., biological) phenomenon. Concerning this perspective, Leo (2004) offered:

> The basic tent of biological psychiatry is that mental illness is an "organic" disease, meaning that the patient has too much or too little of a neurotransmitter, too much or too little of a receptor, or an overactive or underactive neuronal circuit. Whatever the problem might be, it is "biological" and biological problems are best treated with drugs. [P.45]

The psychiatric definition, diagnosis, and treatment of mental illness are controversial to some sociologists because there is little evidence that the preponderance of what psychiatrists deem mental illness has a physiological cause (Rogers and Pilgrim 2005). Conrad (2005) shows the power of the pharmaceutical industry in promoting the view that mental illness is medical by bringing our attention to the recent proliferation of psychotropic drugs and the conditions that they supposedly treat.

Though not necessarily pointing to deviant individuals or groups as inherently inferior or deficient (i.e., degenerate), medicalization shifts our gaze back to individual physiology in the form of the *disease* metaphor (and also uses disease in a very different way than we saw with social pathology). Take major depressive disorder as an example. To diagnose this form of mental illness, according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV Text-

Revision (DSM-IV-TR), one needs to exhibit enough symptoms or clinical criteria to be officially diagnosed and labeled. Here are a few of the criteria:

> - depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either subjective report (e.g., feels sad or empty) or observation made by others (e.g., appears tearful)
> - markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either subjective account or observation made by others)
> - fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day
> - feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may be delusional) nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about being sick) [APA 2000]

Medicalization proponents may argue that this diagnostic paradigm and resulting psychiatric label is a product of transgressing professionally mandated (i.e., psychiatric) social standards for acceptable behavior, and do not necessarily indicate the underlying presence of a "biological" mental disorder; in other words, the diagnosis reflects certain social preferences about what it means to be happy or sad, but does not demonstrate a biological problem.

In his reading in this section, Conrad (2005) notes that the expanding authority of medicine in society, and more recently the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, is shown in the growth and professionalization of these sorts of labels that define acceptable ranges for behaviors and conditions. By noting that certain behaviors or conditions such as depression, autism, ADHD, or anti-social personality disorder can be identified and understood as collections of symptoms, and that they were deviant, psychiatry sets the parameters for acceptable social behaviors and why individuals' *bodies* were at fault for their deviance. With the completion of the Human Genome Project in the year 2003, the stage was set for an even closer look at our bodies to locate the source of our deviance.

"The Genetic Turn in Sociology"

Medicalization set the stage for a rebirth of social scientists' focus on the body and brain, as well as the incorporation of new knowledge of the possible genetic influence on mental illness into traditional sociological models. With the luxury of hindsight, this newer focus on the genetic underpinnings of mental illness is a less pejorative and exclusionary form of "degeneracy" and has become known as "geneticization" (Shostak and Freese 2010). Indeed, the incorporation of genetics research has become so important to how sociologists think about mental illness and other social outcomes that flagship publications in the field have devoted entire issues to genetics in recent years. The completion of the Human Genome Project and the interest in genetic explanations for social differences, and more acutely social deviance, has refocused our attention towards innate, inherent differences between individuals and groups by way of their genetic makeup.

Recently, genetics has been touted as a successful approach to explaining some forms of mental illness such as schizophrenia and affective disorders, but only because of their presumed heritability and not because of any single gene explanation. For example, the Conrad reading argues that "most of genetic medicine remains on the level of potential rather than current practice…Thus far, genetics has made its impact mostly in terms of the ability to test for gene mutations, carriers, or genetic anomalies" (p.7). These tests, currently, only allow for low levels of predictive ability for mental illness outcomes, and must take into account the necessary social environments to activate the genetic predisposition. Mental illnesses such as autism, anorexia nervosa, bipolar affective disorder, unipolar depression, and anxiety disorders all point to gene-environment interactions in their manifestation (Uher 2009).

Through this perspective, the individual is the focal point for intervention. But how is this accomplished? If we are to accept definitions of mental illness as provided by the DSM, then first we need a diagnosis, followed by an investigation into the genetic makeup of the individual receiving the diagnosis. By pursuing genetic explanations for differences across individuals who are already defined as mentally ill, we quickly move *back* towards the notion of inherent, heritable traits that provide for deviant outcomes like mental illness, while losing sight of the initial social process of labeling and diagnosis and the social environments that contribute to their manifestation.

Take attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as an example. Firmly rooted in the DSM, this diagnosis follows the same steps as any other that uses clinical criteria. However, recent medical scholarship points to a potential genetic underpinning of this disorder. Conrad (2007) stated:

> Researchers posit a potential link between ADHD and three genes: the D4 dopamine receptor gene, the dopamine transporter gene, and the D2 dopamine receptor gene…The thinking is that people who carry the gene overproduce dopamine, and this overproduction impairs self-control. Some have suggested that genetic inheritance may account for as much as 80 percent of the likelihood that one has ADHD…If the disorder is genetic, then it is deemed an intrinsic characteristic of people with the gene. [Pp.62-63]

A long line of sociological criticism argues that modern ADHD is not mental illness, but rather the expanding power of pharmaceutical companies to define acceptability in social behavior and intervene with their products. However, because of its inclusion in the DSM, the stage was set for ADHD to undergo genetic investigation. Thus, the "pathway" to searching for genetic determinants of ADHD as a DSM-defined mental illness lay in its history of already being medicalized in the lexicon of diagnosis and psychiatry (Shostak et al. 2008).

Coming Full Circle: Mental Illness as Medical Deviance in the Future

Recently, respected UCSF neurobiologist and psychiatrist Samuel Barondes remarked that he is optimistic about DNA research in helping to understand the genetic underpinnings of mental illnesses like bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. He noted: "When I trained in psychiatry in the 1960s, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder were blamed on bad mothering. Now we know that the pathogenic stuff that mothers (and fathers) transmit is genes" (Barondes 2007:200). Statements like this offer excitement in the promise of new genetic research, but we must be cautious about how mental illness and deviance are defined in the first place and, as the Conrad reading notes, who the major claimsmakers driving the medicalization and geneticization of mental illness are today.

Conclusion

The path that mental illness has traveled over time in the field of sociology as a form of medical deviance does not represent a clear linear trajectory, moving from one idea to the next, building on its predecessors. From the early notions that mental illness was a result of degenerate individuals to social pathology, labeling, medicalization, and modern geneticization, it has been both a subject of sociology and a target for sociological criticism in other fields. Over time, we can see how sociology has moved from studying the degenerate body to the diseased social body, to powerful labels, and now back to the genetically predisposed individual. However, the trajectory of mental illness in sociology as medical deviance has, all the while, been in a love/hate relationship with the field of medicine and psychiatry.

The prevailing mood in the field today is that genetics research can only complement the sociological understanding of mental illness. The later models that incorporate biological and genetic data are likely more powerful ways of understanding mental illness, if only because they

will highlight the importance of social environments that contribute to gene expressions. If genetic determinants were found to produce a variety of human outcomes, the environmental (i.e., social) interaction effects needed to allow for the expression of genetic predispositions is left entirely to the social environment in which persons with those predispositions find themselves. From this perspective, sociology is even more important than before as an interdisciplinary scientific endeavor that can demonstrate under which social conditions, social networks, and social interactions genetic predispositions will express themselves and manifest into a variety of deviant outcomes, including mental illness (Ledger 2009).

This essay has argued that the conceptual development of mental illness is somewhat of a circular trajectory, and knowing this expands our understanding of how deviance is defined and understood over time as powerful institutions and agents of social control compete for the ability to define and regulate it. If sociology is to remain relevant, either by incorporating genetic variables into their models to explain mental illness and deviance, or by critiquing the potential stigmatizing effects of genetics research and the medical consumer market interests of pharmaceutical companies, it must also continually pronounce that mental illnesses are, by definition, social phenomena to begin with. Once an illuminating sentiment at the height of labeling theory, this is a vital characteristic of the continued relevance of sociology in the study of mental illness that must not be forgotten. New, powerful medical claimsmakers, such as pharmaceutical companies, are at the forefront of how mental illness is being defined today. Like our predecessors, we must now fully examine how we can continue to interject sociological wisdom and prescience into the study of mental illness in an increasingly medicalized world.

Critical Thinking Questions:

1. Explain how sociology has had “a love/hate” relationship with medical and psychiatric conceptions of mental illness. Why is this important when examining the trajectory of mental illness as medical deviance over time in the field of sociology?

2. The essay argues that both social pathology and medicalization use a medical perspective, but in very different ways -- explain how. Based on your response, how does each locate mental illness at the societal and individual levels?

3. How does the essay argue that degeneracy and the contemporary “genetic turn in sociology” are related? What are some implications of the use of genetic information by sociologists today? Does it empower or disempower the role of sociology in examining mental illness?

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Section 5. Labeling, Resistance, and Edgework

Introduction.

Tammy L. Anderson.

> What do we have to do to get law enforcement to do something about the massive numbers of skateboarders who are using public sidewalks and streets with their boards as a means of transportation? As a business owner with a shop directly on Thames Street, I witness almost daily near misses with these skateboarders and pedestrians. People have to really be looking out as I have seen them skoot quickly to one side or other to avoid being hit. …Bikes are a problem too, but for the most part they have rules to follow. Have to give signals before turning. I am "picking on skateboarders" as you say, because that is the issue at hand. One thing at a time. Bicyclists are not allowed to ride on the sidewalks. There are rules for bikes, there are rules for cars, now we need rules for skateboarders. (Gaines, June 9, 2011 at http://newport.patch.com/blog_posts/skateboarders-are-a-nuisance-on-public-streets)

The text above describes one woman's --Shana Gaines-- sentiment about skateboarders in Newport, Massachusetts. Gaines is one of many who see public sidewalks, streets, stoplights and other urban fixtures as essential to ensuring public order and protecting citizens from harm. She has seen skateboarders doing tricks or navigating their own pathways over benches, stairwells, and curbs throughout the city, which she believes puts innocent pedestrians in harm's way. Gaines might be comforted if Newport implemented the same anti-skateboarding laws that are on the books in Asheville, South Carolina. A "Nuisance Court" there handles tickets issued to skateboarders for doing the sorts of "dangerous" things Gaines describes (Postelle 2010).

How and why does a popular youth-oriented sport like skateboarding-- or its "cousin" parkour[1]-- get designated a harmful activity that threatens daily life, one so serious that jurisdictions across the U.S. have moved to criminalize it? When is social control needed in our society and who gets to determine its content and form? How do individuals respond to such control?

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[1] Urban freerunning or the uses of the built environment for urban sport. About parkour, Berg (2011: 1) states: It's kinda like skateboarding, only without the skateboard."

Section 5 attempts to answer these questions through labeling theory and the concepts of resistance and edgework. The reading by Lemert (1974) and the Section 1 reading by Becker articulate the labeling theory position, while papers by Lyng (1990) and Valli (2007) discuss resistance and edgework. They offer very different answers to the questions above using various types of deviance, such as juvenile delinquency, extreme sports and voluntary risk-taking, drug abuse and domestic violence. John Brent's connections essay about parkour—urban freerunning—describes their differences by weaving them into a framework of governance, which is a more encompassing form of social control that characterizes our society today. Brent shows how young free-runners practicing parkour – similar to the skateboarders in Newport, Massachusetts or Asheville, South Carolina—"tinker" with the boundaries of safety and risk and violate ordinances and norms about the environment to move through cities and towns as they see fit. Such resistance of local ordinances and edgework-like behavior are ways people push back against social control instead of giving in to it. The paragraphs below briefly introduce students to the evolution of social control and governance in society through the concepts of labeling theory, resistance and edgework.

Labeling. Labeling theory is concerned with how society responds to deviant acts. From the Becker reading in Section 1, you learned that labels are a form of social control that can influence people's lives. To Lemert (1974), labels are a type of social reaction, which can be both informal or much more serious in nature. For instance, when a teenager is ticketed for skateboarding in Asheville and is processed through the juvenile justice system, he or she may be shunned by law-abiding society, have difficulty staying in school and lose some civil rights. This *social reaction* can ultimately levy a heavy burden on the labeled person's identity.

Lemert was interested in expanding labeling theory in ways that will help us see just how much social control we are exposed to in society. One of his key ideas is that people and groups give up some of their values – most likely to powerful bodies like government agencies--in order to satisfy their more salient needs for things like safety, protection and order. For example, people resist temptations to jaywalk or sleep on a city bench in order to enhance their safety and keep urban space orderly. They use cars or public transportation to get around, instead of riding skateboards or scooters or freerunning. What remains is a sort of common set of values and policies that are believed to satisfy and benefit everyone. Agencies, like the Asheville police department, are entrusted with protecting and enforcing this more general set of values and will enjoy a great amount of power doing so. Invariably, individuals will find themselves at odds with such authority if they attempt to express alternative ideas and ways.

In his connections essay, John Brent picks up on the observations Lemert made nearly 40 years ago, by tying Lemert's group interaction ideas to Foucault's notion of governance. He writes:

> Governance refers to new processes, actions, and forms of discipline that seek to rule individuals and society more broadly. This notion of contemporary governance closely relates to the labeling framework as each focus on the role of social control when handling deviant acts… Harking back to the labeling framework, resultant crime control practices are designed to expand definitions of deviance so to as manage an ever-broadening set of perceived threats to safety and order.

The Lemert reading and this observation by Brent provide answers the questions above about how certain acts get designated harmful activity that require formal social control and how is likely to be targeted and labeled. But it is the two newer terms of resistance and edgework that answer the question about how individuals respond to things like labels, discrimination and social control.

Resistance is concerned with actions—symbolic and real, social and political—that oppose labels and norms. People who are labeled as outcasts or nuisances—in the case of skateboarders or freerunners-- often try to thwart their deviant labels, even while powerful forces try to control them. Instead of feeling shame about deviant behavior and stopping it, people double down in their deviant actions and take pride in doing so. They reject society's definitions and some even become invested in deviant lifestyles. Thus, resistance highlights how the powerless often stand in opposition to mainstream values.

Edgework is a second, and perhaps an even more fitting, term that may help us understand skateboarders and freerunners. Originating from the work of Lyng (1990), edgework is a form of resistance that features risking harm for a thrill. Edgework is a manipulation of the boundaries between safety and harm, order and chaos, and norms and deviance (Lyng 1990). A fundamental quality about it is the sensation it provides and the "competence" or "expertise" one can accrue by doing engaging in it. Individuals utilize a specialized skill sets and particular individual capacities in edgework pursuits. Doing so is viewed as a way to fulfill a need for control, self-determination, stimulation, and arousal.

Edgework is another variety of resistance against oppression and restraint or the social control levied by labeling. For example, the connections essay by John Brent on parkour discusses how urban freerunners move through public space in ways that not only violate norms (i.e., how to descend a building or use a courtyard bench), but risk significant injury. Among freerunners, however, such edgework is performed for the protest it represents, respect it earns and thrill it provides. The reading by Valli (2007) is yet another provocative example of edgework. The drug-addicted women she studied used their own forms of intimidation and

violence against their abusive male partners. They engaged in this edgework despite the likelihood of retaliation or blowback from their male partners.

To close, Lemert writes that deviants who are successfully labeled lose their individuality and become empty organisms. But is this really what happens? Both the resistance and edgework terms reject the idea that labeling and social control—even modern-day governance by the state—can always wield such power. Instead, outcasts or troublemakers fight back against punitive social norms and modern-day governance and come back to life. When paired together, we can see that labeling might start the process of social control, but instead of simply expecting people to head down the path of conformity or shame toward a self-fulfilling prophecy (as labeling theory contends), resilient "deviants" might resist their labels and accrue expertise (i.e., engage in edgework) in being deviant instead. By learning to see deviance through the multiple and opposing lenses of labeling, resistance and edgework, students may better understand their own and other's behavior and experiences. They might also be able to spot and dissect social control in our society and anticipate how increased governance might affect human interaction.

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Reading 18

Beyond Mead: The Societal Reaction to Deviance

Edwin M. Lemert

What I prefer to call the sociology of deviance now appears to be under attack from so many quarters, both for what it is and what it is not, that a sense of embattlement is inescapable. The diverse, perverse, and tangential nature of the criticisms makes it difficult to tell friend from foe. Sensitive to this state of affairs, Peter Manning (1973) in a review essay of surpassing excellence asserts that a grey fog has settled over the field. This I can discount as the natural fog of good men's minds; but his further allegations that the theoretical impetus of deviance sociology is spent and that a state of exhaustion and conceptual decay prevails, I found painful and much harder to reconcile with my proprietary interests.

I should say parenthetically that reading the essay left me spelled by the beauty of its words and niceties of expression, as well as overwhelmed by its sense of prophecy. It recalled me to an old auctorial ideal espoused by James Branch Cabell, namely that we should write beautifully of things as they are. But having had time to cast off Manning's spell, I conclude that sociologists sometimes write beautifully of things as they are not and that in striving for rhetorical symmetry their conclusions may go beyond what facts will support. In this case I must object that the allegations of its sadness and senility ignore the theoretical potential of deviance sociology, its continuing research output, its influence on the diversion movement in criminal justice, and its striking impact on younger, highly articulate sociologists in Britain. Granting the slow stain and constant erosion of all ideas, it seems to me that even with age deviance sociology still is "majestic in decay."

But without further pause on the decadence issue, I would like to deal with what may cause some of the faithful to cry sacrilege, namely the deficiencies of G. H. Mead's conception

of symbolic interaction and their implications for the study of deviance. My purpose is not to add to the theoretical confusion but to clear some of it away, and hopefully free up sociological energies to exploit in the measure it deserves its least worked area, namely the societal reaction. In order to maximize the clarity of my discussion I will recap what the term has meant to me.

Some years ago in my early work on deviance I used the term societal reaction to comprehend a number of processes by which societies respond to deviants either informally or through their officially delegated agencies (Lemert, 1951). While communication of invidious definitions of persons or groups and the public expression of disapproval were included as part of the societal reaction, the important point was made that these had to be validated in order to be sociologically meaningful. Validation was conceived as effective social control taking form as isolation, segregation, penalties, supervision, or some kind of organized "treatment." In effect, this was a kind of middle range conceptual orientation to a body of data.

Societal reaction theory distinguished objective as well as subjective aspects of deviance, recognizing a relationship between the nature, degree, extent, and visibility of deviance and corresponding form and intensity of the societal reaction. It also allowed that attributes of deviants and the form of their deviance affected the way in which societal definitions were internalized, most easily seen in biological anomalies and physical handicaps. Among the objective influences on the societal reaction were noted technology, procedures, and limitation of agency personnel and resources. However, these did not get much elaboration or application, save in the discussion of changing tolerances for crime.

Then, as in my later work on deviance (Lemert, 1973), I emphasized the need to begin the analysis with the societal reaction, more particularly social control, rather than with etiology. Herein lay the distinctiveness of the societal reaction approach, which sought to show how deviance was shaped and stabilized by efforts to eliminate or ameliorate it. In retrospect, the

break with structural conceptions of deviance and the traditional concern of sociology with causes was by no means complete. This I now believe to have been less a matter of theoretical asymmetry than an encounter with a perennial problem of sociological theory, namely how to establish a connection between symbolic systems, social systems, and physical systems, without denying the obvious fact that human beings make choices that affect as well as are affected by the system. According to J. F. Scott's (1963) informed analysis, even the grand theorist of our age, Talcott Parsons, failed to reach an ultimate solution of this problem.

This question was pretty well obscured during the 1950's and 1960's, probably because of the tremendous growth in our national production and the belief that affluence was easily procurable for all, abetted by Keynesian economic theory aimed at little more than preventive maintenance of the marvelous machine making it all possible. But recently the avalanche of population growth, swift exhaustion of resources, environmental destruction, plus an "energy crisis" have made an awareness that human choices can either sustain or destroy the physical and technological basis on which they are made. Physical environments formerly taken as constants and merely limiting now can be seen changing in foreseeable time spans, and it becomes possible to speak of responses and feedback from the physical world. Even the vulgarization and deserved criticism of the ecology movement cannot quiet the deepening appreciation that man is inescapably part of a larger bio-physical system.

SYMBOLIC INTERACTION

Over the decades of the present century sociology moved steadily away from early social science, which had sought standing ground on biology, geography, and economics. Within sociology, social psychologists pushed farthest along this path, retaining only some nominal allegiance to organic and natural history analogies. And within social psychology, it has been

those sociologists concerned with deviance who have laid the greatest and most exclusive emphasis on the socio-psychological process as the determining element in social life. It has been asserted that the one theme uniting the otherwise diverse views of labeling theorists, Neo-Chicagoans, or West Coast school, as they are variously called, is their fealty to the symbolic interactionism of G. H. Mead (Schur, 1969).

Nevertheless, it may be asked whether the prevailing definition of deviance as a group creation through labeling and the adoption of an "underdog" view of the symbolic process do not do a disservice to Mead. Labeling unfortunately conveys an impression of interaction that is both sociologistic and unilateral; in the process deviants who are "successfully labeled" lose their individuality; they appear, as Bordua (1967) says, like "empty organisms" or, as Gouldner (1968) puts it, "like men on their backs" (Walton 1973). The extreme subjectivism made explicit by the underdog perspective, reflecting sympathy for the victim and antipathy towards the establishment, also distorts by magnifying the exploitative and arbitrary features of the societal reaction. But more important, it leaves little or no place for human choice at either level of interaction.

Actually the difficulties may lie in the ambiguities and uncertainties of Mead's ideas themselves. While Mead reconciled the objective and the subjective in general terms by making self and other dual aspects of a common behavioral process, the specifics of the process with respect to choice making were far from clear. Other strictures inhere in Mead's conception of the societal other; his unformed ideas about society, primarily that of one generalized other, are a poor source for a modern theory of the societal reaction (Meltzer 1967; Kolb 1967). This is amply demonstrated in the dramatistic descriptions of the societal reaction which revolve around the idea of symbolic interaction.

GROUP INTERACTION

Group interaction is best understood as a process resting on evaluation in which individuals sort out their purposes or values in terms of their dependence on groups necessary for their satisfaction. In so doing they give up some values in order to satisfy others, at the least possible sacrifice. The pattern of group action which results will reflect the claims and power of all those involved in the interaction; and the priorities it follows often are at considerable variance from the value hierarchies of individual participants. When a chain of interaction occurs between groups, the disparity between values dominate in final action, and the values of any one group member may be enormous. Police may acquiesce in positions of legislation taken by their representative association which deeply offend their sense of morality and justice because other values which have been given precedence are at stake in concurrent legislation. Legislators, too, may be captured by their group commitments so that they must give do pass to bills which are grossly contrary to values they personally espouse.

The order in which interests, claims, or values get satisfied reflects not only group allegiance but also the availability of means for their satisfaction and the costs of such means, measurable by time, energy, and other values expended. Laws and rules made by this kind of process often express the values and norms of no group or person but rather their dilemmas, compromises, expeditious adherence to procedures, and strictures of time and budgets. For this reason it becomes difficult or impossible to predict the emergence of new definitions and controls of deviance by introspecting or “taking the role of the other” to discover what it is the minds of those making the change. Nor can predictions be made successfully by imputing cultures, subcultures, or life styles to the agents of change.

What has been said is well illustrated by reference to the interaction of a variety of professional associations which took part in revising the Juvenile Court law in California in 1961, a change which narrowed the jurisdiction of the court and effectively modified definitions

of delinquency (Lemert, 1970). Each association sorted out the proposed changes in terms of its own values, supporting or resisting according to whether the changes were seen as a means of achieving their existing values or called for sacrifices deemed intolerable. In the change, probation officers gave up their accustomed right to employ a number of informal procedures but got more power *vis-à-vis* the police in decisions to detain juveniles. Police lost this power but got badly needed clarification of arrest powers. Judges lost their considerable freedom to handle the court informally, but they along with interested attorneys gained by the introduction of guarantees of certain rights to minors.

All three professional groups had splits for and against the changes, and their conflicting positions were arrived at for different reasons and in different ways. Ultimately resistance among probation officers disappeared because the resisters had to choose between continued opposition and preservation of their association, which it threatened to destroy. Opposition among judges centered around one of their members who remained against the changes throughout but ultimately chose not to risk loss of reputation among his other colleagues by protracted resistance. Police resistance, primarily among Juvenile Officers from the south state, got stymied by the structure of their lobbying committee, which was dominated by chiefs who were more concerned with evidentiary bills and a death penalty bill than they were with juvenile justice.

STRUCTURES AND THE SOCIETAL REACTION

It is clear from what has been said that social structures influenced the outcome of the legislation in question. This happened in several ways, such as limiting the access of some groups to the legislature, allocating power in a manner so that the decision of one committee was crucial, and the special autonomy to act given to the group which initiated the changes.

However, here I wish to emphasize for theoretical reasons how structures become instrumentally important as vehicles or channels by which feedback from direct experience with the objective world modifies choice—in this instance how new structures affect dissemination of new knowledge which selects out old patterns or paradigms.

The movement to change the juvenile court law, although it had outside leadership, was something less than a moral crusade, nor could it be described realistically as a popular movement shaped by public opinion. Leaders were a few attorneys, some probation officers, correctional administrators, and college professors, from among whom was organized a commission within the California Youth Authority and the Department of Corrections. Joint sponsorship by the two organizations and later loss of interest by the CYA top people in the movement made it much like an autonomous staff operation. Several of the attorneys were attracted to the movement in its early stages mainly from frustrating encounters with highhanded judges in juvenile courts, but the focus and articulation of the movement owed much to organizational features introduced with creation of the CYA.

In essence, the movement was a challenge to the traditional *parens patriae* conception of the juvenile court, although it was not so represented. Social action grew out of an accumulation of new facts and information that raised serious doubts about the efficacy of the basic philosophy of the court. The main source of such information was input at the Board created for a different purpose, to hear and dispose all cases referred to CYA. This, together with reports from its field consultant division, allowed staff and Board members for the first time, circa 1944, to develop a statewide impression of what the juvenile courts were like in fact and to begin to appreciate the discrepancies between their ideology and their performance. A number of Board members after repeatedly listening to stories of youth coming before them grew convinced that injustices were being done.

The problem of the Commission became one of convincing persons with power to change

the law that this was true. Given this general stance, the Commission did in a sense try to reconstruct the symbolic reality of the juvenile court, chiefly by means of a statewide survey, hearings, and presentations before legislative committees. But their report was late in appearing and was not very good at that; and the Commission's presentations before the powerful Senate Judiciary Committee, a majority of whose members were opposed to any change, fell short.

The event which did more than any other to undercut and select out the existing *parens patriae* conception of the juvenile court came from the unsolicited testimony of a single upstate judge who had come to defend the old style court and fight the changes sought by the Commission. A somewhat quaint, anachronistic figure in a black suit and a furled umbrella, he told in fine detail how he ran what was in effect an inquisitorial system of juvenile justice, ordering arrested youths into detention until by confessing their misdeeds they showed the remorse he considered necessary for their rehabilitation. The impact on a committee composed entirely of lawyers, former district attorneys, and a former judge was like that of a bomb in an echo chamber.

This strongly indicates that when a radical change is contemplated on the basis of new ideas about reality, it most likely occurs when there is a validation of the ideas in direct sensory experience—in this case a living breathing judge of the type the commissioners ineptly tried to fix as an image. The situation was dramatic because it was so real and because it was not staged.

Legislators—at least those in California—are well accustomed to staged presentations and highly sophisticated efforts to create realities favorable to the causes of lobbyists. As a matter of fact, they have committee techniques of their own designed to cope with these, that which might be called counter staging, set up to give the impression of responding to the voices of the public. Underneath, legislators tend to be tough-minded; and the prevalence of

lawyers among them sets rigorous standards for what will be accepted as facts or evidence. That they have problems of obtaining objective measures of the harmful effects of deviance and of consequences of proposed programs for its control none will deny. The problems face social scientists as well as legislators, but they do not seem sufficient reason to believe that legislators have no way of getting feedback from the objective world.

It remains to comment on the effects of direct experience with physical or ecological consequences of patterns of social control as influences on change. From these flow costs, by which is meant the time, energy, and money costs of means to implement various methods of control. In a context of change this refers to anticipated as well as experienced costs. An important principle is that changes in the definition and control of deviance may be due not to any alteration in value systems but to changes in their costs of satisfaction. An increase in costs, such as the time needed to deliver a youth to detention, may change the disposition of cases by police or probation officers even though their preferences are to follow an old pattern.

Anticipated changes in the costs of means to ends affected both the support for and opposition to the 1961 Juvenile Court Law revision. Los Angeles county sheriff people favored the change because the new arrest procedures simplified and helped the efficiency of their delinquency control operations. Police, on the other hand, both north and south, were concerned that the 48-hour limit imposed in the new law for investigations prior to detention hearings would make their jobs impossible. And indeed this was the case so far as their old procedures were concerned, especially in counties like Los Angeles, which had set up a detention control unit within its probation department. As a result, it became harder to use the juvenile court as an adjunct for extra-legal police methods. “Weekenders,” youth swept up by police and detained in order to break up or curb local disorders, tended to disappear as a category.

Judges, probation officers, supervisors, and county executives in many instances were painfully aware that the proposed law revision would cost a great deal more money in order to provide counsel for minors, engage court reporters, and prepare records for court hearings. How to raise such funds was a critical issue in a number of counties. The requirement of two and possibly three court hearings could only increase the workload of the court and probation department, which meant either more tax funds or greater expenditures of time and effort by court personnel from judges on down.

The strong opposition to the law change by police and probation officers in the southern part of the state came from recognition of the hard fact that it would end the use of jail for detention, which was an intrinsic feature of the delinquency control system there. This eventuality was felt keenly in Long Beach, where a new wing of the jail had been constructed for such a purpose.

Higher standards of proof mandated by the law change and the new power of probation officers to dismiss at intake meant that more time was care had to go into police investigations and reports. This was more fully appreciated after some experience with the new law, and it fostered a changed categorical attitude that "either you have a case, or you don't." An organizational reflection of this change was the decision of the Los Angeles Police to eliminate its juvenile bureau and turn its work over to the detective bureau.

Herein may lie one of the main outcomes of the 1961 law change, namely a growing tendency to redefine delinquency more exclusively as law violations, and to differentiate such cases from so-called delinquent tendencies cases, many of which began to be handled by other means. Comments now are heard from probation officers that "601's (the code term for such cases) are on their way out."

CONCLUSION

It has been my contention that existing theories of deviance are ill suited to account for the complexities of the societal reaction in modern society. In place of a sociopsychological model I have proposed a group interaction model and tried to show how it clarifies the shifting significance of ends and means and their costs in the emergence of new patterns of social control. The chief gain is a method for specifying the way in which human choices affect the societal reaction without generalizing the claims of others or reducing them to reified ideas of culture, class, or power. It also shows how costs of changes in social control feed back into decisions to make changes, without the necessity of relying on older deterministic conceptions of the effects of the physical world on the social.

The possibility exists that the special subject matter of procedural law change within a bureaucratic context of correctional agencies puts the group interaction model in a more favorable light than if it were applied to substantive legislation of a more obviously "moral" nature, such as marihuana laws, temperance laws, and anti-pornography statutes. Yet I note a recent study of the evolution of our marihuana laws which advisedly chooses an organizational perspective emphasizing bureaucratic utilitarian values in its explanation (Dickson, 1968). I am also reminded of A. M. Lee's (1944) older pluralistic analysis of the temperance movement, which still stands unreconciled with the symbolic crusade theory of the same phenomenon.

A study of social control in Cuba, touching on censorship and sex behavior, not only has challenged the validity of the notion of moral entrepreneurs but also accentuates the need to fit concepts of social control to the differentiation of interests and groups in particular societies (Looney, 1973). All of which tells me that deviance sociologists can do better with working tool concepts than with ambitious theory. They obviously "can't go home again" to old style structural, positivist sociology any more than conservative sociologists can stomach

the extremes of labeling theory. But there may be a less pretentious midground on which to meet—if not they, then a less committed generation of sociologists yet to come.

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Reading 19

Edgework: A Social Psychological Analysis of Voluntary Risk Taking

Stephen Lyng

Voluntary risk taking is an activity that attracts a sizable number of people in American society but has been largely ignored by sociologists. A literature review is presented that points to a number of shortcomings in existing studies, most of which are associated with the psychological reductionism that predominates in this area of study. An effort is made to provide a sociological account of voluntary risk taking by (1) introducing a new classifying concept—edgework—based on numerous themes emerging from primary and secondary data on risk taking and (2) explaining edgework in terms of the newly emerging social psychological perspective produced from the synthesis of the Marxian and Meadian frameworks. The concept of edgework highlights the most sociologically relevant features of voluntary risk taking, while the Marx and Mead synthesis offers a framework for tracing the connections between various aspects of risk-taking behavior and structural characteristics of modern American society at both the micro and macro levels. This approach ties together such factors as political economic variables, at one end of the continuum, and individual sensations and feelings, at the other end.

Among the many paradoxes of the modern age, one that has been the focus of much attention recently from the American media is particularly puzzling. While there seems to be general agreement among members of contemporary American society about the value of reducing threats to individual well-being, there are many who actively seek experiences that involve a high potential for personal injury or death.[2] High-risk sports such as hang gliding, skydiving, scuba diving, rock climbing, and the like have enjoyed unprecedented growth in the past

several decades even as political institutions in Western societies have sought to reduce the risks of injury in the workplace and elsewhere. The contradiction in American society between the public agenda to reduce the risk of injury and death and the private agenda to increase such risks deserves the attention of sociologists.

In looking for social scientific literature that bears on this issue, one is naturally drawn to the field of risk analysis. An examination of this body of research reveals much work dealing with the assessment and management of technological and natural hazards but a complete absence of research on voluntary risk-taking behavior. As one authority on risk analysis notes (Heimer 1988), this problem is due, in part, to the dominance of a psychological model of risk taking that views anticipated rewards as the primary motivation for risk-taking behavior (cf. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982). This approach, however, cannot be reconciled with one of the principal features of voluntary risk taking—the fact that some people place a higher value on the *experience* of risk taking than they do on achieving the final ends of the risky undertaking. In another line of criticism, James Short (1984) complains that the focus of research in risk analysis has been so narrow as to exclude even the "bottom line" issue of the field, that is, determining what makes risks acceptable. I support his call for a more expansive approach and further suggest that attention be directed to an even more puzzling issue—the problem of what makes risk taking *necessary* for the well-being of some people.

Although voluntary risk taking has been ignored by students of risk analysis and sociologists generally, a literature on this subject does exist. A diverse group of social and behavioral scientists has attempted in earlier decades to explain the phenomenon. No one, however, has provided a thoroughly sociological explanation—an account that would explain high-risk behavior in terms of a socially constituted self in a historically specific social environment. The aim of this paper is to provide such an account.

THE CONCEPT OF EDGEWORK

The idea of edgework is the product of several diverse influences. The term itself is borrowed from the journalist Hunter S. Thompson, who has used it to describe a variety of anarchic human experiences, the most infamous being his experimentation with drugs. Thompson's journalistic accounts of many different types of edgework give powerful expression to the essential character of this experience. Indeed, negotiating the boundary between life and death, consciousness and unconsciousness, and sanity and insanity is a central theme in Thompson's work (1971, 1979).

The first effort to analyze edgework within a social scientific framework was undertaken by Lyng and Snow (1986) in an earlier study. This project involved a five-year ethnographic study of a group of sky divers. As a "jump pilot" for a local skydiving center, I was able to gain access to the complex subculture of skydiving. Field research was conducted on the skydiving subculture with a combination of techniques including participant observation, semistructured interviews, and document analysis.

My status as jump pilot permitted me to collect participant-observational data on the world of skydiving. Because the jump pilot is responsible for transporting sky divers to jump altitude, he or she is able to observe all aspects of the core activity of the group. Also, the jump pilot's special function in jumping activities gives him or her "insider" status, even though he or she may not be a sky diver. Thus, after the first year of study, I became sufficiently well integrated into the group to be included in most informal gatherings of sky divers outside of weekend jumping activities. Although it is always difficult to get sky divers to describe their feelings about the sport (see below), the more reflective mood that sometimes prevailed during these social gatherings yielded valuable data on the skydiving

experience.

Thus, as jump pilot, I was able to observe the most intimate details of the group's activities. These observations were recorded in the form of field notes written up at the end of most weekends at the drop zone (an area approved by the FAA for parachute drops) and after many sky-diver social events. The accuracy of participant-observational data was also checked in intensive semistructured interviews with strategic respondents. In these interviews, which totaled scores of hours, respondents were asked to describe the experience of dealing with the various risks associated with the sport. Finally, to ensure the representativeness of the observational and interview data, I perused literature that circulated within the national skydiving network. Technical manuals (see, e.g., Works 1975) and related publications, as well as many issues of *Parachutist* magazine, were examined for information that would help identify the social psychological factors that lead people to participate in a high-risk sport like skydiving. All the findings emerging from interviews and document analysis were double-checked with additional firsthand observations I made in my dual role as jump pilot and novice sky diver.[4]

As noted in the earlier study, some of the features that define the edgework concept were delineated by a specific "vocabulary of motive" employed by the sky divers. Although this was just one of three separate motivational perspectives used at different times by the group, I eventually came to regard the edgework perspective as theoretically useful for understanding risk taking in general. This view emerged from my examination of various accounts of high-risk activities, ranging from other thrill sports (downhill skiing, car racing, etc.) to wartime combat situations and business entrepreneurship. These accounts are astonishingly similar to the descriptions provided by the respondents in my study. Indeed, the common patterns seem to point to a nomothetic potential for the concept of edgework.

Because of my personal access to a body of rich primary data on the sport of skydiving, I

have chosen to focus on this sport as the principal substantive illustration of the edgework concept. But I also make use of illustrative material from sources dealing with other types of high-risk activities in order to demonstrate the wider application of the concept.[5] Emerging from these data are empirical patterns that can be organized into three separate categories: (1) the kinds of activities that qualify as edgework, (2) the specific individual characteristics and capacities that are relevant to the edgework experience, and (3) the subjective sensations associated with participation in edgework. Discussing edgework in terms of the first dimension demonstrates the broad scope of the concept while directing attention to the features common to all forms of edgework. Focusing on the second dimension helps to identify the individual-level factors that reflect most clearly the macrostructural determinants of the edgework pattern. And, finally, the third dimension is concerned with empirical patterns belonging to perhaps the most "private" level of individual experience. The consistency of these private experiences across various forms of edgework lends support to the claimed validity of the edgework concept.

Edgework Activities

Activities that can be subsumed under the edgework concept have one central feature in common: they all involve a clearly observable threat to one's physical or mental well-being or one's sense of an ordered existence. The archetypical edgework experience is one in which the individual's failure to meet the challenge at hand will result in death or, at the very least, debilitating injury. This type of edgework is best illustrated by such dangerous sports as skydiving, hang gliding, rock climbing, motorcycle racing/car racing, and downhill ski racing or by such dangerous occupations as fire fighting, test piloting, combat soldiering, movie stunt work, and police work. The threat of death or injury is ever-present in such activities,

although participants often claim that only those “who don’t know what they’re doing” are at risk.

While such death-defying activities are the quintessential form of edgework, the concept has much wider application. The “edge,” or boundary line, confronted by the edgeworker can be defined in many different ways: life versus death, consciousness versus unconsciousness, sanity versus insanity, an ordered sense of self and environment versus a disordered self and environment. This more general definition of the edge is consistent with Hunter Thompson’s conceptualization of certain kinds of drug use as edgework. Alcohol users who engage in binge drinking negotiate the line between consciousness and unconsciousness, while the use of hallucinogenic drugs may push one over the line separating an ordered from a disordered sense of self and environment. Thompson establishes an explicit link between the latter form of edgework and the life-and-death variety in the following interview statement:

> PLAYBOY: Do you believe religious things about drugs?
>
> THOMPSON: No I never have. That’s my main argument with the drug culture. I’ve never believed in that guru trip; you know, God, nirvana, that kind of oppressive, hipper-than-thou bullshit. I like to just gobble the stuff right out in the street and see what happens, take my chances, just stomp on my own accelerator. It’s like getting on a racing bike and all of a sudden you’re doing 120 miles per hour into a curve that has sand all over it and you think “Holy Jesus, here we go,” and you lay it over till the pegs hit the street and metal starts to spark. If you’re good enough, you can pull it out, but sometimes you end up in the emergency room with some bastard in a white suit sewing your scalp back on.
>
> PLAYBOY: Is that what you call “edgework”?
>
> THOMPSON: Well, that’s one aspect of it, I guess—in that you have to be good

> when you take nasty risks, or you'll lose it, and then you're in serious trouble. *[Playboy* 1974, p. 78]

Another form of edgework sometimes associated with excessive drug use involves negotiating the boundary between sanity and insanity. This boundary line can be reached through other means as well—for example, when some "workaholics" seek to push themselves to the very limits of sanity.

In abstract terms, edgework is best understood as an approach to the boundary between order and disorder, form and formlessness. As we will see shortly, edgeworkers typically seek to define the limits of performance for a particular object or form. One category of edgework involves efforts to discover the performance limits of certain types of technology, as when test pilots take their airplanes "to the outside of the envelope" (i.e., pushing it to its aerodynamic limits) or when race-car drivers push their cars to their mechanical limits. Another category consists of testing the limits of body or mind, as illustrated by marathon runners attempting to discover their physical limits or artists endeavoring to realize their creative potential through intense work schedules. In many cases, edgeworkers explore the performance limits of both themselves and a material form; with the increasingly sophisticated nature of modern technology, individuals must sometimes push themselves to the outer limits of human performance in order to reach the performance limits of the technology under their control.

Edgework Skills

Another common feature of the activities I have classified as edgework is that they all involve the use of specific individual capacities. One such capacity has already been

identified: the exercise of the particular skills required to discover the performance limits of a piece of technology or other form. Indeed, edgeworkers regard the opportunity for the development and use of skills as the most valuable aspect of the experience. Sky divers are typically very preoccupied with their own and others' skills in the art of flying one's body in free-fall, and the status hierarchy in the group tends to center on this characteristic. Edgework in drug use can also involve skilled performance, as revealed in Hunter Thompson's statement that "you have to be good when you take nasty risks, or you'll lose it, and then you're in serious trouble."

Of course, the emphasis on skilled performance is not, in and of itself, unique to high-risk activities. People who devote leisure time to such activities as home improvement and fishing do so in part because these activities allow for the development and use of various skills. But edgeworkers claim to possess a special ability, one that transcends activity-specific skills such as those needed for driving a car, riding a motorcycle, and flying an airplane or one's body in free-fall. This unique skill, which applies to all types of edgework, is the ability to maintain control over a situation that verges on complete chaos, a situation most people would regard as entirely uncontrollable. The more specific aptitudes required for this type of competence involve the ability to avoid being paralyzed by fear and the capacity to focus one's attention and actions on what is most crucial for survival. Thus, most edgeworkers regard this general skill as essentially cognitive in nature, and they often refer to it as a special form of "mental toughness." This view is especially prominent among those who participate in more athletic forms of edgework (endurance running, etc.).

In surveying various forms of edgework, I found that many participants regard this special "survival capacity" as an *innate* ability. They find support for this belief in the instinct-like character of edgework action—the fact that people respond automatically without thinking. A related and somewhat ironic presupposition about the capacity is

revealed in Tom Wolfe's (1979) ethnography of the test-pilot subculture. Wolfe describes an interesting tautology that pilots employ for determining who possesses "the right stuff," that is, the basic survival instinct under discussion here. Because they believe that having this capacity will insure against accidents, a fatal crash by one of their comrades is taken as direct evidence that he or she never possessed "the right stuff" in the first place. I have observed a similar attitude on the part of sky divers. When people are killed or injured in skydiving accidents, it does not suggest to them that some risks in the sport are beyond anyone's ability to manage; it merely indicates that not everyone involved in skydiving possesses the innate survival capacity.

Such beliefs are associated with an elitist orientation among some edgeworkers who maintain that these innate edgeworking capacities are possessed by only a select few and who often feel a powerful solidarity with one another based on their perceived elite status. In some cases, this solidarity transcends the boundaries of interpersonal networks so that even people who practice very different forms of edgework regard one another as members of the same select group. A logical consequence of this belief is the notion that a demonstrable capacity for "crowding the edge" in one domain is evidence of one's ability to handle other forms of edgework. In accordance with this belief, individuals accomplished in one type of edgework often try their hands at other types as well.[6]

Edgework Sensations

Although different types of edgework do not produce precisely the same sensations, the primary and secondary data assembled for this study reveal a number of common themes. First, participants in virtually all types of edgework claim that the experience produces a sense of "self-realization," "self-actualization," or "self-determination." In the pure form of

edgework, individuals experience themselves as instinctively acting entities, which leaves them with a purified and magnified sense of self. As one sky diver noted about his experience with a parachute malfunction, “I wasn’t thinking at all—I just did what I had to do. It was the right thing to do too. And after it was over, I felt really alive and pure.” In edgework, the ego is called forth in a dramatic way.

This sensation is also accompanied by a specific sequence of emotions. In those forms of edgework involving a threat of death or injury, the individual typically feels a significant degree of fear during the initial, anticipatory phases of the experience. This finding, which persists across many varieties of edgework, should dispel the popular stereotype of risk takers as fearless individuals. Even sky divers with thousands of jumps report being very nervous and fearful in the 15 or 20 minutes before reaching jump altitude (a finding corroborated by Klausner 1968). But as one moves to the final phases of the experience, fear gives way to a sense of exhilaration and omnipotence. Having survived the challenge, one feels capable of dealing with any threatening situation. This no doubt contributes to the elitest orientation of some edgework groups.

The edgework experience can also involve alterations in perception and consciousness. Participants in many different types of edgework report that, at the height of the experience (as they approach the edge), their perceptual field becomes highly focused: background factors recede from view, and their perception narrows to only those factors that immediately determine success or failure in negotiating the edge. In this state of mind, edgeworkers not only are oblivious to extraneous environmental factors, but they also lose their ability to gauge the passage of time in the usual fashion. Time may pass either much faster or slower than usual: sky divers experience 45 seconds of free-fall as an eternity, while rock climbers sense many hours on the cliffs as “just a few minutes.”

Focused perception also correlates with a sense of cognitive control over the essential

"objects" in the environment or a feeling of identity with these objects. Edgeworkers sometimes speak of a feeling of "oneness" with the object or environment. For example, motorcycle racers and test pilots describe a feeling of "being one with their machines," a state in which they feel capable of exercising mental control over the machines. Sky divers are particularly instructive on this point. In describing how to fly one's body in free-fall, jumpers emphasize the need to "think" one's way through space: "If you try to physically force your body into the correct configuration, you won't be able to go where you want. You have to 'think' your way from point *A* to point *B.* It's impossible to do this though unless you've reached a state of being completely comfortable with the air."[7]

Another prominent theme is the sense of the edgework experience as a kind of "hyperreality." Despite the out-of-the ordinary character of edgework, participants often describe the experience as being much more real than the circumstances of day-to-day existence. This view is expressed in a sky diver's description of the various stages of a jump: "While we're riding in the airplane on the way to jump altitude, I always feel scared and a little amazed that I'm fixing to do this bizarre thing—jump out of an airplane! But as soon as I exit the plane, it's like stepping into another dimension. Suddenly everything seems very real and very correct. Free-fall is much more real than everyday existence."

One last sensation that arises in edgework may appear to undermine my approach. Although the preceding discussion is based on a body of rich descriptive data reported by edgeworkers themselves, many edge-work enthusiasts regard the experience as ineffable. They maintain that language simply cannot capture the essence of edgework and therefore see it as a waste of time to attempt to describe the experience. Indeed, some believe that talking about edgework should be avoided because it contaminates one's subjective appreciation of the experience. Fortunately, not all edgeworkers hold this view, as indicated by the growing body of primary data on this subject.[8]

The characteristics and sensations I have described obviously vary in intensity from one form of edgework to another. For instance, fear and the sensations associated with it are obviously more pronounced in the life-and-death circumstances of skydiving than they are in the consciousness-versus-unconsciousness edgework of excessive alcohol use. However, edgeworkers tend to search for more purified forms of edgework. Some achieve this goal by *artificially* increasing the risks, as when sky divers jump under the influence of drugs or when mountain climbers make an ascent without oxygen tanks. These patterns suggest another general principle of edgework—the commitment to get as close as possible to the edge without going over it.

Finally, it is important to discuss concepts relevant to voluntary risk taking that bear some resemblance to the notion of edgework. In an early essay on this subject, Erving Goffman conceptualizes risk-taking behavior as "action," which he defines as behavior that is consequential for the individual, that has problematic outcomes, and that is undertaken for its own sake (1967, p. 185). Goffman's empirical illustrations of the concept of action include many of the same activities I have classified as edge-work: high-risk occupations and leisure activities, combat experience, drug use, and the like. The difference between edgework and action, however, can be found in the broader scope of Goffman's conceptualization, especially his inclusion of such activities as gambling and thrill seeking in his illustrative material. The data I have examined indicate that these latter activities are not properly classified as edgework.

Edgeworkers are not typically interested in thrill seeking or gambling because they dislike placing themselves in threatening situations involving circumstances they cannot control. Since amusement-park rides or similar activities involve placing one's fate in the hands of a ride operator of unknown competence, these activities are usually avoided. As indicated above, edgeworkers have high regard for their own abilities to deal with danger but low

regard for the abilities of those outside edgework circles. Moreover, they feel equally uncomfortable when their well-being is left to the whims of "fate." Edgeworkers do not place much value on a pure gamble, no matter what the odds may be. What they seek is the chance to exercise skill in negotiating a challenge rather than turn their fate over to the roll of the dice.[9]

A second concept that has much in common with the edgework idea is Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's (1985, p. 491) notion of "flow," which refers to a state of focused attention or deep concentration on a limited set of stimuli, accompanied by a distorted sense of time, a feeling of personal transcendence, and merging of the individual with the objects at hand. But while these characteristics bear an obvious resemblance to the edgework sensations discussed above, flow differs from edgework in some important ways. For instance, the structural parameters of the two experiences are fundamentally different: "Every conscious experience lies on a continuum ranging from boring sameness at one end to enjoyable diversity at the center and, finally, to anxiety-producing chaos at the further end. It is in the enjoyable middle regions of experience that one's attention is fully effective. This optimal state of involvement with experience, or flow, is in contrast with the extremes of boredom and anxiety, which can be seen as states of alienated attention" (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981, p. 185).

As we have seen, experiences belonging to the "enjoyable middle regions" cannot be classified as edgework since, by definition, edgework involves the extreme state referred to by these authors as "anxiety-producing chaos." The different structural correlates of the two types of experience account for some differences in sensation as well. While the flow state produces a loss of self-consciousness (Csikszentmihalyi 1985, p. 491), edgework stimulates a heightened sense of self and a feeling of omnipotence, sensations described above as self-determination or self-actualization.

An examination of the similarities and differences between edgework and these other concepts suggests that they may each refer to different dimensions of the same general phenomenon. It appears that edgework activities represent a distinct subset of those activities that Goffman has classified as action. At both levels, people seem to experience elements of the flow phenomenon, a set of sensations that can characterize a broader range of activities, including some forms of play and certain types of work. Although it is beyond the scope of the present study to sort out the precise connections among these related concepts, this is an important matter for future research in this area.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I have endeavored in this essay to articulate a new approach for understanding voluntary risk taking. To conceive of this form of behavior as edgework is to understand it as a type of experiential anarchy in which the individual moves beyond the realm of established social patterns to the very fringes of ordered reality. The fact that many people find this type of experience alluring and seek to repeat it as often as possible is an important critical statement on the nature of modern social life.

There can be little doubt that the greatest impediment to further progress in the study of voluntary risk taking is the lack of data on this important subject. It is hoped that the present study will help to guide future empirical analyses in this area of research. Complete validation of the model I have proposed will require, at the very least, more evidence relating to the institutional circumstances (especially in the domain of work) of edgework enthusiasts—in particular, data that measure the degree to which alienation and oversocialization characterize the institutional routines of those who value the edgework experience. Also, the present framework would acquire even greater explanatory utility if it

can be documented that the number of Americans engaging in edgework is increasing (relative to other kinds of leisure activities) with the number of people who experience alienation and oversocialization in their institutional roles. I have specifically avoided the implication that this paper tests such a thesis because of the lack of relevant data, but this is clearly one important avenue for future research.

As a final note, I would like to call attention to an even greater paradox than the one referred to at the beginning of this essay. It is certainly strange that people voluntarily place themselves at risk even as public organizations endeavor to reduce the risks of living in modern society. It is even more startling to realize that these people value risk taking because it is the only means they have for achieving self-determination and authenticity. The same society that offers so much in the way of material "quality of life" also propels many of us to the limits of our mortal existence in search of ourselves and our humanity.

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Notes

2 A recent cover story in *Time* magazine (Skow 1983) is indicative of the increased media attention to dangerous sports and daring exploits in the past decade. Another example of the recent interest in voluntary risk taking is its celebration in the popular culture. The catchphrase of the 1980s seems to be the exhortation to "go for it." The merits of actively seeking high-risk situations appear as a dominant theme in many pop cultural domains as well. In popular music, a high-energy, "take it to the limit" style is dominant. And in television programming and advertising, series characters and the users of advertised products are often engaged in some exciting, high-risk endeavor. Finally, the movie industry has also played a significant role in giving expression to this theme; witness the success in recent years of the *Indiana Jones* and similar movies.

3 The only study within this tradition perhaps exempt from this criticism is Michael Balint's (1959) analysis of the "philobatic/ocnophilic" continuum.

4 The author completed a parachute training course and made a number of jumps during the period of study.

5 A representative sampling of the secondary sources used in this part of the study include the folowing: aircraft test piloting (Wolfe 1979; Thompson 1979), mountain climbing (Mitchell 1983), combat soldiering (Marshall 1968), prostitution (James 1980), drug use (Thompson 1971, 1979), gambling (Kusyszyn 1980), scuba diving (Blau 1980), rock climbing (Fawcett 1987), ice climbing (Lowe 1987), auto racing (Wilkinson 1973), motorcycle racing (*Cycle* 1985–88), endurance sports (Gross 1986), downhill skiing (Loudis et al. 1986), and criminal behavior (Toch 1980).

6 This pattern was especially prevalent among the group of sky divers observed in this study. Members of the group made explicit conceptual connections between skydiving and other high-risk activities such as high-speed motorcycle riding, hang gliding, drug use, etc. (see Lyng and Snow 1986).

7 This view has also received formal expression in a well-known skydiving handbook (Works 1975), whose author (p. 5) states that "relative work" is "done largely with one's imagination."

8 It should be noted that the data collected in my study of the skydiving group were not easily acquired. In the early stages of the study, I was constantly frustrated in my attempt to get sky divers to talk about the jump experience. The typical response to my probing questions was, "If you want to know what it's like, then do it!" It was only after the respondents became convinced that I shared their commitment to edgework that they were willing to try to articulate their feelings about the experience.

9 Wolfe also finds this attitude prevalent among test pilots (1979, pp. 18–19).

10 Concepts from both the Marxian and Meadian traditions have been used in a previous study to analyze one type of high-risk activity—the sport of mountain climbing. Richard Mitchell (1983) employs a number of sociological concepts and perspectives to account for various aspects of the mountain-climbing experience but ignores the recent literature on the Marx-Mead synthesis.

11 In his exploration of the concepts of activity, work, and creativity, Marx employs the "relational" method of analysis (see Ollman 1971), in which he first establishes an identity among these three concepts (at some points using these terms interchangeably) and then later carefully distinguishes among them. This apparent inconsistency is a crucial analytical device: Marx uses each term to bring out "certain aspects of what is essentially the same interaction between man and nature" (Ollman 1971, p. 104).

12 It should be acknowledged that many forms of gambling *do* involve highly developed skills such as calculating odds, executing bluffs, etc. These forms of gambling can be properly classified as edgework.

13 Another area of study that is relevant to the problem under discussion here is research on the subject of the "locus of control." Langer's polar distinction between the "illusion of control" and "learned helplessness" may correlate with the more general distinction between an "internal" and an "external" locus of control (see Rotter 1966; Lefcourt 1982).

14 This model belongs to an older tradition of collective-behavior theories that rest on the assumption that crowd behavior is pathological.

15 I have chosen the terms "nonpersonal" and "noninstitutional" rather than "nonsocial" in recognition of some insights into Meadian theory provided by scholars researching self-esteem. Franks and Marolla (1976) argue that action by the individual on an impersonal, physical environment (which is the basis of inner self-esteem) is no less "social" in nature than symbolic interaction between social actors.

16 This way of conceptualizing self-actualization is probably relevant only to the experience of members of Western culture. Only within the context of Western individuality would we expect to find such a positive emotional response to the experience of personal authorship in one's actions.

17 There are additional reasons to question the applicability of Turner's locus-of-self model to edgework. While edgeworkers seem to belong to the category of "impulsives," closer examination reveals some problems with classifying edgeworkers this way. In a section of Turner's essay that describes the key differences between the institutional and impulsive loci of self, the following crucial passage appears: "Under the institution locus, the real self is revealed only when the individual is in full control of his faculties and

behaviors. . . . When control is impaired by fatigue, stress, alcohol, or drugs, an alien self displaces the true self. . . . If use of alcohol is viewed with favor, it is only on condition that the user is able to practice moderation or 'hold his liquor,' *maintaining control in spite of alcohol*" (1976, p. 993; emphasis mine). If the ability to maintain control is a key characteristic of institutional behavior, then conceiving of edgeworkers as "impulsives" is problematic. I have noted that maintaining control in situations in which one's faculties are altered by fatigue, stress, drugs, etc., is an essential feature of edgework. Hence, while some aspects of edgework are consistent with the impulse locus, this latter feature belongs, by Turner's definition, to the institutional locus. In discussing the difference between institutional and impulsive loci, Turner stresses that the two categories are *analytical* constructs that do not necessarily distinguish clear-cut empirical types. He explicitly notes that most people are a mixture of the institutional and impulse anchorages of self. The data I have used for describing edgework speak to the importance of this point.

Reading 20

Resistance as Edgework in Violent Intimate Relationships of Drug-Involved Women

Rajah Valli

Introduction

Early research on intimate partner violence (IPV) minimized women's ability to shape their own lives. Women were seen as 'trapped' in their oppressive positions by gender inequalities, broadly defined. Later literature recognized women's active adaptations to a hostile relationship environment—their ability to make realistic appraisals of risk and to structure their responses accordingly (Dunn 2005). With its primary focus on the effects of violence, this body of literature nevertheless still conceived of violently victimized women primarily as objects of oppressive forces. Recent scholarly work has explored women's active attempts to resist male control and violence through a range of acts, including self-defense and retaliation, challenging their partners' financial control, seeking informal assistance through friends and family and seeking formal assistance through social-control agencies (such as the police), all in an effort to stem their partners' use of violence (Abraham 2000). By whatever means and to whatever purpose—to secure critical resources, to enhance physical safety, to police a subjectively important symbolic boundary—some degree of resistance to extreme male control appears to be an imperative to women in violent intimate relationships.

Not so much counterbalancing as coexisting with the imperative to resist patriarchal control is a set of factors encouraging many violently victimized women to preserve their relationships. While feminist scholars originally chalked women's susceptibility to such factors up to false consciousness, subsequent research untangled the complexity of the phenomenon. Notably, recent research has examined women's lives up close and has tried,

without stigmatizing this course of action, to explain why some women choose to remain in and even work to maintain their violent intimate relationships (Dunn 2005). The costs and benefits of such relationships vary with context. For inner-city women, for instance, violent men may still be valued for the material support they provide (Raphael 2000), and their presence in the household may enhance women's social status and increase their children's physical safety (Fine *et al*. 2000). Yet, for any woman who adapts to rather than abandons a violent intimate relationship, the dual imperatives to resist patriarchal control on one hand, and to maintain the relationship on the other, create a situation of sociological ambivalence, in which the multiple, contradictory roles she inhabits give rise to potentially conflicting normative expectations and privileges (Merton and Beirber, 1976; Connidis and McMullin 2002). Typically, cultural conventions and social relations necessitate that women manage sociological ambivalence in intimate relationships through oscillating practices of accommodation and resistance (Connidis and McMullin 2002).

This paper looks at a population of poor, drug-using, largely African-American and Puerto Rican women with habitually violent male intimate partners to examine one particular practice: the use of edgework as resistance to violent exploitation and patriarchal control. It is based upon an empirical investigation and the analyses presented here have important implications for criminology, particularly for a body of IPV scholarship that examines women's lived experience of violence. The analyses are informed by, and add to, research conducted in other areas of criminology—research that recognizes the body not merely as an entity that constrains or enables certain kinds of crime or victimization, but as central to the social order generally and to criminal action or performance particularly (Ferrell and Sanders 1995; Katz 1988). From this perspective, IPV can be viewed as a criminal practice that is constructed, experienced and even avoided in and through embodied practices, discourses and social relationships (Monaghan 2004). This is not to say that existing IPV research has

completely ignored the importance of the body. It has argued, for instance, that men often constrain and visibly injure women's bodies as part of larger processes of control. Importantly, however, this paper demonstrates the specific importance of an embodied perspective when evaluating women's actions in relationships characterized by IPV. Likewise, victim-precipitation theories (Hindelang *et al*. 1981) suggesting that women act in ways that increase their risk of victimization have been criticized for ignoring the asymmetrical power relations that help explain violence against women and the ways in which women regulate or adapt their practices and even their bodies to avoid it. The analyses presented here suggest that when women resist IPV with a skillful, embodied performance, they not only self-regulate, but also exercise control over themselves and over a given interaction, which in turn yields its own embodied rewards. Finally, developing the embodied perspective here proposed may be of particular importance to criminology given the legal and criminal justice responses to IPV that increasingly identify the body as a site on which specific legal determinations are to be made. In New York State, for instance, where this research was conducted, a 1996 amendment to the Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act requires that police officers ascertain degrees of physical injury and differentiate offensive from defensive wounds when making domestic-violence arrests[1] (NY Crim. Proc. Law § 140.10(4)(c) (McKinney Supp. 2001)).

Resistance

Resistance—which can be broadly understood as nonconformist behaviour that questions the legitimacy of a prevailing social order—may be a necessary element in any relationship of dominance (McFarland 2004; Foucault 1978), but in the intimate relationships examined here, its consequences can be severe. Research has linked the high rates of partner violence

that drug-involved women experience—more than two to three times the 21–34 per cent range found in surveys of the general population (El-Bassel *et al*. 2005)—to their social marginalization and symbolic degradation (Ettorre 2004). Approximately 90 per cent of this study's participants reported a lifetime prevalence of physical assault in their intimate relationships, and roughly three-quarters experienced some form of sexual coercion by an intimate partner during their lifetimes. For more than two-thirds of the women, an attack by an intimate partner resulted in physical injury, with half of such cases causing unconsciousness, broken bones or requiring a visit to a doctor. Study participants experienced comparable rates and intensity of violence with their current intimate partners, who were the principal focus of discussion in this study.

In light of their experience with partner violence and their sociologically ambivalent position, it is not surprising that study participants rarely adopted overt means to resist their partners' controlling behaviour. Research has made similar findings for resistance in very different relations similarly marked by a significant imbalance of power, such as relationships between peasants and oppressive overseers. These studies assume that 'oppressors' usually suppress any perceived challenge to their authority and that individuals facing the threat of retaliation for their actions, and often operating in situations of near-constant surveillance, must find unique, less open forms of resistance if they are to resist. In such contexts, individuals creatively reinvent and extend the meanings of everyday actions to express their opposition while masking their true intentions (Scott 1985). Physical acts of resistance are sometimes employed, though typically in ways that obscure their full meaning, as when oppressed workers feign illness to oppose their exploitation.

The situation of one labourer among many acting against the wishes of a controlling power is rather different, however, from the situation of a wife disobeying her violent and controlling husband. Without the cover of anonymity, one intimate partner openly resisting

the controlling powers of another runs the obvious risk of reprisals. Furthermore, violent retaliation to an overt act of resistance solidifies the meaning of the resistant act, and may tangibly impact the relationship in ways that the woman does not desire. Covert action, on the other hand, provides protection from violent retaliation, and because of its ambiguity, it also allows multiple meanings to be attached to it, enabling a greater range of actions to be taken in the future.

The minority, drug-using women in this study undertake a wide variety of both overt and covert acts in defiance of their partners' authority. Here, I examine a particular form of this resistance in which meaning is somewhat obscured, though not so much as to render the act risk-free and devoid of embodied rewards. I analyse instances of such resistance as 'edgework'—a term originally used to describe volitional risk-taking activities like skydiving—activities in which participants knowingly court the danger of physical injury but deploy context-specific expertise as their means of avoiding such injury.

Two interrelated questions are here addressed: (1) What constitutes edgework, and why does it make sense as a resistance strategy in the context of a violent intimate relationship? (2) What kind of edgework-resistance do these women engage in, and what are the risks and benefits of their actions? The answers to these questions will add to existing scholarship on edgework (Lyng 2005) by recognizing the phenomenon in the context of everyday life and by exploring how its practice might be differentiated across gender, class and race. This paper also advances resistance literature by examining an under-developed perspective on the benefits of resistance, and it joins a well developed body of scholarship calling for greater clarification of the impact of resistance (Hollander and Einwohner 2004; Rubin 1996).

Edgework as resistance

The concept of edgework was originally developed to describe dangerous recreational activities like skydiving—voluntary behaviours undertaken in a highly controlled fashion but entailing a clearly observable threat to one's physical well-being (Lyng 1990). The concept was extended to describe similar behaviour by those who pursue dangerous professions such as emergency rescue work (Lois 2005). As different as skydiving and rescue work may be, they share several factors from the perspective of the edgework paradigm. Skydivers and rescue workers alike engage in intense preparation before putting themselves in harm's way. Unprepared individuals undertaking either activity would find the line between safety and danger to be thin. An edgeworker, on the other hand, through careful preparation, transforms a clear line between safety and danger into a risk-filled but survivable border zone (Milovanovic 2005). Metaphorically speaking, he turns a nearly perpendicular drop-off from a plane of total security into a steep but navigable edge from which he may retreat to safety, but on which he will pay dearly for any false move.

From a sociological standpoint, edgework takes place not just within a boundary zone between safety and harm, but also between order and chaos, or between normative and non-normative practices (Lyng 2005). In approaching the limits of physical safety, edge-workers are freed from social roles. When self-reflection falls away, individuals experience transcendence marked not primarily by fear, but by intense feelings of excitement, self-determination and even omnipotence (Lyng 1990). Edgework can be viewed as a form of resistance to specific contradictions of late capitalism, wherein institutions increasingly privilege self-control, calculation and routinization while themselves being considerably destabilized (Lyng 2005; O'Malley and Mugford 1994). In the context of social-institutional restrictions and risks, edgework can also be conceptualized as an 'ethic' and skill-set that individuals develop to navigate an environment that fails to provide them with a coherent social experience (Lyng 2005; McDonald 1999; Young 2003). A coherent social experience,

of course, is exactly what an individual whose social position is characterized by extreme sociological ambivalence lacks. I propose, therefore, to extend the edgework paradigm by applying it to an inquiry into oppressive intimate relationships. In this context, edgework functions not as a way in which individuals momentarily escape the figurative strictures of modern social existence, but as a way in which they might periodically challenge the literal strictures of their oppressed position.

For women involved in intimate relationships marked by a history of drug use and violence, edgework represents a mode of resistance to patriarchal privilege and control. As it does for other individuals in very different contexts, edgework for this study's participants entails a conscious departure from a zone of safety into a zone of relative danger. It entails courting physical harm by defying their violent partners' wishes absent any practical exigency demanding that they do so. It requires context-specific expertise, born of intense preparation. And when carried out successfully, it delivers embodied rewards.

An examination of the processes discussed above requires a methodology that allows us to capture women's lived experience up close.

Investigation

A combined theoretical and convenience-sampling strategy was used to recruit 50 women from three Methadone Maintenance Treatment Programs (MMTPs) in New York City to participate in 98 in-depth interviews and a close-ended survey questionnaire over a two-and-a-half-year period. Potential participants were told that the study was not connected to the clinic in any way and that its aim was to gain a better understanding of the lives of women on methadone generally, and of their experiences in relationships particularly. At first, women were scheduled to take part in interviews on a first-come, first-served basis. Then, as

interview slots started to fill up, particular women were targeted so that the pool of interview participants would match the racial/ethnic background of the clinic population as a whole, which was roughly 58 per cent Latino (predominantly Puerto Rican), 27 per cent African American and 16 per cent Caucasian.

A woman was deemed eligible for the study if she was 'drug-involved' and if, based on her responses to the revised CTS2 scale (Straus *et al*. 1996), she acknowledged being 'abused'[2] by a 'primary' heterosexual romantic partner during the past year. Drug-involvement was defined by eligibility requirements for methadone treatment: at least one year of opiate use and demonstrated tolerance and abstinence (withdrawal) symptoms (Hartel 1993). A 'primary partner' was defined as a person whom the respondent described as a boyfriend, spouse, ex-spouse, regular male sexual partner or the father of her children *and* with whom the respondent had: (1) engaged in a regular dating or sexual relationship within the past year; (2) lived with in the past year and *formerly* had a dating or sexual relationship; or (3) shared childcare responsibilities within the past year and formerly had a dating or sexual relationship. This broad definition of intimate partners is similar to that commonly used in other domestic-violence research (Fagan and Browne 1994). Participants were paid $20 for each interview that they completed.

All participants completed a baseline in-depth interview and a closed-ended survey instrument that investigated demographic characteristics. Interviews focused on participants' personal biographies and the broader cultural and social forces that shaped their lived experience. Respondents were asked to reconstruct the transactions that occurred within several distinct incidences of IPV. A second in-depth interview was undertaken with a sub-sample of 30 women who met an additional sampling criterion: that their primary partners were also drug-involved during the course of their relationships with the participants. The second in-depth interview covered several topical areas to examine not only the ways in

which the women in the study had engaged in and responded to conflict in their relationships, but also how financial and drug interdependencies impacted these dynamics. Additional questions focused on women's own use of violence in their relationships, how such violent engagements began and how they were resolved. Finally, a third interview was conducted with a further sub-sample of 18 women who had participated in the first two interviews and who had been in the longest-lasting relationships to ascertain the impact that relationship longevity may have on women's responses to IPV.

An open-ended, longitudinal, multiple-wave design was used to augment the intimacy between the researcher and the interviewees, to encourage freer disclosure and to provide an internal check on the consistency of interviewees' responses. In an effort to ensure that women's accounts of their experiences were not overly constructed by the research protocol, I employed an 'active interviewing' approach (Holstein and Gubrium 1997). All interviews were audio-taped. The data in this paper are based on the 93 in-depth interviews that were transcribed verbatim. (Five initial baseline interviews were excluded.) To ensure confidentiality, all names of participants have been changed.

Data Organization

Sample characteristics

The overall sample included in this analysis includes seven Caucasians, 23 Latinas (including 20 Puerto Ricans) and 15 African-Americans—proportions that roughly match the racial/ethnic characteristics of the clinic population as a whole. The average age of study participants was 38. The women in this study generally fit the profile of individuals typically classified as members of the underclass. The majority were raised in families plagued by various social problems, including poverty, parental absence or neglect, suicide, drug

addiction and violence. They have continued to experience many of these same problems in their own adult lives. In the first year of this study, the average annual income of the women was $5,442. During the previous year, almost a quarter had been homeless, and roughly three-quarters reported having too little money to feed themselves and their families. Almost all participants began bearing children before the age of 18, and they cared for these children—when they retained custody—as single mothers. The majority of the women did not finish high school, and during the study's first year, 95 per cent were unemployed, and roughly 85 per cent depended on government assistance for their survival. Because of the changing terms of welfare policy, the majority of these participants had recently seen or expected to see their public benefits cut or terminated in the near future. Further deepening the poverty of the women in the study was their history of drug use. Every participant had a history of heroin addiction, and the majority had been in methadone treatment for over five years. Their intimate partners had similar histories of drug use. Most of the women were poly-drug users at the time of their first interview, reportedly using heroin, crack and other forms of cocaine in addition to methadone.

The majority of the women had been in the relationships they discussed in this study for more than seven years and had shared a household with this male partner during at least some of that period. Like other drug-involved women, study participants have histories of exposure to other forms of violence in their lives, including physical and sexual abuse in childhood and various forms of street violence as adults (see Sterk 1999; Maher 1997).

Analysis

Edgework is a concept that was originally developed to explain dangerous recreational and professional activities. Translating it to a very different kind of risk-taking activity—

resistance to violence and control in an intimate relationship—reveals certain significant differences that expand the edgework concept rather than pushing it beyond its useful limits.

Risk thresholds and the rewards of resistance

A fundamental quality of edgework is the sensation that it delivers—the sometimes transcendent thrill of putting oneself in harm's way and surviving (Lyng 2005). Edge-work as a form of resistance in violent intimate relationships appears to deliver similar rewards—not thrills, perhaps, but at least a sense of accomplishment and personal authorship for having defied the constraints of a controlling intimate partner. An act that constitutes defiance in one relationship, however, may not do so in another because the meaning of an act varies from setting to setting. Furthermore, the negative consequences of defiance may be far greater in one relationship than in another. It stands to reason, then, that the rewards experienced by different women undertaking the same act of resistance will vary with the risk environment of each woman's intimate relationship.

Grace is an African-American woman who, at the time of our interviews, had been married to her husband for more than 25 years. Grace recounted that she would fantasize about poisoning her husband's food or putting ground glass in it to damage his internal organs. She also explained, however, that while she 'pictured' herself performing these acts, she would never commit them because they would distance her from the impact and pleasure of her resistance:

> Grace: I'd rather take a stick and whack him up his head, cause that way I could feel it. Maybe that's colder. If I was to hit him with a stick, I've swung, I connected, and I hit him. I could see the pain and the anger and his head go back from the blow. And I could

> see that I did it. (2B)

For Lucia, a Puerto Rican woman, on the other hand, a covert act of resistance that Grace would regard as unsatisfying carries with it some of the satisfaction Grace says she could gain only through open, physical resistance:

> Lucia: I would do little things like, if I would make him a sandwich or something, and if the bread fell on the floor I would pick it up and wipe it off and put it back . . . . I'll put it back in and give it to him.
>
> VR: How does it affect you when you do things like put the bread from the floor into the sandwich?
>
> Lucia: I don't know, it's just knowing that I did something that he wouldn't like, you know? Just knowing that if he knew that I did that, he would blow a fit . . . . Just knowing that I did that would give me like that little edge. (161B)

While Grace's husband had beaten her severely at times, Grace estimated that this had happened a dozen times in their 25 years together. Lucia's experience was different. The danger of violence in Lucia's intimate relationship was pervasive, and severe physical abuse regularly occurred. Not surprisingly, Lucia's threshold for deriving satisfaction from an act of resistance was far lower than Grace's. If edgework were defined solely in terms of taking risks and experiencing affective rewards, then the subjectivity of women's perceptions of risks and rewards would render the concept so broad as to be of little value. Edgework, however, has other defining characteristics, both as originally applied to high-risk recreational activities and violent intimate relationships.

Preparation for edgework

A *sine qua non* of edgework is the acquisition of special knowledge and/or skills that make a dangerous activity safe enough to undertake. In an edgework activity like skydiving, the laws of physics present all participants with the same risks, whether they jump for the first or for the thousandth time. Like fighter pilots and firefighters, skydivers gain mastery of their chosen risk-taking activity only through extensive firsthand experience, but they gain their basic skills and knowledge through formal training. The predictable nature of skydiving does not negate its dangers, but it has allowed for the development of a universally applicable safety curriculum. Given the variable risk environments from one intimate relationship to the next, no such objective safety guidelines apply to preparing for the kind of edgework discussed here. Yet, while firsthand experience may be the most important teacher for women resisting male violence and control in their intimate relationships, a kind of baseline early training often does play a crucial role.

In childhood, more than a quarter of study participants witnessed violence between their parents or primary caregivers, and in most cases this violence was directed toward respondents' mothers. Earlier studies have found that witnessing violence in childhood may increase a woman's aggressive responses to interpersonal conflict and her risk of being abused by an intimate partner (O'Leary 1988). The accounts I gathered were more nuanced, however, when it came to the impact of witnessing a mother's violent victimization. It appears that watching their mothers try to manage male violence gave study participants an early lesson in what and what not to do in their own violent relationships.

A long-term history of drug involvement provides a further common background of preparation for edgework, a body of knowledge and set of skills on which women frequently call in managing their violent partners. This experience and knowledge reflect an addict's

habitus (Bourdieu 2001)—the skills a drug user develops in interaction with other drug users which enable her to secure drugs, finesse the conditions under which she uses and manage her involvement in drug treatment. Study participants emphasized that their relationships with drug-using intimate partners were different from their relationships with other fellow drug-users because of their affective basis. Yet, even in their intimate relations, these women employed skills and strategies learned through drug use to manage the problems they had in their relationships. They learned, for instance, how their partners' patterns of drug use could be exploited in the interest of minimizing risk when undertaking an act of resistance. Women frequently reported, for instance, that both they and their partners wanted 'quiet' time after being medicated at methadone treatment programmes, so they would arrange things accordingly to minimize the likelihood that conflict would erupt if one partner disturbed the other. Women also recognized that approaching their partners at certain specific points in their drug cycles could lessen their risk that these men would become violent. Roberta, an African-American woman, explains how she strategically raised issues of concern that might provoke her partner's anger:

> Roberta: When I know he don't have nothing in his system, not even methadone, you know, and it's early in the morning, we just woke up, and we're getting ready to come to our programs [. . . .] So when he's not high, and I'm not high and have nothing in our system, then I would try to talk to him about things that upset me or things that I didn't like, or how to improve, make things better and everything, and then he would be agreeable and understandable and everything right. (28B)

Several other women reported employing a strategy similar to Roberta's, while others reported timing their acts of open resistance to periods when their partners were in the throes

of withdrawal, because at these times, their partners would be too ill to retaliate.

Finally, preparation for edgework as resistance to intimate partner violence can be seen in the skill-set and knowledge base gained by women through firsthand experience acting within a particular violent relationship. Having lived, hustled and taken drugs with their male partners sometimes over decades, women were aware of their various partners' likes, dislikes, strengths and weaknesses. The women routinely acted on the basis of this knowledge in every aspect of their relationships, including in their acts of resistance. As Lucia, the extremely cautious risk-taker quoted earlier, said:

> I've lived with him [my partner] for nine years, it's gonna be ten years and I know his weaknesses, I know his sleeping pattern. I know him. So, I know I COULD hurt him. Now he knows it, too, [so] it's like a tug of war you know. (161B)

Preparation for edgework in this context, however, also entails learning how far one can push the envelope. As with any dangerous activity, one can either approach a risk zone cautiously or headlong. While Lucia might be viewed as pursuing the former course, Anna, another study participant, took the latter. She recounted the following story about pretending to her partner that there was a rival for her affections:

> Anna: I told [my partner] that, you know, 'It's not working between us, so I think we should start seeing other people.' He goes 'Why, you got somebody?' I said 'Well, I met somebody. I'm not going with them, I didn't make love to him or nothing like that.' And then my foster brother happened to call right after . . . . [My partner] goes, 'Oh, your lover is already calling.' Then he turned around and threw one of those thick-ass, long, this-color crystal ashtrays—those thick ones, those big round ones. He hit me and my head

> split here. I had a blood clot on my head, my brain. That was the worst thing I coulda done. (123B)

Several women in the study strongly emphasized that when it comes to violence, 'every man is different'. We can extend this to the basic idea that the context of each act of violence and resistance is unique, as are the requirements of each 'successful' act of edgework.

These assumptions about the specificity of edgework-resistance notwithstanding, situations characterized by acute sociological ambivalence lend themselves especially well to edgework-resistance. For women, one such situation occurs around sexual practices, which involve inherently conflicting social constructions of women's sexuality. The women I spoke with articulated conflicting perspectives regarding sex in intimate relationships. On one hand, they espoused the belief that a woman should maintain an intimate relationship only to the extent that it is sexually satisfying and allows for emotional closeness and self-expression (cf. Giddens 1992). Yet, in tension with this perspective, the women in this study also reported working to satisfy their partners' sexual needs and desires as part of their 'wifely duties', sometimes at great personal cost.

Drug use and the public images associated with the sex practices of drug-involved women are implicated in women's sex lives as well. Drug use can negatively affect an individual's capacity to perform sexually and enjoy sexual activity and can even alter the perceived meaning of sexual activity. Moreover, male partners both forced unwanted sexual activity on study participants and controlled how these women experienced sex while high (El-Bassel *et al.* 2003). At the same time, women are haunted by prominent popular images associated with drug involved women such as that of the 'crack whore'—a woman so degraded that she will wantonly use her sexuality to secure resources for drugs and will engage in sexual activity simply because crack makes her desire sex (Campbell 2000). Although such public

images do not match the reality of their sex lives[3], the women I spoke with were cognizant of this imagery and sought to distance themselves from it. Both for the sake of intimacy and because of the real fear of violent victimization, women typically met their partners' demands and restrictions when it came to sex, but not always.

Examples of well executed edgework-resistance

Individuals who resist often do so spontaneously and opportunistically, minimizing the risks associated with opposing dominant actors (Scott 1985). Even spontaneous acts of edgework-resistance, however, draw upon knowledge and experiences that, in effect, constitute preparation for resistance. Frustrated with her inability to influence her partner Tony's patterns of violence through talk and cooperation, a Puerto Rican study participant seized an unplanned opportunity to resist her partner's controlling behaviour with a well played act of edgework:

> Ciara: I went down to the store and I was talking to Slick. [. . .] Slick told me, 'Ciara, when you come back, don't go to your house. Just keep going all the way up to the other apartment,' to where he's at. You know what I did first, though? I knock on my door, and I drop the bags, instead of taking the bags with me. [. . .] Tony opened the door, and I said, 'Tony, I'll be back.' And he said, 'Where you goin'?' And he see Slick goin' up. But he was scared of Slick, because [Slick]'s a drug dealer . . . 'cause he got guns, whatever. I knew he was scared of him. He know you can't fuck with him, 'cause you're gonna get your ass whipped. I said, 'Listen, I'll be right back. I gotta go upstairs, I gotta do something.' I stayed half an hour upstairs.

On the face of it, Ciara's provocative act was an extremely risky kind of resistance. She continues her narrative:

> When I was coming down the stairs, I was thinking to myself, 'Oh man, Tony's gonna be pissed off. He's gonna try to hit me or somethin'. I thought like that—boom! [Ciara makes a hitting motion in the air]—coming at me. But he wasn't on drugs—he was clean. So I guess, I don't know, for that or the frightness about Slick, or I don't know what, when I came in that house, and he said, 'What was it that you had to do that took you half and hour? What, you was with Slick upstairs?' [I said] 'So, what? I was just stay up in my friend's house.' He was with this face [Ciara makes a grimace] sitting down, wondering, thinking. [. . .] So I just chilled out, whatever. Then I took my shower, whatever, and we never spoke about it.

What makes this act successful edgework is not only that she escaped retaliation, but also that she escaped retaliation specifically because her partner's freedom of action was constrained by factors of which Ciara was very much aware. Ciara opportunistically chose to resist in a specific context in which her partner had every reason to accept her denials and thereby render her edgework successful. It is also worth noting that Tony was not high—a factor that Ciara earlier explained diminishes the likelihood that he will use violence against her.

Ciara experienced several pleasures through her act of edgework. First, Ciara presumably derived pleasure from the attentions of Slick, a man whom she reveals, later in her interview, she finds sexually attractive. Second, and critically, Ciara also experienced the pleasure that accompanies self-authoring a course of action and defying her often oppressive partner. As she concludes her story:

> He never, NEVER asked me [about Slick] no more, but I could see it. See, he never messed with me ’cause he was scared. I think that if it would have been somebody else, he would have probably went upstairs [after me] or whatever. (200B)

Ciara’s well played act of edgework helped stop her partner from retaliating with violence—a course of action that he has taken many times before.

A mastery of context selection can also be played out more subtly in edgework. To understand the story excerpted below, it is important to know that the study participant, Louisa, was highly skilled at manipulating men sexually because of her experience as a sex worker. Louisa relates an example of how she would defy her violent partner’s sexual expectations, which included his desire for acts she associated with sex work:

> Louisa: I would start off like uninterested, where he had to do more of the work [and] where he wasn’t getting his fulfillment. And he knew that my capabilities was far more advanced and he didn’t know why I wasn’t putting out, you understand? Then, all of a sudden, when he least expected it, boom. I would just whip it on him and it would be over with, cause he couldn’t take it, you know? Then he would wish that I stayed the way I was, cause it woulda last him longer, you know what I mean? (63B)

Louisa made it clear to me that in any other context, such an act of defiance on her part would have invited a serious and violent response from her partner. But beyond involving the exercise of context-specific expertise, what makes her act such a fine example of edgework is Louisa’s selection of a sexual context for her defiance. The thrill and pleasure associated with the edgework performed by both Louisa and Ciara derives in part because both women believed their partners had a level of awareness that they were being thwarted. While this

made the risks they were taking real, both women counted on their partners' not responding with violence because doing so would acknowledge the emasculating defiance and illuminate the men's tenuous control. As Lousa continued:

> And he say, 'Please stop, wait, wait, if you don't I'm a come.' And he would be like, 'Oh god. I know you must think I'm a real wimp.' Cause it would be, and this is no lie, I could count up to sixty, and it be finished.

Louisa describes her feelings in bringing her mastery to bear in an act of defiance:

> Louisa: I knew my qualifications. I was on the street for a couple of years you get to learn each man, their weak spots, stuff like that. [. . .] I knew everything about him, what not to do, what to do. [I'd tell myself] 'Oh you could make a man stand on his head if you wanted to.' I would pat myself on the back, you know what I mean? He would be begging me to stop because I was too good. (63B)

As we can see, Louisa expressed a sense of accomplishment and personal authorship that are the ultimate goal of successful edgework.

Discussion

Recent scholarship examines the everyday life experiences of women in violent relationships and challenges conventional understandings of such women as passive actors trapped by their experiences. What is left undeveloped in much of this work, however, is an examination of how women author their own experiences even in the midst of extremely oppressive

situations. The present research attempts to fill part of this gap by drawing on scholarship on resistance, sociological ambivalence and edgework.

Poor, drug-using, largely African-American and Puerto Rican women with habitually violent male partners experience profound sociological ambivalence in their intimate relationships, operating under contradictory imperatives to resist their partners' violence and patriarchal control without threatening the stability of their relationships. Edgework is a mode of resistance that serves these competing imperatives while giving oppressed women the opportunity to experience the rewards of self-authorship. In the context of intimate relationships, the specialized knowledge that is a defining characteristic of edgework is largely habitual and gained in daily life. In terms of risks and rewards, however, the volitional acts described here and undertaken by women in defiance of their violent male partners closely approximate the risks and rewards of 'traditional' edgework.

Scholars have noted that the kind of activities typically associated with edgework—skydiving, stock-trading—are typically out of reach for poor minorities (O'Malley and Mungford 1994; Miller 1991). However, the risky environments navigated daily by poor minorities in the inner city, and particularly by those who use drugs, can be viewed as training ground for various other kinds of edgework. Employing the skills they have acquired in their daily lives to the edgework they practice in their violent intimate relationships, women not only respond to risks posed by their partners, but they also play with the line that separates safety from danger—a defining aspect of edgework.

It is worth noting that most of the examples of resistance cited earlier involved sexuality and sexual fidelity. In every aspect of their intimate relationships, study participants find their actions constrained by the threat of male violence, yet they are also aware of the power they hold in the context of sexual relations, whether because of cultural meanings broadly associated with women's sexuality, because of the especially high value placed on sex as a

form of capital in contexts of long-term drug use, or because of some combination of both (Bourdieu 2001; Maher 1997). In examining strategies of resistance by which women leverage this power, the research reported here adds an important new perspective to existing literature by suggesting that edgework may be differentiated across gender, class and race.

The resistance concept itself is also refined by this research in several ways. Existing research has been criticized for its failure to specify when resistance is likely to occur. This paper argues that women are particularly prone to and may be particularly capable of resisting masculine domination when negotiating sociological ambivalence in their intimate relationships. Existing resistance scholarship has also been criticized for falling into one of two extremes: either allowing almost any act to be interpreted as resistance (Scott 1985) or leaving too little room for the possibility of resistance by overplaying the social and cultural forces that limit it (Radway 1991). By applying the concept of edgework to the intimate sphere, this paper lays out one way in which oppressed women can and do perform clear and specific acts of resistance to patriarchal control, even in the face of strong forces discouraging such action. Finally, this research adds a previously missing piece to the resistance literature, which has pointed to the embodied pleasures and escape of resistance without necessarily articulating the conditions that produce such pleasures.

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that while edgework as a form of resistance to intimate partner violence may offer visceral rewards, it does not necessarily constitute a victory for women, and may even help to reproduce gender inequality. Instances of failed edgework, in particular, may have dire repercussions for women. Nevertheless, the embodied experience of successful edgework may lead women to identify contradictions in their social position, which may, in turn, lead to changes in consciousness that counteract their oppression.

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Notes

1 The recognition that procedural problems with the implementation of this 1994 act had contributed to the wrongful arrest of individuals in domestic disputes led to the addition, two years later, of a "Primary Physical Aggressor" (PPA) provision to the law (N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.10 (4)(c) (McKinney Supp. 2001). When making arrest decisions, police officers are directed to identify the Primary Physical Aggressor (PPA) by evaluating the following four factors: 1) the comparative extent of any injuries inflicted by and between the parties; 2) whether either party is threatening or has threatened future harm against another household member; 3) whether either party has a prior history of domestic violence that can be reasonably ascertained; 4) whether either party acted defensively to protect himself or herself from injury.

2 The Conflict Tactics Scale 2 defines violence as "an act carried out with the intention or perceived intention of causing pain or injury to another person" and examines physical,

sexual and emotional acts that meet these criteria (Hudson and MacIntosh 1981). Because violence is a subjective experience, when women characterized as “violent” a phenomenon outside of this definition, I report it (DeKesseredy and Schwartz 1998).

3 For instance, typically, women described how when they were using cocaine or crack, they “felt sexy” or sensual but did not actually want physical contact. In contrast, crack use increased their partners’ desire to have sex. It is notable that crack had opposite and incompatible effects on their sexual desires and the sexual desires of their partners. Predictably, this often encouraged conflict between them.

21. Connections: Parkour through Labeling, Resistance, and Edgework

John J. Brent

Introduction

Unclipping the front support strap from his backpack, he walks to the end of the rooftop to get a better view of the landing obscured by the building's height. The plan is to jump approximately thirty feet from one rooftop to the next. Rather than taking the conventional route to the next building by utilizing elevators, stairs, sidewalks, and doors, this participant of parkour reconstructs rooftops within the city as mere launching and landing platforms. In essence, his plan challenges and resist the norms and rules built into the environment to re-appropriate rooftops and ledges as sites of exhilaration.

After taking a quick look over the edge, he returns to the center of the building where he prepares for the jump. The backpack, in order to reduce weight and imbalance, is ditched; shoe laces are tightened and tucked in; and a couple run passes are taken to ensure proper footing. Across the way, a friend helps guarantee a successful landing by examining the area and removing any potentially hazardous debris. At this point, the jump has been discussed, planned, and thoroughly scrutinized.

Without hesitation he takes off, resembling a sprinter trying to maximize the limited running space. Reaching the edge of the building his right foot plants with inches to spare, his left knee forcefully drives up, and both arms swing forward to help initiate the jump. Despite the power

> and force generated, his body regroups into a symmetrical form as he soars across the gap. Should the jump fail, pavement, metal trash dumpsters, and a few parked cars are all that's left to break his fall. However, midway through the skill it is clear he has the distance to reach the rooftop across the ally. The task now has quickly shifted from the jump to negotiating a safe landing. As both feet touch down a safe distance from the ledge, his body coils to absorb the impact of the landing and reduce the possibility of injury. Still carrying a good deal of forward momentum, he tucks his right shoulder and seamlessly transitions into a forward roll before springing up to his feet. As he looks back, excitement runs through his body, there is a sense of satisfaction, thrill, and – of course – celebration. This is parkour.

As the description above highlights, parkour (or free-running) is often marked by its physical displays of uninhibited behavior, daring feats of unconventional skill, and sheer wonderment for both practitioners and onlookers. Although founded in the small suburb of Lisses in Paris during the 1980s, this international phenomenon has become a lifestyle sport practiced by many. The primary goal of parkour is to travel the city by running, jumping, balancing, climbing, and vaulting over encountered obstacles as efficiently and fluidly as possible (Bavinton 2007). By showcasing daring leaps, exciting acrobatics, and unrestrained movement, this new sport has generated massive audiences and has become part of popular culture. This is evidenced by the growing number of movies, commercials, clothing lines, internet websites, and gyms catering to the activity of parkour. Despite its appeal to many, parkour is considered an urban nuisance by many

because it violates norms about how public space is to be used (Thomson 2008). Being a risk-laden activity that is marginalized by society yet alluring to its practitioners, this new urban sport provides a rich field for theoretical investigation.

In the essay, I use parkour to contrast the labeling, resistance and edgework perspectives. This essay proposes that edgework is an important extension of labeling theory that will advance our understanding of deviance in contemporary society. More specifically, labeling theory has argued that social reactions to deviant behavior amount to informal and formal social control of those who engaged in it. Labels and stigma were believed to shame deviants into more conforming behavior.

Contemporary ideas about social control in society (Grattet 2011), however, feature a much more invasive and excessive set of tools and practices. Researchers link this shift to the failure of the criminal justice system to provide effective security to the public. As Garland (2001) argues, individuals now face an unprecedented "culture of control" whereby ordinary behaviors have become subject to monitoring and regulation. Consequentially, societal reactions now extend far beyond mere labels and stigma; they have expanded to much grander notions about governing individuals in everyday life.

In response to this culture of control, edgework offers what contemporary society often deprives: the possibility for self-determination, uninhibited behavior, emotional outbursts, and spontaneous expression. More importantly, edgework provides opportunity for seizing control and realizing choice, expression, and autonomy.

This essay offers an overview of the basic tenants of labeling theory, resistance, and edgework and how each understands the practice of parkour, i.e., free-running in urban space. Further, this essay considers how an edgework activity, such as parkour, can

be understood as a reaction to society's preoccupation with safety and order. Lastly, by offering a comparison of these conceptual frameworks, we can see the value of both classic and contemporary ideas of deviance in everyday life.

Parkour as a Deviant Label

Labeling theory is primarily concerned with how society reacts to non-normative behaviors. It does not consider certain individuals or actions inherently deviant. Therefore, parkour is not deviant per se, but only becomes so when people define it that way and sanction traceurs (free-runners). This societal reaction perspective, outlined in the Lemert (1974) reading in this section, refers to the processes through which individuals and groups respond to socially definitions of deviance. Central to this perspective, he adds, are the "expressions of disapproval" that are validated by sources of social control. That is, the labeling perspective is equipped to consider how free-running becomes (re)constructed as a social problem and urban nuisance. In short, special consideration is given to the disapproving societal reaction, not the act itself found in violation of established rules or laws.

In addition to examining why certain behaviors earn a deviant status, the labeling or societal reaction perspective also considers the successful application of the deviant label and its respective punishment. The reading by Lemert (1974), for instance, emphasizes that deviance studies should not only study societal reactions, but more importantly, the sources of social control that seek to "eliminate or ameliorate" deviant acts. In that same vein, Becker's (1963) seminal work *Outsider's*, shifted attention away from the causes of nonconformity to better consider how and why some acts are negatively labeled and punished. Becker (1963: 9) writes that deviance is:

> *not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an 'offender.' The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label* (Becker, 1963: 9).

Although parkour is currently popular, it has been viewed by authorities as a social disruption and nuisance to others. These reactions have culminated in both informal and formal sanctions against those engaging in free-running. As Lemert (1974) and the labeling theory would suggest, parkour was once constructed as a social problem by negative societal reactions, the application of the deviant label, and corresponding punishments. Although most states have not enacted legislation against the practice of free-running, it is still vulnerable to sanctions that come with "trespassing," "defacing public property," and "public disorder" laws.

While early labeling theory has focused on the process and consequence of deviant labels, recent studies have begun to situate the social construction of deviance alongside greater social control in society Grattet (2011). No longer are the core themes of labeling theory reserved for the deviant or criminal. Instead, they have helped establish a new mode of governance throughout society. Governance refers to new processes, actions, and forms of discipline that seek to rule individuals and society more broadly. This notion of contemporary governance closely relates to the labeling framework as each focus on the role of social control when handling deviant acts. Social theorists, for example, argue that modern social control practices and policies have made predicting, identifying, and *managing* risks that threaten the order, efficiency, and security of society a central objective (Erikson 2007; Simon 2007). These practices have paved the way for

an escalating culture of control shaping the operation of schools, workplaces, and public spaces (Garland 2001; Simon 2007). The ultimate task of this new paradigm of control is to maximize certainty in an uncertain world (Erikson 2007). Harking back to the labeling framework, resultant crime control practices are designed to expand definitions of deviance so to as manage an ever-broadening set of perceived threats to safety and order. These are oftentimes established by imposing rationality, reason, and order onto irrationality, emotion, and disorder. These developments have barricaded many avenues for authentic excitement, experience, and thrill seeking – a practice that may push young people to society's seductive and illicit margins.

Labeling theory, thus, provided a framework for understanding social control via the creation of deviant labels, sanctions, and social stigmatization. While meant to quash deviance initially, modern forms of social control have been intensified to include surveillance and security in everyday life. In other words, original formulations of labeling theory fall short in delivering the types of social control modern society demands. This, in turn, creates the possibility for new forms of resistance.

Parkour as Resistance

As stated above, the preoccupation with security has, in turn, created new forms of deviance. These deviant acts are often considered forms of resistance against modern social control practices that have blocked many avenues for self-expression and excitement. Parkour is one such act because it represents young people's desire for a sense of autonomy and power that goes against societal norms (see Presdee, 2000). It is a strike back against regulations about safety and order. *Thus, the transgressive nature of deviance seduces people into resisting social control.* Recent scholarship suggests that

acts of resistance and deviance have the ability to expose oppressive conditions forced upon individuals (Cohen 2004; Rajah 2007; Brotherton 2008 2011). Through this lens, resistance provides the means to establish a sense of control, and individual fulfillment in an increasingly regulated world.

The urban practice of parkour is said to stand in opposition to the governance model of society. Despite its growing appeal, support is often limited given both the strenuous physical requirements and – more importantly – lingering hesitance regarding free-running generally. For instance, in the parkour documentary Jump London, the mayor of Lisses discusses his reluctance to the once emerging sport:

> *Regarding this new discipline in our town, right at the beginning of my office as mayor, I was, I must say, quite surprised and worried because everyone could see young people up and down the walls like cats. I can't prevent young people from doing that, they are responsible for themselves. We can explain the risks to them, make available the equipment that they need, and if they feel like jumping, they can jump in total safety on mattresses and not on schools during lessons and retirement homes frightening elderly people.*

Parkour finds meaning in the intersection between risk, expression, and resistance. Ordinary objects and spaces, such as railings, stair cases, parking levels, and street lamps, provide traceurs – practitioners of parkour – the means for creativity, expression, and purposive action. According to the website *American Parkour*, the significance of this phenomenon is "it introduces us to complete freedom from restraining obstacles, and it is this freedom amidst the routine and regimentation of much of the modern society that make parkour very appealing." Studies of parkour suggests it exists

as a symbolic act; a form of resistance against the restraining qualities of the contemporary city. Bravington (2007), for instance, uncovered that traceurs upset authority within the city's environment by re-appropriating preplanned and predetermined space and using it in an alternative manner. Its objective becomes the discovery of original and creative ways to negotiate, move through, and re-appropriate fixed city-space.

For the traceur, city benches that designate places to sit transform into vaulting platforms; guardrails meant to guide and manage movement become openings to dive through; and rooftops deemed 'off limits' become surfaces to leap across. As one practitioner states, they often view and interact with the city in very different terms:

> *I think living in big cities like London is a crazy life. People don't look around them, they go straight on, they go to work, then go home, then sleep, then wake up and go….I think life in the city is too stressful as it is. We see the city as a playground* (Jump London).

Through employing specialized skills and voluntarily engaging in risk-taking activity, traceurs corrupt the functional purpose of the city by turning even the most controlling mono-dimensional environment into spaces of opportunity, creative inhabitation, free expression, and disorder. As participants approach this boundary between order and disorder, Parkour provides the literal and metaphorical 'edge' needed to challenge the social, cultural, and political constraints that have materialized in cities across the US.

Parkour as Edgework

Similar to the resistance framework, an expanding interest has emerged seeking to understand the individual motivations driving deviant acts (Ferrell et all. 2008; Katz, 1988; Lyng, 1990). One area of this field, conceptualized as “edgework”, explores the voluntary participation in risk-taking activities that involve ‘a clearly visible threat’ that individuals must negotiate by using specialized skill sets and particular individual abilities (Lyng, 1990). This is a new concept often utilized to explore the internal and cultural dynamics of deviance. Engaging in risk-taking activities is, thus, viewed as a way to fulfill a need for control, self-determination, stimulation, and arousal; it becomes a mechanism of resistance against oppression and restraint.

By way of example, the reading by Rajah (2007) utilizes the edgework perspective to examine the lived experiences of poor, minority, and drug involved women in violent relationships. Her research challenges the notion that women with few resources and in abusive relationships are passive actors. She finds that the women she studied resist violent exploitation and patriarchal control by employing skillful edgework acts. That is, women not only exercise self-control, they also draw from past experiences and knowledge to control potentially dangerous interactions. For example, one of Rajah’s respondents resisted her violent partner’s controlling behavior by exploiting his fears of another man in their building. By skillfully leveraging this knowledge, she was able to leave her apartment, negotiate a violent situation, and gain various rewards for doing so. Edgework type actions, as Rajah discovers, offer women the means necessary to contest their oppressive conditions by offering opportunities of defiance and self-authorship.

Lyng (1990: 883) describes the larger significance of resistance, marginality, and edgework activities when he claims they are forms of “experiential anarchy” that

challenge established social patterns in efforts to achieve self-actualization and determination. Here, edgework offers what contemporary society often deprives: the possibility for self-determination, uninhibited behavior, emotional outbursts, and spontaneous expression. Robert Pires, interviewed for Jump London, summarizes this point as he says:

> *The sport is a way for expressing one's self, a way of escaping, a way out. Most importantly for people who come from urban areas. It's good because it allows you to see many things and I'm happy because it sets them free.*

More importantly for Lyng, edgework provides opportunity for seizing control, a way to challenge the societal reactions to disorder that strip one of choice, expression, and autonomy.

Edgework considers three primary aspects of voluntary risk taking: the activity itself, the skill set required to perform the activity, and subjective sensations. There can be little doubt that the performance of parkour exemplifies the concept of edgework as young people negotiate multiple story free-falls, perform dangerous urban acrobatics, and vault from one building rooftop to another. A health and safety consultant featured in Jump London speaks directly to the specialized skills needed to confront the dangerous nature of parkour:

> *When I first saw them doing on of their jumps for real as opposed to on video tape, my heart was in my throat I have to say. Because no matter what safety measures you put in place and how much planning goes into it, you still think, this in inherently dangerous, its still a dangerous thing to do. But you realize that the guys that are doing it are extremely competent, physically they are built for it,*

they are very light, they are very strong, and they've had years of training and experience.

Traceurs, however, not only employ specific skills to avoid physical dangers, they do so to pursue liberation from the stifling conditions brought about by the acts and processes employed to govern individuals in modern society. As Lyng discovered, the foremost motivation for traceurs – and edgework practitioners more generally – is the feeling of being ushered uncontrollably through life by "unidentifiable forces that rob one of true individual choice" (1990: 870). This framework thus applies well as participants voluntarily engage in a classification of high-risk behavior in attempts to confront ideas of safety and governance.

Aside from challenging social norms and cultural constructions of space, parkour celebrates what modern governance and the contemporary city space often deny. Accordingly, the attraction to edgework phenomena survives beyond the act itself; it lives in the emotional rewards and sensational qualities of the social performance or free-running. For instance, Brown (2012), while highlighting its central qualities, states that "the tensions of life find a physical manifestation for release through parkour, leaving the practitioner with the relative and reported feeling of freedom." He continues that traceurs, by negotiating the literal and metaphorical edge, are afforded emotional, physical, and mental rewards not yet experienced; more specifically, a sense of autonomy, outlet for expression, and ownership over one's own activities. This form of urban resistance or urban anarchy, attempts to reclaim the cityscape and take back the urban streets. Ferrell (2001:78) highlights the similarity between edgeworkers and anarchists as he argues:

> *Both edgeworkers and anarchists share a profound passion….they are junkies for the seductive, intoxicating tension between artistry and abandon, for the dialectic of chaos and control, for that "strange music" that plays when you stretch your lick, but stretch it right. It's the emergent interplay that defines edgework and anarchism, and the potential for human actualization that they both offer – in fleeting moments, a sort of magic emerges: You get to grab hold and let go at the same time.*

Herein lays a primary motivation for engaging in risk-taking activities according to edgework: a need for arousal and excitement, a form of disorderly behavior that resists the perils and jeopardies of modern society (Lyng 1990).

Parkour can be interpreted as resistance, as a symbolic form of opposition against the limiting composition of the city. By redefining the use of space, disrupting its disciplinary functions, and re-appropriating the environment, traceurs effectively challenge social norms, break free from cultural constraints, and create opportunity among the most bounding structures (Bennett 2010; Geyh 2006; Brown 2009). Through its non-conforming and unusual practice, the movements of parkour represent the willful transgression where the need to explore and create overrides the influence of everyday conventions. As a form of resistance, parkour provides the means necessary to escape from under current structures and conditions imposing restraint, rationality, and control. By reconstructing ones environment and re-appropriating space, parkour is, as Fromm would argue, "rooted in the unbearableness of individual powerlessness and isolation" (1941: 177). Therefore, deviant activities such as parkour provide individuals with a

sense of autonomy, they allow performances of unhindered expression, and afford power in moments of marginality.

Conclusion

Although the labeling perspective never addressed parkour specifically, it discussed social control as a form of symbolic pressure to get people to conform by threatening their identities through labels and stigmatization. When viewed this way, free-runners are constructed as social misfits because they are disturbing norms about the acceptable use of public space. Rather than examining parkour itself, labeling teaches us that such behavior is likely to provoke a negative societal reaction, brand traceurs deviant, and deliver still other punitive sanctions. These ideas of social control have been expanded, giving rise intensified forms of individual and societal governance. As a form of resistance against such control, parkour provides the avenue by which individuals may challenge the current structures and conditions imposing restraint, rationality, and control. By reconstructing and re-appropriating physical environments, parkour offers a pushback against individual powerlessness. Now, parkour amounts to what is termed edgework as individuals voluntarily engage in risk-taking activities by employing necessary skills to do so in efforts to achieve subjective rewards. As Lyng (1990) and others have documented, these rewards often take the form of self-determination, stimulation, free expression, and autonomy.

Interpreting free-running through these frameworks uncovers a number of common attributes spanning labeling, resistance, and edgework. Shared by each theoretical framework is a focus on social interaction, meaningful definitions, constructed realities, and ideas of social control. While cornerstones of the early societal reaction perspective, these attributes have been passed forward into new theoretical interpretations of deviance. Tracing the elaboration of labeling uncovers that a growing literature has

begun to demonstrate that the central tenants, themes, and underpinnings of the societal reaction perspective have given rise to contemporary studies of social control within sociology and criminology (Grattet, 2011). As societal reactions call for increased safety and security, the labeling process has intensified to include routinized control that seeks to identify and manage any perceived threats to social order. These more invasive types of control have begun limiting opportunities for excitement and individual autonomy. As scholars have proposed, resistance via deviant conduct offers what contemporary society often deprives: the possibility for uninhibited behavior, emotional outbursts, and spontaneous expression (Ferrell et al., 2008; Presdee, 2000). Often conceptualized as edgework, this field explores moments of extreme risk taking that challenge the societal reactions to disorder that strip one of agency.

Despite these similarities, there are a few noteworthy departures between the perspectives. As Best (2004) highlights, labeling theorists began focusing on the deviant; romanticizing them as being sympathetic and victims of social ills. That is, greater emphasis has been given to gaining what Ferrell (1997) refers to as *Criminological Verstehen* – an empathetic appreciation for moments of marginality, transgression, and criminal involvement. While labeling theory focused on the social response and process by which deviant statuses were created and applied, edgework reorients the study of deviance to better consider the response of those being labeled. Accordingly, the deviant is the primary topic of investigation, not the societal responses and processes by which labels are created and applied as with labeling theory. Along with this new focus, conceptual developments like edgework are often better equipped to examine the situated significance of deviant behavior, critique large social conditions, and consider the agency

of those being labeled. Despite differences, this essay suggests that earlier strands of the societal reaction perspective can be found in recent theorizing about crime and deviance. Instead of viewing edgework as a departure from labeling, this work highlights their theoretical linkages and demonstrates that the concept of edgework has ushered a number of early labeling theory's major features into contemporary studies of deviance.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Discuss some reasons for why the shift from labeling theory to resistance resulted in greater attention toward deviants and their actions rather than societal reactions.

2. As both articles by Lyng and Rajah highlight, edgework practices can take many forms (i.e. base jumping, skydiving, deception, and manipulation). Keeping this in mind, identify other possible forms of edgework, their goals, and potential rewards to those engaging in them.

3. While resistance and edgework have similar conceptual tenants, use the readings to compare and contrast these theoretical perspectives.

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Section 6. Stigma, Carnival, and the Grotesque Body

Introduction.

Tammy L. Anderson.

Do you think the human body can be painted, shaped, and decorated in any fashion or should there be limits to how individuals treat it? Consider music stars Adam Levine (from the group *Maroon 5* or TV's *The Voice*) and Lil Wayne, Emmy-winning hip hop artist. Both are covered in tattoos and/or piercings that some would consider disgraceful or an abomination[1]. Even if you support Adam and Lil Wayne in decorating their bodies as they have, to what extent do you approve or disapprove of others – less famous--for doing just that? Is there a line to be drawn and, if so, where do YOU *draw* it? Moreover, do you have one set of standards for one type of body modification (i.e., tattoos or piercings) and a different set for others having a different body style or shape (i.e., extreme obesity or emaciation)?

Section 6 contrasts stigma with the newer, postmodern idea of carnival of the grotesque using various types of body deviance – like tattooing, piercing, and obesity-- to help you better understand deviance in our society today. An excerpt from Goffman's (1963) classic book explains the concept of stigma and abominations of the body like physical deformities, while the Monaghan (2005) paper discusses bears, feedees and so-called big handsome men from the post-modern, carnival of the grotesque perspective. Along with these readings, Kang and Jones (2007) offer some important context about tattooing and body deviance in America. The connections essay by David Lane then ties together the major points and outlines a future pathway for deviance in areas of aesthetics and the body.

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[1] Goffman wrote that abominations of the body were a type of stigma that represented moral failings or medical deformities or deficiencies.

An objective of this section is to get you thinking about the importance of aesthetic and body norms and how they impact our lives. Face it, we are bombarded with standards for our physical selves daily and must learn how to manage our own and others' efforts to control them. For example, Kang and Jones (2007) argue that tattoos are a way for young people to resist social pressures to conform to appearance principles. In their paper, Christine explains "I want everyone to know that I'm sick of being told what to do and how to look."(43). Clinicians and researchers (Caplan, Kormaromi, and Rhodes 1996), on the other hand, seem to endorse appearance-based standards by classifying obsessive tattooing as an act of self-harm or obsessive behavior. Even Lil Wayne cautioned "I have no problem with people going and getting a billion tattoos. But why are you doing it?" (Rose 2011). The answer to Lil Wayne's question – to why people live with deviant bodies—can begin by learning about stigma and carnival of the grotesque.

Stigma. The word "stigma" originally referred to bodily signs—like tattoos-- designed to expose something morally problematic about the individual. It is a special relationship between a trait or condition that disallowed its bearer to exist as a normal member of society. Over time, the word expanded to represent deeply discrediting facts that could tarnish reputations, reduce life chances and even exact a social death.

The Goffman (1963) reading in this section specifies three types of stigma. *Weaknesses of individual character* were a form of earned stigma since they resulted from bad decision-making and maladaptive behavior by people with poor values and improper socialization. David Lane points out that tattooing and obesity could be classified as this type of stigma because they involve lifestyle choices. Thus, weaknesses of character are morally-based. *Abominations of the body* represented another type and come closest to the definition of body deviance. People born

with bodily deformities were viewed as having conditions over which they often had little control, but a great deal of shame. The blind, deaf, paraplegic or epileptic, according to Goffman, were varieties of people with abominations of the body. This type of stigma was more closely rooted in medical definitions of deviance, yet there often existed moral condemnation as well. Finally, *tribal stigmas* were those associated with minority racial and ethnic backgrounds. Since people are born with a racial and ethnic classification and identity, there was little the tribally stigmatized could do about their discredited identities.

Recently, sociologists have begun paying more attention to the physical body and what it signifies about life in our society. This growing literature, as well as people like Adam Levine, Lil Wayne, and Gaining Gabbi (Preface), might challenge Goffman's ideas about body stigma and get us to see things in new ways. One such innovation, and perhaps alternative to Goffman's stigma, is Mikhail Bhaktin's (1941) term ***carnival of the grotesque.*** It refers to a happening that establishes an alternative social order that departs dramatically from the codes and norms we have about daily comportment. Specifically, the carnival refers to the location where the alternative social order is set, while the grotesque refers to the outrageous behaviors or characteristics of the people who gather therein. This includes the exaggeration of bodily features deemed "unfit" or "freakish." The alternative social order of the carnival is maintained through expressions of folk humor, rituals of degradation, and satire. In this process, participants are reborn and are bolstered by a temporary and alternative folk consciousness. Here, actors experience a birth, life, and death that celebrate the *vulgar characteristics* of their bodies, i.e., the grotesque. It is a second "way of life" that is often denied or rejected by conventional society.

The pairing of Goffman's stigma and Bhaktin's carnival and the grotesque centers on shame with respect to body deviance. While Goffman noted that abominations of the body

marked people with stigma and disgrace, Bhaktin views outrageous and weird body types and expressions as powerful statements of the self and reflections of a more utopian society. The Kang and Jones (2007) provides an example. The paper opens with a quote from a "24-year-old, insecure female who isn't a perfect, thin, beautiful supermodel." She reports that her tattoo has helped her feel better about her body: "It is rearing up on its hind legs with its wings spread like it's about to take off, much like the way I want to break free of my self-doubt and start loving me for me." (Kang and Jones, 2007: 42).

A central distinction between stigma and carnival of the grotesque is whether the body is a social entity or an earthly object. While Goffman noted that abominations of the body marked people with stigma and shame, post-modernists like Bhaktin and Monaghan remind us of its power. In short, stigma may exact a social death but the body lives on.

The salience of this point should not be underestimated. By now, most of us know that there will be some stigma and condemnation for people engaging in outrageous acts of body deviance --- like the big handsome men in Monaghan's study, Gaining Gabbi from the Preface, or the heavily tattooed Lane quotes in his connections essay. We might even be amused by them celebrating their grotesque bodies in unique (carnival-like) places.

But how do we respond when body deviance is motivated by more "legitimate" concerns or medical conditions and impacts someone we know or can empathize with? For example, how do we imagine amputees who live without prosthetic limbs or deaf people who refuse to get cochlear implants? Do we expect them to sit in shame or sign their way through it? What about the woman who has been diagnosed with breast cancer? Do you expect her to get reconstructive surgery (breast implants) after a mastectomy or will you support her decision to do as women from the Kang and Jones reading did: get tattoos, which express meaning of the disease on their

lives, to cover their mastectomy scars? These types of empowered responses to “deformed” bodies demand our attention and the future of deviance should envision new ways to explain them and the ever-growing aesthetic and appearance-based norms in our society.

Reading 22

STIGMA and SOCIAL IDENTITY

Erving Goffman

The Greeks, who were apparently strong on visual aids, originated the term *stigma* to refer to bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier. The signs were cut or burnt into the body and advertised that the bearer was a slave, a criminal, or a traitor—a blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places. Later, in Christian times, two layers of metaphor were added to the term: the first referred to bodily signs of holy grace that took the form of eruptive blossoms on the skin; the second, a medical allusion to this religious allusion, referred to bodily signs of physical disorder. Today the term is widely used in something like the original literal sense, but is applied more to the disgrace itself than to the bodily evidence of it. Furthermore, shifts have occurred in the kinds of disgrace that arouse concern. Students, however, have made little effort to describe the structural preconditions of stigma, or even to provide a definition of the concept itself. It seems necessary, therefore, to try at the beginning to sketch in some very general assumptions and definitions.

Preliminary Conceptions

Society establishes the means of categorizing persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories. Social settings establish the categories of persons likely to be encountered there. The routines of social intercourse in established settings allow us to deal with anticipated others without special attention or thought. When a stranger comes into our presence, then, first appearances are likely to enable

us to anticipate his category and attributes, his “social identity”—to use a term that is better than “social status” because personal attributes such as “honesty” are involved, as well as structural ones, like “occupation.”

We lean on these anticipations that we have, transforming them into normative expectations, into righteously presented demands.

Typically, we do not become aware that we have made these demands or aware of what they are until an active question arises as to whether or not they will be fulfilled. It is then that we are likely to realize that all along we had been making certain assumptions as to what the individual before us ought to be. Thus, the demands we make might better be called demands made “in effect,” and the character we impute to the individual might better be seen as an imputation made in potential retrospect—a characterization “in effect,” a *virtual social identity*. The category and attributes he could in fact be proved to possess will be called his *actual social identity.*

While the stranger is present before us, evidence can arise of his possessing an attribute that makes him different from others in the category of persons available for him to be, and of a less desirable kind—in the extreme, a person who is quite thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or weak. He is thus reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one. Such an attribute is a stigma, especially when its discrediting effect is very extensive; sometimes it is also called a failing, a shortcoming, a handicap. It constitutes a special discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity. Note that there are other types of discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity, for example the kind that causes us to reclassify an individual from one socially anticipated category to a different but equally well-anticipated one, and the kind that causes us to alter, our estimation of the individual upward. Note, too, that not all undesirable attributes are at issue, but only those which are incongruous with our stereotype of what a given type of individual should be.

The term stigma, then, will be used to refer to an attribute that is deeply discrediting, but it should be seen that a language of relationships, not attributes, is really needed. An attribute that stigmatizes one type of possessor can confirm the usualness of another, and therefore is neither creditable nor discreditable as a thing in itself. For example, some jobs in America cause holders without the expected college education to conceal this fact; other jobs, however, can lead the few of their holders who have a higher education to keep this a secret, lest they be marked as failures and outsiders. Similarly, a middle class boy may feel no compunction in being seen going to the library; a professional criminal, however, writes:

> I can remember before now on more than one occasion, for instance, going into a public library near where I was living, and looking over my shoulder a couple of times before I actually went in just to make sure no one who knew me was standing about and seeing me do it.[1]

So, too, an maividual who desires to fight for his country may conceal a physical defect, lest his claimed physical status be discredited; later, the same individual, embittered and trying to get out of the army, may succeed in gaining admission to the army hospital, where he would be discredited if discovered in not really having an acute sickness.[2] A stigma, then, is really a special kind of relationship between attribute and stereotype, although I don't propose to continue to say so, in part because there are important attributes that almost everywhere in our society are discrediting.

The term stigma and its synonyms conceal a double perspective: does the stigmatized individual assume his differentness is known about already or is evident on the spot, or does he assume it is neither known about by those present nor immediately perceivable by them? In the first case one deals with the plight of the *discredited,* in the second with that of the

discreditable. This is an important difference, even though a particular stigmatized individual is likely to have experience with both situations. I will begin with the situation of the discredited and move on to the discreditable but not always separate the two.

Three grossly different types of stigma may be mentioned. First there are abominations of the body—the various physical deformities. Next there are blemishes of individual character perceived as weak will, domineering or unnatural passions, treacherous and rigid beliefs, and dishonesty, these being inferred from a known record of, for example, mental disorder, imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, homosexuality, unemployment, suicidal attempts, and radical political behavior. Finally there are the tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion, these being stigma that can be transmitted through lineages and equally contaminate all members of a family.[3] In all of these various instances of stigma, however, including those the Greeks had in mind, the same sociological features are found: an individual who might have been received easily in ordinary social intercourse possesses a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn those of us whom he meets away from him, breaking the claim that his other attributes have on us. He possesses a stigma, an undesired differentness from what we had anticipated. We and those who do not depart negatively from the particular expectations at issue I shall call the *normals.*

The attitudes we normals have toward a person with a stigma, and the actions we take in regard to him, are well known, since these responses are what benevolent social action is designed to soften and ameliorate. By definition, of course, we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human. On this assumption we exercise varieties of discrimination, through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce his life chances. We construct a stigma-theory, an ideology to explain his inferiority and account for the danger he represents, sometimes rationalizing an animosity based on other differences, such as those of social class.[4] We use specific stigma terms such as cripple, bastard, moron in our daily discourse as

a source of metaphor and imagery, typically without giving thought to the original meaning.[5] We tend to impute a wide range of imperfections on the basis of the original one,[6] and at the same time to impute some desirable but undesired attributes, often of a supernatural cast, such as “sixth sense,” or “understanding” :[7]

> For some, there may be a hesitancy about touching or steering the blind, while for others, the perceived failure to see may be generalized into a gestalt of disability, so that the individual shouts at the blind as if they were deaf or attempts to lift them as if they were crippled. Those confronting the blind may have a whole range of belief that is anchored in the stereotype. For instance, they may think they are subject to unique judgment, assuming the blinded individual draws on special channels of information unavailable to others.[8]

Further, we may perceive his defensive response to his situation as a direct expression of his defect, and then see both defect and response as just retribution for something he or his parents or his tribe did, and hence a justification of the way we treat him.[9]

Now turn from the normal to the person he is normal against. It seems generally true that members of a social category may strongly support a standard of judgment that they and others agree does not directly apply to them. Thus it is that a businessman may demand womanly behavior from females or ascetic behavior from monks, and not construe himself as someone who ought to realize either of these styles of conduct. The distinction is between realizing a norm and merely supporting it. The issue of stigma does not arise here, but only where there is some expectation on all sides that those in a given category should not only support a particular norm but also realize it.

Also, it seems possible for an individual to fail to live up to what we effectively demand

of him, and yet be relatively untouched by this failure; insulated by his alienation, protected by identity beliefs of his own, he feels that he is a full-fledged normal human being, and that we are the ones who are not quite human. He bears a stigma but does not seem to be impressed or repentant about doing so. This possibility is celebrated in exemplary tales about Mennonites, Gypsies, shameless scoundrels, and very orthodox Jews.

In America at present, however, separate systems of honor seem to be on the decline. The stigmatized individual tends to hold the same beliefs about identity that we do; this is a pivotal fact. His deepest feelings about what he is may be his sense of being a "normal person," a human being like anyone else, a person, therefore, who deserves a fair chance and a fair break.[10] (Actually, however phrased, he bases his claims not on what he thinks is due *everyone,* but only everyone of a selected social category into which he unquestionably fits, for example, anyone of his age, sex, profession, and so forth.) Yet he may perceive, usually quite correctly, that whatever others profess, they do not really "accept" him and are not ready to make contact with him on "equal grounds." [11] Further, the standards he has incorporated from the wider society equip him to be intimately alive to what others see as his failing, inevitably causing him, if only for moments, to agree that he does indeed fall short of what he really ought to be. Shame becomes a central possibility, arising from the individual's perception of one of his own attributes as being a defiling thing to possess, and one he can readily see himself as not possessing.

The immediate presence of normals is likely to reinforce this split between self-demands and self, but in fact self-hate and self-derogation can also occur when only he and a mirror are about:

> When I got up at last . . . and had learned to walk again, one day I took a hand glass and went to a long mirror to look at myself, and I went alone. I didn't want anyone . . . to

> know how I felt when I saw myself for the first time. But there was no noise, no outcry; I didn't scream with rage when I saw myself. I just felt numb. That person in the mirror *couldn't* be me. I felt inside like a healthy, ordinary, lucky person—oh, not like the one in the mirror! Yet when I turned my face to the mirror there were my own eyes looking back, hot with shame . . . when I did not cry or make any sound, it became impossible that I should speak of it to anyone, and the confusion and the panic of my discovery were locked inside me then and there, to be faced alone, for a very long time to come.[12]

Over and over I forgot what I had seen in the mirror. It could not penetrate into the interior of my mind and become an integral part of me. I felt as if it had nothing to do with me; it was only a disguise. But it was not the kind of disguise which is put on voluntarily by the person who wears it, and which is intended to confuse other people as to one's identity. My disguise had been put on me without my consent or knowledge like the ones in fairy tales, and it was I myself who was confused by it, as to my own identity. I looked in the mirror, and was horror-struck because I did not recognize myself. In the place where I was standing, with that persistent romantic elation in me, as if I were a favored fortunate person to whom everything was possible, I saw a stranger, a little, pitiable, hideous figure, and a face that became, as I stared at it, painful and blushing with shame. It was only a disguise, but it was on me, for life. It was there, it was there, it was real. Every one of those encounters was like a blow on the head. They left me dazed and dumb and senseless every-time, until slowly and stubbornly my robust persistent illusion of well-being and of personal beauty spread all through me again, and I forgot the irrelevant reality and was all unprepared and vulnerable again.[18]

The central feature of the stigmatized individual's situation in life can now be stated. It is a question of what is often, if vaguely, called "acceptance." Those who have dealings with him fail to accord him the respect and regard which the un-contaminated aspects of his social

identity have led them to anticipate extending, and have led him to anticipate receiving; he echoes this denial by finding that some of his own attributes warrant it.

How does the stigmatized person respond to his situation? In some cases it will be possible for him to make a direct attempt to correct what he sees as the objective basis of his failing, as when a physically deformed person undergoes plastic surgery, a blind person eye treatment, an illiterate remedial education, a homosexual psychotherapy. (Where such repair is possible, what often results is not the acquisition of fully normal status, but a transformation of self from someone with a particular blemish into someone with a record of having corrected a particular blemish.) Here proneness to "victimization" is to be cited, a result of the stigmatized person's exposure to fraudulent servers selling speech correction, skin lighteners, body stretchers, youth restorers (as in rejuvenation through fertilized egg yolk treatment), cures through faith, and poise in conversation. Whether a practical technique or fraud is involved, the quest, often secret, that results provides a special indication of the extremes to which the stigmatized can be willing to go, and hence the painfulness of the situation that leads them to these extremes. One illustration may be cited:

> Miss Peck [a pioneer New York social worker for the hard of hearing] said that in the early days the quacks and get-rich-quick medicine men who abounded saw the League [for the hard of hearing] as their happy hunting ground, ideal for the promotion of magnetic head caps, miraculous vibrating machines, artificial eardrums, blowers, inhalers, massagers, magic oils, balsams, and other guaranteed, sure-fire, positive, and permanent cure-alls for incurable deafness. Advertisements for such hokum (until the 1920's when the American Medical Association moved in with an investigation campaign) beset the hard of hearing in the pages of the daily press, even in reputable magazines.[14]

The stigmatized individual can also attempt to correct his condition indirectly by devoting much private effort to the mastery of areas of activity ordinarily felt to be closed on incidental and physical grounds to one with his shortcoming. This is illustrated by the lame person who learns or re-learns to swim, ride, play tennis, or fly an airplane, or the blind person who becomes expert at skiing and mountain climbing.[15] Tortured learning may be associated, of course, with the tortured performance of what is learned, as when an individual, confined to a wheelchair, manages to take to the dance floor with a girl in some kind of mimicry of dancing.[16] Finally, the person with a shameful differentness can break with what is called reality, and obstinately attempt to employ an unconventional interpretation of the character of his social identity.

The stigmatized individual is likely to use his stigma for "secondary gains," as an excuse for ill success that has come his way for other reasons:

> For years the scar, harelip or misshapen nose has been looked on as a handicap, and its importance in the social and emotional adjustment is unconsciously all embracing. It is the "hook" on which the patient has hung all inadequacies, all dissatisfactions, all procrastinations and all unpleasant duties of social life, and he has come to depend on it not only as a reasonable escape from competition but as a protection from social responsibility.
>
> When one removes this factor by surgical repair, the patient is cast adrift from the more or less acceptable emotional protection it has offered and soon he finds, to his surprise and discomfort, that life is not all smooth sailing even for those with unblemished, "ordinary" faces. He is unprepared to cope with this situation without the support of a "handicap," and he may turn to the less simple, but similar, protection of the behavior patterns of neurasthenia, hysterical conversion, hypochondriasis or the acute

> anxiety states.[17]

He may also see the trials he has suffered as a blessing in disguise, especially because of what it is felt that suffering can teach one about life and people:

> But now, far away from the hospital experience, I can evaluate what I have learned. [A mother permanently disabled by polio writes.] For it wasn't only suffering: it was also learning through suffering. I know my awareness of people has deepened and increased, that those who are close to me can count on me to turn all my mind and heart and attention to their problems. I could not have learned *that* dashing all over a tennis court.[18]

Correspondingly, he can come to re-assess the limitations of normals, as a multiple sclerotic suggests:

> Both healthy minds and healthy bodies may be crippled. The fact that "normal" people can get around, can see, can hear, doesn't mean that they are seeing or hearing. They can be very blind to the things that spoil their happiness, very deaf to the pleas of others for kindness; when I think of them I do not feel any more crippled or disabled than they. Perhaps in some small way I can be the means of opening their eyes to the beauties around us: things like a warm handclasp, a voice that is anxious to cheer, a spring breeze, music to listen to, a friendly nod. These people are important to me, and I like to feel that I can help them.[19]

And a blind writer.

> That would lead immediately to the thought that there are many occurrences which can diminish satisfaction in living far more effectively than blindness, and that lead would be an entirely healthy one to take. In this light, we can perceive, for instance, that some inadequacy like the inability to accept human love, which can effectively diminish satisfaction of living almost to the vanishing point, is far more a tragedy than blindness. But it is unusual for the man who suffers from such a malady even to know he has it and self pity is, therefore, impossible for him.[20]

And a cripple:

> As life went on, I learned of many, many different kinds of handicap, not only the physical ones, and I began to realize that the words of the crippled girl in the extract above [words of bitterness] could just as well have been spoken by young women who had never needed crutches, women who felt inferior and different because of ugliness, or inability to bear children, or helplessness in contacting people, or many other reasons.[21]

The responses of the normal and of the stigmatized that have been considered so far are ones which can occur over protracted periods of time and in isolation from current contact between normals and stigmatized.[22] This book, however, is specifically concerned with the issue of "mixed contacts"—the moments when stigmatized and normal are in the same "social situation," that is, in one another's immediate physical presence, whether in a conversation-like encounter or in the mere co-presence of an unfocused gathering.

The very anticipation of such contacts can of course lead normals and the stigmatized to arrange life so as to avoid them. Presumably this will have larger consequences for the stigmatized, since more arranging will usually be necessary on their part:

> Before her disfigurement [amputation of the distal half of her nose] Mrs. Dover, who lived with one of her two married daughters, had been an independent, warm and friendly woman who enjoyed traveling, shopping, and visiting her many relatives. The disfigurement of her face, however, resulted in a definite alteration in her way of living. The first two or three years she seldom left her daughter's home, preferring to remain in her room or to sit in the backyard. "I was heartsick," she said; "the door had been shut on my life." [23]

Lacking the salutary feed-back of daily social intercourse with others, the self-isolate can become suspicious, depressed, hostile, anxious, and bewildered. Sullivan's version may be cited:

> The awareness of inferiority means that one is unable to keep out of consciousness the formulation of some chronic feeling of the worst sort of insecurity, and this means that one suffers anxiety and perhaps even something worse, if jealousy is really worse than anxiety. The fear that others can disrespect a person because of something he shows means that he is always insecure in his contact with other people; and this insecurity arises, not from mysterious and somewhat disguised sources, as a great deal of our anxiety does, but from something which he knows he cannot fix. Now that represents an almost fatal deficiency of the self-system, since the self is unable to disguise or exclude a definite formulation that reads, "I am inferior. Therefore people will dislike me and I cannot be secure with them." [24]

When normals and stigmatized do in fact enter one another's immediate presence, especially

when they there attempt to sustain a joint conversational encounter, there occurs one of the primal scenes of sociology; for, in many cases, these moments will be the ones when the causes and effects of stigma must be directly confronted by both sides.

The stigmatized individual may find that he feels unsure of how we normals will identify him and receive him.[25] An illustration may be cited from a student of physical disability:

> Uncertainty of status for the disabled person obtains over a wide range of social interactions in addition to that of employment. The blind, the ill, the deaf, the crippled can never be sure what the attitude of a new acquaintance will be, whether it will be rejective or accepting, until the contact has been made. This is exactly the position of the adolescent, the light-skinned Negro, the second generation immigrant, the socially mobile person and the woman who has entered a predominantly masculine occupation.[26]

This uncertainty arises not merely from the stigmatized individual's not knowing which of several categories he will be placed in, but also, where the placement is favorable, from his knowing that in their hearts the others may be defining him in terms of his stigma:

> And I always feel this with straight people—that whenever they're being nice to me, pleasant to me, all the time really, underneath they're only assessing me as a criminal and nothing else. It's too late for me to be any different now to what I am, but I still feel this keenly, that that's their only approach, and they're quite incapable of accepting me as anything else.[27]

Thus in the stigmatized arises the sense of not knowing what the others present are "really" thinking about him.

Further, during mixed contacts, the stigmatized individual is likely to feel that he is "on,"[28] having to be self-conscious and calculating about the impression he is making, to a degree and in areas of conduct which he assumes others are not.

Also, he is likely to feel that the usual scheme of interpretation for everyday events has been undermined. His minor accomplishments, he feels, may be assessed as signs of remarkable and noteworthy capacities in the circumstances. A professional criminal provides an illustration:

> "You know, it's really amazing you should read books like this, I'm staggered I am. I should've thought you'd read paper-backed thrillers, things with lurid covers, books like that. And here you are with Claud Cockburn, Hugh Klare, Simone de Beauvoir, and Lawrence Durrell!"
>
> You know, he didn't see this as an insulting remark at all: in fact, I think he thought he was being honest in telling me how mistaken he was. And that's exactly the sort of patronizing you get from straight people if you're a criminal. "Fancy that!" they say. "In some ways you're just like a human being!" I'm not kidding, it makes me want to choke the bleeding life out of them.[29]

A blind person provides another illustration:

> His once most ordinary deeds—walking nonchalantly up the street, locating the peas on his plate, lighting a cigarette—are no longer ordinary. He becomes an unusual person. If he performs them with finesse and assurance they excite the same kind of wonderment inspired by a magician who pulls rabbits out of hats.[30]

At the same time, minor failings or incidental impropriety may, he feels, be interpreted as a direct expression of his stigmatized differentness. Ex-mental patients, for example, are sometimes afraid to engage in sharp interchanges with spouse or employe-because of what a show of emotion might be taken as a sign of. Mental defectives face a similar contingency:

> It also happens that if a person of low intellectual ability gets into some sort of trouble the difficulty is more or less automatically attributed to "mental defect" whereas if a person of "normal intelligence" gets into a similar difficulty, it is not regarded as symptomatic of anything in particular.[31]

A one-legged girl, recalling her experience with sports, provides other illustrations:

> Whenever I fell, out swarmed the women in droves, clucking and fretting like a bunch of bereft mother hens. It was kind of them, and in retrospect I appreciate their solicitude, but at the time I resented and was greatly embarrassed by their interference. For they assumed that no routine hazard to skating—no stick or stone—upset my flying wheels. It was a foregone conclusion that *I* fell because I was a poor, helpless cripple.[32]
>
> Not one of them shouted with outrage, "That dangerous wild bronco threw her!"—which, God forgive, he did technically. It was like a horrible ghostly visitation of my old roller-skating days. All the good people lamented in chorus, "That poor, poor girl fell off!"[33]

When the stigmatized person's failing can be perceived by our merely directing attention (typically, visual) to him—when, in short, he is a discredited, not discreditable, person—he is likely to feel that to be present among normals nakedly exposes him to invasions of privacy,[34]

experienced most pointedly perhaps when children simply stare at him.[35] This displeasure in being exposed can be increased by the conversations strangers may feel free to strike up with him, conversations in which they express what he takes to be morbid curiosity about his condition, or in which they proffer help that he does not need or want.[36] One might add that there are certain classic formulae for these kinds of conversations: “My dear girl, how did you get your quiggle”; “My great uncle had a quiggle, so I feel I know all about your problem” ; “You know I’ve always said that Quiggles are good family men and look after their own poor” ; “Tell me, how do you manage to bathe with a quiggle?” The implication of these overtures is that the stigmatized individual is a person who can be approached by strangers at will, providing only that they are sympathetic to the plight of persons of his kind.

Given what the stigmatized individual may well face upon entering a mixed social situation, he may anticipatorily respond by defensive cowering. This may be illustrated from an early study of some German unemployed during the Depression, the words being those of a 43-year-old mason:

> How hard and humiliating it is to bear the name of an unemployed man. When I go out, I cast down my eyes because I feel myself wholly inferior. When I go along the street, it seems to me that I can’t be compared with an average citizen, that everybody is pointing at me with his finger. I instinctively avoid meeting anyone. Former acquaintances and friends of better times are no longer so cordial. They greet me indifferently when we meet. They no longer offer me a cigarette and their eyes seem to say, “You are not worth it, you don’t work.” [37]

A crippled girl provides an illustrative analysis:

> When . . . I began to walk out alone in the streets of our town . . . I found then that wherever I had to pass three or four children together on the sidewalk, if I happened to be alone, they would shout at me, . . . Sometimes they even ran after me, shouting and jeering. This was something I didn't know how to face, and it seemed as if I couldn't bear it. . . .
>
> For awhile those encounters in the street filled me with a cold dread of all unknown children . . .
>
> One day I suddenly realized that I had become so self-conscious and afraid of all strange children that, like animals, they knew I was afraid, so that even the mildest and most amiable of them were automatically prompted to derision by my own shrinking and dread.[38]

Instead of cowering, the stigmatized individual may attempt to approach mixed contacts with hostile bravado, but this can induce from others its own set of troublesome reciprocations. It may be added that the stigmatized person sometimes vacillates between cowering and bravado, racing from one to the other, thus demonstrating one central way in which ordinary face-to-face interaction can run wild.

I am suggesting, then, that the stigmatized individual—at least the "visibly" stigmatized one—will have special reasons for feeling that mixed social situations make for anxious unanchored interaction. But if this is so, then it is to be suspected that we normals will find these situations shaky too. We will feel that the stigmatized individual is either too aggressive or too shamefaced, and in either case too ready to read unintended meanings into our actions. We ourselves may feel that if we show direct sympathetic concern for his condition, we may be overstepping ourselves; and yet if we actually forget that he has a failing we are likely to make impossible demands of him or unthinkingly slight his fellow-sufferers. Each potential

source of discomfort for him when we are with him can become something we sense he is aware of, aware that we are aware of, and even aware of our state of awareness about his awareness; the stage is then set for the infinite regress of mutual consideration that Meadian social psychology tells us how to begin but not how to terminate.

Given what both the stigmatized and we normals introduce into mixed social situations, it is understandable that all will not go smoothly. We are likely to attempt to carry on as though in fact he wholly fitted one of the types of person naturally available to us in the situation, whether this means treating him as someone better than we feel he might be or someone worse than we feel he probably is. If neither of these tacks is possible, then we may try to act as if he were a "non-person," and not present at all as someone of whom ritual notice is to be taken. He, in turn, is likely to go along with these strategies, at least initially.

In consequence, attention is furtively withdrawn from its obligatory targets, and self-consciousness and "other-consciousness" occurs, expressed in the pathology of interaction—uneasiness.[39] As described in the case of the physically handicapped:

> Whether the handicap is overtly and tactlessly responded to as such or, as is more commonly the case, no explicit reference is made to it, the underlying condition of heightened, narrowed, awareness causes the interaction to be articulated too exclusively in terms of it. This, as my informants described it, is usually accompanied by one or more of the familiar signs of discomfort and stickiness: the guarded references, the common everyday words suddenly made taboo, the fixed stare elsewhere, the artificial levity, the compulsive loquaciousness, the awkward solemnity.[40]

In social situations with an individual known or perceived to have a stigma, we are likely, then, to employ categorizations that do not fit, and we and he are likely to experience

uneasiness. Of course, there is often significant movement from this starting point. And since the stigmatized person is likely to be more often faced with these situations than are we, he is likely to become the more adept at managing them.

NOTES

1 T. Parker and R. Allerton, *The Courage of His Convictions* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1962), p. 109.

2 In this connection see the review by M. Meltzer, "Countermanipulation through Malingering," in A. Biderman and H. Zimmer, eds., *The Manipulation of Human Behavior* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1961), pp. 277–304.

3 In recent history, especially in Britain, low class status functioned as an important tribal stigma, the sins of the parents, or at least their milieu, being visited on the child, should the child rise improperly far above his initial station. The management of class stigma is of course a central theme in the English novel.

4 D. Riesman, "Some Observations Concerning Marginality," *Phylon*, Second Quarter, 1951, 122.

5 The case regarding mental patients is presented by T. J. Scheff in a forthcoming paper.

6 In regard to the blind, see E. Henrich and L. Kriegel, eds., *Experiments in Survival* (New York: Association for the Aid of Crippled Children, 1961), pp. 152 and 186; and H. Chevigny, *My Eyes Have a Cold Nose* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, paperbound, 1962), p. 201.

7 In the words of one blind woman, "I was asked to endorse a perfume, presumably because being sightless my sense of smell was super-discriminating." See T. Keitlen (with N. Lobsenz), *Farewell to Fear* (New York: Avon, 1962), p. 10.

8 A. G. Gowman, *The War Blind in American Social Structure* (New York: American Foundation for the Blind, 1957), p. 198.

9 For examples, see Macgregor e*t al., op. cit.,* throughout

10 The notion of "normal human being" may have its source in the medical approach to humanity or in the tendency of large-scale bureaucratic organizations, such as the nation state, to treat all members in some respects as equal. Whatever its origins, it seems to provide the basic imagery through which laymen currently conceive of themselves. Interestingly, a convention seems to have emerged in popular life-story writing where a questionable person proves his claim to normalcy by citing his acquisition of a spouse and children, and, oddly, by attesting to his spending Christmas and Thanksgiving with them.

11 A criminal's view of this nonacccptancc is presented in Parker and Allerton, o*p. cit.,* pp. 110–111.

12 K. B. Hathaway, *The Little Locksmith* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1943), p. 41, in Wright, *op. cit.,* p. 157.

13 *Ibid.,* pp. 46–47. For general treatments of the self-disliking sentiments, see K. Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts,* Part III (New York: Harper & Row, 1948); A. Kardiner and L. Ovesey, *The Mark of Oppression: A Psychosocial Study of the American Negro* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1951); and E. H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: W. W. Norton &. Company, 1950).

14 F. Warfield, *Keep Listening* (New York: The Viking Press, 1957), p. 76. See also H. von Hentig, *The Criminal and His Victim* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 101.

15 Keitlen, *op. cit.,* Chap. 12, pp. 117–129 and Chap. 14, pp. 137–149. See also Chevigny, *op. cit.,* pp. 85–86.

16 Henrich and Kriegel, *op. cit.,* p. 49.

17 W. Y. Baker and L. H. Smith, “Facial Disfigurement and Personality,” *Journal of the American Medical Association,* CXII (1939), 303. Macgregor *et al., op. cit.,* p. 57 ff., provide an illustration of a man who used his big red nose for a crutch.

18 Henrich and Kriegel, *op. cit.,* p. 19.

19 *Ibid.,* p. 35.

20 Chevigny, *op. cit.,* p. 154.

21 F. Carling, *And Yet We Are Human* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962), pp. 23–24.

22 For one review, see G. W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (New York: Anchor Books, 1958).

23 Macgregor *et al., op. cit.,* pp. 91–92.

24 From *Clinical Studies in Psychiatry,* H. S. Perry, M. L. Gawel, and M. Gibbon, eds. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1956), p. 145.

25 R. Barker, “The Social Psychology of Physical Disability,” *Journal of Social Issues,* IV (1948), 34, suggests that stigmatized persons “live on a social-psychological frontier,” constantly facing new situations. See also Macgregor *et al., op. cit.,* p. 87, where the suggestion is made that the grossly deformed need suffer less doubt about their reception in interaction than the less visibly deformed.

26 Barker, *op. cit.,* p. 33.

27 Parker and Allerton, *op. cit.,* p. 111.

28 This special kind of self-consciousness is analyzed in S. Messinger *et al.,* “Life as Theater: Some Notes on the Dramaturgic Approach to Social Reality,” *Sociometry,* XXV (1962), 98–110.

29 Parker and Allerton, *op. cit.,* p. 111.

30 Chevigny, *op. cit.,* p. 140.

31 L. A. Dexter, “A Social Theory of Mental Deficiency,” *American Journal of Mental*

Deficiency, LXII (1958), 923. For another study of the mental defective as a stigmatized person, see S. E. Perry, "Some Theoretical Problems of Mental Deficiency and Their Action Implications," *Psychiatry*, XVII (1954), 45–73.

32 Baker, *Out on a Limb* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, n.d.), p. 22.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 73.

34 This theme is well treated in R. K. White, B. A. Wright, and T. Dembo, "Studies in Adjustment to Visible Injuries: Evaluation of Curiosity by the Injured," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XLIII (1948), 13–28.

35 For example, Henrich and Kriegel, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

36 See Wright, *op. cit.*, "The Problem of Sympathy," pp. 233–237

37 S. Zawadski and P. Lazarsfeld, "The Psychological Consequences of Unemployment," *Journal of Social Psychology*, VI (1935), 239.

38 Hathaway, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–157, in S. Richardson, "The Social Psychological Consequences of Handicapping," unpublished paper presented at the 1962 American Sociological Association Convention, Washington, D. C, 7–8.

Reading 23

Why Do People Get Tattoos?

Miliann Kang and Katherine Jones

Who gets tattoos, and why? A self-described "24-year-old, insecure female who isn't a perfect, thin, beautiful supermodel" writes in the *Body Modification* e-zine that her Pegasus tattoo has helped her overcome hatred of her body. "It is rearing up on its hind legs with its wings spread like it's about to take off, much like the way I want to break free of my self-doubt and start loving me for me." The same e-zine carries an account of an operations manager at a Borders Books and Café who says about hiring tattooed employees, "We look for it. It makes things more interesting and more fun." While these individuals give varied and multi-layered meanings to their own and other's tattoos, their personal assertions are sometimes at odds with the pervasive popular interpretations of tattoos as signs of rebellion or faddishness.

The growing number of enthusiasts exhibit a broad array of tattooing practices, from a discreet flower on the hip to full body and facial tattoos. According to a 2003 survey by Scripps Howard News Service and Ohio State University, 15 percent of the U.S. adult population has tattoos, and the figure rises to 28 percent for adults younger than 25. In addition, 88 percent of those interviewed said they know at least one person who has a tattoo. According to *U.S. News and World Report*, tattooing was the sixth fastest-growing retail business in 1997. What accounts for the rising popularity and visibility of tattoos?

Most tattooed people see their tattoos as unique aspects of themselves, but sociologists who study tattooing focus on group patterns and overall trends. They examine the influence of media and consumer culture and the influence of gender, sexuality, race, and class on "body politics." While no single explanation accounts for the increasing popularity of tattoos,

researchers find that people use tattoos to express who they are, what they have lived through, and how they see themselves in relation to others and to their social worlds. Studies also find that people cannot fully control the meaning of their own tattooed bodies; the social contexts in which they live shape the responses to and interpretations of their tattoos by others.

Paul Sweetman writes, “The popular image of the tattooee as young, male and working-class is now increasingly outdated, as more and more men and women, of various age-groups and socio-economic backgrounds, choose to enter the tattoo studio.” In trying to understand these new tattooees, we focus on three groups—youth, women, and members of tattoo subcultures. We then discuss whether tattoos actually satisfy the aims of those who get them.

tattooed youth

Tattooing is especially popular among teenagers and college students. At a stage when young people are seeking to assert their independence, tattoos may provide a way to ground a sense of self in a seemingly changing and insecure world.

Myrna Armstrong and her collaborators have examined the prevalence of tattooing (as well as body piercing) among today’s teenagers. Through the results of two surveys, one based on 642 high school students in Texas and one based on a national sample of 1,762 students, they conclude that most tattooed adolescents, contrary to stereotypes, are high-achieving students and rarely report gang affiliations.

Since the 1980s, tattooing has won a following among teenagers and college students, who have altered the reputation of tattooed people from that of criminals and laborers to that of artists and free thinkers. Whereas many cities, including New York, once banned tattoo parlors, they have become ubiquitous in most college towns. Numerous Hollywood

celebrities, musicians, and models have visible tattoos, including Angelina Jolie, Lucy Liu, Janet Jackson, Johnny Depp, and Nick Carter—inspiring many youth to emulate their pop idols by becoming tattooed. This has resulted in what Michael Atkinson calls the "supermarket era" of tattooing, marked by easy availability and consumer choice.

Despite this aura of mass consumption, Atkinson finds that tattoos and the tattooing experience give young people feelings of greater control and authority over their own lives. Christine, for example, explains her tattoos as an effort to reclaim her body from the pressures of school, peers, and parents. "I want everyone to know that I'm sick of being told what to do and how to look." Tattoos can become a symbolic battleground between adolescents asserting autonomy over their own bodies and authority figures trying to enforce standard codes of appearance.

Adolescents may also use tattoos as a way to signify and solidify group memberships as they move between schools and communities. Susan's tattoo enforces her ties to childhood friends. "We grew up in [town] together, and these flowers [pointing to tattoo] were painted all over the gym in our elementary school.... I love knowing my girls and I will always be together like that." Another young woman, Renee, describes to Atkinson how several women from her residence hall floor decided together to get tattoos of their university logo. While these individuals believe that tattoos can provide some semblance of belonging and security in a changing world, these promises of permanence often fall short in the face of real personal transitions and shifting social norms.

Eve, a young woman interviewed for this article, explains that she and her fiancé plan to get tattoos on the day they sign their marriage license. The tattoo "symbolizes permanence, something long lasting but also a journey." She argues that these tattoos are not about teenage rebellion, but about commemorating a passage to adulthood and a committed relationship. In an age when the divorce rate hovers around 50 percent, the tattoo emerges as a poignant if

shaky symbol of an attempt to sustain a long-term relationship. Eve emphasizes that even if she eventually divorces, she still wants a memento of her marriage because it marks an important era in her life.

As these young people illustrate, tattoos are a powerful means by which a generation can assert independence and commemorate important events, ranging from going away to college to living alone for the first time to getting married. In marking these rites of passage, young people give tattoos multiple and at times contradictory meanings. While some invoke tattoos as rebellion or rejection of authority figures and mainstream values, others utilize them in more nuanced ways to assert their own definitions of maturity and autonomy. Whatever the particular statements that young people are making with their tattoos, the act of getting a tattoo increasingly serves as a vehicle to mark adulthood.

tattooing women

Women's interest in tattooing has also been increasing in the United States since the 1960s. Today almost half of tattooed people are women, according to various sources. A 2003 Harris poll found that 15 percent of women and 16 percent of men have tattoos. (The same poll found that 31 percent of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals had at least one tattoo.)

Tattooing offers many women control over their own bodies. Some have used the tattoo to challenge the limited roles of wife and mother and to explore other ways to define themselves. Around the turn of the last century, aristocratic women in England, France, and the United States, including Winston Churchill's mother and members of the Vanderbilt family, sported tattoos. Margo DeMello asserts that many Victorian women were drawn to tattoos as a way of demonstrating that they were "less likely to accept the idea of the quiet, pale, and bounded female body." In addition, she says, "tattoos have long been a sign of that

resistance within the working class."

Perceptions of tattooed women as sexually promiscuous and lower-class have a long history. Albert Parry describes a rape case in late-1920s Boston in which the prosecutor, upon realizing that the young woman he was defending had a tattoo, requested that the case be dropped. The judge and jury released the two men who raped her on the grounds that they had been misled by the butterfly on her leg. As with many women in rape cases, the defendant herself was put on trial, and her tattoo was seen as evidence of her guilt, overriding whatever meaning she herself hoped to assert through it.

While men and women both get tattoos, men are more likely to use tattoos to reinforce traditional notions of masculinity, whereas women often both defy and reproduce conventional standards of femininity. In interviews with Atkinson, Caroline states, "Women nowadays believe that whatever men can do women can do better, and that includes tattooing." Zeta explains that tattoos provide a concrete way of challenging traditional gender norms: "I could talk and talk and talk about wearing grungy clothes and not dyeing my hair to look like a Barbie doll, and no one would care since all of that is superficial." While Zeta believes the permanence of a tattoo demonstrates a deep and tangible commitment to alternative gender definitions, other women use tattoos to conform to mainstream standards of femininity.

As tattoos become more common, they are less able to express subversive definitions of women and their bodies. Atkinson argues that many of the young women he interviewed used their tattoos to enforce rather than challenge traditional femininity. Their tattoos were placed in either easily hidden or sexualized areas of the body such as the shoulder, hip, or lower back. The images were also traditionally feminine, such as animals, flowers, and hearts. Stephanie Farinelli, a regular participant in tattoo contests, describes to Mifflin how mainstream expectations for feminine beauty shape these competitions: "I felt that I was not

feminine-looking enough and scantily clad enough to win. I got a wardrobe change, went on a diet, and won first place the following year." DeMello argues that while feminist scholars have rushed to embrace tattooing's liberatory potential for women, "People aren't interested in the women who get men's names on them, or who get what their men want on them because it's sexy and feminine rather than 'empowering.'"

Even when women seek freedom and power over their own bodies, the meanings women attach to their tattoos are "culturally written over" by the larger society. Braunberger gives the example of Elaine Schieve, a North Dakota lawyer who got a tattoo of a Nile River goddess on her right ankle to celebrate her 60th birthday and the "liberation of menopause"—only to be confronted by friends concerned about the reactions of her husband and male colleagues who do not take women seriously in the law profession. Even among well-meaning friends, her intention of celebrating a personal passage was overshadowed by the social contexts in which women must struggle to achieve professional respect.

Women have pioneered the use of tattoos to reclaim their bodies from traumatic experiences, including disease and abuse. Recently, women recovering from breast cancer have sought tattoos, both to create a new aesthetic for mastectomy scars and to express the devastating effects of the disease. Tattoo artist Sasha Merritt, recognizing the importance of tattooing in the healing process for women who have mastectomy scars, advertises a special rate for breast cancer survivors at the Women's Cancer Resource Center in Oakland, California. Andree Connors, a California writer with a rose tattoo over her mastectomy scar, told *Ms. Magazine* in 1992, "This is an invisible epidemic: everyone looks 'normal' because they're wearing prostheses. So the message does not get across to the world that we are being killed off by breast cancer."

Marking their bodies with tattoos helps women to feel they are reclaiming lost or violated parts of themselves—an especially important process for women healing from abuse or

trauma. In an interview with Atkinson, Marion describes her participation in a sexual abuse survivor's group in which ten of the women had gotten tattoos: "Each of us has taken a turn writing a story about our tattoo and what it means. We present them at group meetings and go over how tattooing helps women feel in control of our bodies."

Ironically, while some individuals invoke tattooing as a critique of consumer society, tattoos have themselves become a popular commodity.

Women may use tattooing to reclaim their bodies not only from violence or illness, but from more everyday experiences of feeling unattractive, weak, or different—like the young woman with the Pegasus tattoo. While some critics regard tattooing as another form of self-mutilation, and this indeed may be true in some cases, the self-described experiences of most tattooees seem to contradict this interpretation. Whereas most people who engage in cutting are ashamed of and attempt to hide their scars, most tattooees regard their tattoos as sources of pride and works of art, even those who hesitate to display them in public.

For many women, tattooing is a complex practice that involves both conformity and resistance to the expectation that their bodies be attractive to men. While historically many women have sought tattoos as a way to transgress gender norms, contemporary women increasingly seek tattoos as conventional markers of feminine beauty. In both cases, women have used tattoos as vehicles to create a sense of community with other women around shared experiences, even including abuse or disease.

tattoo subcultures

Some of those who modify their bodies in extreme ways by becoming heavily tattooed define

themselves as neo- or modern primitives and identify with tribal tattooing practices. Neo-primitives define their movement in opposition to modern society and view body modification as a way of reconnecting to primal experiences. While the tattoos worn by neo-primitives may be similar to those worn by others, many neo-primitives embrace tattoos and body modification as a spiritual experience and seek out modern primitive tattoo artists who take a ritualistic approach. Jamie Summers, a tattoo artist chronicled by Mifflin, sees tattooing as a "metamorphic rite." Some neo-primitive tattoo artists arrange ceremonies to coincide with phases of the moon or include chanting, drumming, and burning of sage in their sessions. For many neo-primitives, the tattoo not only becomes a primary source of identity but also shapes a sense of group membership. Thus, rather than being antisocial, Victoria Pitts states that heavily tattooed people form bonds with others in the body modification subculture. The shared practice of using tattooing to "provoke disdain, accept risk and push the envelope of body aesthetics" creates strong group ties.

Statistics on modern primitives are hard to find because the category is hard to define. Many modern primitives may also be members of other subcultures such as gay and lesbian, S and M, and fetish communities. While some tattoo artists may incorporate elements of modern primitive ceremony into their practices, they might not identify with the modern primitive movement. Also, the modern primitive practice of deeply personal and heavily symbolic tattooing has been taken up by people outside this community.

Some individuals may not identify themselves as modern primitives yet still consider themselves part of a tattoo community. Often referred to as "tattoo enthusiasts," they not only have lots of tattoos but also share a commitment to associating with others who have tattoos and to a lifestyle in which tattoos are central. According to DeMello, activities such as reading tattoo publications, attending tattoo conventions, and participating in Internet chat rooms give members of a tattoo subculture a "sense that they have found people who are like

them and who are not like everyone else."

This sense of shared values is especially true for those who use tattooing to criticize the consumer values of capitalist society. Cliff, a self-proclaimed neo-primitive interviewed by Atkinson, regards his tattoos as challenging the spiritual emptiness of our culture. "I was tired of looking like everyone else, and walking around like a zombie in my own body. Ripping up your body with tattoos is a way of getting in touch with yourself and others who are tired of being spiritually beaten down by our culture."

Ironically, while some individuals invoke tattooing as a critique of consumer society, tattoos have themselves become a popular commodity. As tattoos become more mainstream, some modern primitives engage in increasingly extreme practices to differentiate themselves. "When it [tattooing] gets embraced by the culture-at-large, somehow they take the rough edges off and make it palatable—cute-ify it and render it safe," says Don Ed Hardy in *Modern Primitives*. Tattoo artist Greg Kulz adds, "People are going for the extreme experience—whatever's accepted becomes boring, so you have to have something new."

While tattoo enthusiasts argue that tattoos are an expression of freedom and control over the body, their tattooing practices are highly sensitive to shifting social trends. And while many hard-core and neo-primitive people are regarded as marginalized and even freakish by mainstream society, they are part of established groups with their own codes of belief and norms of behavior.

limitations

The message that a person intends to communicate through a tattoo is not always the message received by others. The complex motivations of people who get tattoos are filtered through historical and cultural lenses that often impose unintended and unwanted meanings on their

tattooed bodies. A person's choice of imagery, location of the tattoo, and whether or not to cover it are all influenced by that person's social context.

Despite their increasing popularity, tattoos still carry stigma and can provoke discrimination. The University of California at Los Angeles conducted a "Business Attire Survey" in 1999 which revealed that 90 percent of campus recruiters looked negatively on tattoos. Despite evidence to the contrary, teenagers with tattoos are more likely to be perceived as gang members, drug users, dropouts, and troublemakers. A study by Armstrong and McConnell shows that medical professionals still often attribute tattoos to gang affiliation. Racial and ethnic minorities are especiallly likely to have their tattoos perceived as marks of gang membership or criminal behavior. Defense attorneys often advise their clients that visible tattoos can have a negative influence on middle-class (and white) jurors and judges.

Young people may find it necessary to cover their tattoos not only when looking for work but also on the job. Once employed, many people still need to keep their tattoos covered or face situations like that of a receptionist in San Diego interviewed by Mifflin: "People think I'm stupid until they talk to me. They think because you look different you have no respect for society and that you're not educated." Thus, while they may desire the tattoo as a mark of individuality, rebellion, or creative expression, some tattooees have difficulty reconciling their own intentions with negative social perceptions of their tattoos. Furthermore, hardcore forms of tattooing—such as full-body and facial tattoos—result in stronger stigmatization that can affect employability and social acceptability in ways that a small, easily hidden tattoo would not.

Tattoos also can create tensions in interpersonal relations. In Atkinson's study, Adele reveals, "I go home at night and cry sometimes because I don't have the brass to stand up and ask people to accept me for how I look" with a tattoo. Rena agonized over getting a tattoo

when she noticed her father's reaction to a tattooed friend: "My dad won't even talk to her anymore when she comes by the house." In the end, she decided to place her tattoo where no one, especially her family, could see it. Even when a tattoo symbolizes positive relationships or accomplishments to the bearer, friends and family may still interpret it negatively.

Contradictory interpretations of tattoos may also confront those who wish to make political or social statements. Doug explains to Atkinson that his swastika tattoos were his way to reclaim the ancient symbol from its connections with Nazism. But he covers them because he is afraid they will be misunderstood, marking him as a white supremacist. The historical symbolism and common cultural understanding attached to this design overshadow Doug's intended message.

In addition, tattoos in and of themselves do little to change social conditions and may contribute to the very conditions they seek to challenge. The anti-consumer values expressed by many neo-primitives and tattoo enthusiasts are undermined by the marketing of tattoos as fashionable and chic. Pitts reports that attempts to use tattoos to counter demeaning and objectifying images of women have been subverted by the popularization of tattooed bodies in pornographic magazines, videos, and strip shows.

The tattoo speaks to the ongoing, complex need for humans to express themselves through the appearance of their bodies. The tattooed body serves as a canvas to record the struggles between conformity and resistance, power and victimization, individualism and group membership. These struggles motivate both radical and mundane forms of tattooing. The popularity of tattoos attests to their power as vehicles for self-expression, commemoration, community building, and social commentary. At the same time, the tattoo's messages are limited by misinterpretation and the stigma that still attaches to tattooed people.

Reading 24

Big Handsome Men, Bears and Others: Virtual Constructions of 'Fat Male Embodiment'

Lee F. Monaghan

> I don't know if anyone else is watching the new Road Rules [US TV programme], where they're in the South Pacific. I caught some of it tonight and their challenge was that the two guys had to put on a Chippendales-type dance show at this drag bar, while the girls had to get at least fifty people to show up to it. One of the guys was a BHM [Big Handsome Man] and their show was SO GOOD! Both of the guys wore thongs about the size of your average piece of Kleenex, and they were pretty good dancers. The crowd absolutely loved them, and so did the judges. Not because they thought it was funny to see a big guy dancing around like that, but because they really thought they were good. And in two out of the three categories, the BHM guy got a higher score than the skinny guy!!!! Big guys rule!!!! (Posted on a fat acceptance Internet discussion board by a Female Fat Admirer or FFA)

Fatness and the Management of Spoiled Masculine Identities

The appropriateness of fatness has long been bounded and regulated in Western culture, even when fat bodies are sexed as male. Note, for instance, William Banting's 1863 *A Letter on Corpulence* (cf. Huff, 2001), Falstaff's proclaimed frailty, Shakespeare's *Henry IV* and cultural commentary on the medical category 'morbid [*sic*] obesity' since Hippocrates (Gilman, 2004:11). Of course, this does not translate to a naturalized and universal condemnation of fatness. Forms of fat embodiment have long had historical and cross-

cultural currency. Mennell (1991: 147), for example, notes that ‘healthy stoutness’ and ‘the magnificent amplitude of the human frame’ constituted the cultural model in medieval and early modern Europe. The anthropology of the body tells a similar story, especially in relation to female fecundity (Brain, 1979). However, in contemporary Anglophone culture, such bodily capital is often ‘discredited’, that is, it is a stigma which, unlike ‘discreditable’ stigma, is immediately evident during face-to-face interaction (Goffman, 1968: 14).

Once good, fat bodies putatively belong to the bad and/or the ugly according to the definitional workings of ‘somatic society’ – an increasingly global society where ‘major political and personal problems are both problematized in the body and expressed through it’ (Turner, 1996: 1). This degradation, which is currently being extended to Asia and Pacific regions (where body mass, in contrast to the UK and the USA, is positively correlated with socio-economic status), is certified and accentuated by the Western disease-focused biomedical model (International Diabetes Institute, 2000). According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 1998), ‘overweight’ and ‘obesity’ are reaching ‘epidemic’ proportions in both developed and developing nations. Compounding the stigma of fatness, such pathologizing typifications are increasingly taken for granted in the English-speaking world. Even so, alternative definitions exist in various communicative contexts. Using qualitative data generated in Anglophone cyberspace, this article explores more positive typifications of fat male embodiment – social constructions which could be described as ‘virtual’ given their digital expression and ‘connotation[s] of “not quite”, adequate for practical purposes even if not strictly the real thing’ (Hine, 2000: 65). Extending Goffman’s (1968) arguments about stigma, such typifications are also ‘virtual’ in another sense, representing expectations which may figure in the management of spoiled identities.

[INSERT TABLE 24.1 HERE]

Big Handsome Men: Putting On(line) a Desirable Body and Face

This typification is relatively inclusive. One of my contacts wrote: ‘Any fat guy is a BHM, be he gay, teenager, African American, Asian or if he comes from Jupiter’ (AdorableFFA, email: 11 May 2004). However, in practice, this universality is highly circumscribed. If reference is made to sexuality, the BHM label is largely constructed within heterosexual *SA* groups (some meet off- as well as online). Although primarily catering to Big Beautiful Women (BBW), and their typically slim male Fat Admirers (FAs), these (cyber-)groups also offer acceptance, support and heterosexual validation for fat men. Online, self-typifying BHM (or, more modestly, ‘big men’) often seek corporeal connections and offline dating opportunities with Female Fat Admirers (FFAs). This is illustrated below. Here ‘nice and thick’ refers to the author’s offline body, rather than intellect, amidst similar postings where geographically locatable BHM described their eye and hair colour, as well as weight and height:

> Any FFA’s in California? Hi, I’m a big man in Santa Barbara, I would just love to meet a woman who appreciates someone nice and thick. If you’re a FFA who is hungry for a date, email me! (Posting on a BHM/FFA discussion board)

In contrast to gay male typifications (discussed below), the genus BHM is relatively homogeneous. When differentiation was observed, this often coincided with the heavy offline stigma associated with particular categories of fat male. These include adolescents (Teen BHM), who are often considered ‘body conscious’ (WHO, 1998: 61), and those clinically defined as ‘morbidly [*sic*] obese’ (Super Size BHM). The typification Big Handsome Black Men (BHBM) was unusual, despite AdorableFFA’s ethnically inclusive definition. Following Mosher (2001: 176), this could be due to a more accommodating attitude to fat among

African Americans. However, I did observe one self-typifying BHBM (reportedly weighing 260 pounds at 5 feet 10 inches) admonish African American women for ignoring or insulting their fat 'brothers' offline. However, while all BHM may be vulnerable to offline stigma, or 'non-person treatment' (Goffman, 1959), the Internet allows fleshy bodies to become more durable and valued cyborgs. For Haraway (1991: 175), cyborgs embrace technology in order to exercise 'the power to survive . . . to mark the world that marked them as other, [to] reverse and displace hierarchical dualisms' such as ugly and handsome. Following Wernick (1991), this also meshes with a promotional culture where men, like women, are increasingly being constructed as fleshy advertisements for the self.

The BHM label is a 'personal front' (Goffman, 1959) in the theatre of life. As part of the online presentation or promotion of self, BHM seek acceptance and heterosexual matching through 'face work' (Goffman, 1967), which could more appropriately be termed 'screen work'. This work, sometimes manifest in light-hearted sociability, draws positive meanings from the symbolism of the desirable (handsome) male face (on the cultural significance of the face, see Synnott, 1989). Photographs purportedly depicting the BHM's face, and favourable self-comparisons to 'famous faces' (e.g. the BHBM mentioned above claimed he looked like Sidney Poitier) may also render this 'screen work' more corporeally grounded. Here the Internet provides a stage upon which 'real' fat males may (virtually) construct a self that (partially) transcends the increasing bodyism of somatic society. Though, as indicated below, corpulent male bodies (fat body parts below the neck) are still relevant, contrasting with common representations of fat as 'an unwanted appendage of the head-self' (Millman, 1980; cited by Mosher, 2001: 174). These male body-selves also include those typified as SSBHM in *SA* circles:

Once, on a 'You're Too Fat to Be All That' episode of Ricki Lake, I heard a 500 pound

> man describe his belly as 'the playground'. 'Ladies love the playground!', he said. 'They love to ride and slide and do the glide'. It was a horrible episode, but man, did I laugh. And I now call my belly the playground. And I still laugh. I've been called many things, but the best was 'big, sexy beast'. (A BHM responding to FFAs on a fat-acceptance discussion board)

SA cyber-groups typically comprise 'the own and the wise' (Goffman, 1968). These cybersociates are instrumental in manufacturing favourable (recognizably human) versions of fat male embodiment. Through collaborative efforts, participants promote a 'line' (Goffman, 1967) which, in the words of AdorableFFA, 'is designed to make both the person of size and the public aware that fatness does not imply ugliness' (email: 11 May 2004). The consistency of this shared viewpoint – along with its promotion of civil liberties, social support and legitimacy – leads me to suggest that it is a *relatively* proactive, rather than reactive, stance. Julie, who, like AdorableFFA, was a key member of a prominent fat activist group, also stated that fat men unaffiliated to *SA* organizations are BHM irrespective of their own awareness or promotion of fat civil rights (email: 26 December 2003). To borrow from, and modify, Marxist social thought, these 'fat-male-bodies-in-themselves' may lack political consciousness but they share discredited corporeal capital and are therefore potential advocates of fat civil rights.

The materiality of offline bodies, as well as being an important aspect of participants' online definitions and interactions, was recurrent during interviewing. In response to my questioning, Julie added that 'real-life' BHM (experienced by her as unique individuals rather than social types) do not have to be facially handsome. This, in turn, countered the suggestion that the BHM typification simply perpetuates the importance of actual physical looks (email, 26 December 2003). In short, the handsome 'face' in face (and screen) work does not have to

be realistic; rather, it is a virtual construction which is aligned with particular expectations and emotions, calling forth supportive social responses as part of a more general cult of the self (Goffman, 1967). Of course, such efforts to fight stigma actually consolidate a public conception of fatness as a 'real thing' and fat people as constituting a 'real' group (cf. Goffman, 1968: 139). Transforming 'fat-bodies-in-themselves' into 'fat-bodies-for-themselves' may therefore have its downside, as well as its advantages (also, see LeBesco, 2004: 89, 137).

Because desire is an important dimension in the constitution of acting bodies, it is worth underscoring its relevance in the context of BHM/BBW/FFA sexual social relations. Sexual desire, socially patterned according to 'a joint system of prohibition and incitement' (Connell, 1987: 112), is produced relationally. Organized within what Connell terms the 'structure of cathexis' (1987: 112), this 'mode of desire' determines fat men's eligibility for sexual matching and 'interpellates' them as 'sexual objects' (Turner, 1996: 46). As noted, the 'reality' of physical appearance/attraction may be disavowed online for political reasons, yet the BHM typification connotes sexual (physical) desirability rather than mere acceptability. Offline, Gimlin (2002: 136) observes that many fat women belonging to a prominent US organization (The National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance or NAAFA) do not find fat men sexually desirable. Confirmatory evidence is available online. However, there is also, methodologically speaking, much 'negative evidence', that is, more positive online meanings. Cyber-support from FFAs and others (e.g. BBW and the larger *SA* community) is revisited below in a discussion of the virtual construction of viable masculinities.

Bears: 'Cuddly' Hirsute Types in Gay Culture

This typification 'includes many big men deemed fat and denigrated by the main-stream of

gay male social and community networks' (Textor, 1999: 223). In-group purists would disagree, but this is a relatively inclusive and self-referential label which overlaps with other identity categories (cf. LeBesco, 2004: 90). Similar to BHM, Bears also engage in processes of self-acceptance and promotion. This proactive stance is especially relevant in gay male culture given the intensity of bodyism and 'aesthetic inequality' (Synnott, 1989). Gay culture, more so than heterosexual culture, objectifies a standard image of male beauty: 'the young, blond, smooth-skinned, gym-buffed' model type or 'twink' (Wright, 1997: 2). Bears seek to transcend this body ideal through their symbolic style and advocated codes of self-body relatedness:

> The most common definition of a 'bear' is a man who is hairy, has facial hair, and a cuddly body. However, the word 'bear' means many things to different people, even within the bear movement. Many men who do not have one or all of these characteristics define themselves as bears, making the term a very loose one. Suffice it to say, 'bear' is often defined as more of an attitude than anything else – a sense of comfort with our natural masculinity and bodies that is not slavish to the vogues of male attractiveness that is so common in gay circles and the culture at large. (Bear Information Website)

Thinner and less hirsute types sometimes embrace this identity. And, similar to the possibility of rotund gay men being described as 'big' and handsome, heterosexual men with a 'bear-like' appearance could also be typified as Bears. However, responding to 'heterosexual [STR8] bears' or 'women looking for them', the above website administrators write: 'heterosexuals are always welcome to use our resources, and we will gladly link in heterosexual-related bear sites, should they come to our attention. But unfortunately, at present, we aren't aware of any.' This open and communicative stance toward others suggests

that Bears can be highly supportive and accepting.

There are many Bear subtypes. In the mordant words of one IRC participant: ‘bears have more self-identification strata than regular people have underwear’ (Wolf Man). ‘Cybearspace’ is informative. Websites describe ‘subclasses of bear’ including Cubs, who are typically younger, smaller and possibly less experienced group members; Daddy Bears (or Polar Bears) who are typically older (greying) and (sexually) superordinate to Cubs; and Otters and Wolves who are ‘thin bears, the wolf being more aggressive’ (Bear Information Website). Because Table 1 is structured at the generic level according to typifications of ‘fat’ male body-subjects, Otters and Wolves are categorized as cybersociates of ‘cuddly’ Bears. However, there are many other sizeable subtypes. For example, ethnic variation is signified by labels such as Black Bear though ‘the predominant types of bears are “American Bears” who are typically Caucasian males’ (Bear Admirer Website). Some are hybrids with other generic types: Grizzlies are gay males whose physical characteristics border those of Bears and large Chubbies (see discussion below).

Systems of relevance, including motivational relevances which reflect participants’ (sexual) interest in big men, render further differentiation possible. Indeed, the ‘inner horizon’ or ‘frame of further determination’ (Schutz, 1966: 95) of this typification can become extremely variegated. Drawing from Turner (1996: 47), it may be stated that Bears live their sensual, sexual yet resistant lives via the heterogeneous categories of a homoerotic mode of desire. ‘Because “Bears” mean so many things to different people, because bears come in all shapes and sizes and have different sexual proclivities’, and also given the purported expense of placing personal ads to meet potential sex partners, the administrators of one website offer what they describe as ‘an incredibly scientific system to describe bears and bear-like men’ (Bear Information Website). Admittedly ‘somewhat tongue-in-cheek’ (Wright, 1997: 33), the so-called ‘Natural Bear Code’ differentiates types on the basis of

various eroticized bodily dimensions. These include facial hair (length, thickness and tidiness), body hair (chest, back, buttocks, etc.), other aspects of the physique (e.g. height, muscularity, weight), bodily comportment and action (e.g. dominance, passivity, sexual proclivities).

Focusing upon bodily bigness, codes exist for Round Bears, Big Teddy Bears, Big Boned Bears and Bears with a Tummy. Heaviness is not always relevant, but 'cuddly' types with 'bear bellies' are common and are desired. This, in turn, may render fatness an explicitly eroticized 'body project' (Shilling, 2003), where being a 'man of girth' is not simply accepted but positively embraced and cultivated as part of an alternative gay identity. This is discussed below in relation to Gainers. However, while the value of fatness (and other bodily capital such as youthfulness) is being inflated in the US gay male cultural economy following the devastating impact of AIDS (Kruger, 1998), there are limits. AIDS 'wasting syndrome' and horrific images of the emaciated 'homosexual body' have not simply resulted in a gay fat utopia. Even Bears sometimes police types of fat male body, constituting their subjectivity by producing excluded and abjected Others (LeBesco, 2004: 5, 91).

Other Fat-friendly Typifications

There are other typifications and associated relevances. For example, eating 'excessively' is a primary concern among Gluttons while the gay eroticization of corpulence is thematic among Chubbies and Chubby Chasers. Inseparable from the history of Christian asceticism, where eating and sex have long been considered 'gross activities of the body' (Turner, 1996: 49), other recalcitrant types embody an amalgam of corporeal concerns. In pursuing greater pleasures from eating and growing, Gainers or Feedees seek eroticized relations with Encouragers or Feeders. This gives an explicitly sexual twist to what Campos (2004: 70)

terms ‘food porn’ – the investment of quasi-erotic qualities and compensatory sexual meanings to food.

Focusing first upon the gay male community, the Chubby label is common. Existing on/offline, Chubbies can be differentiated from other large gay men along two axes, namely (1) their physical characteristics and (2) self–body relatedness. First, these men tend to be bigger than their bear-like cousins: ‘[unlike] the “traditional” bear types, “chubbies” have sumo wrestling builds’ (Bear Admirer Website). Other physical characteristics are also relevant. For example, hair can act as a symbolic marker for (overlapping) membership categorization, belonging and rejection. Harry, a bearded, middle-aged man reportedly weighing 400 pounds and self-typifying as a Chubby, wrote: ‘chubbies who are not bears (no beard, no body hair) feel excluded by some bears’ (email: 12 June 2004). Second, Chubbies do self-acceptance/promotion work, seeking recognition and/or sexual validation via the Internet. However, they are typically dissatisfied with their weight, adopting more of a reactive rather than proactive stance. Certainly Harry felt his weight was ‘a bit much’, adding ‘if I could, I’d like to be under 300 [pounds]’ (email: 12 June 2004). Another gay contact, Ray, reportedly weighing 250 pounds, said more generally: ‘I think of chubbies as the big guys who are big not by choice and wish they were thin (usually complain all the time about the diet they should start tomorrow!)’ (email: 13 January 2004).

However, while ‘most chubbies want to weigh less’ (Harry, email: 12 June 2004), their corpulence is eroticized. The Internet and offline convergences, organized by ‘fat-friendly’ European and US gay clubs, offer spaces for sexual expression and matching. Websites for and by Chubbies and Chubby Chasers (who may not necessarily be ‘big’ themselves) are often sexually explicit. Some are commercial porn sites, though others are personal homepages. Again, white ethnicity and US nationality are often taken for granted, though some websites present other nationalities and ethnicities. Several sites I came across

described the biographies and romantic hopes of African American Chubbies – cyber-bodies whose weight *and* ethnicity have reportedly led to offline discrimination and subordination in gay culture.

Other typifications refer to (typically smaller) men who actively embrace and possibly eroticize fattening processes. Here, if only in imagination, the internal and external spaces of the (cyber)body are constructed as 'free territory' – a place of liberty and licence that may be manipulated, adorned and penetrated according to the owners' intentions and will (cf. Lyman and Scott, 1970: 106). Gainers and Belly Builders are typically, though not necessarily, gay men whose bodies, or specific body-parts (the stomach), are in a state of 'unfinishedness' (Shilling, 2003). Similar to the 'grotesque medieval body' (Bakhtin, 1965), they happily resist being devoured by the world by consuming, growing and playfully partaking of the world. As an aside, it is interesting to note that clinicians, without any irony or recognition of the fat-bellied cyborg, refer to accumulated abdominal fat as 'android obesity' (WHO, 1998: 7).

It would be wrong to view websites (and the typifications used therein) as exclusively heterosexual or gay. Ray, who hosted an internationally popular Gainer website, wrote: 'over recent years more straights [heterosexuals] seem to be showing up in typically gay "places" so the line blurs' (email: 15 March 2004). Understandings gleaned from an early visit to a Gainer/Builder chat room suggest that men identifying as heterosexual in everyday life (i.e. claiming to be married to women) visit such spaces, albeit with the intention of making gay sexual contacts. Drawing from Waskul's (2005) concept of 'alter-sexuality' or liminal sexuality, there is nothing unusual about this: cyberspace provides suitable conditions for safely 'bounded' reinventions of the sexual self which may contrast radically with everyday life. Nonetheless, essentialist constructions of sexuality often prevail. For example, those providing the aforementioned 'freebie' IRC room sought to include straight men.

Distinguishing their space from other ‘chub sites’, they encouraged the appreciation and cultivation of men’s fat stomachs by focusing upon ‘guts’ not genitals. Even so, gay male sexuality remained highly thematic.

Whether reference is made to gay or heterosexually oriented cyberspace, emphasis may shift from weight-gain fantasies to the pleasures of eating. Often there is overlap. Either way, dyadic relationships may be sought with supportive cybersociates as part of the expression, production and direction of discreditable desires (including desires which some participants describe as ‘mildly’ masochistic). These resistances against dietary and sexual restraint entail praise and/or playful degradation in techno-sexualized contexts. (If actual physical interaction does not occur, then the telephone may serve as a more immediate alternative to text-based interaction.) Here erotic fantasies and fictional stories render food, sex and expanding/expansive bodies pivotal concerns. Food is not necessarily a compensation for sex in these representations; rather, food may complement the sensual pleasures of sexual relations (e.g. eating chocolate cake which is smeared on a sexual partner’s naked body). Textor (1999) discusses this in relation to US gay men, where Gainers form eroticized feeding relationships with Encouragers. Similar relationships are forged in heterosexual space, though participants may typify as Feedees and Feeders and call their practice Feederism. A FFA elaborates, noting subtle distinctions and the fact that gay men do not have a monopoly on the Gainer label:

> As far as gainers/feedees go, they may or may not be fat. For many, the feeding and gain is just a fantasy, because their real life circumstances do not allow them to feel they can get as fat as they want. Many of course are already quite chubby or fat, want to get even fatter, and are interested in a woman who wants to feed them and then tease them about their excess girth. You can even split up the gainer and the feedee into two different

> categories, as each may have a different end to attaining sexual pleasure. The gainer wants to gain weight because he finds the feeling of having the extra weight erotic, and wants to please his FFA [qua Feeder], or at least wants her to notice his extra flab. The Feedee may or may not want to gain, but finds the fullness and sensual experience of indulging to be the most erotic aspect. I think there's usually overlap, but a distinction is worth noting. I think both carry a hint of the masochism role, but there are subtle differences. (WarmFFA, email: 12 May 2004)

Feederism in cyberspace sometimes entails role-play between two self-identified heterosexual men, with one adopting the role of a female Feeder in a 'mutual-pretence awareness context' (Glaser and Strauss, 1964). Drawing from ethnomethodological studies of gender attribution, this is an instance of social cognition and interpretation transforming 'naturalistic' bodies according to shared structures of practical relevance (Connell, 1987: 78). Following Feather-stone (1995: 233), this may also be described as 'computer cross-dressing' which destabilizes boundaries such as sex and gender, intimacy and anonymity, organic and cybernetic, reality and fantasy.

Other typifications in heterosexually oriented space include Glutton and Foodee. They too lend weight to the sociological truism that 'food is not just something to eat' (Murcott, 1998: 14). Their relatedness to supportive others, comprising dyadic (sexualized) feeding and eroticized weight gain, may be less central but they collectively emphasize gluttonous pleasures. These relevances encode an open disregard for medical models of healthy diet – models which often clash with people's gustatory habits and preferences (Beardsworth and Keil, 1997: 256). In the gluttony email group I subscribed to, there was often a caustic championing of fat people's rights to share in the public's growing fascination with eating (cf. Murcott, 1998: 1). Here tales of gluttony were posted in an atmosphere of camaraderie

and acceptance. (Re)producing a shameless orientation to fat male embodiment, information was circulated on competitive eating events, 'all-you-can-eat' restaurants and fattening recipes. In contrast to bourgeois stylization, refinement and distinction, 'the crudely material reality' (Bourdieu, 1984: 203) of eating was celebrated as part of the performance of gender, class and identity. That said, other issues were also discussed, including: discrimination, ambivalence about weight gain, affordability of food and the eroticization of those BBW who publicly display gustatory verve, flesh and a desire to become even fatter.

Finally, typifications may be defined relationally independent of possible incumbents' feelings (cf. Schutz, 1964: 45). Typifications may even be constructed in 'closed awareness contexts' (Glaser and Strauss, 1964) characterized by gendered power relations and a traditional sexual division of domestic labour. For example, a self-typifying male Glutton may become a Feedee by forming a 'food-centric' relationship with a woman (Feeder) independent of her knowledge or self-identity. The host of the gluttony group cited above, writing in a characteristically self-assured style, makes this clear when advising other male Gluttons on how to form offline commensal relations with a female Feeder:

> Here's my advice for finding a female feeder. Go to a personals website. A BBW site might be more likely to yield positive responses. Or just put an ad in the regular local newspaper. NEVER specify that you are looking for a female feeder. No one knows what that means. Most female feeders are not really consciously aware of their preferences. Many of them have not discovered this side of themselves because they have not met the right man to bring it out in them. IN your ad, just say something like 'Must be a good cook'. That's all you really need to say. You might mention that you are 'a bit of a glutton'. Be certain to include dining out and picnics and such in your list of interests. You'll probably get several responses. In the initial phone call, be sure to chat about your

> favorite foods and inquire about hers and her favorite recipes. From the way she talks about food or the interest she shows in your preferences, you may get a feeling if she is a potential feeder. Design your first date so that several food encounters are included. Demonstrate your strong appetite to her without drawing attention to it. Note her reaction. If the response is neutral to intrigue you have a promising lead. The acid test will come a few dates later when you know her well enough to share a home cooked meal at her place. A potential female feeder will have picked up on your abnormally well-developed appetite in the course of a date or two. She will prepare generous quantities of food in multiple courses. If she makes a 'diet' meal or fails to offer seconds, or gives you a lecture for eating too much, you may have someone too hung up on dietary restraint to ever satisfy you. (Al, host of a 'Food and Drink' website)

Virtually Constructing Acceptable, Admirable or Resistant Masculinities

The above gendered typifications figure within online schemes of orientation and interpretation and have implications for positive subjectivity. At a time when the obesity industry is actively constructing overweight as a serious problem, the Internet provides space for alternative definitions of fat male embodiment. Some common ways of managing spoiled masculine identities online are outlined below under four headings: (1) appeals to 'real' or 'natural' masculinity; (2) the admiration and eroticization of fat men's bodies; (3) transgression, fun and the carnivalesque; and (4) the pragmatics and politics of fat male embodiment.

Appeals to 'Real' or 'Natural' Masculinity

Constructions of normative masculinity are multi-dimensional, incorporating factors such as employment, marital status and fatherhood (Watson, 2000). Yet, in the context of bodyism, fatness may be used to emasculate male bodies or render them subordinate on masculine hierarchies. In contemporary Anglophone culture, fatness symbolizes lack of self-discipline and adherence to masculinist imperatives such as being active and in control. Participants in various *SA* groups challenge this effacement. Whether focusing upon heterosexual or gay male groups, the competing rhetoric is clear: fat men have 'real' or 'natural' bodies.

Similar to Watson's male interviewees, cyber-persona criticized media images of 'ideal' men's bodies on the basis that such bodies are unrepresentative of the 'normal bloke's everyday body' (Watson, 2000: 80). Men often know 'ideal' or 'perfect' physiques require body-maintenance regimes, rendering the hard-edged male body 'an artificial creation' (2000: 117, also, see Monaghan, 2001). Nonetheless, given the importance of sport as a gendered institution, men may still align themselves with the functionality, if not the aesthetics, of an exercised body. By reportedly engaging in physically demanding (male-coded) sports, 'big' men seek to counter negative (feminized) stereotypes. Their vocabularies of motive derive additional weight if the type of male body invoked is 'gigantic in all its qualities' rather than 'pathologically fat' (Gilman, 2004: 53). One contributor to a mixed-sex *SA* discussion board wrote the following, joining others in condemning a 'fat discriminatory' article in a men's health and fitness magazine:

> Well I was offended by this [article] a lot because as a big man none of the things said in that article are true. I am an athlete. I train in dojos, gyms and I spar with pro wrestlers to this day. I am 6 feet 7 inches and 400 pounds. I wear a size 18 shoe. I have never liked *Men's Health* [magazine] in general because they're only concerning themselves with the image of the perfect man and not the real man. (Gargantua, Big Men's discussion board)

Bears also typically accept many trappings of hegemonic masculinity. The historical association between male homosexuality and effeminacy undeniably promotes complexity and contradiction within this subculture (Wright, 1997: 11). Yet, key dimensions of masculinity are embraced, including self-confidence and assurance. The symbolism of body and facial hair, physical bulk and male-coded activity are also relevant. Bears self-present as having the 'correct attitude' towards their 'natural' ageing male bodies, hair on the body and face differentiates men from women (baldness is acceptable for the same reason), 'the battle of the bulge' is rejected (it is typically associated with the feminine), and being camp is replaced by a sense of being an 'everyday guy' who also happens to be gay. Comfort with other men's bodies is also framed in terms of 'real' masculinity – Bears are not 'afraid' to touch others, for example.

Other types also engage online in masculine validating processes. For example, Belly Builders assert control and licence over their 'body territory' (Lyman and Scott, 1970: 106) in response to a society that dispraises the 'obese' for their putative lack of control. Gluttons emphasize 'man-size' appetites, the capacity for sheer quantitative stuffing and the enjoyment of food without fear of calories (also, see Bordo, 1993: 132–4). Aligned with female Feeders, male Feedees reiterate traditional gendered stereotypes where women lovingly cook their men 'masculine' foods such as meat. Here the 'gendered accumulation process' discussed by Connell (2002: 25) takes a specifically embodied form. The space-occupying male body is also relevant: being or becoming a 'bulky' man from overeating and/or reduced physical activity may represent an easier approach to 'bodybuilding' than lifting weights. Many gay Gainers, self-presenting as former athletes (ex-Jocks), reportedly take this stance offline (Textor, 1999: 228).

Admiring and Eroticizing Fat Men's Bodies

Fatness is potentially problematic for men regardless of their achievements or non-corporeal indicators of acceptability, respectability and desirability. Despite coming from a range of socio-economic backgrounds (including the professions), unmarried fat men in a Canadian study blamed their lack of success in dating, and loneliness, on their weight (Joanisse and Synnott, 1999: 54). Correspondingly, *SA* cyber-communities represent possible oases of support and admiration, which, in some instances, extends to the explicit eroticization of fat men's bodies.

As noted, BHM seek to efface the perceived ugliness of fatness by putting on(line) a desirable body and face. Such 'screen work' may be tentative (real-life rejection may be mentioned, for example), but some cybersociates are highly supportive. Those reporting offline relationships with fat men, including women who have struggled to reinterpret their own fat, sometimes offer encouragement. As expressed within a heterosexual Gainer group:

> Subject: Yeah, she's gaining!! Once I accepted the fact that fat does not make me a bad person, it was easy to give in to my natural tendency to be fat as well as my feelings that fat is erotic and desirable. I not only like being fat, I like Fred [partner] to be fat too. So I rub his belly and encourage him. What about you? Would you like to be fat? Would she like it if you were fat too? (Sugar Plum Fairy, Weight-Watching group email)

And, referring to the same *Men's Health* magazine article discussed above by Gargantua and cybersociates ('Thirty-One Reasons I'm Still Fat'), another FFA cited and concurred with one of these reasons: ' "there actually exists a completely viable group of really hot women who are bored with totally buff, cut, in-shape guys." You bet, we FFAs are here!' (Ruben's Girl, Big Men's discussion board). Ruben's Girl, who self-presented as an SSBBW married

to a BHM, also initiated an extended group discussion on complementary masculine adjectives for BHM. Here BHM were described as massive, burly, imposing, robust, awesome, powerful, cuddly and magnificent. This conversation ritual elevated BHM to sacred status (cf. Goffman, 1967). In this little social system, these rituals prompted BHM to thank their cybersociates for offering esteem and validation. Renewed hope in finding romance was similarly expressed in other (free to access) *SA* groups by those self-presenting as single men who had spent their lives thinking their fatness was an insurmountable barrier to close, intimate heterosexual relationships.

Of course, gender asymmetry must be recognized. An important feminist argument is that women's physical appearance is more often emphasized in a broader objectifying and sexist culture. It is unsurprising, therefore, that BHM may be praised for qualities extending beyond their looks, such as personality, intelligence, charm and conversation skills. However, fat men may also be favourably positioned on sexual hierarchies because of, rather than despite, their size. WarmFFA's website expressed admiration and lascivious heterosexual attention towards fat men. These men included film and TV stars (e.g. Robbie Coltrane), musicians (e.g. Popa Chubby), athletes (e.g. sumo wrestlers) and historical figures such as Daniel Lambert who was described as one of England's biggest men, reputedly weighing as much as 52 stone (also, see Gilman, 2004: 98). Positioned as 'eye candy' for the FFA, visitors to this website were offered links to photographs of fat men (some of them available through gay-themed sites) with the stated intention of serving 'our female lustful eyes as well' (WarmFFA's website).

The range of acceptable or desirable male body types is reportedly much narrower in gay culture, rendering many gay men insecure about their looks (Locke, 1997). One response is to reject the objectification (symbolic feminization) of gay men's bodies where the emphasis upon beauty is recast as an impediment to intimacy (Wright, 1997: 9). However, many *SA*

spaces promote the gay eroticization of expansive male bodies. Textor's (1999) work on representations of fat men and homosexual desire within the big men's magazine media is extendable to cyberspace. Similar to magazines, 'an erotic lexicon is in place' forming 'a discourse of desire' which reflects and produces an imagined community wherein fat men have sexual currency (Textor, 1999: 218).

However, structures of sexuality and cathexis produce mixed emotions (Connell, 1987: 112). Similar to BBW/FA sexual social relations (Gimlin, 2002), some 'big' gay men are ambivalent about this sexual validation (objectification). Several gay cybersociates claimed that Chubbies are suspicious of slim Chasers because they are often predatory types, sexually 'grazing' on 'big' men who lack self-esteem and are needy of love. Harry elaborated upon this, indicating that erotic reciprocity in these (offline) power relations is based on an unequal exchange:

> Chubbies have issues with chasers because chasers' desires can come off as a fetish, being more interested in the fat than the whole picture. When they say 'the bigger the better' it boils their whole attraction down to one thing. Chasers can be only interested in sex and go from one chubby to another. A slim chaser can do this because they are a scarce commodity. At [offline chubby club], although about half of the guys are chasers, only half of those chasers are slim guys. Even with chubbies who have a degree of self-acceptance, having a handsome, young, slim or muscular guy interested in you can boost your self-esteem. But this sets them up for a crash when that person leaves. (email: 12 June 2004)

Transgression, Fun and the Camivalesque

The stigma of fatness is often challenged in a convivial atmosphere, characterized by fun and enjoyment rather than illness and disease. Again, sexual desire is relevant. However, in exploring other (interrelated) themes, I will briefly consider online representations of feeding and fattening processes. For Gainers, Belly Builders, Gluttons and Feedees, the vicarious pleasures of gluttony and/or body modification are central. For them, opprobrium is flamboyantly resisted through the assertive 'technique of self-flaunting' (Joanisse and Synnott, 1999: 64). The following supportive interchange in a mixed-sex Gainer group humorously refers to measurable offline bodies and seasonal celebrations. Even in contexts of corporeal transgression, food is socially ordered, patterned and encoded (cf. Mennell, 1991: 10):

> Subject: Have gained, how do I know? Kevin wrote:
>
> I went out today and I think I have gained, my fly on my jeans would not stay up, the pressure of that extra belly was not going to give in.:), [symbol signifies a smiling face]. Just as well it is winter and I had a large loose jumper so you could not tell anyway, blush. I am now a good 173 cm in girth, when I was 168 cm I was 172 kg so I estimate that I am now 176–178 kg or about 390 lbs, I am aiming for 180 cm by Xmas.
>
> Reply (on the same day) from Jake:
>
> Dude, I think you'll make it to your goal by Christmas, after all you're so close now and still 4 months away, with 3–4 big eating holidays ahead of you too, make the most of those and I believe you'll be comfortably over your goal by Christmas. . . . I only wish it was me that big. (Weight-Watching group emails)

In late modernity, the body and its appetites are increasingly regulated by the (self-)imposed

imperatives of health (Lupton, 1997) – a contradiction, to be sure, given the stimulus continually to consume foodstuffs in capitalist economies. However, unlike the bourgeois 'civilized body' (Elias, 2000), which disciplines its own appetites and bodily boundaries according to (increasingly medicalized) middle-class dictates (Lupton, 2000), types of fat male cyberbody celebrate unrestrained yet patterned consumption. Comparable to bingeing among some women, this is 'a virtual inevitability' (Bordo, 1993: 130) in a culture where fat people (regardless of gender) are increasingly told to deny their hunger. Here participants seek to resist cultural injunctions against the unapologetically fat by enthusiastically and unashamedly embracing fat identities and bodies, and fattening processes. Similar to Rabelais and his world, members of these groups typically exaggerate and caricature the negative, the inappropriate (Bakhtin, 1965: 306). Here monstrous appetites and bellies (a typical grotesque hyperbola) acquire an extreme and fantastic character. A series of morphed photographs depicting a Belly Builder's fattening career (with dates and accumulating poundage written next to a massively expanding torso), or images of forced feeding among Fatties (e.g. a funnel and tube for administering liquidized calories) mock common proprieties. If only ephemerally, the Internet gives rich expression to 'the second life of the people' – a space where the 'civilising of appetite' (Mennell, 1991) and the (medicalized) regulation of fat bodies are resisted and mocked.

Such processes, which lend themselves to a symbolic interactionist analysis of liminality and the emergence of personhood (Waskul, 2005), are not idiosyncratic. Some postmodern academic books similarly resist healthist injunctions against fat, fatness and gluttonous feeding. Extolling the virtues of periodically permitting oneself the sensual experience of gluttony ('the beastlike satisfaction of a bloated belly'), Klein (1996: 60) writes: 'You need once in a while to transgress the barrier between eating well and eating like a pig, in order to understand what eating well might mean'. Interestingly, this idea of 'eating like a pig' –

painfully implicated in forms of public harassment against fat people (Joanisse and Synnott, 1999: 58–9) – figures within pre-modern carnivalesque imagery where participants subvert high/low distinctions between humans and (dirty) animals. This also occurs within online feeding communities; here politically correct labels are playfully rejected – 'fat greedy pig' is preferable to 'plus size person'. For Goffman (1968: 155–9), self-derogation is 'understandable within a framework of normal psychology' where the 'normal deviant' derives 'sad pleasure' through 'vicarious rebelliousness'. Of course, as discussed by Langman (2004) when researching cyberporn, the 'grotesque degradation' of subordinated others (usually women) represents the 'dark side' of carnivalization (a case of humiliation rather than admiration). Hence, and on a political note that converges with Bakhtin's comments (1965) on degradation and betterment, derogatory labels are only acceptable when used among (certain groups of) fat people. For Jake, this parallels the black community's appropriation of the term 'nigger' (spelt 'nigga') where repeated use is intended to defuse negative meanings and 'hurtful feelings towards us' (email: 9 February 2004).

The Pragmatics and Politics of Fat Male Embodiment

Common difficulties and common solutions to fat embodiment are discussed online. The keyword here is support for those encountering (and perhaps hoping successfully to challenge) an unaccommodating 'real' world. Importantly, prominent *SA* groups do not officially *support* mainstream efforts to neutralize fat bodies through restrictive dieting and other techniques of contraction. (After all, that would reinforce the acceptability of slimness among those who are unwilling and/or unable to become and remain slim.) Rather, the everyday practicalities and experiences of being fat are discussed, alongside what might be done to redress social discrimination and promote wider tolerance. However, while political

concerns are often clearly articulated by fat women aligned with feminism (Gimlin, 2002), the politics of fat male embodiment largely concern the gendered 'politics of identity' (Goffman, 1968: 149).

Regarding pragmatics, communication and advice abound on tackling the routine, everyday difficulties of being large. Themes include finding suitable clothes suppliers; ensuring good health regardless of size; dealing with prejudiced clinicians; travelling comfortably (cramped aircraft seating is particularly problematic); buying reinforced furniture and other everyday items. This communication is also often gendered in form and/or content. For example, the private motor vehicle – a symbol of masculine autonomy and independence – sometimes figures within information requests. Such requests may also enact male homo-sociability and solidarity:

> It's time for a new ride. My 95 Ford Taurus has 190,000 miles and is starting to nickel and dime me to death. I'd like to get a pickup or a car, but need something I can fit into comfortably. I'm 6 feet 2 inches, 500#[pounds] have a 68-inch waist, to give you some idea. I'd like to hear what you guys are comfortable in so I have some idea where to look. I tried a Chevy Silverado with a cab and a half and was jammed in like a sardine! A little help from my friends . . . (Mr. Round, Big Men's discussion board)

Such talk reproduces a supportive context where fat men are not condemned for their 'excessive' weight. It also reinforces a resistant position against those who would urge the 'obese' to embark upon a difficult-to-sustain and reportedly risky weight-loss regime (cf. Campos, 2004).

Pragmatics are also intertwined with gendered body politics. The politicization of women's bodies is well documented and is clearly articulated with second-wave feminism

(e.g. Boston Women's Health Collective, 1971). There the female body is claimed to be a political, material subject constituted by and through 'anti-fat' cultural representations (Textor, 1999: 223). Following feminism's impact upon female body consciousness, many fat women in the USA have organized and mobilized their efforts in order to protest against size discrimination in the real world. Men (who may also, but not necessarily, be fat) are also supportive. However, as observed in NAAFA, the official politicized stance is often secondary to the male FA's eroticization of fat women's bodies (Gimlin, 2002; though see LeBesco, 2004: 37). This is highly problematic for others contributing to more politically minded SA cyber-groups.

There are parallels with the gay male community. Textor (1999: 234) states: 'feminist and lesbian insistencies upon the body as materially central to politics have influenced the flourishing of the [gay] big men's movement in the 1990s [but] a sexual focus predominates'. Even so, micro-political concerns are still expressed online albeit in response to general political apathy. After stating that Chubbies 'hate political stuff', one participant (Harry, who also wrote for a US 'chub' newsletter) urged his peers to be 'political not polite' in everyday life. This carefully framed admonition was expressed after an observed enactment of stigma was left unchallenged during an offline chub convention.

Bears are not preoccupied with politicized social change either. Their gender politics are largely confined to intra-male relationships and practices (Wright, 1997: 7). Ray offered an explanation, after I asked whether fat gay men were politically motivated in the same way as female fat activists. For him, fat men's and women's different political orientation is due to inequitable (gendered) body norms. However, while containing an element of truth, I would treat these words as a display of perspective, or moral forms, rather than an unmediated view of somatic society. It is a functionally resistant stance, which, like Joanisse and Synnott's (1999) observations, entails transcendence and projected self-confidence. In Ray's words:

> I think this relates back to the age-old ‘women as objects’ not as people issue. Fat men (up to a point) are seen as powerful and successful. Fat women, the opposite. I think that men can carry themselves positively and somehow have the ability to give off the sense that what I am is OK with me – that many women find harder to accomplish. (email: 29 January 2004)

Goffman (1968), in focusing upon stigma management and group alignment, comments upon the politics of identity. Here in-groups present the stigmatized individual with an ego or felt identity largely in political phrasings. This is perhaps the most suitable conceptual framework for exploring the online gender politics of fat male embodiment. According to Goffman, if the stigmatized ‘adopts the right line [then] he will have come to terms with himself and be a whole man; he will be an adult with dignity and respect’ (1968: 149). While Ray told me ‘adopting the right attitude’ is an essential yet largely individual accomplishment, he recognized that the social situation of many fat gay men has profited from others in the big men’s movement. In his words, ‘bears helped us all by saying I am just who I am and I’m not going to fit into some stupid mould you may have’ (email: 29 January 2004). Here ‘advocated codes of conduct’ (Goffman, 1968: 135) provide (some types of) fat gay men not merely with a platform and a politics but with recipes for an appropriate attitude regarding the gendered self.

For others, such as Gluttons, Gainers and Feedees, recipes quite literally provide a politics of pleasure which virtually unite people seeking positively to engage with, rather than retreat from, the world. However, the ‘not quite’-ness of virtuality (Hine, 2000) should be reiterated. Experiential bodies may bestow ‘the accent of reality’ upon cyberspace but there remains a ‘paramount reality’ (Schutz, 1970) which exerts its ‘unbearable weight’ (Bordo, 1993) on

discredited offline bodies. Unsurprisingly, therefore, intimate and enduring relationships with supportive consociates – real flesh-and-blood bodies – are often valued by those wishing to 'live the dream' of fat acceptance or admiration (Jake, Weight Watching group, email).

Conclusion: Expanding and Embodying Gendered Studies of Fatness

Reference to the 'gendered dimensions' of fatness is often interpreted to mean women's dissatisfaction with their body weight. Within the social sciences, steps are being taken to 'bring in' gendered meanings of fatness as they relate to males at various stages of the life course, but this emergent literature is limited. Furthermore, embodied sociology is seldom advanced in current studies; that is, an approach which re-reads classic social theory when treating bodies as the source, location and medium of society (Shilling, 2003). Because corpulent male bodies are increasingly discredited in somatic society, I used interpretive and embodied sociology to explore some of the ways in which cyberspace may provide alternative, validating meanings. After reporting and analysing relevant ethnography, several observations are worth making.

There are clear efforts to reinterpret the gendered (masculine) meanings of fatness online. Although internationally relevant, these efforts are largely enacted on *SA* websites whose members and designers are from the USA: a nation known for promoting a sense of entitlement and rugged individualism among its citizenry. Within these digital spaces participants actively challenge degraded and degrading body norms which reflect and reproduce predominantly white, middle-class cultural ideals (the streamlined, rationalized, civilized body). Here forms of fat male embodiment become 'virtually' acceptable, admirable and even sexually desirable. Ideal typically, these are correct bodies rather than correctable bodies. 'Screen work' and embodied 'identity work' are thus conjoined as participants seek to

invert negative meanings and construct (however fleetingly) viable masculinities. There is also a playfulness to fatness and eating, representing an interesting contrast to the pathology of obesity and the rationalization of diet. And, because pain may be socially inflicted through stigma, efforts to ameliorate these negative meanings and emotions through 'screen work' could be considered healthful.

Despite being, or rather, because they are, *reduced* versions of their 'real' physical selves, cyberbodies renegotiate stigma without eschewing the immediate corporeality of fatness. Ethnomethodologically speaking, the reduced tangibility of fatness online provides suitable conditions for successful 'inflation ceremonies', that is, the inverse of Garfinkel's (1956) degradation ceremony, with cyberbodies practically accomplishing increased social worth. Not to be shamefully left behind the screen (scene), types of 'big' or 'fat' male body-subject occupy the centre of an electronic stage and are digitally amplified (symbolically cloaked with magical costumes) and/or normalized with potentially real consequences for offline actors and audiences. Inflationary practices – comprising advocated codes of self–body relatedness, socially constructed sexualities and other relevances – re-dress stigma by re-presenting otherwise discredited material bodies. Online, the corporeal matter of corpulent male body-subjects therefore matters, regardless of the degree to which cyberbodies are alter-bodies which depart from everyday life. In *SA* cyberspace, corporeality is a necessary condition and organizing principle for online sociality – mediated forms of embodied interaction which interface with the hardware and software of lived bodies in complex ways. Organic bodies are thus inseparable from these techno-processes, rendering online constructions of fat male embodiment virtual in another sense: they are not merely social constructions because they are *anchored* in 'real' fleshy selves (the binary blurring cyborg).

Supportive cybersociates are integral to and integrated into the digital manufacturing of more positive typifications. Whether corpulent male bodies are typified as young or old,

black or white, big or super-size, heterosexual or gay, others provide support and possibly renewed hope for an emotionally fulfilling life. Researching male embodiment necessarily entails exploring a social world which extends beyond, while encompassing, bodies sexed/gendered as male/masculine. Similar to offline life, virtually constructing viable masculinities online is an interactional process comprising inter- as well as intra-gendered social relations. And, as may be expected, supportive cybersociates also explicitly or implicitly enact plural sexualities and other identities (e.g. ethnicity, age and social class) while co-constituting a field of hierarchical social relations. Criticism of and resistance toward stigmatizing body norms is therefore entangled with the uncritical reproduction of somatic society. In short, virtual constructions of fat male embodiment depend upon dividing practices and iniquitous meanings which hierarchically grade bodies: some bodies may be 'too fat' or the 'wrong' colour while others, such as women's bodies, may be expected domestically to service heterosexual men. Of course, and this is a double-edged sword, cybersociates know online expectations, identities, sexualities and bodies may contrast dramatically with offline life. Nonetheless, authenticity and trust are valued. This, in turn, interfaces with offline opportunities for dating, sociality and conviviality.

While cyberspace provides a treasure-house of positive meanings, interactions and previously unknown opportunities, managing spoiled identities online is ultimately a contradictory and limited project. This is not simply due to the ever-present possibility of encountering so-called 'trolls', who establish trust before enacting stigma, or the ultimate 'flatness' of cyberspace compared to the physicality of fatness. Crucially, constructing alternative definitions of fatness is dependent upon reified, negative typifications. Restated, favourable online constructions derive their meanings by implicitly and explicitly reproducing stigmatizing body norms: positive and negative typifications are not polar opposites but mutually informing and interdependent social constructs. Unsurprisingly,

therefore, participants sometimes express ambivalence about being fat and practices which increase body fat. For example, those wholeheartedly endorsing carnivalesque gluttony sometimes voice regret about their reported size. Stigma is also sometimes enacted by supposedly supportive cybersociates. During such instances, actual (everyday) typifications of fatness also become virtual (digital) constructions – an unfortunate convergence which creates a stigmatizing divergence between some fat men's virtual identities (desire to be valued) and actual (tainted) identities (Goffman, 1968).

Before closing this article, I will briefly add to recent commentary on the usefulness of classic social theory for studies of the body and society, as well as reiterate the case for an embodied sociology. While key body theorists such as Williams and Bendelow (1998) and Shilling (2003) have critically fleshed out the relevance of classic sociologists (e.g. Goffman, Simmel, Weber), other interpretive sociologists have been sidelined. On the basis of my research, Schutz should be recognized as an important source of reference for body studies. Focusing upon typifications and the intersubjectively constructed life-world, Schutz certainly appears to have been more concerned with developing a social theory of cognition rather than sexed/gendered bodies and the embodiment of social action. However, similar to other classic work, Schutz s writings may be re-read in corporeal terms as part of a broader effort to overcome some of the problematic dualisms in social theory. Cognition is not disembodied, with fe/male social actors intersubjectively (intercorporeally) constructing life-worlds (dream-worlds and fantasies), which may be governed by the laws of the body and pleasure (Monaghan, 2002). This is exemplified in Dionysian contexts where eating and sex are topically and motivationally relevant. Furthermore, Schutzian phenomenology is extendable to cyberspace, where body-subjects are structured according to shared systems of typification and relevance.

Embodied sociology clearly has much to offer. It is attentive to the sociality of lived

bodies and the embodiment of the social. Even when studying supposedly disembodied spaces such as the Internet, there is a complex intermixing of minds, bodies and society. The indivisibility of human corporeality, sociality and cognitive/emotional dimensions means that social scientists are increasingly addressing the importance of embodiment while also drawing insights from the sociological tradition. Based upon my own engagement with the body-literature and ongoing empirical work, I envision an exciting and highly relevant research agenda. With one foot in classic and recent social theory, and the other in an increasingly digitally mediated 21st century, embodied sociology has the potential critically to advance our knowledge of an expanding and expansive somatic society. Of course, this theoretical argument acquires particular meaning and relevance given the current societal focus upon 'obesity' in a global context.

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25. Connections:

Explaining Body Deviance with Stigma and Carnival of the Grotesque

At 600lbs, Goddess Patty, advertizes herself as the Queen of Squashing. She performs "Eating, Squashing, Crushing…NAKED!", all for paying customers. Goddess Patty's case is not an isolated incident; rather, she is part of a growing industry of adult models that features women with larger bodies. In this world of modeling, she is known as a SSBBW (Super Size Big Beautiful Woman), representing the largest of these models. Others, who have yet to gain such weight, but who are still large enough, are considered BBWs (Big Beautiful Women). Within this world, cellulite and large bellies are celebrated as aesthetically and sexually pleasurable.

Recently, I met Glen, a 38 year old, white male, in Baltimore, while conducting interviews for my dissertation. Glen works as a tattooist, and one day he shared a conversation with me about how he feels when visiting some public places.

> Glen: I have a lot of really visible stuff [tattoos] and no matter how acceptable people want to say it is, I see what happens when I go to malls and shit like that, and it's still, it's not as acceptable as people make it out to be.
>
> Dave: what happens when you go to malls?
>
> Glen: oh, I mean they look over and put their purses on the other arm, or hang onto it with both hands, walk on the other side, point and stare. You'll be looking at clothes or something and have people, been physically grab your arm and look at it and stuff. And if I went up to some woman and grabbed her arm to look at her jewelry, you know what I mean...

Not only are Glen's arms covered, but he is tattooed across his knuckles, neck, face, andear lobes. It is easy to pick him out in a crowd as he has little ability to hide these marks in public. While Glen does not regret being tattooed, he certainly feels that his tattoos mark him from the rest of the population.

While these stories seem to be unrelated, fatness and being tattooed share similarities. First, the incidence of them seems to be on the rise, as indicated in the reading by Kang and

Jones in this section. Obesity has garnered enough public interest that many have labeled it an epidemic in the United States and England. Walking around my college campus, I observe many young adults who have tattoos. Tattoos are now increasingly seen on celebrities, athletes, and artists; and media provide up-to-date accounts about new tattoos on celebrities. Second, both obesity and tattooing involve lifestyle choices. No one is born with a tattoo or weighing 600 pounds. Both these outcomes require dedication, planning, and effort to achieve. Third, they can both be understood as forms of body deviance. Body deviance refers to non-normative traits, behaviors and conditions of the physical self. It includes things like gender reassignment, body building, and cutting or self-injury.

The objective of this essay is to discuss how old and new ideas about deviance can enhance our understanding of radical body modifications like tattooing and obesity. In short, how can we make sense of body deviance today and how does this differ from what it meant in the past? How do alternative sociological viewpoints help us appreciate Goddess Patty and Glen's deviance? I begin with stigma; a classic sociological deviance approach and then pivot to a more contemporary viewpoint – carnival and the grotesque—that is anchored in post-modernism.

Goffman and Stigma

Stigma emerged from symbolic interactionism (Goffman 1963) and was best articulated by Erving Goffman in his 1963 book *Stigma*. Excerpts of his work are included in this section of this book. A stigma is the result of a social process that links a trait or characteristic with a stereotype. It is used to explain how people attain a deviant identity and manage it in different settings. In this essay, I focus on forms of body deviance that carry stigmatizing traits.

Goffman (1963) specified three types of stigma: 1) abominations of the body, which are physical traits that can be observed visually; 2) blemishes of character, or the flaws of the individual, like beliefs, values, and personal history; and 3) tribal, which are "race, nation, and religion,"which are things transmitted through lineages" (Goffman 1963: 4). This essay will specifically focus on fatness and tattooing as abominations of the body because it is the type of stigma most relevant to body deviance.

Goffman (1963:3) notes that a stigma is "an attribute that is deeply discrediting." A stigma is a trait or mark that is associated with a stereotype. As an abomination of the body, tattooing "defaces" the body beautiful and, perhaps, leads some to stereotype a heavily tattooed person as a criminal. For Glen, the stereotypes associated with being heavily tattooed also lead to being shunned in public. Persistent stereotypes, like the association of tattoos to criminality are what reinforce the boundaries of between normal and deviance.

When a stigma is known, it subordinates the stigmatized to others. Stigmas possess so much ill repute the bearer suffers, Goffman argued, a social death. Moreover, stigmatized persons are denied equal opportunity to construct an identity as a normal member of society. Goffman also noted they were discriminated against. Revisiting Glen's description, we know he is denied the ability to be an equal member of society. People moving to the other side of the street, or women clutching their purse in his presence, indicates that normals may perceive him as a type of a social threat. Over time Glen learns to treat his body with shame and guilt in certain settings. In other words, he is less human and more like a freak or object to be ogled. Goffman would argue that Glen's dilemma is because his tattoos are an abomination of the body.

With body deviance, some attributes become a master status. Goffman notes that a master status is a trait that dominates a person's identity. Master statuses are especially

problematic, as the stigmatized cannot escape being defined by that identity. Being obese or heavily tattooed are forms of body deviance that are highly visible, and difficult to hide, and each can become a master status.

Finally, Glen's story highlights how the context of stigma contains specific objects, a physical location, and other social actors. In every social setting, people act and through their interaction, meaning is created. Not all stigmas carry the same stereotypes across settings. Glen's tattoos are stigmatizing when he is in the presence of members of an older generation in the mall. However, in the tattoo shop, older persons may appreciate knowing that Glen is heavily tattooed, and that he will be the one producing their tattoos. On the one hand, the physical location of the encounter is changing; on the other, the motivations of the actors Glen encounters are different. If less visibly tattooed on the face and neck, Glen would be able to use objects, like clothing, to cover up his tattoos when in contexts where he feels stigmatized. Stigmas vary across social contexts, and what is stigmatizing to some groups of society, may not be stigmatizing to others.

Carnival and Grotesque Bodies

The Monaghan reading in this section offers a very different viewpoint on these kinds of deviance. In a study on "big handsome men" and "bears" (obese heterosexual and gay males who aspire to be large for sexual reasons), Monaghan views body deviance from a carnival of the grotesque perspective. Carnival describes a social setting where people, like BHM or "bears" create different sets of norms about their bodies' shape and functions. In these physical or virtual (online) spaces, people celebrate new norms and establish an alternative interpretation of the world. In other words, "carnival represents a world upside-down, but most importantly a world that is restructured through laughter" (Presdee 2000: 40). Looking at Monaghan's (2005) reading in this book, it is easy to understand the actions of these men as carnival behavior. Online

communities for BHM and bears create new norms about body deviance that celebrate grotesque joys of their body becoming larger over time and online communities construct norms that embrace forbidden pleasures.

While Goffman (1963) argued stigma led to a social death, scholars like Monaghan claim participation in the carnival works to renew the obese or tattooed marginal, as participants are considered reborn in this temporary situation. Bakhtin (1968: 7) states "The carnival is not a spectacle seen by people, they live it, and everyone participates, because its very idea embraces all the people. While carnival lasts, there is no other life outside it. During carnival time life is subject only to its laws, that is, the laws of its own freedom". When Goddess Patty engages in acts of gluttony, crushing, and squashing, she is no longer a stigmatized obese woman. Instead, people in this carnivalesque space find pleasure and gratification derived from behaviors which are typically understood as unpleasant. In this order, Goddess Patty and her followers are living the idea, either by assisting in her gaining weight or being crushed by her. In other words, these actors create a subjective experience, which can only be understood through participation in the carnival.

Another current deviance concept is grotesque realism. Grotesque realism is the literary term for body degradation and derogatory humor. In the carnival, grotesque realism occurs as participants celebrate the vulgar features of the body (urine, feces, sexual functions, blood, eating, drinking, and vomit).For example, the fat men in Monoghan's (2005) research celebrated gluttony and weight gain. One of Monaghan's subjects explains:

> "I went out today and I think I have gained, my fly on my jeans would not stay up, the pressure of that extra belly was not going to give in. :) [symbol signifies a smiling face]. Just as well it is winter and I had a large loose jumper on so you

> could not tell anyway, blush. I am now a good 173 cm in girth, when I was 168 cm, I was 172 kg, so I estimate that I am now 176-178 kg or about 390 lbs. I am aiming for 180 cm by Xmas (page 101).

Rituals of degradation during the carnival strip away all that is holy, spiritual, or flawless. Goddess Patty's patrons find her bed sores enticing and even want to clean them for her. Thus, grotesque bodies are celebrated for their vulgar features, which are embraced by participants at the carnival.

Grotesque bodies are "radical deviations from the norm—by way of exceeding it" (Shabot 2006: 229). Since grotesque bodies differ from the norm, they are a form of deviance. Goddess Patty's physical self is a grotesque body. She claims to weigh over 600 pounds, which clearly exceeds norms regarding body size. Additionally, this kind of excessiveness is celebrated and tied to sexuality.

Finally, grotesque realism can function as resistance. In deviance, resistance refers to the ways people intentionally engage in deviant behavior to challenge norms. For Goddess Patty, her size was the result of a conscious decision to gain weight over time. Embracing her curves was one way she challenged the norms regarding female body size. Instead of striving to fit within the ideal of thinness for women, Patty claims her size is sexy. In other words, grotesque bodies are liberated from existing norms, and actors create a meaningful alternative that challenges the distinction between normal and deviant.

Identity

One way to approach obesity and tattooing is to understand how deviant identities come into existence. Stigma and carnival of the grotesque emphasize how identity is created through a

social process. However, each concept interprets the process of identity creation in a different manner.

Stigma explains identity under the symbolic interactionist tradition. In this approach, identity refers to the characteristics or attributes that are an indicator of a person's self. Identities are confirmed though a social process where a person: 1) presents themselves to others, 2) receives a reaction from others, and 3) reflexively evaluates their self in light of the reactions of others. Identities are based in the ways that we categorize the reactions of others. For stigmatized persons their identities are oppressed, equating to a social death.

Angus Vail (2008), a sociologist of deviance, and tattoo enthusiast, explains how he learned of his deviant identity.

> Retail establishments, like nursing homes and hospitals, have code words that the employees use to call security's attention to potential trouble…at the Safeway near my apartment in Portland, it was 'Johnny.' I know this because I heard many a call for 'Johnny' to come to my aisle which I was shopping during the summer, and every time it was followed by a security guard standing, very conspicuously, at the end of the aisle, watching me. During the school year, Johnny became unnecessary. Why the seasonal change?
>
> During the school year I used to stop into Safeway on my way home from teaching, usually wearing jeans with a shirt and tie. During the summer, though, I walked to Safeway from my apartment, usually wearing shorts and a tank top. Shorts and tank tops don't do an especially effective job at covering close to 100 hours worth of tattoos. Without visible tattoos, I was innocuous, no 'trouble' at all; and when my tattoos showed I was dangerous—a 'trouble' maker (26).

In this example, Dr. Vail is able to understand his stigmatized identity as it is confirmed by others. In the summertime, Safeway security (or formal agents of social control) reacted to the presence of his tattoos, thereby allowing him to see himself as a 'threat' to order. However, he also passes as a normal, when his tattoos are covered during the school year. The lack of reaction by others, demonstrates Dr. Vail is effectively managing his identity to pass as a non-tattooed

person. It is only when he is able to interpret other's reactions that Dr. Vail knows if his identity is stigmatized.

Dr. Vail's stigmatized identity arises from a social process where a stereotype is created. This stereotype is created from the cultural values or beliefs which designate tattooing as a violation of norms. For example, in the United States, many of us associate tattooing with criminality. There is truth to this claim. In many societies, historically, criminals were marked with tattoos, as the following excerpt from sociologist Clinton Sanders suggests: "[t]he disreputable connections of tattooing in the west…lead conventional members of society to define people with tattoos negatively. In turn, discussions of tattooed persons generated by psychiatric and criminological analysts reflect (and reinforce) these commonplace definitions" (Sanders 1989: 36).These stereotypes insist that being heavily tattooed is a behavior of criminals or psychological misfits. This is further evidenced by the behaviors of young workers in Kang and Jones' (2007: 46) piece. Many feel that visible tattoos will lead to them being negatively judged in the workplace, and they attempt to 'pass' as normal while working by altering their attire.

In contrast, carnival of the grotesque is a deviance concept that can be used to understand identity creation in a different way from stigma. First, it explains how actors celebrate their body deviance, embracing and enjoying it. Second, carnival of the grotesque understands identity as temporary. Since the carnival is a fleeting event, and people are born anew, the identities developed can be temporary. In other words, many deviant actors are only deviant for a short amount of time. In the carnival, obesity is an identity to be celebrated, yet, when the carnival is over, the obese identity will no longer be celebrated and accepted.

By the mid 1970s there was a wave of identity movements in the U.S. One of the smaller movements was the Fat Acceptance Movement (FAM). FAM activists challenged the notion that their bodies were abnormal or deviant. To embrace their deviance FAM activists began to have Fat-ins. Fat-Ins were carnival-like events where people could celebrate what it meant to be fat.

At the first Fat-In, in 1967, "[t]hey carried banners ("Fat Power," "Think Fat," "Buddha Was Fat"), wore buttons ("Help Cure Emaciation, Take a Fat Girl to Dinner"), and performed anti-slim rituals (they ceremoniously burned diet books, a large photograph of Twiggy the teenaged ectomorph, who is one of the world's leading mannequins, and stabbed a cold, fat watermelon)" (Curves Have Their Day 1967: 54).Participants handed out free candy and created clothing, accessories, and adornments out of food or candy, and most of all, indulged in eating. By coming together and celebrating obesity, actors embraced their deviant identities.

At Fat-Ins various activities facilitate embracing deviant identities through jubilation. In this setting burning diet books was a comedic ritual that allowed participants to be born anew. As such, they were able to reinterpret their body deviance, and celebrate it as part of their identity. Participants were destroying the sources of knowledge that defined their bodies negatively, and reveled in this destruction. By eating and handing out free candy, participants were engaging in behaviors that are associated with being fat. During the Fat-In, participants can engage in these behaviors without violating any norms. A Fat-In is an alternative social order and lived experience. Only in this setting can both fat and skinny people celebrate their behaviors linked to obesity.

Language

Language, or how people talk about things, plays a significant role in defining deviance. It is central to shaping reality, because it contains meaning. Language conveys expectations of

what a society or group considers normal or deviant. It defines who or what behaviors are deviant. It is useful to think of how language is used to shape body deviance.

Stigmas are created and reinforced by beliefs and conceptions. As Goffman stated, stigmas are rooted in a “language of relationships” (Goffman 1963:3). This language of relationships, is a language of stereotypes, created by those in power, that define what is deviant and how members of society should interpret them. Thinking about body size, language is used to decide what body sizes are normal. According to health professionals and the institution of medicine (Sobal 1995), body sizes that are too big pose an increased health risk. By posing body size as a health risk, norms are created for which bodies are appropriate and which bodies are deviant. In this situation, those bodies which deviate too far from the norm (skinny or fat) are defined as unhealthy, and this is justified by stating that these body sizes pose a health risk to members of society. Powerful people have authority in justifying agendas about body size, including how to talk and think about the body as normal (Best 2013).

Recently, Surgeon General, Dr. Benjamin, has advocated a “national grassroots effort to reverse the current obesity crisis”. In the Surgeon Generals Vision for a Healthy Nation, it is stated that ‘[e]very one of us has an important role to play in the prevention and control of obesity” (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2010: 1).Further, obesity is such an epidemic that,

> adults are at increased risk for many serious health conditions, including high blood pressure, high cholesterol, type 2 diabetes and its complications, coronary heart disease, stroke, gallbladder disease, osteoarthritis, sleep apnea, and respiratory problems, as well as endometrial, breast, prostate, and colon cancers (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2010: 1).

The first statement targets body size by claiming that some bodies need to be controlled, monitored, or supervised. It is reinforced by claiming that uncontrolled bodies are linked to

conditions that may lead to premature death. By scientific measures, those who fall between 18.5-24.9% Body Mass Index (BMI) are considered to have normal bodies. All others are defined as obese or too skinny, hence deviant.

Goffman stated that a 'language of relationships' is needed to understand stigma. This means that language determines which bodies are deviant. In this case an agent of the state—Surgeon General Benjamin—dictates ideal body sizes and justifies them with institutional and medicalized language. Reading through the statement from the Department of Health and Human Services, it is clear that obesity carries the stereotypes of lacking self-control, lethargy, negligence, and moral inferiority. The language of obesity justifies a reason for people who have this stigma to be controlled, supervised, or monitored.

While stigma is used to explain how dominant groups use language to shape deviance, grotesque bodies can be used to understand how actors use language to embrace their body deviance. The language of grotesque bodies challenges the boundaries that define norms. In the carnival, language alters, changes, or challenges the definitions of deviance. Bodies that purposefully violate norms, do so with a motive, which challenges the boundary between normal and deviant. In this perspective, deviant bodies can be understood as an attempt to enact social change. Carnival bodies are a form of resistance to definitions of deviance.[1]

Monaghan's article in this book discusses the challenge that deviant bodies pose to the accepted language. Social actors create new meanings, which challenge or resist ideal body sizes. These actors find admirable traits in bodies that violate social norms. Not only are different

[1]It is important to note that carnival bodies and the carnival are not always a form of resistance (Presdee 2000) . In her critique of the carnival, Douglass (1966) states that carnivals may actually reinforce conformity and adherence to the conventional order, effectively limiting the potential that resistance is occurring. In this perspective, conventionalization of the carnival (such as Mardi Gras) allows participants to briefly act out their fantasy of resistance in a manner that does not threaten the interest of elites. The carnival functions to temporarily satiate politicized challenges to the conventional order.

aesthetics being appreciated, but some of these actors even view these larger bodies in an eroticized manner, and others actively encourage the process of gaining weight. These people are taking control over the language used to define their bodies. By creating new terms and meanings, they reject the ideology that justifies normal body size. With new language that admires grotesque bodies, they are resisting the norms of society.

Another way to use this concept is to think of grotesque bodies as attempts to change norms. Activists in the fat positive movement have attempted to redefine the debate over health and body size. They claim that people with a BMI of 25% are not all deviant. Further, the BMI index, is an attempt to enforce a norm that does not accept the wider range of body shapes and sizes. Recently, the National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance (NAAFA) released the Heath At Every Size initiative (see http://www.naafaonline.com). This initiative claims that health is a complex concept, measured by emotional, spiritual, physical, and psychological well-being. Additionally, they argue there is a diversity of body types which deviate from medical standards. NAAFA entices people to embrace their bodies, even if they do not fit within the normal standards. It challenges the boundaries of what types of bodies can be considered healthy by insisting that health consists of more than weight or size. Moreover, these challenges are made in the political realm. In both of these examples, fat people are attempting to redefine the language which define them as deviant.

Not all forms of body deviance are clearly stigma or carnival of the grotesque. What is initially intended to be a stigma can become a mark of resistance. For example, punitive tattooing has been used by different societies; it is the practice of marking criminals with tattoos. By applying a tattoo to a deviant, the deviant now has a permanent, stigmatizing mark to let others know about their social position. During the Edo Period (1603-1887), in Japan, tattoos

were used to mark criminals. It was so important that tattoos be reserved for marking criminals that the state outlawed any disfigurement of the body. While these were intended to be stigmatizing marks, criminals soon began to embrace the practice. They would cover up their punitive tattoos with even larger, more elaborate, tattoo designs (Taylor 1997). When criminals manipulated punitive tattoos, they created new norms that reclaimed their bodies from state oppression. Similarly, the reading by Kang and Jones in this book explains how a number of people with different social statuses use the practice of tattooing to redefine how they view their identities. Tattoos help these people construct a positive image of the self.

Social Organization

When sociologists speak of social organization, they move the analysis beyond the individual. Social organization refers to the recurring patterns of interaction among members of society. In the field of deviance, social organization reveals the relationships that deviants and non-deviants share with one another. Finding organization helps actors to make sense of the world, and it facilitates behavior and available choices for it.

One way to depict the organization of stigmas is to discuss how patterns of relationships between in-groups and out-groups come into existence. For Goffman (1963), stigmatized persons must first learn which social group they belong to. When interviewing tattoo wearers, one of Sanders' (1989) interviewee's describes the process of identifying with what is termed an "in group":

> Having a tattoo is like belonging to a club. I love seeing tattoos on other people. I go up and talk with other people with tattoos. It gives me an excuse because I'm not just going up to talk with them, I can say, 'I have one, too.' I think maybe subconsciously I got (the tattoo) to be part of that special club (53).

By having a tattoo, this person was able to align with their in-group. An in-group is comprised of all people who share the same stigma. It provides the stigmatized actor with rules of conduct for managing their stigma in front of others.

A second aspect of social organization is the relationship that stigmatized persons share with out-groups. In this process, the stigmatized person learns of their deviant social position by understanding the relationship between their in-group and other out-groups.

> Usually I'm fairly careful about who I show my tattoos to. I don't show them to people at work unless they are really close friends of mine and I know I won't get any kind of hassle because of them. I routinely hide my tattoos…I generally hide them from people who wouldn't understand or people who could potentially cause me trouble. I hide them from my boss and from a lot of the people I work with because there is no reason for them to know (interview in Sanders 1989: 54).

In this case the tattooed person realizes their body is considered deviant in the professional world, but in their leisure time with in-group members, their tattoos are acceptable. The stigmatized person must, therefore, manage their stigma differently across social settings. In sum, the social organization of stigma occurs as actors identify who belongs to which social group and what social position that person has as a result of being in it.

Similar to stigma, the social organization of the carnival can be used to understand how people come to embrace body deviance. The carnival provides an alternative social order where all people are accepted. For example, DeMello (2000) describes attending a tattoo convention, which celebrates body deviance.

> [A]nything goes and conventional social rules are frowned on. Men and women disrobe in public [showing] their nipple piercings, thong bikinis and pubic hair. They oil each other's near-naked bodies, and…[p]eople also get tattooed at conventions, so the spectacle of the body grimacing in pain is also evident. Tattoo conventions are marked by ritual inversion, exaggeration, and excessiveness of all kinds (30).

Grotesque bodies can only be understood in light of the order that people create around them. In this alternative social organization, both normals and deviants are welcome, and celebrate those who have deviant bodies.

The carnival functions as a space where participants can celebrate and embrace transgression of social norms. As evidenced, "heavily tattooed men and women use tattoo conventions in much the same way that circus attractions used freak shows—as a platform for public spectacle—the difference being that conventioneers view their audiences as like mined enthusiasts, not thrill-seeking-oglers." (Mifflen2001:142). Participants in the carnival are understood as supporting members who embrace the practice of tattooing. This is a form of organization that must be lived and experienced. Tattoo conventions then redistribute power by celebrating the corporeal aspects that participants share and have affection for. Moreover, an alternative social structure is established, a structure that provides an escape or release from the conventional world.

Conclusion

This "connections" essay has used heavily tattooed and fat persons as examples of body deviance. It demonstrates that stigma and the carnival of the grotesque provide separate outcomes when examining phenomena that may appear similar on the surface. These concepts are developed from different interpretations of society. For sociologists, this means understanding how these concepts are used to explain deviant identities, ideologies that justify forms of deviance, and patterns of social organization among deviants.

While both stigma and grotesque help to explain body deviance, each concept carries its own set of assumptions. These are assumptions about the nature of society and social deviance.

These concepts are not interchangeable, and each can be used to examine different aspects of body deviance.

[INSERT FIGURE 25.1 HERE]

This figure provides a summary breakdown of the difference between stigma and carnival of the grotesque when applied to 3 key social processes: *Identity*, *Language*, and *Social Organization*. Each of these attributes is useful for understanding specific elements of deviance.

But we are still left with a conundrum: deciding what types of deviance are best explained by stigma and which are best explained by carnival of the grotesque. This is the task that students of deviance face.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Imagine you are in the audience watching the legendary performer Elvis. As a sociologist of deviance, explain his body deviance using concepts from this chapter.
2. Analyze another form of body deviance using one of the two concepts. Explain why the concept you chose was more appropriate for analyzing this form of body deviance.
3. Evaluate the concepts of stigma and carnival of the grotesque. What contributions do they provide to sociology? How do they help to understand body deviance? What are the shortcomings of each?

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Section 7- Deviant Careers, Identity and Lifecourse Criminology

Introduction.

Tammy L. Anderson

> Nancy became a prostitute at age 17. She explained "I started selling drugs at first and then I went and did a double date with a girl. I made $300 in like 15 minutes and so I was like, 'Whoa, I'm in the wrong profession." In Bakersfield, California, police are cracking down on prostitutes like Nancy and the men who command her services. She has been arrested and sent to jail many times, but remains undeterred. She states: "The longest they've [police and courts] held me is like 19 hours on a cite and release, and I mean to me that's just like sleep, you know, for me to come back out to work so it [arrest] really doesn't do anything." (Cook, 2013: 1).

Every day in the U.S., thousands of people, like Nancy, are arrested for criminal offenses and enter the criminal justice system while another large group is released or transitioned out onto probation or parole. According to a recent Federal Government report (Carson and Sobel 2011), 688,800 people were admitted to the U.S. prison system (state and federal) in 2011, while 688,384 were released from it. That amounts to about 1,887 people entering prison each day, while about 1,885 leave it.

This movement into and out of prison – or deviance more generally-- has captivated social scientists for decades. They have studied ways to prevent people like Nancy from getting involved in crime in the first place or discovering ways to help them stop committing it (deterrence). While we can think of entry and exit into prison or jail as benchmarks of our criminal justice system, they might represent something much more extensive in the lives of individual lawbreakers. For example, breaking the law, being arrested or convicted, and serving

time may be simple facts of a lifestyle in deviance, as Nancy tells us. Such ways of life can persist for substantial periods of time and feature a lot of crime. Moreover, most people are not caught and arrested the first time they ever break the law. Individuals, like Nancy, "get away" with a lot of deviance. Criminologists call undetected offending the "dark figure of crime," while Becker called it secret deviance.

The readings in Section 7 help us understand this phenomenon. They are about lifestyles in crime and deviance. Readings by Becker, Sampson and Laub, Oselin, and Bonistall and Ralston explain deviant lifestyles or criminal careers in two different ways. Becker uses a deviant career concept to explain how people become marijuana smokers. His work articulated how smoking marijuana led to the involvement with deviant groups and changes in identity which enmeshed smokers in deviant lifestyles. Alternatively, a more contemporary lifecourse criminology approach by Sampson and Laub (in this volume) is concerned with long-term patterns of crime (trajectories) and the events that can alter their pathways (transitions). Their reading in this section addresses the causes of childhood crime and juvenile delinquency and how they change over time.

While Becker and Sampson and Laub discuss drug use and delinquency, readings by Oselin and Bonistall and Ralston target prostitution, specifically street-level sex work performed by women like Nancy. There are many types of prostitution today (e.g., escort services, street walkers, and brothels or house prostitutes to name a few) and the larger sex work industry—of which street prostitution is only a small part—is a global industry with up to six million women (Branigan 2013) engaged in commercial vice at hotels, massage parlours, strip clubs, karaoke bars, hair salons, parks etc.

A main objective of this book is learning to see deviance through multiple lenses—like the deviant career or lifecourse criminology framework. Embracing alternative viewpoints may assist students in their future jobs in social service, criminal justice and other agencies and institutions that deal with populations considered deviant or problematic. Imagine, for a moment, that you are a probation officer assigned to keep a convicted prostitute – like Nancy-- out of trouble with the law. Would you focus on how she sees herself, her life, and willingness to change (an identity issue) or on what causes her to trade sex for money (external cause issue) or engage in other deviant behaviors?

This question contrasts some core differences between the classic term deviant careers with the more contemporary ***lifecourse criminology*** approach. In the Becker (1963) reading in this section, you will learn about the "deviant career" idea. Becker defined deviant careers as a series of statuses, achievements and roles associated with deviant behavior. He highlighted the shifts in identity that accompanied it. Becker maintained that individuals became enmeshed in deviant lifestyles and developed deviant identities as their non-conforming behaviors accumulated. One result from this could be life on the margins of society with the possibility of long-term alienation. The deviant identity was, therefore, critical in influencing the present and future trajectory of non-conforming behavior and society's reaction to it.

Life-course criminology, on the other hand, is concerned with changes in offending and problem behaviors over time. This approach is articulated in the Sampson and Laub (1994) reading in this section. The life-course perspective gives increased importance to patterns in criminal behavior over time and the causes of them. In short, lifecourse criminology looks at what predicts the prevalence of criminal behavior over time as people age.

There are important similarities and differences between deviant careers and lifecourse criminology that might be relevant to your work as a probation officer. For example, you might believe both her self-identity and initial causes for becoming a prostitute are ultimately linked in handling her and other offenders' predicaments. This combined deviant career and lifecourse criminology idea is the position Oselin takes in her reading that is included in this section. However, understanding the fundamental differences between the classic idea of deviant careers with the more contemporary lifecourse criminology approach—and how they matter to us—is taken up by Emily Bonistall and Kevin Ralston in their connections essay on prostitution.

Bonistall and Ralston note that the deviant career term does not explain why people like Nancy, or Betty who they profile in their connections essay, initially commit deviant acts. Nor does it identify the causes of their behavior. However, identifying the causes of crime is a central aspect of lifecourse criminology. Practitioners, criminal justice officials, and scholars find this very helpful in shaping social policy to control crime. Thus, they would advise probation officers to focus on external causes when working with Nancy or other offenders. Finally, research on deviant careers has been based in labeling theory and has employed qualitative methodologies to investigate deviance. On the contrary, lifecourse criminology boasts sophisticated use of quantitative methodologies and statistics and functionalist theories of crime to track offending and its predictors over time. The ability of lifecourse criminology to identify how much prostitution Nancy and others engage in, as well as when it does and why, captivates the public and is essential to policy-makers and interventionists who seek to reduce it.

As you read the papers in this section, consider how these two approaches might be useful in addressing how various types of unconventional behavior develops, persists, and terminates. To what extent will focusing on definitions of who we are (identity)—a deviant

career viewpoint-- or external causes and transitions (lifecourse criminology) provide the answers?

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Reading 26

Outsiders

Kinds of Deviance: A Sequential Model

Howard S. Becker

Deviant Careers

The first step in most deviant careers is the commission of a nonconforming act, an act that breaks some particular set of rules. How are we to account for the first step?

People usually think of deviant acts as motivated. They believe that the person who commits a deviant act, even for the first time (and perhaps especially for the first time), does so purposely. His purpose may or may not be entirely conscious, but there is a motive force behind it. We shall turn to the consideration of cases of intentional nonconformity in a moment, but first I must point out that many nonconforming acts are committed by people who have no intention of doing so; these clearly require a different explanation.

Unintended acts of deviance can probably be accounted for relatively simply. They imply an ignorance of the existence of the rule, or of the fact that it was applicable in this case, or to this particular person. But it is necessary to account for the lack of awareness. How does it happen that the person does not know his act is improper? Persons deeply involved in a particular subculture (such as a religious or ethnic subculture) may simply be unaware that everyone does not act "that way" and thereby commit an impropriety. There may, in fact, be structured areas of ignorance of particular rules. Mary Haas has pointed out the interesting case of interlingual word taboos.[4] Words which are perfectly proper in one language have a "dirty" meaning in another. So the person, innocently using a word common in his own language, finds that he has shocked and horrified his listeners who come from a different culture.

In analyzing cases of intended nonconformity, people usually ask about motivation: why does the person want to do the deviant thing he does? The question assumes that the basic difference between deviants and those who conform lies in the character of their motivation. Many theories have been propounded to explain why some people have deviant motivations and others do not. Psychological theories find the cause of deviant motivations and acts in the individual's early experiences, which produce unconscious needs that must be satisfied if the individual is to maintain his equilibrium. Sociological theories look for socially structured sources of "strain" in the society, social positions which have conflicting demands placed upon them such that the individual seeks an illegitimate way of solving the problems his position presents him with. (Merton's famous theory of anomie fits into this category.) [5]

But the assumption on which these approaches are based may be entirely false. There is no reason to assume that only those who finally commit a deviant act actually have the impulse to do so. It is much more likely that most people experience deviant impulses frequently. At least in fantasy, people are much more deviant than they appear. Instead of asking why deviants want to do things that are disapproved of, we might better ask why conventional people do not follow through on the deviant impulses they have.

Something of an answer to this question may be found in the process of commitment through which the "normal" person becomes progressively involved in conventional institutions and behavior. In speaking of commitment,[6] I refer to the process through which several kinds of interests become bound up with carrying out certain lines of behavior to which they seem formally extraneous. What happens is that the individual, as a consequence of actions he has taken in the past or the operation of various institutional routines, finds he must adhere to certain lines of behavior, because many other activities than the one he is immediately engaged in will

be adversely affected if he does not. The middle-class youth must not quit school, because his occupational future depends on receiving a certain amount of schooling. The conventional person must not indulge his interests in narcotics, for example, because much more than the pursuit of immediate pleasure is involved; his job, his family, and his reputation in his neighborhood may seem to him to depend on his continuing to avoid temptation.

In fact, the normal development of people in our society (and probably in any society) can be seen as a series of progressively increasing commitments to conventional norms and institutions. The "normal" person, when he discovers a deviant impulse in himself, is able to check that impulse by thinking of the manifold consequences acting on it would produce for him. He has staked too much on continuing to be normal to allow himself to be swayed by unconventional impulses.

This suggests that in looking at cases of intended nonconformity we must ask how the person manages to avoid the impact of conventional commitments. He may do so in one of two ways. First of all, in the course of growing up the person may somehow have avoided entangling alliances with conventional society. He may, thus, be free to follow his impulses. The person who does not have a reputation to maintain or a conventional job he must keep may follow his impulses. He has nothing staked on continuing to appear conventional.

However, most people remain sensitive to conventional codes of conduct and must deal with their sensitivities in order to. engage in a deviant act for the first time. Sykes and Matza have suggested that delinquents actually feel strong impulses to be law-abiding, and deal with them by techniques of neutralization: "justifications for deviance that are seen as valid by the delinquent but not by the legal system or society at large." They distinguish a number of techniques for neutralizing the force of law-abiding values.

In so far as the delinquent can define himself as lacking responsibility for his deviant actions, the disapproval of self or others is sharply reduced in effectiveness as a restraining influence.... The delinquent approaches a "billiard ball" conception of himself in which he sees himself as helplessly propelled into new situations.... By learning to view himself as more acted upon than acting, the delinquent prepares the way for deviance from the dominant normative system without the necessity of a frontal assault on the norms themselves. . . .

A second major technique of neutralization centers on the injury or harm involved in the delinquent act.... For the delinquent ... wrongfulness may turn on the question of whether or not anyone has clearly been hurt by his deviance, and this matter is open to a variety of interpretations.... Auto theft may be viewed as "borrowing," and gang fighting may be seen as a private quarrel, an agreed upon duel between two willing parties, and thus of no concern to the community at large. . . .

The moral indignation of self and others may be neutralized by an insistence that the injury is not wrong in light of the circumstances. The injury, it may be claimed, is not really an injury; rather, it is a form of rightful retaliation or punishment. Assaults on homosexuals or suspected homosexuals, attacks on members of minority groups who are said to have gotten "out of place," vandalism as revenge on an unfair teacher or school official, thefts from a "crooked" store owner—all may be hurts inflicted on a transgressor, in the eyes of the delinquent....

A fourth technique of neutralization would appear to involve a condemnation of the condemners.. . . His condemners, he may claim, are hypocrites, deviants in disguise, or impelled

by personal spite.... By attacking others, the wrongfulness of his own behavior is more easily repressed or lost to view. . . .

Internal and external social controls may be neutralized by sacrificing the demands of the larger society for the demands of the smaller social groups to which the delinquent belongs such as the sibling pair, the gang, or the friendship clique. . . . The most important point is that deviation from certain norms may occur not because the norms are rejected but because other norms, held to be more pressing or involving a higher loyalty, are accorded precedence.[7]

In some cases a nonconforming act may appear necessary or expedient to a person otherwise law-abiding. Undertaken in pursuit of legitimate interests, the deviant act becomes, if not quite proper, at least not quite improper. In a novel dealing with a young Italian–American doctor we find a good example.[8] The young man, just out of medical school, would like to have a practice that is not built on the fact of his being Italian. But, being Italian, he finds it difficult to gain acceptance from the Yankee practitioners of his community. One day he is suddenly asked by one of the biggest surgeons to handle a case for him and thinks that he is finally being admitted to the referral system of the better doctors in town. But when the patient arrives at his office, he finds the case is an illegal abortion. Mistakenly seeing the referral as the first step in a regular relationship with the surgeon, he performs the operation. This act, although improper, is thought necessary to building his career.

But we are not so much interested in the person who commits a deviant act once as in the person who sustains a pattern of deviance over a long period of time, who makes of deviance a way of life, who organizes his identity around a pattern of deviant behavior. It is not the casual

experimenters with homosexuality (who turned up in such surprisingly large numbers in the Kinsey Report) that we want to find out about, but the man who follows a pattern of homosexual activity throughout his adult life.

One of the mechanisms that lead from casual experimentation to a more sustained pattern of deviant activity is the development of deviant motives and interests. We shall examine this process in detail later, when we consider the career of the marihuana user. Here it is sufficient to say that many kinds of deviant activity spring from motives which are socially learned. Before engaging in the activity on a more or less regular basis, the person has no notion of the pleasures to be derived from it; he learns these in the course of interaction with more experienced deviants. He learns to be aware of new kinds of experiences and to think of them as pleasurable. What may well have been a random impulse to try something new becomes a settled taste for something already known and experienced. The vocabularies in which deviant motivations are phrased reveal that their users acquire them in interaction with other deviants. The individual learns, in short, to participate in a subculture organized around the particular deviant activity.

Deviant motivations have a social character even when most of the activity is carried on in a private, secret, and solitary fashion. In such cases, various media of communication may take the place of face-to-face interaction in inducting the individual into the culture. The pornographic pictures I mentioned earlier were described to prospective buyers in a stylized language. Ordinary words were used in a technical shorthand designed to whet specific tastes. The word "bondage," for instance, was used repeatedly to refer to pictures of women restrained in, handcuffs or straitjackets. One does not acquire a taste for "bondage photos" without having learned what they are and how they may be enjoyed.

One of the most crucial steps in the process of building a stable pattern of deviant behavior is likely to be the experience of being caught and publicly labeled as a deviant. Whether a person takes this step or not depends not so much on what he does as on what other people do, on whether or not they enforce the rule he has violated. Although I will consider the circumstances under which enforcement takes place in some detail later, two notes are in order here. First of all, even though no one else discovers the nonconformity or enforces the rules against it, the individual who has committed the impropriety may himself act as enforcer. He may brand himself as deviant because of what he has done and punish himself in one way or another for his behavior. This is not always or necessarily the case, but may occur. Second, there may be cases life those described by psychoanalysts in which the individual really wants to get caught and perpetrates his deviant act in such a way that it is almost sure he will be.

In any case, being caught and branded as deviant has important consequences for one's further social participation and self-image. The most important consequence is a drastic change in the individual's public identity. Committing the improper act and being publicly caught at it place him in a new status. He has been revealed as a different kind of person from the kind he was supposed to be. He is labeled a "fairy," "dope fiend," "nut" or "lunatic," and treated accordingly.

In analyzing the consequences o£ assuming a deviant identity let us make use of Hughes' distinction between master and auxiliary status traits.' Hughes notes that most statuses have one key trait which serves to distinguish those who belong from those who do not. Thus the doctor, whatever else he may be, is a person who has a certificate stating that he has fulfilled certain requirements and is licensed to practice medicine; this is the master trait. As Hughes points out, in our society a doctor is also informally expected to have a number of auxiliary traits: most people expect him to be upper middle class, white, male, and Protestant. When he is not there is a sense

that he has in some way failed to fill the bill. Similarly, though skin color is the master status trait determining who is Negro and who is white, Negroes are informally expected to have certain status traits and not to have others; people are surprised and find it anomalous if a Negro turns .out to be a doctor or a college professor. People often have the master status trait but lack some of the auxiliary, informally expected characteristics; for example, one may be a doctor but be female or Negro.

Hughes deals with this phenomenon in regard to statuses that are well thought of, desired and desirable (noting that one may have the formal qualifications for entry into a status but be denied full entry because of lack of the proper auxiliary traits), but the same process occurs in the case of deviant statuses. Possession of one deviant trait may have a generalized symbolic value, so that people automatically assume that its bearer possesses other undesirable traits allegedly associated with it.

To be labeled a criminal one need only commit a single criminal offense, and this is all the term formally refers to. Yet the word carries a number of connotations specifying auxiliary traits characteristic of anyone bearing the label. A man who has been convicted of housebreaking and thereby labeled criminal is presumed to be a person likely to break into other houses; the police, in rounding up known offenders for investigation after a crime has been committed, operate on this premise. Further, he is considered likely to commit other kinds of crimes as well, because he has shown himself to be a person without "respect for the law." Thus, apprehension for one deviant act exposes a person to the likelihood that he will be regarded as deviant or undesirable in other respects.

There is one other element in Hughes' analysis we can borrow with profit: the distinction between master and subordinate statuses." Some statuses, in our society as in others, override all

other statuses and have a certain priority. Race is one of these. Membership in the Negro race, as socially defined, will override most other status considerations in most other situations; the fact that one is a physician or middle-class or female will not protect one from being treated as a Negro first and any of these other things second. The status of deviant (depending on the kind of deviance) is this kind of master status. One receives the status as a result of breaking a rule, and the identification proves to be more important than most others. One will, be identified as a deviant first, before other identifications are made. The question is raised: "What kind of person would break such an important rule?" And the answer is given: "One who is different from the rest of us, who cannot or will not act as a moral human being and therefore might break other important rules." The deviant identification becomes the controlling one.

Treating a person as though he were generally rather than specifically deviant produces a self-fulfilling prophecy. It sets in motion several mechanisms which conspire to shape the person in the image people have of him.[11] In the first place, one tends to be cut off, after being identified as deviant, from participation in more conventional groups, even though the specific consequences of the particular deviant activity might never of themselves have caused the isolation had there not also been the public knowledge and reaction to it. For example, being a homosexual may not affect one's ability to do office work, but to be known as a homosexual in an office may make it impossible to continue working there. Similarly, though the effects of opiate drugs may not impair one's working ability, to be known as an addict will probably lead to losing one's job. In such cases, the individual finds it difficult to conform to other rules which he had no intention or desire to break, and perforce finds himself deviant in these areas as well. The homosexual who is deprived of a "respectable" job by the discovery of his deviance may drift into unconventional, marginal occupations where it does not make so much difference. The drug

addict finds himself forced into other illegitimate kinds of activity, such as robbery and theft, by the refusal of respectable employers to have him around.

When the deviant is caught, he is treated in accordance with the popular diagnosis of why he is that way, and the treatment itself may likewise produce increasing deviance. The drug addict, popularly considered to be a weak-willed individual who cannot forego the indecent pleasures afforded him by opiates, is treated repressively. He is forbidden to use drugs. Since he cannot get drugs legally, he must get them illegally. This forces the market underground and pushes the price of drugs up far beyond the current legitimate market price into a bracket that few can afford on an ordinary salary. Hence the treatment of the addict's deviance places him in a position where it will probably be necessary to resort to deceit and crime in order to support his habit.[12] The behavior is a consequence of the public reaction to the deviance rather than a consequence of the inherent qualities of the deviant act.

Put more generally, the point is that the treatment of deviants denies them the ordinary means of carrying on the routines of everyday life open to most people. Because of this denial, the deviant must of necessity develop illegitimate routines. The influence of public reaction may be direct, as in the instances considered above, or indirect, a consequence of the integrated character of the society in which the deviant lives.

Societies are integrated in the sense that social arrangements in one sphere of activity mesh with other activities in other spheres in particular ways and depend on the existence of these other arrangements. Certain kinds of work lives presuppose a certain kind of family life, as we shall see when we consider the case of the dance musician.

Many varieties of deviance create difficulties by failing to mesh with expectations in other areas of life. Homosexuality is a case in point. Homosexuals have difficulty in any area of

social activity in which the assumption of normal sexual interests and propensities for marriage is made without question. In stable work organizations such as large business or industrial organizations there are often points at which the man who would be successful should marry; not to do so will make it difficult for him to do the things that are necessary for success in the organization and will thus thwart his ambitions. The necessity of marrying often creates difficult enough problems for the normal male, and places the homosexual in an almost impossible position. Similarly, in some male work groups where heterosexual prowess is required to retain esteem in the group, the homosexual has obvious difficulties. Failure to meet the expectations of others may force the individual to attempt deviant ways of achieving results automatic for the normal person.

Obviously, everyone caught in one deviant act and labeled a deviant does not move inevitably toward greater deviance in the way the preceding remarks might suggest. The prophecies do not always confirm themselves, the mechanisms do not always work. What factors tend to slow down or halt the movement toward increasing deviance? Under what circumstances do they come into play?

One suggestion as to how the person may be immunized against increasing deviance is found in a recent study of juvenile delinquents who "hustle" homosexuals.[13] These boys act as homosexual prostitutes to confirmed adult homosexuals. Yet they do not themselves become homosexual. Several things account for their failure to continue this kind of sexual deviancy. First, they are protected from police action by the fact that they are minors. if they are apprehended in a homosexual act, they will be treated as exploited children, although in fact they are the exploiters; the law makes the adult guilty. Second, they look on the homosexual acts they engage in simply as a means of making money that is safer and quicker than robbery or similar

activities. Third, the standards of their peer group, while permitting homosexual prostitution, allow only one kind of activity, and forbid them to get any special pleasure out of it or to permit any expressions of endearment from the adult with whom they have relations. Infractions of these rules, or other deviations from normal heterosexual activity, are severely punished by the boy's fellows.

Apprehension may not lead to increasing deviance if the situation in which the individual is apprehended for the first time occurs at a point where he can still choose between alternate lines of action. Faced, for the first time, with the possible ultimate and drastic consequences of what he is doing, he may decide that he does not want to take the deviant road, and turn back. If he makes the right choice, he will be welcomed back into the conventional community; but if he makes the wrong move, he will be rejected and start a cycle of increasing deviance.

Ray has shown, in the case of drug addicts, how difficult it can he to reverse a deviant cycle.[14] He points out that drug addicts frequently attempt to cure themselves and that the motivation underlying their attempts is an effort to show non-addicts whose opinions they respect that they are really not as bad as they are thought to be. On breaking their habit successfully, they find, to their dismay, that people still treat them as though they were addicts (on the premise, apparently, of "once a junkie, always a junkie").

A final step in the career of a deviant is movement into an organized deviant group. When a person makes a definite move into an organized group—or when he realizes and accepts the fact that he has already done so—it has a powerful impact on his conception of himself. A drug addict once told me that the moment she felt she was really "hooked" was when she realized she no longer had any friends who were not drug addicts.

Members of organized deviant groups of course have one thing in common: their deviance. It gives them a sense of common fate, of being in the same boat. From a sense of common fate, from having to face the same problems, grows a deviant subculture: a set of perspectives and understandings about what the world is like and how to deal with it, and a set of routine activities based on those perspectives. Membership in such a group solidifies a deviant identity.

Moving into an organized deviant group has several consequences for the career of the deviant. First of all, deviant groups tend, more than deviant individuals, to be pushed into rationalizing their position. At an extreme, they develop a very complicated historical, legal, and psychological justification for their deviant activity. The homosexual community is a good case. Magazines and books by homosexuals and for homosexuals include historical articles about famous homosexuals in history. They contain articles on the biology and physiology of sex, designed to show that homosexuality is a "normal" sexual response. They contain legal articles, pleading for civil liberties for homosexuals."[15] Taken together, this material provides a working philosophy for the active homosexual, explaining to him why he is the way he is, that other people have also been that way, and why it is all right for him to be that way.

Most deviant groups have a self-justifying rationale (or "ideology"), although seldom is it as well worked out as that of the homosexual. While such rationales do operate, as pointed out earlier, to neutralize the conventional attitudes that deviants may still find in themselves toward their own behavior, they also perform another function. They furnish the individual with reasons that appear sound for continuing the line of activity he has begun. A person who quiets his own doubts by adopting the rationale moves into a more principled and consistent kind of deviance than was possible for him before adopting it.

The second thing that happens when one moves into a deviant group is that he learns how to carry on his deviant activity with a minimum of trouble. All the problems he faces in evading enforcement of the rule he is breaking have been faced before by others. Solutions have been worked out. Thus, the young thief meets older thieves who, more experienced than he is, explain to him how to get rid of stolen merchandise without running the risk of being caught. Every deviant group has a great stock of lore on such subjects and the new recruit learns it quickly.

Thus, the deviant who enters an organized and institutionalized deviant group is more likely than ever before to continue in his ways. He has learned,, on the one hand, how to avoid trouble and, on the other hand, a rationale for continuing.

One further fact deserves mention. The rationales of deviant groups tend to contain a general repudiation of conventional moral rules, conventional institutions, and the entire conventional world. We will examine a deviant subculture later when we consider the case of the dance musician.

NOTES

4. Mary R. Haas, "Interlingual Word Taboos," *American Anthropologist*, 53 (July-September, 1951), 338–344.

5. Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York; The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), pp. 131–194.

6. I have dealt with this concept at greater length in "Notes on the Concept of Commitment," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVI (July, 1960), 32–40. See also Erving Goffman, *Encounters: Two Studies in the Sociology of Interaction* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1961), pp. 88–110; and Gregory P. Stone, "Clothing and Social Relations: A Study of

Appearance in the Context of Community Life" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1959).

7. Gresham M. Sykes and David Matza, "Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency," *American Sociological Review, 22* (December, 1957), 667–669.

8. Guido D'Agostino, *Olives on the Apple Tree* (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1940). I am grateful to Everett C. Hughes for calling this novel to my attention.

9. Everett C. Hughes, "Dilemmas and Contradictions of Status," *American Journal of Sociology,* L (March, 1945), 353-359.

10. Ibid.

11. See Marsh Ray, "The Cycle of Abstinence and Relapse Among Heroin Addicts," *Social Problems*, 9 (Fall, 1961), 132-140.

12. See *Drug Addiction: Crime or Disease?* Interim and Final Reports of the Joint Committee of the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association on Narcotic Drugs (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1961).

13. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "The Social Integration of Queers and Peers," Social Problems, 9 (Fall, 1961), 102-120.

14. Ray, op. cit.

15. *One* and *The Mattachine Review are* magazines of this type that I have seen.

Reading 27

Crime and Deviance in the Life Course

Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub

INTRODUCTION

Accepted wisdom holds that crime is committed disproportionately by adolescents. According to data from the United States and other industrialized countries, property and violent crime rise rapidly in the teenage years to a peak at about ages 16 and 18, respectively, with a decline thereafter until old age (Hirschi & Gottfredson 1983, Farrington 1986, Flanagan & Maguire 1990). The overrepresentation of youth in crime has been demonstrated using multiple sources of measurement—whether official arrest reports (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1990), self-reports of offending (Rowe & Tittle 1977), or victim reports of the ages of offenders (Hindelang 1981). It is thus generally accepted that, in the aggregate, age-specific crime rates peak in the late teenage years and then decline with age.

The age-crime curve has had a profound impact on the organization and content of sociological studies of crime by channeling research to a focus on adolescents. As a result sociological criminology has traditionally neglected the theoretical significance of childhood characteristics and the link between early childhood behaviors and later adult outcomes (see Robins 1966, Caspi et a11989, McCord 1979, Farrington 1989, Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990, Loeber & LeBlanc 1990, Sampson & Laub 1990). Although criminal behavior does peak in the teenage years, evidence reviewed below indicates an early onset of delinquency as well as continuity of criminal behavior over the life course. By concentrating on the teenage years, sociological perspectives on crime have thus failed to address the life-span implications of childhood behavior.

At the same time, criminologists have not devoted much attention to the other end of the spectrum—desistance from crime and the transitions from criminal to noncriminal behavior in adulthood (Cusson & Pinsonneault 1986, Shover 1985, Gartner & Piliavin 1988). As Rutter (1988a: 3) argues, we know little about "escape from the risk process" and whether predictors of desistance are unique or simply the opposite of criminogenic factors. Therefore, not only has the early life course been neglected, but so has the relevance of social transitions in young adulthood and the factors explaining desistance from crime as people age.

In this paper we confront these issues by bringing both childhood and adulthood back into the criminological picture of age and crime. To accomplish this goal we synthesize and integrate the research literature on the life course and crime. As described below, the life-course perspective highlights continuities and discontinuities in behavior over time and the social influences of age-graded transitions and life events. Hence, the life course is concerned not only with early childhood experiences but also with salient events and socialization in adulthood. To the extent that the adult life course does explain variation in adult crime unaccounted for by childhood development, change must be considered part of the explanatory framework in criminology, along with the stability of early individual differences.

The life-course perspective also bears on recent controversies that have embroiled criminology. While all agree that the issue of age and crime is important, conflicting views have emerged on the implications of age for the study of crime and deviance. Hirschi & Gottfredson (1983) argue that the age-crime curve is invariant over different times, places, crime types, and demographic subgroups. Moreover, they believe that age has a direct effect on crime that cannot be explained by social factors, that the causes of crime are the same at every age, and hence that longitudinal research is not needed to study the causes of crime (see also Gottfredson & Hirschi 1987, 1988, 1990). By contrast, Farrington (1986) argues that the

age-crime curve reflects variations in prevalence rather than incidence and that incidence does not vary consistently with age. He also presents evidence to suggest that the relation between age and crime varies over time and by offense type, location, and gender. Blumstein & Cohen (1979) argue further that individual crime rates are constant during a criminal career, implying that arrest rates do not always decrease with age for all offenders (see also Blumstein et al 1988).

Accordingly, even fundamental "facts" about the age-crime relationship and their implications for research design are subject to much debate. This predicament provides yet another motivation to link the study of age and crime to the life-course perspective. Indeed, the data on age and crime lend themselves naturally to a concern with how criminal behavior changes as individuals pass through different stages of the life course. By integrating knowledge on crime with age-graded transitions in the life course, our review attempts to shed further light on the age-crime debate.

This paper is organized in the following manner. Before assessing the criminological literature directly, we first highlight major ideas in life-course research and theory. In subsequent sections we then examine the research on continuity (stability) and discontinuities (change) in crime over the life course. In the final sections, we outline a research agenda on age and crime that stems from a reconceptualization of stability and change.

THE LIFE COURSE PERSPECTIVE

The life course has been defined as "pathways through the age differentiated life span," where age differentiation "is manifested in expectations and options that impinge on decision processes and the course of events that give shape to life stages, transitions, and turning points" (Elder 1985: 17). Similarly, Caspi et al (1990: 15) conceive of the life course as a

“sequence of culturally defined age-graded roles and social transitions that are enacted over time.” Age-graded transitions are embedded in social institutions and are subject to historical change (Elder 1975, 1991).

Two central concepts underlie the analysis of life-course dynamics. A trajectory is a pathway or line of development over the life span such as worklife, marriage, parenthood, self-esteem, and criminal behavior. Trajectories refer to long-term patterns and sequences of behavior. Transitions are marked by specific life events (e. g. first job or first marriage) that are embedded in trajectories and evolve over shorter time spans—“changes in state that are more or less abrupt” (Elder 1985: 31–32). Some transitions are age-graded and some are not; hence, what is often assumed to be important is the normative timing and sequencing of changes in roles, statuses, or other socially defined positions along some consensual dimension (Jessor et al 1991). For example, Hogan (1980) emphasizes the duration of time (spells) between a change in state and the ordering of events, such as first job or first marriage, on occupational status and earnings in adulthood. Caspi et al (1990: 25) argue that delays in social transitions (e.g. being “off-time”) produce conflicting obligations that enhance later difficulties (see also Rindfuss et al 1987). As a result, life-course analyses are often characterized by a focus on the duration, timing, and ordering of major life events and their consequences for later social development.

The interlocking nature of trajectories and transitions may generate turning points or a change in the life course (Elder 1985: 32). Adaptation to life events is crucial because the same event or transition followed by different adaptations can lead to different trajectories (Elder 1985: 35). The long-term view embodied by the life-course focus on trajectories implies a strong connection between childhood events and experiences in adulthood. However, the simultaneous shorter-term view also implies that transitions or turning points can modify life trajectories—they can “redirect paths.” Social institutions and triggering life

events that may modify trajectories include school, work, the military, marriage, and parenthood (see e.g. Elder 1986, Rutter et al 1990, Sampson & Laub 1990).

In addition to the study of trajectories of change and the continuity between childhood behavior and later adulthood outcomes, the life-course framework encompasses at least three other themes: (i) a concern with the social meanings of age throughout the life course, (ii) intergenerational transmission of social patterns, and (iii) the effects of macrolevel events (e.g. Great Depression, World War II) and structural location (e.g. class and gender) on individual life histories (see Elder 1974, 1985). As Elder (1991) notes, a major objective of the study of the life course is to link social history and social structure to the unfolding of human lives. To address these themes individual lives are studied through time, with particular attention devoted to aging, cohort effects, historical context, and the social influence of age-graded transitions. Naturally, prospective longitudinal research designs form the heart of life-course research.

Of all the themes emphasized in life-course research, the extent of stability and change in both behavior and personality attributes over time is perhaps the most complex. Stability versus change in behavior is also one of the most hotly debated and controversial issues in the social sciences (Brim & Kagan 1980a, Dannefer 1984, Baltes & Nesselroade 1984). Given its pivotal role we thus tum to an assessment of the research literature as it bears on stability and change in criminal behavior. Although personality development is obviously an important topic (see Block 1971, Caspi 1987), space considerations demand that we focus primarily on behavior. As we shall see, the research literature contains evidence for both continuity and change in deviant behavior over the life course.

STABILITY OF CRIME AND DEVIANCE

Unlike sociological criminology, the field of developmental psychology has long been concerned with the continuity of maladaptive behaviors (Brim & Kagan 1980a, Caspi & Bem 1990). As such, a large portion of the longitudinal evidence on stability comes from psychologists and others who study "antisocial behavior" generally, where the legal concept of crime may or may not be a component. An example is the study of aggression in psychology (Olweus 1979). In exploring this research tradition, our purpose is to highlight the extent to which deviant childhood behaviors have important ramifications, whether criminal or noncriminal, in later adult life.

Our point of departure is the widely reported claim that individual differences in antisocial behavior are stable across the life course (Olweus 1979, Caspi et al 1987, Loeber 1982, Robins 1966, Huesmann et al 1984, Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990, Jessor et al 1977, 1991). The stability of crime and antisocial behavior over time is often defined as homotypic continuity, which refers to the continuity of similar behaviors or phenotypic attributes over time (Caspi & Bem 1990: 553). For example, in an influential study of the aggressiveness of 600 subjects, their parents, and their children over a 22-year period, Huesmann et al (1984) found that early aggressiveness predicted later aggression and criminal violence. They concluded that "aggression can be viewed as a persistent trait that . . . possesses substantial cross-situational constancy" (1984: 1120). An earlier study by Robins (1966) also found a high level of stability in crime and aggression over time.

More generally, Olweus's (1979) comprehensive review of over 16 studies on aggressive behavior revealed "substantial" stability—the correlation between early aggressive behavior and later criminality averaged .68 for the studies reviewed (1979: 854-55). Loeber (1982) completed a similar review of the extant literature in many disciplines and concluded that a "consensus" has been reached in favor of the stability hypothesis: "children who initially display high rates of antisocial behavior are more likely to persist in this behavior than

children who initially show lower rates of antisocial behavior" (1982: 1433). Recent empirical studies documenting stability in criminal and deviant behavior across time include West & Farrington (1977), Wolfgang et al (1987), Shannon (1988), Elliott et al (1985), and Jessor et al (1991).

Although more comprehensive, these findings are not new. Over 50 years ago the Gluecks found that virtually all of the 510 reformatory inmates in their study of criminal careers "had experience in serious antisocial conduct" (Glueck & Glueck 1930: 142). Their data also confirmed "the early genesis of antisocial careers" (1930; 143). In addition, the Gluecks' follow-up of 1000 males originally studied in *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency* (1950) revealed remarkable continuities. As they argued in *Delinquents and Non-Delinquents in Perspective:* "while the majority of boys originally included in the nondelinquent control group continued, down the years, to remain essentially law-abiding, the greatest majority of those originally included in the delinquent group continued to commit all sorts of crimes in the 17–25 age-span" (1968: 170). Findings regarding behavioral or homotypic continuity are thus supported by a rich body of empirical research that spans several decades (for more extensive discussion see Robins 1966, 1978, West & Farrington 1977, Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990). In fact, much as the Gluecks reported earlier, Robins (1978) summarized results from her studies of four male cohorts by stating that "adult antisocial behavior virtually requires childhood antisocial behavior" (1978: 611).

Perhaps more intriguing, the linkage between childhood misbehavior and adult outcomes is found across life domains that go well beyond the legal concept of crime. This phenomenon is usually defined as heterotypic continuity—continuity of an inferred genotypic attribute presumed to underlie diverse phenotypic behaviors (Caspi & Bem 1990: 553). For instance, a specific behavior in childhood might not be predictive of the exact same behavior in later adulthood but might still be associated with behaviors that are conceptually consistent

with that earlier behavior (Caspi & Moffitt 1991: 4). Although not always criminal per se, adult behaviors falling in this category might include excessive drinking, traffic violations, marital conflict or abuse, and harsh discipline of children. Gottfredson & Hirschi (1990: 91) invoke a similar idea when they refer to adult behaviors "analogous" to crime such as accidents, smoking, and sexual promiscuity.

Evidence for the behavioral coherence implied by heterotypic continuity is found in the Huesmann et al (1984) study, where they report that aggression in childhood was related not just to adult crime but to spouse abuse, drunk driving, moving violations, and severe punishment of offspring. Other studies reporting a similar coalescence of deviant and criminal acts over time include West & Farrington (1977), Robins (1966), and Jessor et al (1991). It is interesting that the findings of heterotypic continuity generated largely by psychologists are quite consistent with criminological research, showing little or no specialization in crime as people age (Wolfgang et aI1972, Blumstein et al 1986, Elliott et al 1989, Osgood et al 1988).

Invoking another dimension of heterotypic continuity, Caspi (1987) has argued that personality characteristics in childhood (e.g. ill tempered behavior) will not only appear across time but will be manifested in a number of diverse situations. Specifically, Caspi (1987: 1211) found that the tendency toward explosive, undercontrolled behavior in childhood was recreated over time, especially in problems with subordination (e.g. in education, military, and work settings) and in situations that required negotiating interpersonal conflicts (e.g. marriage and parenting). For example, children who display temper tantrums in childhood are more likely to abort their involvement with education, which in tum is related to a wide range of adult outcomes such as unemployment, job instability, and low income. In *Deviant Children Grown Up*, Lee Robins also found strong relations between childhood antisocial behavior and adult employment status, occupational

status, job stability, income, and mobility (1966: 95–102). Robins went so far as to conclude that "antisocial behavior [in childhood] predicts class status more efficiently than class status predicts antisocial behavior" (1966: 305). In a similar vein, Sampson & Laub's (1990) reanalysis of longitudinal data from the Gluecks' archives found that childhood antisocial behavior strongly predicted not just adult criminality but outcomes as diverse as joblessness, divorce, welfare dependence, and educational failure—independent of childhood economic status and IQ.

Implications for Social Theories of Crime

There is ample evidence that antisocial behavior is relatively stable across stages of the life course, regardless of traditional sociological variables like stratification. As Caspi & Moffitt (1991: 2) conclude, robust continuities in antisocial behavior have been revealed over the past 50 years in different nations (e.g. Canada, England, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States,) and with multiple methods of assessment (e.g. official records, teacher ratings, parent reports, and peer nominations of aggressive behavior). These replications across time and space yield an impressive generalization that is rare in the social sciences.

Antisocial behavior in childhood also predicts a wide range of troublesome adult outcomes, supporting Hagan & Palloni's (1988) observation that delinquent and criminal events "are linked into life trajectories of broader significance, whether those trajectories are criminal or noncriminal in form" (1988: 90, see also Hagan 1991). Because most research by criminologists has focused either on the teenage years or adult behavior limited to crime, this idea has not been well integrated into the criminological literature.

As a result of this dual neglect, sociological approaches to crime have been vulnerable to attack for not coming to grips with the implications of behavioral stability. Not surprisingly,

developmental psychologists have long seized on stability to argue for the primacy of early childhood and the irrelevance of the adult life course. But even recent social theories of crime take much the same tack, denying that adult life-course transitions can have any real effect on adult criminal behavior. For example, Gottfredson & Hirschi (1990: 238) argue that ordinary life events (e.g. jobs, getting married, becoming a parent) have little effect on criminal behavior because crime rates decline with age "whether or not these events occur." They go on to argue that the life-course assumption that such events are important neglects its own evidence on the stability of personal characteristics (1990: 237, see also Gottfredson & Hirschi 1987). And, since crime emerges early in the life course, traditional sociological variables (e.g. peers, labor market, marriage) are again presumed impotent. The reasoning is that since crime emerges before sociological variables appear, the latter cannot be important, even in modifying known trajectories.

A dominant viewpoint in criminology is therefore that stability in crime over the life course is generated by population heterogeneity in an underlying criminal propensity that is established early in life and remains stable over time (Wilson & Herrnstein 1985, Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990, Nagin & Paternoster 1991). Precisely because individual differences in the predisposition to commit crime emerge early and are stable, childhood and adult crime will be positively correlated. The hypothesized causes of early propensity cover a number of factors, including lack of self control (Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990), parental criminality (Farrington et al 1975), impulsivity (Wilson & Hermstein 1985), and even heredity (Rowe & Osgood 1984). Although primarily methodological in nature, the heterogeneity argument has import for theoretical understanding, implying that the correlation between past and future delinquency is not causal. Rather, the correlation is spurious because of the heterogeneity of the population in its propensity to crime.

It is clear that traditional approaches to stability leave little room for the relevance of

sociological theories of age-graded transitions. As it turns out, however, whether the glass of stability appears half empty or half full seems to result at least as much from theoretical predilections as from empirical reality. Moreover, not only are there important discontinuities in crime that need to be explained, a reconsideration of the evidence suggests that stability itself may be explained by sociological influences over the life course. To assess these alterative conceptions we first review the evidence on change, followed by a revisionist look at the explanation of stability.

CONCLUSION

The traditional hostility among sociologists toward research establishing early childhood differences in delinquency and antisocial behavior that remain stable over time is unwarranted. Not only can stability be studied sociologically, its flip side is change, and the latter appears to be systematically structured by adult bonds to social institutions. The unique advantage of a sociological perspective on the life course is that it brings the formative period of childhood back into the picture yet recognizes that individuals can change through interaction with key social institutions as they age. With improvements in measurement and conceptualization, the prospects appear bright for future research to uncover the interlocking trajectories of crime, deviance, and human development.

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Reading 28

Weighing the Consequences of a Deviant Career: Factors Leading to an Exit from Prostitution

Sharon S. Oselin

Sex workers have long piqued the curiosity of both academics and the general public because their work violates prevalent social norms and therefore is often considered deviant. Prostitution,[1] one of the oldest recorded types of sex work, continues to prosper throughout the world as it has emerged in various forms, ranging from courtesans to street prostitutes. To date, there is copious research on sex workers, including their daily experiences (Pearl 1987), legal issues affecting their work (Chapkis 2000; Weitzer 2000a), and causal factors pulling women into the trade (Barton 2006; O'Neill and Barberet 2000).

Overall, there is much less academic examination of how and why women leave the trade. Within this research, there are two prevailing foci that account for this transition. First, scholars emphasize that individuals who work in prostitution are situated within particular social economic statuses that make sex work a more appealing option and preclude (or make difficult) their exits (Brock 1998; Jeffrey and MacDonald 2006; Miller 1986; Rosen and Venkatesh 2008). In this scenario, sex work is a rational decision and these broader conditions keep individuals in the trade (Rosen and Venkatesh 2008). The second approach focuses less on structurally based circumstances and more on internal factors that are linked to exits, such as having personal reasons/motivations (Dalla 2006; Sanders 2007) and turning points that cause cognitive changes (Månsson and Hedin 1999).

An alternative way to conceptualize exiting is to view prostitution as a role, associated with certain behaviors and statuses. Ebaugh (1988) refers to the process of shedding one role and adopting another as "role exiting." Research on exiting deviant roles concludes these are

especially difficult to leave due to labeling, stigma, and, in some cases, the associated criminal status. In the United States, street prostitutes are typically thought of as deviants and criminals who therefore occupy a low-status position. Due to the specific socio-legal constraints placed on these individuals, where they are deviant and criminalized yet not provided many resources, leaving the trade may be both a desirable goal and more difficult to achieve single-handedly. Prostitution-helping organizations[2] (PHOs) can serve to facilitate this exiting process.

Building on these works, this study examines the factors that cultivate an exit from prostitution. I find structural or individual explanations do not fully capture how multiple factors combine to pull women off the streets. Rather, I contend it is *both* internal and external factors that lead women to initially exit prostitution by enrolling in a PHO. I structure my analysis according to these four factors—having reasons for leaving, experiencing turning points, learning of a PHO, and the role of bridge parties. In order to address these concerns, I draw on interviews with thirty-six U.S. female street prostitutes who engage in heterosexual sex. This sample is ideal to address this research question because these individuals were in the process of transitioning out of the trade during my fieldwork as they enrolled in PHOs. These findings hold implications for theoretical advancements in research on sex workers (prostitutes), role exiting, and deviant populations.

LEAVING THE TRADE

Given the focus of this study is on the factors that result in leaving the role of prostitute, it is important to underscore the relevance of roles for individuals. Roles provide a vantage point for understanding the world around us and inform our subsequent behaviors. Individuals often take on various roles throughout their lives and transition from one role to another over

the life course, which is known as role exiting. Indeed, some research asserts that role exiting is a pivotal step that subsequently enables new role acquisition (Ebaugh 1988; Howard 2006). Ebaugh's (1988) work on role exiting examines the stages individuals pass through as they leave a role: first doubts, the seeking and weighing of alternatives, turning points and their functions in the role-exit process, and establishing an ex-role identity. Many of these stages are preparatory and important components leading to role exit. With a few exceptions, most sociological research on roles focuses solely on the socialization and internalization of new roles while neglecting other aspects of the exiting process (Howard 2006). When this process is applied to roles that are deemed criminal, it can be considered desistance (Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph 2002; Giordano, Deines, and Cernkovich 2006). While I focus primarily on role exiting in this study, these findings also offer implications for the analogous process of desistance among street prostitutes.

Research finds individuals who attempt to leave "deviant" roles must contend with unique conditions associated with them (Sanders 2007; Snow and Anderson 1993; Uggen, Manza, and Behren 2004). Similarly, street prostitutes experience a high degree of stigma and labeling due to their visibility, involvement with the criminal justice system, and because they work in a trade that violates culturally prevalent mores and norms. As a result, many prostitutes tend to conceal their past history in the trade after exiting (Sanders 2007).

Dalla (2006) highlights the ways women exit prostitution and contends they do so through three avenues: jail, PHOs, and on their own. Her study examines the motivations for leaving, which include relational factors, restrictive factors (e.g., physical deterioration), spirituality, cumulative burdens (e.g., hitting bottom), and being in a transitional context (e.g., jail). Moreover, Sanders (2007) produced one of the most comprehensive studies on exiting prostitution when she compared indoor and outdoor sex workers and developed a typology of

pathways out of sex work that consisted of reactionary exits, gradual planning, natural progression, and yo-yoing.

The ability and resources to exit prostitution though may be hampered by the socio-legal contexts in which these individuals are immersed. Brock (1998) claims the rise in Canadian legislation concerning sex work, in an effort to "contain and control" these activities, was ineffective and only shifted the workers to alternative areas. Consequently, these increasingly punitive legal changes did not decrease the number of prostitutes nor did they facilitate exiting. Månsson and Hedin (1999) conducted research on Swedish street prostitutes who left sex work, in a context that is "interventionist" in nature, and note three turning points that cultivate this transition: eye-opening events, traumatic events, and positive life events. This research was conducted within various settings, each having specific laws and values that likely influence the exiting process.

The combination of particular socio-legal contexts that criminalize prostitution, drug use, arrests and violence can create circumstances that make exiting an especially arduous task (Cusick and Hickman 2005; Sanders 2007). For instance, Cusick and Hickman (2005) point out that prostitution and drug use mutually reinforce each another, making this population especially "vulnerable" and effectively "trapping" them in the trade unless sobriety is achieved. To date, extant studies explore the motivations for leaving, turning points of change, and laws that shape exiting. Building off this body of work, this study aims to contribute by analyzing the combination of factors that result in an initial exit from street prostitution, particularly among women who utilize the services of a PHO.

DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY

In order to gain access to prostitutes, I chose to intern and work with PHOs: nonprofit programs that specifically aim to help and serve prostitutes. I located thirty-three[3] PHOs

across the United States, through extensive Internet searches and snowball sampling, and selected four of them where I conducted in-depth ethnographic work—New Horizons, Phoenix, Safe Place, and Seeds. I chose these four PHOs based on the following factors: modes of entrée, the organizational structure, temporality, and regional location (see Table 28.1). Scholars assert these factors are important considerations, either because they had been previously neglected or proved relevant to studies on role exiting and/or desistance (Ebaugh 1988; Goffman 1961; Hanson 2002). Receiving director approval to research at these sites was another important concern in the selection process.

[INSERT TABLE 28.1 HERE]

I completed this research between 2002 and 2006 and spent an average of three months at each site conducting participant observation and formal and informal interviews. The data in this study draw specifically on the qualitative interviews I conducted with thirty-six clients (approximately nine women per site). These women range in age from 20 to 55, with a majority in their thirties and forties. The interviews focused on the following topics: past histories in prostitution, life course events, experiences on the streets, family relationships, identity, reasons for leaving prostitution and entering the program, interactions with the criminal justice system, and future goals. I conducted the tape-recorded interviews in a private setting to ensure confidentiality and assigned each interviewee a pseudonym for protection. Throughout these interviews, the women espoused stories that contained fairly simplistic cause and effect narratives (Tilly 2006).

I did not find there to be any significant differences among these four samples.

FACTORS LEADING TO AN EXIT

Many studies on exiting prostitution focus on one or two factors that pull women out of the trade, such as reasons for leaving (Dalla 2006; Sanders 2007), turning points (Månsson and Hedin 1999; Sanders 2007), or structural impediments (Brock 1998; Rosen and Venkatesh 2008). In this analysis of street prostitutes, I find it is a combination of both internal (reasons for leaving, turning points) and external factors (learning of a PHO, bridge parties) that lead women to initially exit prostitution as they enter PHOs.

Reasons for Leaving Prostitution

A central component associated with leaving prostitution is having reasons for exiting that can also serve as motivating factors. The respondents in this sample all provided reasons for quitting, with an average of 2.55 reasons given per woman. Dalla (2006) analyzed the motivations for exiting prostitution, which included relational factors, restrictive factors (e.g., physical deterioration), spirituality, cumulative burdens (e.g., hitting bottom), and being in a transitional context (e.g., jail). Similarly, Sanders (2007) uncovers reasons prostitutes leave (such as violence, sobriety, health issues) and connects them to a typology of pathways out of sex work. The above contributions lay important theoretical groundwork for understanding the motivations for exiting, yet at times, these accounts tend to be insufficiently contextualized by the background and life experiences of the individual. Thus, I consider how unique individual characteristics and experiences come into play as women formulate reasons for leaving the streets.

During these interviews, I asked a series of questions about how and why women left prostitution. One common theme that emerged in the responses was being raised in a religious household and a strong desire to “get right with God.” Shondra, a 41-year-old who worked in prostitution for over fifteen years, highlighted the important role a Higher Power

played throughout her life, even while she worked on the streets. She explained how religion was a big part of her childhood and her faith eventually became a primary motivation to leave:

> My mom was a Jehovah witness and that's the religion I was raised in. I always had faith. When I was working on the streets, I kept praying to God: This is not me. Why do I keep doing this? Why can't I stop? God help me stop. . . . He was always there knocking I just had to open up the door to allow him to come in and help me stop.

Tiffany, who was raised Baptist, also viewed her faith as an ongoing process that inspired her to quit:

> It's because I actually felt the hurt that I was putting up on the Heavenly Father and Christ. That was the ultimate straw that broke the camel's back. I promised myself I would never hurt them again and that gives me all the reasons more than I'm going to stop. The other reasons I don't like it no more, like going to prison or for my kids . . . none of those worked. It is God who gives me strength to make the choice.

Another reason for leaving was witnessing and experiencing excessive violence on the streets. While violence in impoverished urban contexts tends to be heightened (Miller 2008), some prostitutes experienced more violent encounters than others, which in turn produced fears of future violence or even death. For some, these concerns emerged and intensified to become a central reason to leave the lifestyle. Shondra, in addition to having religious motivations, also pointed to the increased violence on the streets that was too much for her to bear:

> Really, I thought I was going to die in the life because I didn't see anyway out no matter how much I wanted it to end. Things were getting worse on the streets day by day. I've seen about five prostitutes I knew end up dead in garbage cans.

Jenna concurred that the violence she experienced while working in prostitution for twenty-seven years was a major reason she wanted to leave:

> I was almost killed by my last john and I ran for my life. I knew I needed to get help but I couldn't stop. It was bad out there . . . I was raped many times and left for dead, having people cut my face up and damage my eye.

The amount of negative experiences and fears of them seemed to grow the longer one worked on the streets. In these situations, women often discussed these fears as burdens that left them feeling exhausted and "too old" for this line of work. Barton (2006) refers to these outcomes as a "toll" sex work can take on women. Similarly, the prostitutes who referenced these reasons for leaving typically worked in the trade for a good portion of their adult lives.[4]

Amy was a 28-year-old who worked as a prostitute for thirteen years, or nearly half of her life. She claimed to feel the tangible effects of her years on the streets:

> I was tired of prostituting, yeah I wanted to try and change my life, but I was having a hard time doing it anymore. . . . So I came here, to try to get out of it and off of the streets, so I could do something else because I'm getting way too old for it.

Elaine, 39-years-old, who transitioned from stripping to street prostitution, felt seventeen years as a prostitute burdened her with many mental and emotional problems. She claimed to be exhausted from the work and declared that most girls who leave prostitution are also motivated by this factor: “If they are really, really ready to change their lives [and leave] mostly it’s because they are tired. That’s the main reason you will hear the girls give. They are just burned out by the work.”

Although less commonly cited, a few women claimed their sexual orientation served as an impetus to exit prostitution as it became increasingly difficult for them to have sex with men. For instance, Debbie had a distain of sex with men because she was a lesbian. Though she said she first knew she was a lesbian at 14, she felt sleeping with men grew more despicable over time and ultimately became her motivation to leave:

> I just got tired of being with different men all the time. The smells, the touches, and all that stuff . . . I’m gay. To be with a man is really fucked up to me. I’d always try to play my way out of the sex by either talking or conning people. I did that very well.

For Debbie, not being sexually attracted to men was a significant impediment in this line of work.

Many women also pointed to sobriety and the clarity that followed as a reason for leaving prostitution. In fact, numerous women stated their sobriety was a precursor to be able to identify their feelings about working in prostitution. All the women in this sample except one admitted to having a drug addiction and many stated this kept them in the trade. Accordingly, achieving a period of sobriety was integral to even formulate reasons to leave, and for some women the desire to sustain it became a motivation in itself (Cusick and Hickman 2005).

Loretta, a routine user of PCP and cocaine for eleven years, said her addiction kept her in prostitution and once sober she had no need to return. She recalled:

> My habit was basically what really kept me out there. So I think that when I really decided that I don't want drugs anymore that helped me with the prostitution thing. Because I don't need to go out there and sell my body because I didn't do drugs anymore and that is basically what I was doing it for. So now that I am sober I know that I can do without it.

Evette attributed her mental breakdown to drugs and claimed sobriety was paramount for her to retain her sanity. She felt working in prostitution was not compatible with her sobriety:

> I never really thought about leaving before I came to the hospital, but I knew I couldn't get high no more because I would start hallucinating and all kinds of stuff . . . I was scared. I used the whole time I worked the streets. I think once I got sober I got a moment of clarity and it dawned on me at that time that that was not the way I wanted to die. Before being sober, I had never thought of leaving.

Both Loretta and Evette's statements suggest that sobriety played a crucial role in even being able to place exiting as a desirable outcome.

Another reason that emerged from women's accounts focused on salvaging relationships with their children. Approximately three-quarters of these women had children, and for many, being able to raise their children, re-claim custody, or simply fulfill their motherly duties was an utmost priority. Though Janise lost custody of her children years before, she

still wanted to protect them from negative responses they may have faced because of her actions:

> I started thinking about my kids and that's why I first considered leaving. They are teenagers now and I would never hang around their neighborhood or hang around their friends because I was afraid that I was going to date one of them on accident. If that happened, I feared my kids' friends would tease them— "Hey man, isn't that your mom? Your momma sucked my dick."

Rosen and Venkatesh (2008) find that engaging in sex work allows parents flexibility, time, and money to care for their children. In contrast, very few women in this study had custody of their children or even routine contact with them, and many claimed the lifestyle associated with sex work precluded them from raising their children. Thus, the desire to perform and reclaim their role as mothers served as a motivation to leave prostitution.

Other interpersonal relationships with family members, partners, or close friends likewise became a reason to get off the streets. There were two main ways that these relationships motivated women to leave the trade. First, women considered their relationships with significant others too important to lose, therefore sustaining the relationship was a prominent reason for quitting. Rosaria explained how she took her fiancée's disapproval of her lifestyle into consideration:

> When my fiancée found out I was prostituting he agreed with me that I needed to change my life. He didn't like the drugs, alcohol or prostitution . . . the way I was living. So to be with him, I needed to change.

Mary similarly claimed she did not want to lose her boyfriend and father of her four children due to her involvement with prostitution and drugs because she felt he was a "good man."

The second way interpersonal relationships became a motivation to quit was when individuals served as role models to prostitutes. In these instances, women had connections to other former prostitutes who had successfully left via PHOs. Through their relationships, these role models extolled the virtues of their decision and served as living examples that such a transition was possible. One 52-year-old client stated her motivation to leave prostitution emerged after she witnessed two other women graduate from a PHO and thrive in their new lifestyles. She recounted why she wanted to leave:

> I saw the evidence through my sister and another lady in my neighborhood that was out on the streets [in prostitution] and doing really bad. I saw the changes in them after they went through the program and that's what helped motivate me to want to leave.

For many sex workers, interpersonal relationships factored prominently as reasons to transition out of the trade.

I find the reasons for exiting prostitution among this group of sex workers largely correspond to the findings of previous studies on this topic that include violence, exhaustion, relationships, and religious motivations (Dalla 2006; Sanders 2007). Here, I attempt to assess personal biographies (and life experiences) in conjunction with the formulation of particular reasons because the former shapes the latter. Understanding the motivations for leaving sheds light on the internal factors involved with this decision, but for these women simply possessing reasons does not automatically generate an exit. Extant research on this topic tends to discuss reasons for leaving as if they alone lead to exits. I contend a turning point

event is equally important for bringing these reasons to center stage and subsequently prioritizing leaving.

Turning Points of Change

Beyond reasons for leaving, women also emphasized a turning point event that prompted them to place exiting as a central goal. Turning points, also an internal factor that influences exiting, can cultivate a shift within a person that brings a new set of priorities and goals to the forefront (Stark and Lofland 1965). Månsson and Hedin (1999) find turning point events were relevant to leaving street prostitution and these consisted of eye-opening events, traumatic events (e.g., violence), and positive life events (e.g., relationships, children). In a similar line of inquiry, Sanders (2007) constructed a typology of transitions out of prostitution and in doing so highlighted various turning points of change for these women, such as violent events and significant life events (e.g., pregnancy or jail). Indeed, she finds individual reasons for exiting and turning point events are frequently the same.

In this study, I find that although there is some overlap between turning point events and reasons for leaving, most women spoke of them as two distinct categories. Typically, prostitutes cite reasons for exiting that vary from their turning point event, and as a result of experiencing this event, their reasons rise in salience. The following events functioned as a turning point of change: being arrested, hospitalization, and pregnancy/childbirth.

Arrests and Jail. Given that street prostitutes are highly visible to law enforcement, it is not surprising that all the women in this study have been arrested for prostitution at some point throughout their career. This finding corroborates previous work that claims street prostitutes have among the highest arrest rates of all sex workers (Alexander 1987). As a result of these arrests, a majority of women in this study served jail/prison sentences. Those

who had a history of multiple arrests and extensive criminal records spoke of their heightened fears of returning to jail and the prospect of serving long-term prison sentences. When these fears became a reality, they acted as a turning point for approximately three-quarters (twenty-seven of thirty-six) of this sample. Turning points of this nature are what Månsson and Hedin (1999) consider traumatic events that produce a change in perception. The arrests and imprisonment subsequently removed women from street environments, temporarily enforced sobriety, and provided a space for personal reflection that enabled them to reassess their priorities.

Recall that Shondra stated her reasons for getting out of prostitution consisted of religious beliefs and intense fears of experiencing violence on the streets. However, these motivations did not compel her to exit. It was only when she was rearrested and returned to jail that these motivations to quit became her priority. She explained how her imprisonment evoked a turning point moment in her life:

> God finally rescued me the last time I went to jail, and it finally clicked after I was arrested that this was God's way of helping me out. I prayed for God to strengthen my faith in Him and to put Him in my life . . . to feel what I knew was right and what I was raised to believe in. I embraced that and ran with it because that was my lifeline and I knew with no doubt in my mind that if I would have kept going the way I was going I would end up dead. After I was released I went right into the program because I knew this was my one shot.

Tisha, a 20-year-old who had been working as a prostitute since she was 9 years old, had a substantial history of arrests and jail time and recently violated her parole. Though she provided multiple reasons why she wanted to leave the streets, such as escalating violence

and being “burned out,” her rearrest and the prospect of significant jail time elicited a turning point change in her:

> I was on parole and I got busted for prostitution again. I knew I was going back to prison for a long time, so I called my parole officer and asked her to recommend me for Phoenix instead. At that point, I knew something had to change. I got lucky, instead of returning to prison, I got a chance to go there.

Similarly, Loretta, a 40-year-old who claimed sobriety was her reason to leave, did not work toward that goal until she was arrested and faced a long stint in the penitentiary. She declared:

> I had a long rap sheet—from here to El Paso probably. I was arrested for drugs and prostitution. And all my misdemeanors turned into felonies. I knew I was going to do some serious time in the penitentiary . . . at least three years. I knew it was time to make a change.

These cases emphasize the relevance of arrests and imprisonment, as they served to facilitate turning points of change. This specific type of event was particularly relevant among women with substantial histories of arrests and criminal records, where they perceived the costs associated with working in prostitution as too great.

Hospitalization. Another event that cultivated a turning point for prostitutes was when they experienced extreme psychological duress that resulted in hospitalization. This event is also a traumatic turning point (Månsson and Hedin 1999). In these situations, the women attribute their change in thinking to their time spent in the hospital, where they were able to

take stock of their situation and formulate alternative options. Less than one-quarter (seven of thirty-six) of the women discuss hospitalization as a turning point moment.

Even though Evette had a variety of reasons for wanting to leave prostitution, it was the time she spent in a hospital due to a "mental breakdown" that provided a catalyst for exiting. She felt her mental instability was a result of her excessive drug use, which was fueled by her work in the trade:

> I never really thought about stopping [prostitution] until the drug thing really took a toll on me mentally. I started hallucinating and began losing my mind and it wasn't fun. That's when I really wanted out. When I was in the hospital I recognized that this was it—now or never. Something clicked inside me.

After this realization, she stated she could not return to prostitution.

Tiffany also suffered from mental illness, which she attributed to her intense drug addiction, and had attempted suicide. Her motivations for quitting revolved solely around having a "spiritual awakening," but it was not until she ended up in the hospital that she began to take the necessary steps to exit:

> I tried to smoke myself to death, drink myself to death, and take pills and had to go to the psychiatric unit for six days. It was during this time that I had the clarity to know that I needed help. When I was released I came right to this program.

Both Evette and Tiffany cited multiple reasons for leaving prostitution, however it was only after they were hospitalized for psychiatric problems that they began to experience clarity and a change in thinking that lead them along the path to exiting. These women claimed they had

too much to lose if they returned to the streets, including their sanity and well-being, and felt the only way to prevent further damage or death would be to radically alter their lifestyles by leaving prostitution.

Pregnancy and Childbirth. Pregnancy and childbirth were linked to the final turning point event but were uncommon as only two women in this sample cited them. Amy stated feelings of exhaustion made her want to leave the trade for years, yet it was pregnancy and the birth of her last son that produced a turning point in her life that altered her thinking. Shortly after giving birth, her main goal was to leave prostitution so she could be a mother to her children and especially her newborn son:

> I want my kids back. I realized it was time to stop when I was pregnant with my son and I didn't want to be doing that anymore since he needed a mother. At that point, I started trying to figure out how I could leave . . . what else I could do instead.

These events corroborate previous research because they fall under the category of "positive life turning points" (Månsson and Hedin 1999).

All the women in this study experienced one of these three turning point events that in turn altered their priorities and goals. Janise stated she would never have left prostitution if she had not experienced a change of heart while in jail. Evette provided a similar account: "No, I never seriously thought of leaving prostitution and if it had not been for my going to the hospital, my social worker and the program, I would still be out there today and probably dead."

The effects of a turning point and the corresponding change in thinking spurred women to gather information about ways to leave prostitution and consider available options for help in this endeavor. Similar to reasons for leaving, turning points can be best understood by

examining an individual's particular biography and experiences and are often associated with role transitions (Sampson and Laub 1993). In studies on female desistance from crime, Giordano et al. (2006) conclude that cognitive and motivational changes are central to the desistance process. For prostitutes in this study, turning points created a newfound sense of purpose and priorities, where they felt getting out of prostitution was paramount. In order for a PHO to be perceived as a viable option to exit, prostitutes first had to learn about the program and what it offered. They acquired this information through a variety of sources, which I examine in the next section.

Learning of a PHO

In addition to internal states, external factors also shape the process of initially exiting prostitution. The first of these is having an awareness of a PHO as an avenue through which to leave. Indeed, knowing about a program and the services it provides can make leaving more appealing and appear attainable because one can expect certain provisions through this association. Research finds that marginalized and disadvantaged populations, such as the homeless, benefit the most when they are informed and utilize services that best match their perceptions and needs (Thompson, Pollio, Eyrich, Bradbury, and North 2004). In the literature on prostitution and exiting, there is little discussion or analysis of the ways through which women learn about programs that can help them transition out of the trade.

I find this group of street prostitutes possessed either short- or long-term knowledge of the existence of a local PHO. Three-quarters of these women (twenty-seven of thirty-six) had short-term awareness of a PHO (less than three months) and enrolled within this time frame. The remaining one-quarter (nine of thirty-six) retained long-term knowledge of a PHO,

meaning they knew of a nearby program for longer than three months but did not enroll until a later point in time.

The women who knew about a PHO for longer periods of time acquired this information through a variety of sources: programs and services affiliated with the PHO, staff associated with affiliated institutions, family members or friends, and the media. PHOs that offered additional services—drop-in crisis shelters, street outreach, and jail outreach services—spread the word about their organization through these channels. By providing an array of services, program staff members had numerous avenues through which to disseminate information to street prostitutes and cultivate interpersonal relationships with them.

For instance, Janise first heard of New Horizons when she began using their temporary crisis shelter years earlier:

> See I was just a client coming in and out of their crisis shelter, getting meals or sleeping. Because I knew that if I joined their residential program, then I'm gonna have to do the right thing. But at that time I wasn't ready to quit.

While she was not ready to quit until a few years later, during her visits to the shelter Janise acquired information about the program and its services that she later decided to pursue.

Other clients claimed they first heard of a PHO when they came across its mobile outreach unit, whose purpose was to provide condoms, information, and safety tips to street prostitutes. Evette said she first learned of the PHO when interacting with staff members working in this outreach program:

> I had always known about them as far as passing out condoms and stuff . . . I even knew them on a first name basis . . . but did I go in for the help and all that? No, I did not. I

> even lived really close to the residential house, but I never once thought about going there because in my mind there was no help for me.

In spite of learning about the residential programs offered by some PHOs, few of these women attempted to enroll because they felt they were not yet ready to exit.

Another way the women learned of PHOs was through social workers affiliated with other institutions, such as jails or hospitals. Tiffany stated it was her hospital social worker who provided the details about Safe Place, a PHO she had never heard of previously:

> I was in the hospital for eight days and the social worker, Mr. Green, came and spoke about this program. He said it was peaceful and there were counselors there an all that . . . that was about two and a half years ago, and that's how long it took me before I actually ended up here. But it was at that point that the seed was planted.

Tiffany's expression was common, as many women carried knowledge of PHOs around with them as a "seed planted" to be used at a later time.

Some women found out about PHOs through their family members or friends. Monique attributed learning about the program to her sister and a fellow prostitute, both of whom had enrolled years before:

> I had seen the evidence of the program through my sister, who graduated from the program a few years back. And another lady in my neighborhood was also a prostitute and really bad off. She went to the program too and they both did well. They're now out of the life for good.

A friend in jail told Mary about Phoenix for the first time. She recalled:

> I heard about it at least a year and a half ago from a friend while I was in jail. She went to that program before, but I guess she didn't do what she needed to stay out because she was back on the streets and in jail. I always kept that in mind.

For a few women, like Mary, it was the physical restrictions of incarceration that kept them from enrolling in the program until a later date.

Women also acquired information about PHOs from advertisements or articles placed in local newspapers. Around the same time she learned of the program from her friend, Mary also saw a newspaper article about it that featured the history of the program, the services they offered, and contact information. Similarly, another client came across an ad in a local paper that "stuck in her mind." She recited the title of the ad that resonated with her: "Do you want to get out of the life of prostitution?"

These women discussed a variety of sources from which they learned of PHOs, information which eventually influenced their decision to leave the streets. Awareness of PHOs did not typically engender a quick transition out of the trade, but instead it was stored away and became a "seed" planted that was acted upon at a later time. The remaining women in this study possessed short-term knowledge of PHOs, where they learned about them at the onset of their enrollment process. Whether it was a short or long period of time, learning about PHOs and considering them a viable option to exit shaped women's future trajectories and decisions to leave the streets. In spite of the necessary internal conditions (reasons and turning points) and awareness of PHOs, third-party bridges played a significant part in initial exits from prostitution.

Third Party Bridges

The final external factor tied to exiting is based on a specific type of social network, namely third-party bridges, or individuals who connect prostitutes to PHOs. In the social network literature, this third-party bridge is referred to as a "broker," an actor that mediates exchanges between two other actors not directly linked (Fernandez and Gould 1994). When applied to the case of prostitutes, Månsson and Hedin (1999) highlight how social networks shape the pathways out of prostitution, as individuals extend emotional and practical support to these women during the transition. But social networks do more than that. In fact, I find women not only learn about programs through their social networks, but they rely on these "bridges" to facilitate their entrance into them.

Those who act as bridges have either personal or professional motivations and, in some cases, the power to grant individuals access to PHOs. Networks research distinguishes between two types of brokers—representatives and gatekeepers— where the first groups' interests are aligned with the supplier (e.g., PHOs) and the latter groups' interests are aligned with the customer (e.g., the prostitutes) (Fernandez and Gould 1994). I apply these concepts in order to differentiate the types of bridges prevalent here. The first type was comprised of individuals who acted as *professional bridges* or those who had aligned interests with PHOs, as they were largely motivated to connect prostitutes to programs based on their occupational goals and duties. The other type included individuals who became *personal bridges* and were primarily concerned with the desires of the prostitutes rather than the organizations. To date, extant research on how women leave prostitution does not explore the ways in which bridge parties serve to connect individuals to organizations that facilitate their exit.

The most common professional bridge that linked women with PHOs were individuals affiliated with the criminal justice system, such as public defense attorneys, parole officers,

and the police. In fact, a little more than half of the clients (twenty of thirty-six) identified a person who worked in one of these occupations as their bridge. These bridges were especially salient for those prostitutes entangled within the criminal justice system, as they informed women about the program and, based upon their power, advocated for this sentence in lieu of imprisonment. Ultimately, the final decision is often made by a judge, but attorneys and parole officers certainly influence these outcomes. Tisha was a client who first heard about Phoenix through a chaplain while in jail and shortly thereafter asked her parole officer to plead with the judge for placement there. As a bridge party, who had significant power over her sentencing, it was up to her parole officer's discretion whether she would be able to enter the PHO. Tisha recalled the sequence of events:

> I heard about the Phoenix the third time I went to jail through a chaplain who told me there are programs for prostitutes. I've never heard of one before that. At that point in time when she came to me I had no hope. Because I did a crime—prostitution—I was on parole. I was looking at 18 months at least in jail. I didn't know if I was going to get into the program, not because they wouldn't accept me but because my parole officer wouldn't recommend it. . . . I had to go through her first. So I called my parole officer and I told her about the program. . . . I didn't know if she would recommend it for me or not. Finally, she did and I was able to enter.

Loretta also stated she learned of a nearby PHO when her defense lawyer suggested she try to get in. He set up a meeting between her and the director of the PHO to see if she would qualify and thereafter advocated for Loretta's placement in this program rather than a lengthy prison term. She explained:

> When the public defender said "I know a long-term program, I'm going to give the director a call and she's going to come up here to interview you and see if you are eligible," I said okay because I was ready to quit, I was tired, and I was looking at three years in the penitentiary. Luckily, I got in and I am now a proud program graduate.

Janise, who knew of a local PHO for years, explained she finally enrolled in it because her lawyer, upon her request, pleaded for her to be placed there rather than serve prison time. She was quick to emphasize that she wanted to enter the program because she knew it was a "life threatening situation" for her, where she would likely die if she continued working on the streets. All three of these women depended on a professional bridge party to recommend and secure their placement at a PHO.

In rare instances, the police served as the bridge between street prostitutes and PHOs. Although the police had no legal authority to force a woman to enter a PHO, in circumstances where a woman was willing to accept their suggestion, they served as the effective bridge. Amy, whose last pregnancy and infant son became her turning point, was one of these individuals. She recalled:

> The cops picked me up and they brought me here, and that was the first time I heard about this program. I thought the program wouldn't take me, but they did because the cops knew the director. I've been here ever since.

In Amy's case, the police officer's relationships with the program director eased this transition.

Social workers also functioned as bridges to PHOs, and they were especially instrumental for the women who experienced traumatic events and landed in the hospital. Approximately

22 percent (eight of thirty-six) of the women claimed social workers facilitated their admission into a PHO. For example, Evette emphasized the important role her social worker played in getting her into New Horizons after she wound up in a psychiatric hospital:

> It was a social worker from the hospital who got me to go to the program. She asked me, "Is this the way you really want to die?" I think in the midst of that encounter I got a moment of clarity and it donned on me it was not. . . . So it was that little conversation with that social worker that finally got me here. She set it up so when I was released I came straight here.

Tiffany shared a similar story, where she was in a psychiatric hospital after she attempted suicide, and a social worker recommended Safe Place, which she had heard of years before. After receiving the suggestion and experiencing a turning point, she finally felt ready to change and allowed the social worker to orchestrate her placement into the program.

Lawyers, parole officers, police, and social workers all acted as professional bridges because they shared a mutual interest with the PHOs, which was to get the women out of prostitution and discourage further involvement with the criminal justice system. Acting as brokers between prostitutes and PHOs was beneficial for the workers professionally, as these placements can ultimately help accomplish occupational goals. As one police captain explained:

> The police became an advocate for this program, not only by distributing information to the prostitutes who we were directly involved in the criminal justice system, but also to other agencies, such as courts. You know, if we could keep her from going on the street again by connect[ing] her to this program, we've not only helped her, but we've

> accomplished our goal for the community as well. I think it worked as a real good win/win situation for both of us.

The professional bridges have formalized relationships with their clients, as the very nature of their jobs promotes and encourages citizens to adhere to laws, remain out of crime, and be self-supporting. Thus, it is in their best interests to get women to leave the streets with the hope that many will permanently implement these lifestyle changes.

Family and friends also became bridges between prostitutes and PHOs, and approximately 14 percent (five of thirty-six) of these women mentioned them. These individuals served as personal bridges whose interests primarily aligned with the prostitutes due to their intimate interpersonal relationships. Although Monique first learned of the PHO a few years back, she only decided to actively pursue entering after she experienced a turning point in jail. Upon prioritizing an exit from the trade, she turned to her sister, who had graduated from the PHO a few years prior, for help:

> I went to call my sister and asked her if they will help me. I asked her, “Will they have a spot for me?” She told me more about them, provided their number, and put in a word for me with the director. I called them and they said as soon as you get released you can come. I came right here from jail after my sentence was done because I knew I couldn’t do it alone.

Likewise, Chanelle emphasized how her friend became a crucial link to Phoenix, by not only providing information about the program and describing the qualifications to be accepted but by also giving her the contact information. She explained:

> Apparently, the director of the program would go to the prison and give presentations about the program, what you had to do to qualify, and so on. So a friend I had in jail saw that, kept that information, and would pass it on to other women in jail who wanted another chance at life but were serious about it. After we became friends, she told me about the program and gave me the phone number. I called them and told them I heard about it through a woman who met the director in jail, said I sincerely wanted to quit prostitution, and asked for an interview. Once my sentence was up I came right here.

The personal bridges did not have professional motivations to connect prostitutes to PHOs, but rather their intimate relationships and desire to help these women achieve their goals fueled their actions.

Only three women in this sample claimed to have no bridge person facilitate their entrance into a PHO. These women were rare in that they were extremely motivated to seek help from a PHO and, upon learning of their existence, took all the necessary steps to secure a spot in the program. For instance, after learning about Phoenix, Mary took the initiative to enter by persistently calling and checking back with staff members until she was accepted. She described this process:

> And I called and they told me that they didn't have any beds available. And two months later, she was like, "We don't have any available now but call me back in a week." And I called her back and I got one. At that time I had been out of jail since August of last year and I waited all that time, hoping to go there. Why? I was ready to change my life.

Mary was unique in that she did not rely on any bridges to help her gain access to the program but put in the footwork herself.

An overwhelming majority of the prostitutes in this sample relied on bridges to secure their enrollment in a PHO. Research suggests that social networks are important to the exiting process overall (Ebaugh 1988), and among prostitutes who leave the trade (Månsson and Hedin 1999). However, these studies focus on the emotional or practical support third parties provide after the exit. I contend bridges perform the integral function of informing women of PHOs and helping to place them in these programs prior to their exits.

Prostitute Perceptions of PHOs

Exiting with the help of PHOs is certainly not the only pathway out of street prostitution. However, given the difficulties associated with the trade, many of the women in this study claimed they would not have been able to leave if it were not for the resources and support of a PHO. Debbie stated she had thought about leaving prostitution before, but it never happened until she finally entered a program:

> Yes, I couldn't do it alone. I tried before but it didn't work. I started to get back on drugs. Or I'd find myself in a predicament that I couldn't handle and I needed money. Or I would be staying someplace and they would tell me that I had to get out. Where was I going to go? And the only thing I knew was to go and get money from men [through sex] and once I started doing that I started using drugs too. The program offered me a different way out. I knew they helped you get an education, a job, and maintain sobriety.

Loretta also perceived Phoenix could teach her how to live a life outside of prostitution: "So I knew it was just time to stop and I didn't know how and I felt that this place was definitely

going to show me how. They provided me with so many tools I didn't have or couldn't get on my own. They offered me an education so I could get a job and support myself."

Evette stated that when she was ready to leave she did not know how to accomplish that goal alone and turned to New Horizons for help:

> I didn't know what I wanted at the time, but I did know that I didn't want anymore of what I had been getting. I knew something about the program from the street outreach and I knew they had a structured program set up that could really help me. The structure of the program was key to teaching me some sort of responsibility so I could take care of myself without relying on prostitution.

Similarly, Monique explained she was unsure how to exit prostitution because her life was such a mess. She realized that a PHO could facilitate this transition because she had seen its success through previous clients:

> I thought about leaving a million times. I just didn't know how. When my life was a total mess I knew that for me to get some type of self-worth I had to come here. Because I saw what the program did for my sister and another lady I knew, and the changes they went through, I felt it had to be doing something right. I decided to commit to this program.

In short, many of these women perceived they could not surmount the barriers to exiting prostitution on their own. Therefore, they felt utilizing the services and resources of a PHO would help make their transition easier, provide skills and structure, and ultimately improve their chances of success.

CONCLUSION

Most Americans view prostitutes as criminals and deviants, which positions them in a low-status role and bestows unto them high levels of stigma for working in the trade. Indeed, such socio-legal circumstances likely exacerbate the difficulties of working in prostitution (Sanders 2007) vis-à-vis other contexts (Månsson and Hedin 1999). Prior studies also find those who occupy deviant roles experience unique circumstances (labeling, stigma, and other hardships), which makes exiting more challenging (Brown 1991; Sanders 2007). This article contributes to the research on role exiting and prostitution by illuminating the pertinent factors that shape initial exits out of street prostitution, a particularly deviant role.

Extant research examines how individuals leave prostitution and concludes it is difficult due to structural and economic conditions that act as barriers and keep them immersed within the trade (Jeffrey and MacDonald 2006; Miller 1986; Rosen and Venkatesh 2008). Following this line of reasoning, if their socioeconomic status circumstances changed, then they may be less inclined to continue to work as prostitutes. Conversely, other studies associate internal states (and changes) with exiting prostitution (Cusick and Hickman 2005; Dalla 2006; Månsson and Hedin 1999; Sanders 2007). Such explanations focus primarily on reasons (or motivations) for leaving and turning points of change that result in an exit from sex work (Dalla 2006; Sanders 2007).

Both of these lines of inquiry and their conclusions shed light on why women stay in prostitution and why they leave. Yet neither puts forth an analysis of exiting that considers a multitude of factors that encompass both internal and external circumstances. I find that while internal factors are important because they imply cognitive shifts and a willingness to leave, it is also the knowledge of available “helping” programs and third-party bridges that shape exits. My findings do not discount these previous theories, but they enrich them by

emphasizing it is the combination of internal and external factors that lead prostitutes to exit via PHOs.

PHOs indeed provide one alternative to being "trapped" in prostitution as a result of macro-forces. For these prostitutes, their structural and economic circumstances did not change prior to leaving nor were their internal alterations enough to incite exits. Instead, it was the culmination of these four factors that pulled prostitutes out of the trade, coupled with the perception that PHOs could provide them tools (skills, structure, opportunities, and support) that would ultimately ease their transition. The role of organizations (PHOs), and what they represented, was crucial to this process of initial exits, as the women in this sample felt their affiliation with a PHO offered future possibilities and opportunities they otherwise would not have had. In other words, most women anticipated their future lifestyles (including socioeconomic status) would change due to their association with PHOs.

NOTES

1. Some researchers view the term "prostitute" as a pejorative label and consequently advocate for the use of "sex worker," a term that emphasizes their labor (see Barton 2001; Leigh 1997). After some consideration, I decided to use both terms because I feel the type of sex work one does can result in vastly different experiences. So to solely use the umbrella term "sex worker" obfuscates the particular experiences of street prostitutes that appear to be unique from the experiences of other types of sex workers (e.g., escorts, strippers, phone sex workers, etc.). In using the term "prostitute" I do not intend to endorse the ideology that the prostitutes are only victims (or criminals) or to de-emphasize the labor involved in their jobs. Instead, I use it to provide clarity for the

reader. I want to allow the women's own stories to represent them and the circumstances that are salient in their lives.

2. I use this as an overarching term, labeling all organizations that specially provide services for women in prostitution "prostitution-helping organizations."
3. It is likely there are more than thirty-three of these organizations within the United States, but due to their lack of visibility, it is often difficult to locate them.
4. I did not find tenure in the trade, and the associated "toll" (Barton 2006), to impact initial exits from prostitution. The only time I found it relevant was when it provoked and was tied to particular reasons for leaving, as in the case of exhaustion and perceptions of being too old.
5. The follow-up studies consisted of a combination of methods, including visits with the individual, phone calls, word of mouth, and searching criminal record databases for rearrests on prostitution charges.

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29. Connections: Deviant Career and Life-Course Criminology using Street Prostitution

Emily Bonistall & Kevin Ralston

Introduction

In a September 2012 article from *The Daytona Beach News-Journal* titled "An ex-prostitute's story: 'I've done it all for money,'" "Betty" talks about her involvement in prostitution and how she decided it was time to leave "the life." Her story, like many women prostitutes, is complicated. Betty grew up "a chronic runaway who wanted to bolt from the horrible existence she endured in her childhood home in Minneapolis – she said she was raped regularly by her father from the age of 9 until she was 12 – Betty went from one foster home and juvenile detention center to the next" (Longa, 2012). Betty entered the world of prostitution because she had few other options. "When I was 14 they (my family) stopped looking for me," Betty said. "I started sleeping outside. One day I was sitting on a bus bench and I met a guy … He took me to a house that had other women in it … They taught me how to become a prostitute. I became part of their stable." This teaching "included bringing men into the house so Betty could have sex. Once she had the experience, Betty said she was put out to work on the streets of Minneapolis" (Longa, 2012).

Betty was able to leave the situation that pushed her into prostitution, but that did not mean her life turned around. Her prostitution led to a crack addiction. "You have to be high (to be a prostitute,) … You don't want to feel what they're (the johns) doing to you … Crack was my medication … I had to get high in order to have sex with a stranger" (Longa, 2012). Because she was still a teenager on the streets and had no other way to support herself, Betty continued her involvement in prostitution and drugs.

After 34 years of being involved in prostitution, Betty decided she was ready to end her involvement. However, it was not an easy road. "There are no halfway houses or rehabilitation

centers that specialize in helping prostitutes shatter the mindset they operate under – selling their bodies to make a quick buck." Through help from the Daytona Beach Police Department, Betty was able to leave her previous life behind and land a job. "She gets praised at her new job because her work ethic is strong … she earns a regular check, she pays her rent and cares for her pets, things most people might take for granted."

Betty is what we call a street level prostitute. There are multiple types of prostitution, including escort services, street walkers, and brothels or house prostitutes to name a few. In this essay, we will discuss street prostitution, i.e., the same type that Betty engaged in. Street level prostitution is considered both deviant (breaks social norms) and criminal (breaks a law) in many societies.

One way to think about Betty's life story is through labeling theory and the concept of a deviant career. This approach maintains that all social groups have formal and informal rules regarding what behaviors are acceptable. When those rules are broken (intentionally, unintentionally, or even unknowingly), the rule breaker becomes an outsider to the group and their behavior is labeled deviant. Deviance is taken a step further when formal rules, such as laws, are broken. This deems someone not only deviant, but also criminal. Labeling theorists argue that deviance is not an inherent quality that exists over time and across cultures. It is, instead, more a result of how people react to that behavior. While many scholars focus on deviant behavior during specific stages of life, such as adolescence, others choose to study deviant behavior over the course of a person's life.

This chapter begins with an overview of deviant careers, a classic term in the sociology of deviance, and then shifts to a newer way that criminologists have attempted to study criminal behavior over time: life-course criminology. Following this, we explain how the two

approaches might view the same nonconventional behavior, i.e., prostitution, and people like Betty. Our comparison will show that despite their similarities, the deviant career and life-course criminology perspectives each provide a unique way of understanding prostitution that are valuable for research, policy and interventions in society today.

Deviant Careers

One of the most important scholars in the field of deviance is Howard Becker, whose work is included in this section. In his book Outsiders (1963), he defines the concept of the deviant career and explains that as deviant behaviors accumulate, the individual becomes enmeshed in deviance as a way of life, which ultimately leads to a deviant identity. Eventually, the deviant individual finds herself as an outcast of society. This stable pattern of deviant behavior is what he calls the "deviant career" which is influenced by social interactionist concepts, such as labeling, stigma, and self-identity.

Labeling theorists argue that deviance is not an inherent quality within a behavior or a person; instead, it is the product of a process that involves responses to that behavior. Social groups in power have the ability to create rules that must apply to the rest of society, and when the rules are broken, it constitutes deviance. The deviance, then, is not the act that is committed, but instead is the consequence of the interaction between the person who commits the act and those who respond to it (Becker, 1963). Looking back at Betty and her experience with prostitution, it is not the act of prostitution that makes Betty deviant, but instead how society views prostitution and the stigmatization of those who engage in the activity (Longa, 2012).

Becker (1963) maintained that deviance changed throughout the life-course. The idea of the deviant career is that there is an orderly sequence of deviance which follows identifiable steps. There are steps involved in becoming deviant, or entering into deviance, and there is the

possibility of exit. Becker (1963) explains that one of the most crucial steps of a deviant career is the experience of being caught and labeled as deviant. Labeling theorists argue that being treated in accordance with a deviant label will shape an individual into becoming the person he or she has been labeled to be. The label is applied when an individual commits (or is caught for) the first act of deviance, which is also called primary deviance. Behaviors that occur as a result of the deviant label are called secondary deviance. In essence, these behaviors would not have occurred had the individual not experienced the stigma of the label.

For example, Betty explained that she had to use crack in order to engage in prostitution, so a woman may engage in prostitution and turn to drugs to cope with the experience. Here, prostitution is the primary deviance and drug use is secondary deviance. However, if a woman who is using drugs turns to prostitution to make extra money to support her habit, then drug use is the primary deviance and prostitution is the secondary deviance. Understanding that primary deviance can lead to secondary deviance shows how deviant behaviors accumulate and further enmesh the prostitutes into a deviant way of life.

Since deviance is not an objective fact, it may be that behavior deemed normal in one situation will be rendered deviant in another. If society, either formally through official agents of the state (like the police) or informally through peers and colleagues, react negatively to the primary deviant or criminal behavior, then prostitutes like Betty will be stigmatized. Stigma is the negative treatment of the individual once they have become labeled as deviant. The stigma related to prostitution has many potential consequences, such as the possibility of losing relationships and social status, and potential imprisonment (Koken, 2012). Thus, this stigma is a predominant concern for prostitutes. It is no wonder that Koken (2012) found the prostitutes in her sample managed stigma by remaining “closeted” as sex workers. They actively hid their

involvement in prostitution in order to "protect themselves from the loss of status that can accompany being identified as a member of a stigmatized group" (Koken, 2012: 209). Women involved in prostitution who abuse drugs , such as cocaine or heroin, experience a sort of double stigma (Sallman, 2010). This loss of status can lead to discrimination that denies prostitutes the opportunity to live conventional lives, pushing them to the outskirts of society (Becker, 1963). As outsiders, many prostitutes find it very difficult to end their deviant behavior.

The deviant career framework places much influence on the offender's self-image and self-identity. Being treated in accordance with a deviant label may shape women like Betty into becoming nothing more than the prostitute she is labeled to be. However, Becker (1963) acknowledges that not every individual who is labeled as deviant after committing one deviant act will be pushed to the outskirts of society, continue to commit deviant acts, and have a deviant career.

The attempt at a deviant career exit is about eliminating stigma and repairing one's damaged identity. For those who are unable to leave prostitution and chose to maintain a deviant lifestyle, Becker (1963) argues that the final step in becoming a career deviant is getting involved with a group of similar people. This involvement teaches people like Betty how to rationalize her deviant behavior and how to most easily live a deviant lifestyle. It is this final step that fully transforms her and other prostitutes into *identifying* themselves as deviants. Learning to manage the stigma of a deviant identity, shifting the subcultural attachment, and undergoing the identity transformation are the key aspects of the deviant career.

As outlined above, the concept of the deviant career enables us to think about deviant behavior over the course of Betty's or other prostitutes and deviants' lives. The focus does not lie on the specific deviant behaviors but instead on the societal reaction to those behaviors and

the way those reactions influence the individual's self-identity as a deviant. We can see this approach in Sallmann's (2010) article on women's experiences with stigma related to prostitution and substance use. First, the women she studied talked about being labeled as "hookers" and "whores," which depersonalized and objectified them. This objectification set them up to endure a life of violence by pimps and johns, and due to the stigma they received as a prostitute, they were denied the support and legal response they deserved. Sallmann found "their experiences of violence were minimized, dismissed, and/or normalized by both informal and institutional support systems" (2010: 152).

As we learned above, once individuals are labeled and stigmatized as deviants, they then experience discrimination and are often pushed to the outskirts of society. Sallmann (2010) explains that in addition to violence, the women in her study were also discriminated against by being (1) denied legal protection or representation, (2) blamed for their experiences of sexual violence, and (3) discriminated against by various social institutions. Recall Becker's (1963) point that stigma and labeling would alter the deviant individual's self-identity. Sallmann (2010) found the immense amount of stigma the women endured permanently altered their self-perceptions and "although the majority of participants were no longer using substances or exchanging sex, some still defined themselves by their prior activities" (Sallmann, 2010: 153).

Other deviant career concepts that can be illuminated using the example of prostitution include primary and secondary deviance. Some scholars find that the primary deviance is prostitution which leads to other forms of secondary deviance such as drug use (James, 1976). Others find that the primary deviance is drug use which leads to the secondary deviance of prostitution (Goldstein, 1979). But as we have clearly indicated, regardless of the reason a woman enters prostitution, the behavior is deviant, labeled as such, and stigmatized. Just as

Becker (1963) explained that stigma forces deviants to be "outsiders" of society, Oselin (2010) explains that "in the United States, street prostitutes are typically thought of as deviants and criminals who therefore occupy a low-status position" (528). Their "visibility, involvement with the criminal justice system, and because they work in a trade that violates culturally prevalent mores and norms" brings an immense amount of stigma and labeling onto women prostitutes (Oselin, 2010: 530).

As you have read, since many prostitutes also engage in other forms of secondary deviance, such as drug use, they encounter additional stigma. Due to this low-status position and its associated stigma, there is a lack of resources available to help them leave the trade even when they desire to do so. Many scholars discuss the difficulty of exiting deviant roles (Snow and Anderson, 1993) and leaving the deviant career of prostitution is no less difficult. Oselin's (2010) study gives many internal and external factors that are necessary for successful exit from prostitution.

The many deviant career concepts introduced thus far in this chapter have been illuminated using the example of prostitution behavior, such as deviance, labeling, stigma, self-identity and career exit. The following section outlines the way the field of criminology studies criminal behavior over the course of an individual's life. As you read it, challenge yourself to identify the differences between the two approaches to studying behavior over time.

Life-Course Perspective in Criminology

Until recently, criminology has ignored examining crime over the lifecourse and has instead focused on specific points in time. Moreover, they have been especially concerned with what causes individuals to either commit or not commit crime at certain ages. However, recent studies have attempted to remedy this limited focus by implementing a life-course framework

that provides a more complete picture of criminal behavior. This shift has enabled criminologists to illuminate how earlier life events (such as childhood victimization, runaway behavior, or drug and alcohol use) influence a woman's decision to engage and persist in prostitution behavior.

The life-course perspective focuses on the relationship between age and crime by studying longitudinally "childhood antisocial behavior, adolescent delinquency, and adult crime" (Sampson and Laub, 1992: 63). The life-course perspective incorporates these different areas of research into one, along with a focus on how age and crime are related to each other. One thing that makes the life-course perspective different from other criminological theories is that instead of being a theory, it is a perspective. This means that instead of having a specific method or way of thinking about crime attached, the life-course model permits any theory to be used.

Sampson and Laub (1992), whose work is included in this book, were early pioneers of the life-course perspective. Their paper in this section, emphasizes the need for criminology to incorporate not only specific aspects of crime, including why someone begins engaging in crime and what happens after they become an adult, but how those factors are connected together. The life-course approach "brings the formative period of childhood back into the picture yet recognizes that individuals can change through interaction with key social institutions as they age" (Sampson and Laub, 1992:81).

The life-course perspective examines the onset of criminal behavior, the paths taken after the onset of criminal behavior (called trajectories), factors that lead to different trajectories, and what leads to ending criminal behavior (called desistance). Through these different aspects (which are discussed in more detail below), criminologists are now able to examine criminal behavior over a longer period of time compared to criminological theories of the past, which

focused on specific points in time. On-set refers to the first criminal act in which an individual engages. Traditional models illustrating the connection between age and criminal behavior stress that this behavior occurs at an early age (Moffitt, 1993). The type of on-set behavior is influenced by a number of factors, including peers, social bonds, and internal ideas about crime. Once an individual commits a criminal act, some of the same factors that determine on-set will also determine what type of path the individual will take. Other factors, including whether they are caught or not, are also influential. For Betty, her onset was prostitution and because of her social setting, she continued to engage in prostitution and perform other deviant acts, such as drug use (Longa, 2012).

Once an on-set of criminal behavior happens, individuals follow a pathway of criminal behavior through their life. There are multiple pathways an individual can follow. Research shows that many people follow a trajectory of that begins at a young age, with increased criminal behavior during their teen and early adult years before reducing their criminal behavior and ultimately terminating it completely (Moffitt, 1993). Betty's experience follows this trajectory, where she began prostitution and drug use at age 14 and continued this criminal behavior until she was an adult (Longa, 2012). Since individual's trajectories are influenced by their social context and life events, not everyone will follow the same trajectory as Betty.

The events that occur during the prostitute's lifetime that help determine the type and frequency of criminal behavior are called transitions and turning points. Transitions in criminal behavior typically occur during a period of time during an individual's life characterized by increasing criminal behavior, which for most people occurs during adolescence and into early adulthood. While there are ebbs and flows during this part of a trajectory, criminal behavior continues to increase overall. Life events, or transitions, can either lead individuals further into

criminal behavior, such as getting involved in prostitution, or can lead them away from criminal behavior, such as having a child or becoming gainfully employed. When an event leads to a reduction in criminal behavior as a whole over the remainder of an individual's life, a turning point has been achieved, thus a turning point is when a transition changes the individual's pathway of criminal behavior.

When the turning point leads to the total reduction of criminal behavior, desistance from crime has occurred. For most people, this occurs in their early to mid-twenties after a turning point during late adolescence/early adulthood (Moffitt, 1993). However, depending on when the turning point occurs for an individual, desistance from criminal behavior varies. One such example is re-entry, or the re-entering into society after being imprisoned. During this period of time, an individual re-integrates into society and must end their criminal behaviors in order to lead a conventional life. However, this transition is not always successful and sometimes individuals recidivate, or continue to commit criminal behavior. Therefore it is worth noting that just because a turning point has occurred and criminal behavior has lessoned, it is not a guarantee that criminal behavior will not occur again. While the degree of continued criminal behavior varies from individual to individual, the period of time after a turning point has occurred is characterized by reduced criminal behavior and eventual desistance from all criminal behavior.

Betty is a great example of transitions, turning points, and desistance. As you may recall, she entered prostitution because she was homeless. Once she was involved in prostitution, she began using crack so she could continue engaging in prostitution. The use of crack and her continued engagement in prostitution is a transition that led to more behavior labeled as criminal. Betty's turning point occurred when she decided she was ready to leave 'the

life.’ During her turning point, she required support from other and because of this support, her turning point led to a desistance in her involvement with prostitution (Longa 2012).

As we have explained, both the deviant career and life-course criminology study behavior over the course of an individual’s life. At this point, you should begin seeing the similarities and differences in the way these two approaches accomplish the same goal. As with all criminal behavior, the life-course approach can be applied to prostitution. Some women’s on-set to prostitution occurs as a way to fund their drug habits (Goldstein, 1979; Potteret et al., 1998), such as Erickson and colleagues’ (2000) study which found that the women in their study engaged in prostitution behavior in order to get money or crack for their drug addictions. Other scholars have found that on-set occurs from a history of sexual abuse (Silbert and Pines, 1982; Dalla, 2003) or from running away from home (Nadon et al., 1998). While the period of time after the on-set of the behavior typically involves occasional and situated prostitution, many women become trapped by basic needs or because of their label as prostitutes from a criminal record. These events create transitions that lead to engaging in more prostitution. At some point, many prostitutes decide to alter their trajectory due to various turning points including eye-opening, traumatic, and positive life events, such as being incarcerated, injured, or becoming pregnant (Mansson & Hedin,1999). Nixon and colleagues (2002) explain that most street prostitutes attempt to leave “the life” after significant or traumatic events, such as getting pregnant, having a child or being arrested. One of their respondents said, “I never want to be in that little jail cell. I never want to be handcuffed again; it was a very intimidating process for me. . . . But that lock-up experience was what did it for me. I was sort of scared straight” (Nixon et al., 2002: 1035).

Regardless of the specific turning point event, the turning point may lead to a change in behavior resulting in desistance. Oselin (2010) discusses the difficulty women experience in leaving the trade, and many prostitutes indicate the need for social support, both from their family networks and support services. Some of the services that lead to success for prostitutes who want to leave the trade include housing, transportation, employment, education, prostitution-helping organizations, like those discussed in the Oselin reading, especially when re-entry from incarceration is their turning point. Even still, prostitutes need certain health and support services in order to ensure their turning point and desistance from prostitution leads to the end of their criminal trajectory and not simply a transition back into more prostitution behavior. Instead of simply providing a snapshot of a particular point of criminal behavior, the life-course perspective allows for a more complete picture of what women might experience during their entire trajectory in prostitution and other criminal behavior.

Contrasting the Deviant Career and Life-Course Criminology

The above text indicates that the deviant career and life-course criminology approaches to studying prostitution use different terms but share similar ideas. For example, when discussing the first deviant/criminal act, the deviant career calls it "primary deviance", and life-course calls it "on-set." When discussing deviance/crime over time, the deviant career calls it the "career" and life-course calls it "trajectory." A final similarity is how cessation of deviance/crime is referred to by the deviant career as "role exit" and by life-course as "desistance." Despite these similarities in conceptualizing the various stages of deviant and criminal behavior, like prostitution, there are at least four major differences between the two approaches that demand our attention: reason for change, agency or the ability to act on one's own, successful exit, and methodology.

Reason for Change

Both the deviant career and life-course criminology approaches look at how an individual's nonconventional behavior changes over the course of their life, but they differ in explaining the causes of it. The deviant career theorizes that an individual's deviance continues or ceases because of a shift in their identity. It is the process of being forced to the outskirts of society, becoming enmeshed in a deviant subculture, and learning to live with the stigma associated with their deviant behavior that shifts the individual's self-identity to one of a deviant. Remember how the women in Sallmann's (2010) study internalized the prostitution-related stigma so much so that it caused a permanent shift in self-perception. Similarly, for the individual to successfully exit their deviant career, they must reject the deviant self-identity and attempt to live without stigma. In either situation, the focus is on the process and the importance of a shifted identity. Thus, the focus of change for the deviant career approach is Betty's and other prostitutes' self-identities.

Life-course criminology focuses on the outside factors that influence the individual's trajectory, as Nixon and colleagues (2002) described with the turning points leading women to exit street prostitution. The various turning points an individual encounters will change the path they are on, either leading them further into a life of crime or toward desistance from it. Therefore in life-course criminology, the emphasis is not on process or identity, but instead on life events and outside factors. This is a more externally-based focus than the deviant career paradigm and it would purport that getting prostitutes like Betty to cease deviant behavior takes involvement by community agencies as well as various practitioners, family and friends.

Agency

A second and related difference between the two approaches is the level of agency afforded the individual. Agency (an individual's ability to act freely and make their own choices), is often discussed in relation to how the social world influences the choices and opportunities an individual has. Sociologists and criminologists debate how much free will, or agency, an individual has due to the constraints of society. The deviant career approach gives individuals more agency because he or she must learn to accept or reject their deviant label, as they did in Sallmann's (2010) study. They must also learn to live with the stigma, adapt and change their lifestyle and eventually alter their self-identity. Since life-course criminology exerts that external events, or turning points change the criminal trajectory, there is much less agency given to the individual. Self-determination still plays a role, however, it is more reactive. Recall the woman in Nixon and colleagues' (2002) article who was "scared straight" from her arrest. Thus, instead of the individual taking an active role as they do when using a deviant career framework, the life-course criminological approach places more influence on external actors and events than on the individual's agency.

Successful Exit

Both the deviant career and life-course criminology approaches address returning to conventional behavior: in the deviant career it is career exit and in life-course criminology it is desistance. The major difference is in how each conceptualizes and measures successful return to conventional norms. With deviant careers, an individual has successfully exited a deviant role when they are able to manage their stigma and spoiled identity. Sallmann's (2010) research found that many of the women were afraid that their spoiled identity of their past would be called to attention so even women who were no longer engaging in prostitution behaviors still had to

manage their prostitution-related stigma. In life-course criminology, an individual has successfully desisted when they do not recidivate criminal behavior. Hence, the difference is in how each approach defines success: identity for the deviant career versus behavior for life-course criminology.

Methodology

The golden rule of research methods is to let the research question determine how to study the phenomenon in question. As such, the three aforementioned differences between the deviant career and life-course criminology favor unique methodologies. The deviant career lends itself to qualitative methods due to its focus on process and concepts such as identity. Studies that utilize a deviant career approach, such as Sallmann's (2010), utilize qualitative methods in order to uncover the intricacies of process, change, identity, and the respondent's feelings. Sallmann's methods included interviews where she asked the respondents to expand on their ideas or thoughts by prompting them with phrases such as: ''Tell me more about that,'' ''Can you give me an example?'' or ''What was that like for you?'' (2010: 149). The interview data was then analyzed by identifying themes that emerged from the women's narratives.

Life-course criminology lends itself to quantitative methods because of its focus on measurable events and behaviors. This, however, does not mean that qualitative methods are not ever used. On the contrary, Nixon and colleagues' (2002) and other studies that utilize a life-course perspective include interviews in their analysis. The major difference often lies within analysis, such as in Maxwell & Maxwell's (2000) article on the criminal careers of prostitutes. Whereas Sallmann used interview data to identify themes, Maxwell and Maxwell transformed their interview data into scales and scores which were analyzed statistically.

Conclusion

Using the example of the study of prostitution, the similarities between the deviant career and life-course criminology are clear. Generally, both approaches aim to study nonconventional behavior over the course of an individual's life. More specifically, there are similarities between the various concepts: primary deviance and on-set, deviant career and criminal trajectory, role exit and desistance. This begs the question, when there are so many similarities between the two, why has life-course criminology continued to thrive while the deviant career concept has not? It is because despite these similarities, each approach provides a unique way of understanding nonconventional behaviors via the explanation for change, agentic power, measure of successful exit, and methodology.

Some scholars call for the rejuvenation of the concept of deviant careers by using quantitative methods; others call for life-course criminology to tie itself to the deviant career by utilizing qualitative methods. However, we argue that the two are inherently different in their approaches, their methodologies, and the research they produce. The popularity of life-course criminology is indicative of the continued importance of studying nonconventional behavior over the course of the life, but revisiting this topic via the deviant career lens or utilizing *both* approaches adds to what can be discovered using a life-course criminology lens. Therefore, it is important that scholars continue to use both methods. This chapter has illuminated what each perspective can add to the study of prostitution over the course of an individual's life. Both deviant careers and life-course criminology add to the study of prostitution in different ways and therefore both should be considered valuable tools for understanding nonconventional behavior over time. Revitalizing a deviant career approach will not only rejuvenate the field of Deviance, but it will also add to the extant criminological literature of the importance of process, identity,

agency, and qualitative methodology, when studying nonconventional behavior over the course of the life.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. How do scholars who study the deviant career examine the same issue differently than scholars who study life-course criminology? How are they the same? Why is this important?

2. If you were to study street prostitution, which approach would you choose? Why would you choose that approach and what do you think you would find?

3. What other deviant or criminal behaviors could you study using a life-course or deviant careers approach? Are there any behaviors you do not think would be applicable?

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Section 8- Moral Panics and Risk Society

Introduction.

Tammy L. Anderson

Section 8 reviews the classic term moral panic and the more modern idea of risk society in readings by Cohen, Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Ungar and Kavanaugh and Maratea. Both moral panics and risk society are focused on how we come to know and care about certain types of social threats (i.e., problematic or deviant behaviors, events, conditions). The term moral panic is a classic in deviance studies. It is widely referenced in academic research and society today. When we pair it against the more modern idea of risk society, we may gain a greater understanding of how social anxieties emanate and take control of our lives in the short or long-term. Connecting the two concepts also forces us to consider which social threats might trouble us more and why: (1) those featuring moral wrongdoings or (2) those originating in nature or from human innovations that appear morally neutral (i.e., "amoral").

Moral Panic. The reading by Cohen (1980) in this section defines the classic deviance idea of "moral panic" as an intense media-based reaction to a pressing issue in society that is believed to threaten society. Moral panics usually focus on behaviors or conditions among people and define deviance as moral issues that demand our attention. Cohen (1980) identified two opposing parties involved in them. The first group are "moral entrepreneurs," who create such panics, using media outlets, when they fear society or its values and traditions were being compromised. Blinded by their ideology, they lead moral campaigns to get others to agree with their cause and justify certain responses to perceived threats. Moral entrepreneurs targeted a second very important group: folk devils. Folk devils were those believed (e.g., deviants) to be

responsible for the problem at hand. From Cohen (1980) we learn that various youth cultural groups—like the Mods and Rockers - have been cast as folk devils by the mass media, police, public officials, etc. for engaging in delinquent acts or "mob violence" believed to threaten British society.

Since we are constantly bombarded with messages about social doom, how do we know when a threat is real or an overblown moral panic? The reading by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) attempts to answer this question by describing five criteria of moral panics. First is a sense of concern about a phenomena, behavior, or condition. A second criteria is hostility about those (e.g., folk devils) who are involved or believed to be responsible for it. Next is a shared agreement or consensus in society about the concern and hostility. A fourth component is that the fear or concern about the problem is much greater that the actual threat. Finally, moral panics erupt and spread quickly.

Risk Society. Since Cohen's classic work, the usefulness of the moral panic concept has been challenged. The Ungar (2001) reading in this section introduces us what may be a better way to understand social threats in society. The term "risk society" focuses on events, conditions and phenomena that are unpredictable, unlimited in scope, and not detectable by our physical senses. They have complex causes attributable to human decision-making. Modern societies, Ungar (2001) notes, are exposed to high consequence and technological risks such as pollution, pandemics, crime and terrorism. Such risks are possible, but quite improbable. Yet, concern about them preoccupies us. In fact, our daily lives are often organized around the constant threat of such risks and catastrophes. Societies must, therefore, rely on credentialed experts to alert us to the presence of, and management strategies for these risks.

Connections Essay. So what are the differences between the moral panic and risk society ideas and how and why do they matter? The Kavanaugh and Maratea reading in this section answers this question with two modern day examples: the methamphetamine epidemic and viral pandemics (bird flu). Methamphetamine is a highly addictive illicit drug. It is a central nervous system stimulant that is typically swallowed, snorted, injected or smoked. The 2011 NSDUH (see the report at http://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/methamphetamine) reported that 4.6 percent of Americans had used methamphetamine in their lifetimes. Researchers (Nicosia et al. 2009) at Rand Corporation have estimated that methamphetamine's economic costs approximated about 23.4 billion in 2005. Current levels remain higher than those on which Rand's 2005 reports was based, indicating that today's costs could be much higher. Meth addicts commit a lot of crime to fund their addictions and meth producers engage in ruthless tactics to sell their products (DEA 2011).

Avian flu, more commonly known as bird flu, is a type of influenza attached to birds. It is highly contagious and has been reported around the globe over the course of time (WHO 2013). While human death from past bird and animal flu epidemics have been considerable (WHO 2013), recent scares have produced much less damage. For example, between 2003-2013, the World Health Organization (2013) notes there were 628 reported cases of bird flu worldwide and 374 deaths. Yet, the US government recently announced it has allocated $25 billion to fund medical countermeasures to the disease. The monies were dispersed to major US pharmaceutical and biomedical companies to produce the vaccine (Keller 2012).

Both of these social threats promise to levy heavy costs on the American public, as well as other nations across the globe. What is the role of government and Joe Taxpayer in addressing them? Who is responsible? Does the answer differ between them? If so, why?

The answers to these questions may depend, in part, on whether we view them as social and moral problems or public health risks. This is because a key distinction between the methamphetamine epidemic and bird flu is morality… or is it? People might be supportive of paying higher taxes and having the government combat bird flu because it's difficult to identity a villain to blame for it. Such benevolence may be harder to muster for the meth problem since dealers, users and addicts are behaving in deviant and criminal ways, causing problems for others. In their connections essay, Kavanaugh and Maratea argue that the moral distinction between methamphetamine addiction (often conceived as a moral panic) and viral pandemics (an example of risk in modern society) is not as clear as you would think. They state:

> The case studies that we have presented teach us that amoral risk and moral values are essential, interconnected parts of contemporary campaigns about deviance and broader social scares. Each, in a manner of speaking, breathes life into the other: the presence of risk produces the need to make moral judgments and individual or collective morality allows us to understand (or define) risk.

As you read the essays by Cohen, Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Ungar and Kavanaugh and Maratea, you will learn how to recognize moral panics and social risks and their potential influence on our daily lives. Use your critical thinking skills to evaluate which social threats are more troubling and why. While we predict morality will play a role in your determinations, we also expect it will be challenging for you to spot it in the many social anxieties that crop up now and in the future.

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Reading 30

Deviance and Moral Panics

Stanley Cohen

Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. (A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests) its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself.

One of the most recurrent types of moral panic in Britain since the war has been associated with the emergence of various forms of youth culture (originally almost exclusively working class, but often recently middle class or student based) whose behaviour is deviant or delinquent. To a greater or lesser degree, these cultures have been associated with violence. The Teddy Boys, the Mods and Rockers, the Hells Angels, the Skiheadas and the Hippies have all been phenomena of this kind. There have been parallel reactions to the drug problem, student militancy, political demonstrations, football hooliganism, vandalism of various kinds and crime and violence in general. But groups such as the Teddy Boys and the Mods and Rockers have been distinctive in being identified not just in terms of particular events (such as

demonstrations) or particular disapproved forms of behaviour (such as drug-taking or violence) but as distinguishable social types. In the gallery of types that society erects to show its members which roles should be avoided and which should be emulated, these groups have occupied a constant position as folk devils: visible reminders of what we should not be. The identities of such social types are public property and these particular adolescent groups have symbolized – both in what they were and how they were reacted to – much of the social change which has taken place in Britain over the last twenty years.

In this book, I want to use a detailed case study of the Mods and Rockers phenomenon – which covered most of the 1960s – to illustrate some of the more intrinsic features in the emergence of such collective episodes of juvenile deviance and the moral panics they both generate and rely upon for their growth. The Mods and Rockers are one of the many sets of figures through which the sixties in Britain will be remembered. A decade is not just a chronological span but a period measured by its association with particular fads, fashions, crazes, styles or – in a less ephemeral way – a certain spirit or *kulturgeist.* A term such as 'the twenties' is enough to evoke the cultural shape of that period, and although we are too close to the sixties for such explicit understandings to emerge already, this is not for want of trying from our instant cultural historians. In the cultural snap albums of the decade which have already been collected[1] the Mods and Rockers stand alongside the Profumo affair, the Great Train Robbery, the Krays, the Richardsons, the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, the Bishop of Woolwich, *Private Eye*, David Frost, Carnaby Street, The Moors murders, the emergence of Powellism, the Rhodesian affair, as the types and scenes of the sixties.

(At the beginning of the decade, the term 'Modernist' referred simply to a style of dress, the term 'Rocker' was hardly known outside the small groups which identified themselves this way.) Five years later, a newspaper editor was to refer to the Mods and Rockers incidents as 'without parallel in English history' and troop reinforcements were rumoured to have been

sent to quell possible widespread disturbances. Now, another five years later, these groups have all but disappeared from the public consciousness, remaining only in collective memory as folk devils of the past, to whom current horrors can be compared. (The rise and fall of the Mods and Rockers contained all the elements from which one might generalize about folk devils and moral panics. And unlike the previous decade which had only produced the Teddy Boys, these years witnessed rapid oscillation from one such devil to another: the Mod, the Rocker, the Greaser, the student militant, the drug fiend, the vandal, the soccer hooligan, the hippy, the skinhead.)

Neither moral panics nor social types have received much systematic attention in sociology. In the case of moral panics, the two most relevant frameworks come from the sociology of law and social problems and the sociology of collective behaviour. Sociologists such as Becker[2] and Gusfield[3] have taken the cases of the Marijuana Tax Act and the Prohibition laws respectively to show how public concern about a particular condition is generated, a 'symbolic crusade' mounted, which with publicity and the actions of certain interest groups, results in what Becker calls *moral enterprise:* '. . . the creation of a new fragment of the moral constitution of society.'[4] Elsewhere[5] Becker uses the same analysis to deal with the evolution of social problems as a whole. The field of collective behaviour provides another relevant orientation to the study of moral panics. There are detailed accounts of cases of mass hysteria, delusion and panics, and also a body of studies on how societies cope with the sudden threat or disorder caused by physical disasters.

(The study of social types can also be located in the field of collective behaviour, not so much though in such 'extreme' forms as riots or crowds, but in the general orientation to this field by the symbolic interactionists such as Blumer and Turner.[6]) In this line of theory, explicit attention has been paid to social types by Klapp,[7] but although he considers how such types as the hero, the villain and the fool serve as role models for a society, his main concern

seems to be in classifying the various sub-types within these groups (for example, the renegade, the parasite, the corrupter, as villain roles) and listing names of those persons Americans see as exemplifying these roles. He does not consider how such typing occurs in the first place and he is preoccupied with showing his approval for the processes by which social consensus is facilitated by identifying with the hero types and hating the villain types.

[The major contribution to the study of the social typing process itself comes from the interactionist or transactional approach to deviance.] The focus here is on how society labels rule-breakers as belonging to certain deviant groups and how, once the person is thus type cast, his acts are interpreted in terms of the status to which he has been assigned. It is to this body of theory that we must turn for our major orientation to the study of both moral panics and social types.

The Transactional Approach to Deviance

The sociological study of crime, delinquency, drug-taking, mental illness and other forms of socially deviant or problematic behaviour has, in the last decade, undergone a radical reorientation. This reorientation is part of what might be called the *sceptical* revolution in criminology and the sociology of deviance.[8] The older tradition was *canonical* in the sense that it saw the concepts it worked with as authoritative, standard, accepted, given and unquestionable. The new tradition is sceptical in the sense that when it sees terms like ‘deviant’, it asks ‘deviant to whom?’ or ‘deviant from what?’; when told that something is a social problem, it asks ‘problematic to whom?’; when certain conditions or behaviour are described as dysfunctional, embarrassing, threatening or dangerous, it asks ‘says who?’ and ‘why?’. In other words, these concepts and descriptions are not assumed to have a taken-for-granted status.

The empirical existence of forms of behaviour labelled as deviant and the fact that persons might consciously and intentionally decide to be deviant, should not lead us to assume that deviance is the intrinsic property of an act nor a quality possessed by an actor. Becker's formulation on the transactional nature of deviance has now been quoted verbatim so often that it has virtually acquired its own canonical status:

> . . . deviance is created by society. I do not mean this in the way that it is ordinarily understood, in which the causes of deviance are located in the social situation of the deviant or in 'social factors' which prompt his action. I mean, rather, that *social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance* and by applying those rules to particular persons and labelling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is *not* a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an 'offender'. The deviant is one to whom the label has successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label.[9]

What this means is that the student of deviance must question and not take for granted the labelling by society or certain powerful groups in society of certain behaviour as deviant or problematic. The transactionalists' importance has been not simply to restate the sociological truism that the judgement of deviance is ultimately one that is relative to a particular group, but in trying to spell out the implication of this for research and theory. They have suggested that in addition to the stock set of *behavioural* questions which the public asks about deviance and which the researcher obligingly tries to answer (why did they do it? what sort of people are they? how do we stop them doing it again?) there are at least three *definitional* questions: why does a particular rule, the infraction of which constitutes deviance, exist at all? What are the processes and procedures involved in identifying someone as a deviant and

applying the rule to him? What are the effects and consequences of this application, both for society and the individual?

Sceptical theorists have been misinterpreted as going only so far as putting these definitional questions and moreover as implying that the behavioural questions are unimportant. While it is true that they have pointed to the dead ends which the behavioural questions have reached (do we really know what distinguishes a deviant from a non-deviant?) what they say has positive implications for studying these questions as well. Thus, they see deviance in terms of a process of becoming – movements of doubt, commitment, sidetracking, guilt – rather than the possession of fixed traits and characteristics. This is true even for those forms of deviance usually seen to be most 'locked in' the person: 'No one,' as Laing says, 'has schizophrenia like having a cold.'[10] The meaning and interpretation which the deviant gives to his own acts are seen as crucial and so is the fact that these actions are often similar to socially approved forms of behaviour.[11]

The transactional perspective does not imply that innocent persons are arbitrarily selected to play deviant roles or that harmless conditions are wilfully inflated into social problems. Nor does it imply that a person labelled as deviant has to accept this identity: being caught and publicly labelled is just one crucial contingency which *may* stabilize a deviant career and sustain it over time. Much of the work of these writers has been concerned with the problematic nature of societal response to deviance and the way such responses affect the behaviour. This may be studied at a face-to-face level (for example, what effect does it have on a pupil to be told by his teacher that he is a 'yob who should never be at a decent school like this'?) or at a broader societal level (for example, how is the 'drug problem' actually created and shaped by particular social and legal policies?).

The most unequivocal attempt to understand the nature and effect of the societal reaction to deviance is to be found in the writings of Lemert.[12] He makes an important distinction, for

example, between primary and secondary deviation. Primary deviation – which may arise from a variety of causes – refers to behaviour which, although it may be troublesome to the individual, does not produce symbolic reorganization at the level of self-conception. Secondary deviation occurs when the individual employs his deviance, or a role based upon it, as a means of defence, attack or adjustment to the problems created by the societal reaction to it. The societal reaction is thus conceived as the 'effective' rather than 'original' cause of deviance: deviance becomes significant when it is subjectively shaped into an active role which becomes the basis for assigning social status. Primary deviation has only marginal implications for social status and self-conception as long as it remains symptomatic, situational, rationalized or in some way 'normalized' as an acceptable and normal variation.

Lemert was very much aware that the transition from primary to secondary deviation was a complicated process. Why the societal reaction occurs and what form it takes are dependent on factors such as the amount and visibility of the deviance, while the effect of the reaction is dependent on numerous contingencies and is itself only one contingency in the development of a deviant career. Thus the link between the reaction and the individual's incorporation of this into his self-identity is by no means inevitable; [the deviant label, in other words, does not always 'take'.] The individual might be able to ignore or rationalize the label or only pretend to comply. This type of face-to-face sequence, though, is just one part of the picture: more important are the symbolic and unintended consequences of social control as a whole. Deviance in a sense emerges and is stabilized as an artefact of social control; because of this, Lemert can state that '. . . older sociology tended to rest heavily upon the idea that deviance leads to social control. I have come to believe that the reverse idea, i.e. social control leads to deviance, is equally tenable and the potentially richer premise for studying deviance in modern society'.[13]

It is partly towards showing the tenability and richness of this premise that this book is

directed. My emphasis though, is more on the logically prior task of analysing the nature of a particular set of reactions rather than demonstrating conclusively what their effects might have been. How were the Mods and Rockers identified, labelled and controlled? What stages or processes did this reaction go through? Why did the reaction take its particular forms? What – to use Lemert's words again – were the 'mythologies, stigma, stereotypes, patterns of exploitation, accommodation, segregation and methods of control (which) spring up and crystallize in the interaction between the deviants and the rest of society'?[14]

There are many strategies – not mutually incompatible – for studying such reactions. One might take a sample of public opinion and survey its attitudes to the particular form of deviance in question. One might record reactions in a face-to-face context, for example, how persons respond to what they see as homosexual advances.[15] One might study the operations and beliefs of particular control agencies such as the police or the courts. Or, drawing on all these sources, one might construct an ethnography and history of reactions to a particular condition or form of behaviour. This is particularly suitable for forms of deviance or problems seen as new, sensational or in some other way particularly threatening. Thus 'crime waves' in seventeenth century Massachusetts,[16] marijuana smoking in America during the 1930s,[17] the Teddy Boy phenomenon in Britain during the 1950s[18] and drug-taking in the Notting Hill area of London during the 1960s[19] have all been studied in this way. These reactions were all associated with some form of moral panic and it is in the tradition of studies such as these that the Mods and Rockers will be considered. Before introducing this particular case, however, I want to justify, concentrating on one especially important carrier and producer of moral panics, namely, the mass media.

Deviance and the Mass Media

A crucial dimension for understanding the reaction to deviance both by the public as a whole and by agents of social control, is the nature of the information that is received about the behaviour in question. Each society possesses a set of ideas about what causes deviation – is it due, say, to sickness or to wilful perversity? – and a set of images of who constitutes the typical deviant – is he an innocent lad being led astray, or is he a psychopathic thug? – and these conceptions shape what is done about the behaviour. In industrial societies, [the body of information from which such ideas are built, is invariably received at second hand. That is, it arrives already processed by the mass media] and this means that the information has been subject to alternative definitions of what constitutes 'news' and how it should be gathered and presented. The information is further structured by the various commercial and political constraints in which newspapers, radio and television operate.

The student of moral enterprise cannot but pay particular attention to the role of the mass media in defining and shaping social problems. The media have long operated as agents of moral indignation in their own right: even if they are not self-consciously engaged in crusading or muck-raking, their very reporting of certain 'facts' can be sufficient to generate concern, anxiety, indignation or panic. [When such feelings coincide with a perception that particular values need to be protected, the preconditions for new rule creation or social problem definition are present.] Of course, the outcome might not be as definite as the actual creation of new rules or the more rigid enforcement of existing ones. What might result is the sort of symbolic process which Gusfield describes in his conception of 'moral passage': there is a change in the public designation of deviance.[20] In his example, the problem drinker changes from 'repentant' to 'enemy' to 'sick'. Something like the opposite might be happening in the public designation of producers and consumers of pornography: they have changed from isolated, pathetic – if not sick – creatures in grubby macks to groups of ruthless exploiters out to undermine the nation's morals.

[Less concretely, the media might leave behind a diffuse feeling of anxiety about the situation] ‘something should be done about it’, ‘where will it end?’ or ‘this sort of thing can’t go on for ever’. Such vague feelings are crucial in laying the ground for further enterprise, and Young has shown how, in the case of drug-taking, the media play on the normative concerns of the public and by thrusting certain moral directives into the universe of discourse, can create social problems suddenly and dramatically.[21] This potential is consciously exploited by those whom Becker calls ‘moral entrepreneurs’ to aid them in their attempt to win public support.

The mass media, in fact, devote a great deal of space to deviance: sensational crimes, scandals, bizarre happenings and strange goings on. The more dramatic confrontations between deviance and control in manhunts, trials and punishments are recurring objects of attention. As Erikson notes, ‘a considerable portion of what we call “news” is devoted to reports about deviant behaviour and its consequences’.[22] This is not just for entertainment or to fulfil some psychological need for either identification or vicarious punishment. Such ‘news’ as Erikson and others have argued, is a main source of information about the normative contours of a society. It informs us about right and wrong, about the boundaries beyond which one should not venture and about the shapes that the devil can assume. The gallery of folk types – heroes and saints, as well as fools, villains and devils – is publicized not just in oral-tradition and face-to-face contact but to much larger audiences and with much greater dramatic resources.

[Much of this study will be devoted to understanding the role of the mass media in creating moral panics and folk devils.] A potentially useful link between these two notions – and one that places central stress on the mass media – is the process of deviation amplification as described by Wilkins.[23] [The key variable in this attempt to understand how the societal reaction may in fact *increase* rather than decrease or keep in check the amount of

deviance, is the nature of the information about deviance.] As I pointed out earlier, this information characteristically is not received at first hand, it tends to be processed in such a form that the action or actors concerned are pictured in a highly stereotypical way. We react to an episode of, say, sexual deviance, drug-taking or violence in terms of our information about that particular class of phenomenon (how typical is it), our tolerance level for that type of behaviour and our direct experience – which in a segregated urban society is often nil. Wilkins describes – in highly mechanistic language derived from cybernetic theory – a typical reaction sequence which might take place at this point, one which has a spiralling or snowballing effect.

An initial act of deviance, or normative diversity (for example, in dress) is defined as being worthy of attention and is responded to punitively. The deviant or group of deviants is segregated or isolated and this operates to alienate them from conventional society. They perceive themselves as more deviant, group themselves with others in a similar position, and this leads to more deviance. This, in turn, exposes the group to further punitive sanctions and other forceful action by the conformists – and the system starts going round again. There is no assumption in this model that amplification *has* to occur: in the same way – as I pointed out earlier – that there is no automatic transition from primary to secondary deviation or to the incorporation of deviant labels. The system or the actor can and does react in quite opposite directions. What one is merely drawing attention to is a set of sequential typifications: under X conditions, A will be followed by A1, A2, etc. All these links have to be explained – as Wilkins does not do – in terms of other generalizations. For example, it is more likely that if the deviant group is vulnerable and its actions highly visible, it will be forced to take on its identities from structurally and ideologically more powerful groups. Such generalizations and an attempt to specify various specialized modes of amplification or alternatives to the process have been spelt out by Young[24] in the case of drug-taking. I intend

using this model here simply as one viable way in which the 'social control leads to deviation' chain can be conceptualized and also because of its particular emphasis upon the 'information about deviance' variable and its dependence on the mass media.

Notes

1. For example, Christopher Booker, The *Neophiliacs: A Study of the Revolution in English Life in the Fifties and Sixties* (London: Collins, 1969); David Bailey and Francis Wyndham, *A Box of Pin-Ups* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1965); Bernard Levin, *The Pendulum Years* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970); and (in a different way) Jeff Nuttall, *Bomb Culture* (London: Paladin, 1970).
2. Howard S. Becker, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* (New York: Free Press, 1963), Chaps 7 and 8.
3. Joseph Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1963).
4. Becker, op. cit. p. 145
5. Howard S. Becker (Ed.), *Social Problems: A Modern Approach* (New York: John Wiley, 1966).
6. See Herbert Blumer, 'Collective Behavior,' in J.B. Gittler (Ed.), *Review of Sociology* (New York: Wiley, 1957); Ralph H. Turner, 'Collective Behaviour,' in R.E.L. Farris (Ed.), *Handbook of Modern Sociology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), and Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, *Collective Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ; Prentice-Hall, 1957).
7. Orrin E. Klapp, *Heroes, Villains and Fools: The Changing American Character* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ; Prentice-Hall, 1962).

8. The skeptical revolution can only be understood as part of a broader reaction in the social sciences as a whole against the dominant models, images and methodology of positivism. It is obviously beyond my scope to deal here with this connection. For an account of the peculiar shape positivism took in the study of crime and deviance and of the possibilities of transcending its paradoxes, the work of David Matza is invaluable: *Delinquency and Drift* (New York: Wiley, 1964) and *Becoming Deviant* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969).
9. Becker, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*, op. cit. p. 9.
10. R.D. Laing, *The Divided Self* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), p. 34-
11. A fuller account of these and other implications of the skeptical position is given in my Introduction and Postscript to Stanley Cohen (Ed.), *Images of Deviance* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971). Some examples of work influenced by this tradition can be found in that volume but more directly in Rubington and Weinberg's excellent collection of interactionist writings: Earl Rubington and Martin S. Weinberg (Eds), *Deviance: The Interactionist Perspective* (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1968).
12. Edwin M. Lemert, *Social Pathology: A Systematic Approach to the Study of Sociopathic Behaviour* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951) and *Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967.)
13. Lemert, *Social Pathology*, op. cit.
14. Ibid. p. 55.
15. See John I. Kitsuse, 'Societal Reaction to Deviant Behaviour: Problems of Theory and Method,' *Social Problems* 9 (Winter 1962), pp. 247-56.
16. Kai T. Erikson, *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance* (New York: John Wiley, 1966).

17. Becker, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*, op. cit. Chaps 7 and 8.
18. Paul Rock and Stanley Cohen, 'The Teddy Boy,' in V. Bogdanor and R. Skidelsky (Eds), *The Age of Affluence: 1951-1964* (London: Macmillan, 1970).
19. Jock Young, 'The Role of the Police as Amplifiers of Deviancy, Negotiators of Reality and Translators of Fantasy: Some Aspects of our Present System of Drug Control as seen in Notting Hill,' in Cohen, op., cit.
20. Joseph Gusfield, 'Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of Deviance,' *Social Problems* 15 (Fall 1967), pp. 175-88.
21. Young, op. cit. and *The Drug Takers: The Social Meaning of Drug-Taking* (London: Paladin, 1971).
22. Erikson, op. cit. p. 12.
23. Leslie T. Wilkins, *Social Deviance: Social Policy, Action and Research* (London: Tavistock, 1964), Chap. 4. I have made a preliminary attempt to apply this model to the Mods and Rockers in 'Mods, Rockers and the Rest: Community Reaction to Juvenile Delinquency,' Howard Journal of Penology and Crime Prevention XII (1967), 00. 121-30.
24. Young (1971) *The Drug Takers*, op. cit.
25. David H. Downes, *The Delinquent Solution: A Study in Subcultural Theory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966) , p. ix.
26. Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behaviour* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962).
27. Ibid. p. 17.
28. Ibid. p. 284.
29. Early journalistic accounts of disasters have given way to more sophisticated methods of data collection and theorization. The body in the USA most responsible for this

development is the Disaster Research Group of the National Academy of Science, National Research Council. The most comprehensive accounts for their findings and other research are to be found in: G.W. Baker and D.W. Chapman, Man and Society in Disaster (New York: Basic Books, 1962) and A.H. Barton, *Social Organisation Under Stress: A Sociological Review of Disaster Studies* (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1963). See also A.H. Barton, *Communities in Disaster* (London: Ward Lock, 1970).

30. Robert K. Merton, Introduction to Barton, *Social Organisation Under Stress*, op. cit. pp. xix-xx
31. C.F. Fritz, 'Disaster,' in R.K. Merton and R.A. Nisbet (Eds), *Contemporary Social Problems* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1963), p. 654.
32. I.H. Cissin and W.B. Clark, 'The Methodological Challenge of Disaster Research,' in Baker and Chapman, op. cit. p. 30.
33. From: Barton, *Social Organization Under Stress* op. cit. pp. 14-15; D.W. Chapman, 'A Brief Introduction to Contemporary Disaster Research,' in Baker and Chapman, op. cit. pp. 7-22; J. G. Miller, 'A Theoretical Review of Individual and Group Psychological Reaction to Stress,' in G.H. Grosser er al. (Eds), *The Threat of Impending Disaster: Contributions to the Psychology of Stress* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1964), pp. 24-32.

Reading 31

Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social Construction

Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda

INTRODUCTION

On the continent of Europe, roughly between 1400 and 1650, hundreds of thousands of people—perhaps as many as half a million, up to 85% of whom were women—were judged to have "consorted with the devil" and were put to death. Much of Europe, especially France, Switzerland, and Germany, was in turmoil with suspicion, accusations, trials, and the punishment of supposed evildoers. A kind of fever—a craze or panic—concerning witchcraft and accusations of witchcraft swept over the land. Once an accusation was made, there was little the accused could do to protect herself. Children, women, and "entire families were sent to the stake.... Entire villages were exterminated.... Germany was covered with stakes, where witches were burning alive." Said one inquisitor, "I wish [the witches] had but one body, so that we could bum them all at once, in one fire!" (Ben-Yehuda 1985:36, 37).

In 1893, a charismatic religious mystic led a group of faithful followers into a remote mountain valley in the Brazilian state of Bahia and founded the community of Canudos; within two years, the settlement became the second largest city in the state. Canudos was a millenial cult whose adherents believed that the existing order would be overturned with the dawning of a new day. Landowners, the Catholic Church, and political elites resolved to crush the movement. Three military assaults against the settlement were repulsed by tenacious defenders. Finally, in October, 1897, Canudos was encircled by 8000 troops, serving under three generals and Brazil's Minister of War, and was bombarded into submission by heavy artillery. Thousands were killed; the survivors numbered only in the

hundreds. Soldiers smashed the skulls of children against trees; the wounded were drawn and quartered, hacked to pieces limb by limb. All 5000 houses in the settlement were "smashed, leveled and burned.." The army eradicated the remaining traces of the holy city as if it had housed the devil incarnate" (Levine 1992:190). Throughout the campaign, news of Canudos flooded the Brazilian press; a sense of "public panic" was created. Accounts appeared daily, "almost always on the front page." More than a dozen major newspapers sent war correspondents to the front and "ran daily columns reporting events." "Something about Canudos provoked anxiety, which would be soothed only by evidence that Canudos had been destroyed" (Levine 1992:24).

These historical episodes represent explosions of fear and concern at a particular time and place about a specific perceived threat. In each case, a specific agent was widely felt to be responsible for the threat; in each case, a sober assessment of the evidence concerning the nature of the supposed threat forces the observer to the conclusion that the fear and concern were, in all likelihood, exaggerated or misplaced. Sociologists refer to such episodes as moral panics. They arise as a consequence of specific social forces and dynamics. They arise because, as with all sociological phenomena, threats are culturally and politically constructed, a product of the human imagination.

The Moral Panics Concept

While certain institutions and behaviors may exist before they are conceptualized and named, these processes permit them to be observed and analyzed. Seemingly irrational mass behavior was certainly noticed in the collective behavior literature as far back as Charles Mackay and Gustave LeBon, but the concept of moral panics as an analytically distinct rather than analogous social form made its appearance only in the 1960s.

On a cold, wet Easter Sunday, 1964, in Clacton, a seaside resort community on England's southern coast, what would normally be regarded as a minor disturbance among young people broke out on the street. Several scuffles and brief rock-throwing incidents took place; motorbikes and motorscooters roared up and down the street; some windows in a dance hall were smashed; several beach huts were damaged; a starter's pistol was fired in the air. The police, unaccustomed to such rowdiness, arrested nearly 100 youths on charges ranging from "abusive behavior" to resisting arrest.

While not exactly raw material for a major story on youth violence, the seaside disturbances nonetheless touched off what can only be described as an orgy of sensationalism in the British media. On Monday, the day following these events, every national newspaper (with the exception of the staid *London Times)* ran a lead story on the Clacton disturbances. "Day of Terror by Scooter Groups," screamed the Daily Telegraph; "Youngsters Beat Up Town" claimed the Daily Express; the Daily Mirror chimed in, "Wild Ones Invade Seaside." On Tuesday, press coverage was much the same. Editorials on the subject of youth violence began to appear. The Home Secretary was urged to take firm action to deal with the problem. Articles began to appear featuring interviews with Mods and Rockers, the two youth factions current in Britain at the time, who were involved in the scuffles and the vandalism. Theories were articulated in the media, attempting to explain what was referred to as mob violence. Accounts of police and court actions were reported; local residents were interviewed concerning the subject, their views widely publicized. The story was deemed so important that much of the press around the world covered the incidents. Youth fights and vandalism at resorts continued to be a major theme in the British press for some three years. Each time a disturbance broke out, the same exaggerated, sensationalistic stories were repeated.

The over-heated reaction of the police, the media, the public, politicians, and, in time, action groups and proto-social movement organizations, caught the attention of Stanley

Cohen. To Cohen, the major issue was the "fundamentally inappropriate" reaction by key social actors in key sectors of the society to relatively minor events. The press, especially, had created a horror story practically out of whole cloth. The seriousness of events were exaggerated and distorted—in terms of the number of young people involved, the nature of the violence committed, the amount of damage inflicted, and their impact on the community and the society as a whole. Obviously false stories were repeated as true; unconfirmed rumors were taken as fresh evidence of further atrocities. Once the atrocities were believed to have taken place, a process of sensitization was set in motion, whereby extremely minor disturbances became the focus of press and police attention, captured in the headline at the time: "Seaside Resorts Prepare for the Hooligans' Invasion." And often, Cohen argued, the sensitization process generated an escalation in the disturbances; a minor incident became a more substantial one through overzealous enforcement.

Cohen launched the term moral panic to characterize the reactions of the media, the police, the public, politicians, and action groups to the youthful disturbances. Said Cohen, in a moral panic:

> A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or... resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the subject of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Some times the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-

> lasting repurcussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself (Cohen 1972:9).

In a moral panic, the reactions of the media, law enforcement, politicians, action groups, and the general public are out of proportion to the real and present danger a given threat poses to the society. In response to this exaggerated concern, "folk devils" are created, deviant stereotypes identifying the enemy, the source of the threat, selfish, evil wrongdoers who are responsible for the trouble. The fear and heightened concern are exaggerated, that is, are above and beyond what a sober empirical assessment of its concrete danger would sustain. Thus, they are problematic, a phenomenon in need of an explanation; they are caused by certain social and political conditions that must be identified, understood, and explicated.

To Cohen, in a moral panic, sensitization occurs. Sensitization is the process whereby harm, wrongness, or deviance is attributed to the behavior, condition, or phenomenon that is routinely ignored when the same consequences are caused by or attributed to more conventional conditions. The "cue effect" of the condition or behavior is much greater during the moral panic; supposed effects are noticed and linked to the offending agents that, in ordinary times for ordinary behavior, would have disappeared in the routines and hubub of everyday life. In addition, the police "escalate" their law enforcement efforts, "diffuse" them from precinct to precinct, and "innovate" new methods of social control (1972:86-91); they operate under the "widening-the-net" principle (1972:94).

If all social fears and concerns entailed reactions to a specific, clearly identifiable, and appropriate or commensurate threat, the magnitude of which can be objectively assessed and readily agreed-upon, such reactions would require no explanation. On the other hand, if, as Cohen argues, the reaction is out of proportion to the threat, we are led to ask why it arises. Why is there a moral panic over this supposed threat but not that, potentially even more

damaging, one? Why does this cast of characters become incensed by the threat the behavior supposedly poses, but not that cast of characters? Why a moral panic at this time, but not earlier and not later? What role do interests play in the moral panic? What does the moral panic tell us about how society is constituted, how it works, how it changes over time? Cohen's concept introduces the student of society to a wide range of questions and potential explorations.

Moral Panics: *Definition and Criteria*

What characterizes a moral panic? How do we know when a moral panic has taken hold in a society at a specific time? How may we operationalize the concept? The moral panic is defined by at least five crucial elements or criteria.

CONCERN First. as we saw, there must be a heightened level of concern over the behavior (or supposed behavior) of a certain group or category and the consequences that that behavior presumably causes for the rest of the society. As with social problems, this concern is manifested or measureable in concrete ways, through, for example, public opinion polls, media attention, proposed legislation, action groups, or social movement activity.

HOSTILITY Second, there must be an increased level of hostility toward the category of people seen as engaging in the threatening behavior. Members are collectively designated as the enemy of respectable, law-abiding society; their behavior is seen as harmful or threatening to the values, interests, way of life, possibly the very existence, of the society, or a sizeable segment of that society. These deviants are seen as responsible for the threat. A dichotomization between "them" and "us" takes place, and this includes stereotyping—

generating “folk devils” or villains on the one hand, and folk heroes on the other, in this morality play of evil versus good (Cohen 1972:11-12).

CONSENSUS Third, there must be a certain minimal measure of agreement in the society as a whole or in designated segments of the society that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing of group members and their behavior. This sentiment must be fairly widespread, although the proportion of the population who feels this way need not even make up a majority. Differently put: Moral panics come in different sizes—some gripping only certain social categories, groups, or segments, others causing great concern in the majority. Some discussions (for instance, Zatz 1987) do not posit widespread public concern as an essential defining element of the moral panic, while others (Hall et al 1978) make the assumption that public concern is little more than an expression or epiphenomenon of elite interests. It is necessary to remind ourselves, however, that many elite-generated campaigns do not capture the public imagination, and never become wide-spread moral panics—witness the “family values” theme on which Republican candidate George Bush initially based his campaign in the 1992 American presidential race, which had little resonance for most voters. In addition, the general public, or segments of the public, have interests of their own, and often become intensely concerned with threats that elites would prefer be ignored, such as nuclear contamination (Perrow 1984:324-28, Erikson 1990) and satanism (Richardson et al 1991, Jenkins & Meier-Katkin 1992, Victor 1993). Public concern cannot be swept under the rug as an irrelevant criterion. Still, in arguing that a measure of consensus is necessary to define a moral panic, we do not mean to imply that panic seizes everyone, or even a majority of the members of a society at a given time. Even during moral panics, public definitions are fought over, and some of them win out among one or another sector of the society, while others do not.

DISPROPORTIONALITY Fourth, there is the implicit assumption in the use of the term *moral panic* that the concern is out of proportion to the nature of the threat, that it is, in fact, considerably greater than that which a sober empirical evaluation could support; in the moral panic, "objective molehills have been made into subjective mountains" (Jones et al 1989:4). In moral panics, generating and disseminating numbers is important (Best 1990:45–64)—addicts, deaths, dollars, crimes, victims, injuries, illnesses, total cost—and most of the figures cited by moral panic claims makers are wildly exaggerated.

The criterion of disproportionality is not without its critics (Waddington 1986). How do we know that the attention accorded a given issue or phenomenon is disproportional to the concrete or objective threat it poses? Here are four indicators or criteria.

First, if the figures that are cited to measure the scope of the problem are grossly exaggerated, we may say that the criterion of disproportionality has been met (Ben-Yehuda 1986, 1990:97-134, Best 1990:45-64). Second, if the threat that is feared is, by all available evidence, nonexistent, we may say that the criterion of disproportionality has been met (Richardson et al 1991, Jenkins & Meier-Katkin 1992, Victor 1993). Third, if the attention paid to a specific condition is vastly greater than that paid to another, and the threat or damage caused by the first is no greater than, or is less than, the second, the criterion of disproportionality may be said to have been met (Goode 1993:42-57). And fourth, if the attention paid to a given condition at one point in time is vastly greater than that paid to it during a previous or later time without any corresponding increase in objective seriousness, then, once again, the criterion of disproportionality may be said to have been met (Ben-Yehuda 1986, 1990:97–134, Goode 1993:48-53).

VOLATILITY And fifth, moral panics are volatile: They erupt fairly suddenly (although they may lie latent for long periods of time and may reappear from time to time), and, nearly as suddenly, they subside. As we'll see, some moral panics may become routinized or institutionalized, while other moral panics vanish—seemingly—without so much as a trace; the legal, cultural, moral, and social fabric of the society after the panic is essentially no different from the way it was before. But whether it has a long-term impact or not, the degree of fear, hostility, and concern generated during a moral panic tends to be fairly limited temporally; the fever pitch that characterizes a society or segments of it during the course of the moral panic is not sustainable over a long stretch of time.

To describe moral panics as volatile and relatively short-lived does not imply that they do not have structural or historical antecedents. The specific issue that generates a particular moral panic may have done so in the past, perhaps even in the not-so-distant past. In fact, moral panics that are sustained over long periods of time are almost certainly conceptual groupings of a series of more or less discrete, more or less localized, more or less short-term panics. Likewise, describing a given concern as volatile does not mean that moral panics do not, or cannot, leave a cultural and institutional legacy. Indeed, elements of panics may become institutionalized; during panics, organizations and institutions may be established at one point in time that remain in place and help stimulate incipient concerns later on, at the appropriate time.

Conclusions

Can we draw any conclusions about the origins of moral panics aside from the trite, unsatisfying, and almost tautologically true platitude that different theories apply best to different moral panics or different aspects of a given moral panic? Almost certainly some

latent fear or stress must pre-exist in the general public, or segments of the public, for a widespread panic to "take off."

Once again, our argument goes beyond the claim that different models are helpful in explaining different moral panics. It is that the grassroots provides fuel or raw material for a moral panic, while organizational activists' issues of morality provide the content of moral panic, and interests provide the timing (Ben-Yehuda 1986). While the elite engineered model does not seem to work for most moral panics, the grassroots model enables us to see what fears and concerns are made use of, and the interest group model enables us to see how this raw material is mobilized and intensified. By itself, the grassroots model is naive; by itself, the interest group model is cynical and empty. Together, the two help illuminate the moral panic; interest groups coopt and make use of grassroots morality and ideology. No moral panic is complete without an examination of all societal levels, from elites to the grassroots, and the full spectrum from ideology and morality at one end to crass status and material interests at the other.

Epilogue: *Moral Panics. Demise. and Institutionalization*

Although the rise of moral panics has received some attention, their demise has been virtually neglected. The question of the demise of moral panics is linked intimately with the issue of their impact: What impact do moral panics have? Do moral panics promote substantial, long-term social change? Or is their impact much like that of fads, which flare up, are popular for a time, and vanish without a legacy or, seemingly, a trace?

The excitement stirred up during a moral panic is strikingly similar to the charisma possessed by certain leaders. This excitement, like charisma, is volatile and unstable. The feelings that are generated during its period of influence tend to be intense, passionate. But

they do not last. How to ensure that the willingness of individuals gripped by this temporary fervor to follow certain rules or pursue certain enemies continues over time? How to translate the vision stimulated during the moral panic into day-by-day, year-by-year normative and institutional policy? How to continue the aims and goals of moral entrepreneurs, action and interest groups, leaders, and much of the public, in "doing something" about the threat that seems to be posed during the moral panic, after the emotional fervor of that panic has died down? What we are suggesting is that, as with charismatic leaders, some moral panics are, almost unwittingly, particularly successful in routinizing the demands for action that are generated during these relatively brief episodes of collective excitement.

Do moral panics have an impact on the society in which they take place by generating formal organizations and institutions; do they, in other words, leave an institutional legacy in the form of laws, agencies, groups, movements, and so on? If so, what is the nature of that legacy? Do moral panics transform the informal normative structure of a society? If so, what is the nature of that transformation?

Some panics seem to leave relatively little institutional legacy. The furor generated by the Mods and Rockers in England in the 1960s resulted in no long-term institutional legacy; no new laws were passed (although some were proposed), and the two germinal social movement organizations that emerged in its wake quickly evaporated when the excitement died down.

In contrast, other panics result in laws and other legislation, social movement organizations, action groups, lobbies, normative and behavioral transformations, organizations, government agencies, and so on. For example, the periodic drug panics that have washed over American society for a century continue to deposit institutional sediment in their wake. President Richard Nixon's mini-drug panic of the early 1970s hugely expanded the federal drug budget, placed the drug war on a firm institutional footing, and created

several federal agencies empowered to deal with drug abuse in one way or another. The drug panic of the mid- to-late 1980s left a substantial institutional legacy in the form of two packages of federal legislation, passed in 1986 and 1988, a substantially larger federal budget, dozens of private social movement organizations, and public sensitization to the drug issue. In this way, not only are successive moral panics built on earlier ones, but even in quieter, nonpanic periods, the institutional legacy that moral panics leave attempts to regulate the behavior that is deemed harmful, unacceptable, criminal, or deviant. The earliest, nineteenth century, drug panics defined drug abuse as deviant and, eventually, criminal; in this sense, they generated social change. The later drug panics, in contrast, reaffirmed the deviant and criminal status of drug abuse after a period of drift toward normalization, and thus they prevented social change.

Even seemingly inconsequential panics leave behind some sort of legacy; even those that produce no institutional, organizational, or formal legacy are likely to have had some impact in the informal or attitudinal realm. With the eruption of a given moral panic, the battle lines are redrawn, moral universes are reaffirmed, deviants are paraded before upright citizens and denounced, and society's boundaries are solidified. In Durkheimian terms, society's collective conscience has been strengthened. The message of the moral panic is clear: This is behavior we will not tolerate. Even seemingly transitory panics are not "wasted": They draw more or less precise moral boundaries. Panics emphasize the contrast between the condition or behavior that is denounced and the correctness of the behavior or position of the righteous folk engaged in the denunciation. The satanic ritual abuse scare, for example, reaffirms the moral correctness of the fundamentalist Christian way of life. The Mods and Rockers scare of 1964 to 1967 prepared the way for a later (early 1970s) moral panic in Britain over juvenile delinquency, street crime, and mugging (Hall et al 1978). The Canudos massacre reminded

Brazilians that they were citizens of a modern, progressive, industrializing, and culturally unified nation.

In short, panics are not like fads, trivial in nature and inconsequential in their impact. Even those panics that seem to end without institutional impact often leave normative or informal traces that prepare us for later panics or other events. Some, for example, leave cultural residue in the form of folklore (Best 1990:131–50; Turner 1993). A close examination of the impact of panics forces us to take a more long-range view of things, to see panics as long-term social process rather than as separate, discrete, time-bound episodes. Moral panics are a crucial element in the fabric of social change. They are not marginal, exotic, trivial phenomena, but one key by which we can unlock the mysteries of social life.

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Reading 32

Moral Panic versus the Risk Society: The Implications of the Changing Sites of Social Anxiety

Sheldon Ungar

Moral panic has enjoyed a good run in the sociology of deviance, where it acquired a special affinity with youth-related issues. This paper suggests that the sociological domain carved out by moral panic is most fruitfully understood as the study of the sites and conventions of social anxiety and fear. Researchers select particular crises to investigate, and thereby ignore others. But societies change, as do the phenomena associated with outbreaks of public concern or alarm. As new crises accumulate and become more visible, they are likely to find their way on to the research agenda. This paper examines new sites of social anxiety that have emerged alongside moral panics. These are best captured by Beck's (1992) concept of a 'risk society'. The paper, then, compares the elements and conditions of moral panic with those of the *'political potential of catastrophes'* bred in a risk society (Beck 1992: 24; italics in original). The aim of the comparison is threefold: 1. to establish the position of risk society threats alongside more conventional moral panics; 2. to examine the conceptual shifts that accompany the new types of threats; and 3. to outline the changing research agenda, including the identification of gaps characteristic of moral panic research.

THE IDEA OF MORAL PANIC

Consider Cohen's classic definition

> Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or groups of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved (or more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. (Cohen 1972: 9)

Unfortunately, this definition is cited so frequently that readers are apt to skip it! Careful perusal of the text reveals that it allows for but does *not* necessitate most of the presumptions and concepts that have accrued to the study of moral panic. Consider the concept of folk devil, which is typically identified with the evil doings of an individual or group of individuals. Cohen's definition, however, encompasses not only 'person or groups of persons' but also 'condition' and 'episode.' The latter, as in the case of the elite panic over swine flu in the USA, do not readily fall under the folk devil rubric. Similarly, nothing in this text necessitates the idea of disproportionality, although the exaggeration of the threat has been a key concern of moral panic researchers (e.g., Jenkins 1998, 1999) and of social constructionists generally (Ungar 1998a).

Since most of the ostensibly critical elements of moral panic are not stipulated by definition, they apparently low from the (more contingent) procedures and details of Cohen's classic study. In this context, it is probably a sterile exercise to ask what moral panic is 'really about' (cf. Hunt 1997). Instead, the aim here is to open space for the consideration of other social anxieties that do not quite it the moral panic paradigm. Then these new anxieties will be used to reflect on the nature and limits of the moral panic research.

SOCIAL ANXIETY IN THE RISK SOCIETY

Starting from the mid-1980s on in particular, new social anxieties in advanced industrial societies have built up around nuclear, chemical, environmental, biological and medical issues (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a: 131–134; Hanmer 1987; Rothman and Lichter 1988; Ungar 1990, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1995, 1998a, 1998b). Pertinent examples of these anxieties include the threat of nuclear winter, Three Mile Island, breast implants, various forms of reproductive technology and biotechnology, the ozone hole, the 'greenhouse summer of 1988,' the Exxon Valdez, Ebola Zaire, and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). These new risks have steadily gained greater prominence and created their own issue-attention cycles. For example, 1986 brought, just one year after the surprise discovery of the ozone crater, Chernobyl, the Challenger accident, and toxic pollution of the Rhine River following a chemical fire in Basle, Switzerland. Not surprisingly, ecological concerns rose to the top of the public agenda by the late 1980s (Dunlap and Scarce 1991).

Beck (1992, 1995) subsumes these new sites of social anxiety under the concept of a risk society. While risks are an inevitable consequence of industrialization, Beck claims that the 'side effects' produced by late modernization are a new development. As compared to the recent past (and especially prior to the Second World War), these risks have novel impacts that are: 1) very complex in terms of causation; 2) unpredictable and latent; 3) not limited by time, space, or social class (i.e., globalized); 4) not detectable by our physical senses; and 5) are the result of human decisions (cf. Ali 1999). Essentially, the economic gains following from the application of science and technology are increasingly being overshadowed by the unintended production and distribution of 'bads'. These have gone from being unrecognized, to latent, to globalized, as new types of technology and processes of production, new chemicals, drugs and so on, and new scales of activity combine to accentuate the risks.

According to Beck (1992: 24; italics in original), 'In smaller or larger increments – a smog alarm, a toxic spill, etc. – what thus emerges in risk society is the *political potential of catastrophes* . . . Risk society is a *catastrophic society.'* The catastrophic potential of the risk society gives rise to a reflexive orientation, whereby new technologies are subject to increasing scientific scrutiny and public criticism. But despite the greater public involvement and accountability implied by 'reflexive modernization' (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994), side effects remain for the most part unpredictable and incalculable. They are akin to normal accidents, where what has been scientifically ruled out (as either impossible or extremely improbable) predictably occurs (Perrow 1984). With new technologies such as genetic engineering, the scientific procedures for monitoring risks and protecting the public shift from the security of the laboratory to the real world. As society is rendered into a social laboratory, accidents not only come as a surprise but also can provide a crash course in institutional failings.

As this paper is being revised, Canadians are being inundated with news of an E. coli outbreak in Walkerton, Ontario (population = 4,800), that has killed seven people and left 2300 ill.[1] It provides a good example of a risk society accident discussed by Beck. E. coli O157:H7 is thought to be a new pathogen linked not only to water but to 'hamburger disease' (it may be caused by the overuse of antibiotics in animal feed). The first suspected E. coli death was on May 15. The public was warned on May 21. The source of the E. coli contamination in Walkerton remains unknown. As the media, environmental groups and opposing political parties forage for information, a host of incriminating institutional failures have emerged and all parties are seeking to avoid carrying the 'hot potato'.

Significant questions (in simplified form) are as follow: 1. Why did it take so long for town authorities to inform the populace of the risk?; 2. Why didn't the laboratory hired to test drinking water alert medical officials? (the pathogen was detected about five days prior to the

outbreak; apparently there is no legal duty to do so); 3. Did the closing of all Ministry of the Environment water-testing labs and their privatization in 1996 contribute to the problem?; and 4. Did downsizing of the Ministry of the Environment (about a 40 per cent decrease in budget and 30 per cent in staff) contribute to the outbreak?

With a range of additional questions, four inquiries have been established by the police, the coroner's office, the Ministry of the Environment, and an independent public hearing (the Provincial Government initially repudiated the latter, but bowed to public pressures).[2] Several class-action lawsuits have also been launched. There have been numerous reports of bacterial and pesticide contamination in other towns, several of which have been ordered to boil their water. Questions are also being raised about long-term effects, since E. coli O157:H7 can cause permanent kidney damage, especially in children. Walkerton's tourist industry has been devastated (with conflicting claims over who should bear the costs), and there is a pervasive sense in commentary from rural areas that one can never trust the water again.

COEXISTING ANXIETIES?

How will the rise of such risk society issues affect the occurrence and development of moral panics? A difficulty in addressing this question is a lack of agreement about what is happening with moral panics. McRobbie and Thornton (1995) argue that panics are harder to constitute than they once were. Citing the failed effort to construct a moral panic around single mothers in Britain, they suggest that the proliferation of mass media and the attendant capacity of folk devils to fight back (they are 'less marginalized than they once were') have sharply curtailed the potential for moral panics. In contrast, Thompson (1998: 2) refers to the 'increasing rapidity in the succession of moral panics' and 'the all-pervasive quality of panics that distinguish the current era'. These contradictory claims can be seen in practice in North

America. While successful US moral panics have been directed against single mothers and illegal immigrants, efforts to construct panics around these issues engendered strong resistance in Canada (cf. Eastland 1995).

Fear of crime remains high and seems to be immune to data indicating that crime rates have been falling throughout the 1990s. If fear of crime in particular suggests that panics are not about to be displaced by risk society threats, it may be better to speak of a complementary relationship between the two types of anxieties. Thus Hollway and Jefferson (1997: 258) suggest that fear of crime and risk of victimization must be considered in light of Beck's argument that risk is 'pervasive in late modernity'. They argue that

> . . . fear of crime is a particularly apt discourse within the modernist quest for order since the risks it signifies, unlike other late modern risks, are *knowable, decisionable, (actionable),* and potentially *controllable.* In an age of uncertainty, discourses that appear to promise a resolution to ambivalence by producing identifiable victims and blameable villains are likely to figure prominently in the State's ceaseless attempts to impose social order (1997: 265; italics in original).

In other words, fear of crime may be a relatively reassuring site for displacing the more uncertain and uncontrollable anxieties of a risk society.

Jenkins' (1999: 8–9) study of designer drugs locates a substantive realm where there are elements of convergence between the two types of social anxiety. What he calls 'synthetic panics' are linked to new technologies and human ingenuity, scientists cast as Dr. Frankenstein, a loss of control, and the creation of 'forbidden knowledge' – all common elements of risk society issues. The latter has also brought a reflexive orientation whereby victims challenge authorities and fight back. Since McRobbie and Thornton (1995) observe a similar resistance by folk devils in moral panic, it appears that relationships between

authorities and their publics are becoming more open and less manipulative regardless of the type of social anxiety involved.

COMPARING THE OLD AND THE NEW

To compare the two types of social anxiety, this paper draws on analyses of moral panic because it is a more seasoned concept whose antecedence has allowed time for the systematic formulation of criteria. The most systematic (if at times plodding) historical and theoretical account of moral panic is provided by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a, 1994b). They list 'five crucial elements or criteria' of moral panic: 1. Concern; 2. Hostility; 3. Consensus 4. Disproportionality; and 5. Volatility. The ensuing comparison is guided by their five crucial elements, though the organization of the discussion departs from theirs.

The present analysis focuses on the conceptual shifts that accompany emerging risk society threats and the changing research agenda implied by them. Conceptually, moral panic is linked to a social constructionist perspective. The main issues addressed in this research concern the exaggeration of the actual threat and the use of panics to engineer social consensus and control. With risk society accidents being highly unpredictable and uncontrollable, the social constructionist concern with exaggeration is largely undermined as an analytic strategy. The roulette dynamics of risk society accidents are also at variance with the model of social control and folk devils used in moral panic research. Instead of authorities and other institutional actors using social anxieties to impose moral order, they can find themselves as carriers of 'hot potatoes'. Methodologically, the risk society points to an array of new questions and throws into relief some faulty research assumptions and procedures found in moral panic studies.

CONCLUSION

The present analysis uses the developments associated with a risk society to throw into relief some blinkers surrounding the moral panic-deviance nexus. For all its pitfalls, one cannot wish away the reality that many sociologists *want* a concept like moral panic as a tool to debunk particular social claims or reactions. Taking a critical posture is not inherently unscientific. Rather, it depends on whether or not observers have sufficiently rigorous evidence to support the contention that *particular* reactions are *patently* unwarranted. For most issues, the requisite evidence has been lacking, and hence sociological pronouncements have not been particularly authoritative.

Social anxieties raise the basic issue of safety. Moral panics, along with earlier industrial risks, were largely contained in a discourse of safety. Moral deviants could be identified (there were 'tests' for witchcraft, with an embedded ambiguity that always rendered it possible to 'find' deviants). The deviants were then, at least theoretically, subject to social control. Indeed, even if social reactions were more symbolic than practical, they could still serve to affirm moral boundaries. And the latter could be effectuated regardless of whether the claims exaggerated the nature of the threat or not.

A safety discourse faces rupture in the risk society. Invisible contaminants, intractable scientific uncertainties, unpredictable system effects, the almost tragic calls for 'science-on-demand' at the height of an accident, the prying open of standard operating procedures, efforts to pass off the hot potato, and potential latency effects that hinder closure of the threat – these all suggest that planning and pre-market testing have been replaced by post-market coping, as things are wont to go boom in the night.

Hindsight notwithstanding, it can be presumed that British authorities had no idea that announcing a tentative link between BSE and 10 possible cases of CJD would touch off a

marauding storm. As previously noted, the public wants unambiguous answers pertaining to risk and safety, especially for phenomena that are involuntarily imposed on them. A safety model that boils down to the post-market coping with accidents is not readily sold to a public whose demands for a yes/no risk evaluation hardly countenances a cost-benefit analysis.

With this case and the accumulation of other comparable manufactured risks, the idea that institutions connote safety is severely challenged. According to Beck (1995: 128)

> {T}he political dynamism of the ecological issue is not a function of the advancing devastation of nature; rather it arises from the facts that, on the one hand, institutions claim to provide control and security falls short and, on the other hand, in the same way, devastation is normalized and legalized.

The gap between a safety discourse and the emergent discursive formations and practices built around post-market efforts to cope with emergencies opens up key questions for sociology. These include issues of trust, expertise and authority, the fallibility of science, the nature of (once hidden) institutional practices, the threat of immobility and, ultimately, the affirmation of social order.

NOTES

1. This summary is based on a careful reading of Toronto newspapers and weekly magazines. It only paints the broad strokes; the detailed ordering of events and miscues remain to be sorted out.

2. The crisis has been so volatile that the Progressive Conservative government in Ontario has backtracked on several issues and adopted an uncharacteristically apologetic and conciliatory tone.

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33. Connections: [A]moral Panics and Risk in Contemporary Drug and Viral Pandemic Claims

Philip R. Kavanaugh

R.J. Maratea

During a 2011 segment on the Today Show, host Matt Lauer gloomily reported "we live in an age where people jump on a plane and go around the world in one day, and along that route they can spread something like [a deadly virus] to countless people." Lauer was not discussing the circumstances surrounding an actual viral outbreak, but rather the movie *Contagion*, which depicts the deadly consequences of a fictional worldwide pandemic. Lauer noted that the nature of our globalized society complicates "the logistics of the spread of a virus," and sought the opinion of the film's star, Matt Damon, to understand how to protect people without causing unnecessary panic: "That's the quandary that a lot of these people are in, is how do we disseminate this information in a way that creates the least amount of panic, because the panic can be the most dangerous thing." The media, Damon suggested, "have to resist the temptation to sell the panic because that could actually be putting gasoline on the fire."

The menacing specter presented on the Today Show could have been in response to a whole host of social fears that reflect the inherent risk to living in modern society. From escalators that unexpectedly stop to exotic pets who pose a disease threat "that could rival a terrorist attack" (Associated Press 2006), we are constantly bombarded with tales of unavoidable dangers, ready to strike us down at the most inopportune moments. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we have become conditioned to fear our surroundings for reasons both real and imagined: Oftentimes, these shared fears produce collective sentiments that something must to done to correct all of the problems that surround us before they destroy the moral fabric of society. Perhaps you can think of some examples when our shared fears have

prompted policymakers to legislate corrective action about some form of deviance: Getting tough on crime, declaring war on drugs and terrorism, and requiring sex offenders to be identified on a registry list all reflect attempts to reinforce communal values by eradicating or controlling deviant threats.

Sociologists have adopted the term *moral panic* to describe the unified feelings of outrage directed at a person, group, or event believed to represent a threat to the prevailing cultural values of a society. The concept was originally used by Stanley Cohen in the 1970s to analyze and critique British media reports that sensationalized a series of public brawls between Mods and Rockers - two rival youth subcultures of lower-middle and working class origins - by suggesting these "youth gone bad" reflected a decay in family values and young persons' alienation from mainstream culture (Cohen 1972). Cohen's key point was that the news media play a key role in *constructing* and *defining* deviance, and this influences public perceptions about what deviant conditions ought to concern us the most. Moreover, media-driven campaigns about deviance often cultivate feelings of fear and moral outrage about a perceived problem that may not represent an *objective* threat to the public's welfare. In making this argument, Cohen stressed that the societal reactions are just as, if not more, important to understanding deviance than the threat itself.

So why address such a seminal deviance concept in this chapter? On one hand, moral panics still exist in a fashion similar to when they were first defined. Consider that we continue to debate the morality of folk devils like controversial musician Marilyn Manson just as decades ago when parents feared that Elvis Presley's swiveling hips would send their daughters into uncontrolled sexual frenzy. On the other hand, morality is not necessarily the defining theme in contemporary panics. Sociologists often speak in more neutral terms of *claims-makers* (Spector and Kitsuse 1977), and the rhetoric about troubling conditions formerly the subject of moral outrage has shifted toward concerns about individual and

public health. The problem of illegal drug use, for example, has been culturally rebranded to emphasize HIV/AIDS and other disease risks resulting from injection, or biochemical addiction, rather than concerns about moral corruption and hedonism.

Considering such developments naturally begs the question as to whether the moral panic concept, as traditionally theorized, in need of modification to reflect developments in the areas of health, risk, and medicalization? This is the chief question we answer in this chapter. Our analysis proceeds by means of two case studies. First we examine a new drug scare – that of crystal methamphetamine. Second, we look at claims made about the H5N1 "bird flu" virus and the possibility of a global pandemic. We conclude by discussing the usefulness of the moral panic in understanding definitions of deviance and collective threats in the modern era.

MORAL PANICS AND SOCIAL THREAT

Imagine you are waiting in line to see the latest big budget Hollywood blockbuster and you see demonstrators picketing for the film to be boycotted because it glorifies violent behavior and drug use. Before you know it, the nightly news is reporting on these protests and journalists are asking whether the movie will have a harmful affect on society by encouraging kids to engage in deviance. You may soon find that we are smack in the middle of a moral panic that was started by activists, referred to as *moral crusaders* (Becker 1963) that defined the film as being morally improper and in conflict societal values, and were successful in having those claims disseminated by the media. But in addition to moral crusaders, moral panics also require the presence of a "folk-devil." That is, some clearly identifiable group that can be blamed for the threat (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994). In Cohen's study, the Mods and Rockers were the folk devil. For our example, it is the Hollywood film industry, which produces movies that extol drug use, violence, and a whole host of other illicit behaviors.

Two other elements that characterize moral panics are sensationalism (Cohen 1972) and disproportionality (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994). Sensationalism refers to outlandish or exaggerated statements, while disproportionality focuses on the gap between that *actual* harm caused by a social threat and the concern it generates among the public, the media, and policymakers. To better understand these concepts, consider all of the news reports that pop up every October about the dangers of trick-or-treating. As the story goes, countless children each year fall victim to candy that has been poisoned or tainted with razor blades. In reality, the dangers of contaminated Halloween candy are nothing more than an urban legend, revisited each year in news reports, which stoke parents' fears by embellishing the actual fact that only two children have ever died from tainted Halloween candy - both killed purposely by relatives (Best and Horiuchi 1985)!

Over time, sociologists became less interested in the moral concern about some folk devil or deviant group that embodied the threat, and more attentive to the irrational and panicked nature of the public reaction. This led British sociologist Stuart Waiton to coin the term "amoral panics;" which refer to public scares that originate from a diverse range of perspectives but are not necessarily "moral" in their origins (Waiton 2008). Increasingly, *experts*, particularly those working in the fields of medicine and science, play a key role in generating public concern and defining what is deviant. So, in thinking about contemporary panics, it is important to consider the way deviant behaviors and other troubling conditions are scientized, or medicalized.

SCIENCE, RISK, AND CONTEMPORARY PANICS

As claims about deviant threats have become increasingly dependent on medical and scientific expertise, they are also increasingly cloaked in the rhetoric of "risk," and place ever-greater emphases on individual health and safety. According to sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992), we are now living in a "risk society" that reflects contemporary concerns about

the numerous hazards that have emerged since industrialization, but have only become evident fairly recently, as scientific evidence has accumulated more rapidly. As these dangers become more complex in modern societies, we are forced to rely on medical and scientific expertise to inform us about all of the harms that besiege us in everyday life.

Perhaps you have noticed the litany of warnings from experts and other claims-makers that litter our Internet web pages, periodicals, and news broadcasts. Reports on the dangers of drug use, human trafficking, immigration, terrorism, and a host of other deviant behaviors are readily accessible and neatly packaged for our consumption. Notions of risk compel audiences to pay attention because they cultivate fear and are presented to us with a veneer of objectivity. After all, these claims emanate from credentialed professionals. The information we receive, however, whether from traditional news sources, the Internet, or elsewhere, is often oversimplified, and complex issues are reduced into catchy, easily understandable sound bites. While the moral panic and risk society concepts both focus on the role of the mass media in disseminating claims of harm, the risk society emphasizes "new sites of social anxiety" (Ungar 2001:273), such as environmental, chemical, and technological threats. What emerges in the risk society is the potential for catastrophes (Ungar 2001).

Whether moral panics are in decline or on the rise, we should take the time to think about how the moral panic and risk society concepts are similar and different. Cohen (2002) suggests that the development of the modern risk society forces us to think about moral panics in new ways. The following case studies attempt to do just that. By looking at two modern social scares, we can see elements of both the moral panic and the risk society at work.

Case 1: Crystal Methamphetamine Use[1]

Recently, a panic has emerged over the supposed rise of the abuse of crystal methamphetamine (also known as "meth"), a drug that is synthesized from inexpensive over-the-counter ingredients and household chemicals. Panic surrounding meth emerged in the aftermath of the war on crack in the late 1990s and has similarly been referred to as an epidemic that is sweeping the nation. Meth use was regularly reported by news agencies as spreading to previously unaffected parts of the country, impacting new and vulnerable populations such as housewives and children, prompting a panic over the perceived growth in use. The following account from New York senator Chuck Schumer is illustrative:

> *Twenty years ago, crack was headed east across the U.S. like a Mack Truck out of control, and it slammed New York hard because we didn't see the warning signs. Well, the headlights are glaring off in the distance again, this time with meth. We are still paying the price of missing the warning signs back then, and if we don't remember our history we will be doomed to repeat it, because crystal meth could become the new crack. (U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 2004).*

Claims of this nature were repeatedly disseminated by mass media over the next three years, culminating in *Newsweek* christening meth "America's Most Dangerous Drug" in 2007, emphasizing its threat to mainstream society: "Relatively cheap compared with other hard drugs, the highly addictive stimulant is hooking more and more people across the socioeconomic spectrum: soccer moms in Illinois, computer geeks in Silicon Valley, factory

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[1] The research sample for this case study consists of 175 *New York Times* articles published between 2004-2011, and several related publications accessible via *The New York Times* website.

workers in Georgia, gay professionals in New York… Anytown, U.S.A. can be turned into a meth den almost overnight" (Jefferson 2007). Of course, no empirical research suggests that rates of meth use were particularly high; in fact, data indicate the use rates were far lower than virtually all other illegal drugs during this time (King 2006). Indeed, fears of meth use appeared to be disproportionate to the actual harm it produced, rendering it a classic example of a moral panic.

However, several other aspects of meth use and manufacture helped make it a compelling media storyline. First, the production and use of meth has been repeatedly linked to health and environmental problems (National Drug Control Strategy 2006). Most of the reports that reference physical health problems associated with meth discuss consequences such as psychosis, delusions and hallucinations, and brain damage. Although meth can cause users to become violent, reports have been less likely to reference violent folk devils than media reports surrounding crack (Cobbina 2008). With meth, both media and official reports were more likely to emphasize the neurological and physical health consequences; particularly in regard to the effects of use on personal appearance. This suggests that the framing of the meth panic also shares characteristics of the risk society, using scientized claims about health to stoke public fears.

Sheldon Ungar (2001) notes that while moral panics are constituted by a small number of mostly familiar threats and deviant groups, the risk society is characterized by a large number of new and unfamiliar threats. In this vein, one such widely reported and novel claim regarding meth use and the physical deterioration of one's health is related to a phenomenon colloquially referred to as "meth mouth."

> *Quite distinct from the oral damage done by other drugs, sugar and smoking, methamphetamine seems to be taking a unique, and horrific, toll inside its users' mouths. In short stretches of time, sometimes just months, a perfectly*

> *healthy set of teeth can turn a grayish-brown, twist and begin to fall out, and take on a peculiar texture less like that of hard enamel and more like that of a piece of ripened fruit. (Davey 2005).*

Here we can see a descriptive scientific claim about the risks associated with meth use that does not appear disproportionate nor identifies a folk devil - two identified components of a moral panic. However, if we look more closely, this particular health risk was given a catchy name (meth mouth) and offered compelling – if not disgusting – visual imagery that taps into existing cultural fears surrounding "white trash" (Murakawa 2011). News reports and anti-meth campaigns rarely elaborated on the complex science behind meth mouth, nor did they refer to competing claims from scientists who found no evidence that smoking meth can cause such damage - certainly not in a matter of months. In this example it is apparent how scientific claims characteristic of the risk society converge with the sensationalism that characterizes moral panics in framing this aspect of the meth problem.

As the meth panic reached its apex between 2004-2007, the content of claims increasingly shifted toward scientized tales about individual health, community, and environmental risks. This change in how the panic was framed reflected a movement away from overstated moral claims about meth use sweeping the nation, and toward appeals to scientific knowledge that emphasized how meth addiction might progress physically and produces environmental harm. For example, the drugs-crime link (and in particular the drugs-violence link) received significantly less coverage in the popular press, replaced by narratives about the ravages wrought on the body from use, as well as the harmful effects on wildlife and local communities: "Meth labs can cause health problems including respiratory illness, skin and eye irritation, headaches, burns, nausea, and dizziness (Butte County Meth Strike Force 2011).

While the content of claims having shifted to emphasize environmental and health dangers is emblematic of the risk society, the environmental-health aspect of the meth scare was not simply about informing audiences of potential chemical hazards; it also spawned compelling human-interest stories on the immoral consequences of meth production. The following excerpt creates a new class of victims through inherently moral claims about the harm befallen on homeowners and the elderly:

> *The spacious home where the newly wed Rhonda and Jason Holt began their family in 2005 was plagued by mysterious illnesses... It was not until February, more than five years after they moved in, that the couple discovered their house… was contaminated with high levels of methamphetamine left by the previous occupant… Similar cases are playing out in several states, drawing attention to the problem of meth contamination, which can permeate drywall, carpets, insulation and air ducts, causing respiratory ailments and other health problems (Dewan and Brown 2009).*

While we refer to this trend as a shift toward amorality in how the meth panic was framed, it does not mean that issues of morality ceased to be a part of how the issue was covered by news organizations. It is fair to assume that audiences could easily interpret tales of homeowners and the elderly being victimized by the complications of meth manufacture as being fundamentally moral in nature. Rather, the point is that the *morality* in these panics can intersect with, or even be replaced by *amoral* claims based on scientific knowledge about risk. Indeed, there is still a strong moral component present in many contemporary claims (i.e., a woman charged with murder for breast-feeding while using meth (McKinley 2011)).

However, when compared to drug panics in prior decades, particularly the claims driving the crack-cocaine panic in the 1990s, those surrounding meth have been

increasingly defined by themes of health and environmental consequence. While campaigns about the dangers of meth retain some of the classic elements of a moral panic, amoral claims increased as the meth problem became more familiar. This not only infused novel fears about the dangers of meth into media reports, but allowed scientific experts to articulate previously unknown harms about meth that helped extend the panic's lifespan, thus allowing deviance to be defined in a number of different ways.

Case 2: Avian Influenza[2]

By examining how fears over methamphetamine use were framed as fundamentally *moral* in nature, we can better understand how modern panics can become scientized over time and come to be viewed in terms of the risk society. Similarly, those panics initially characterized as scientific in nature often develop deeply moral storylines that further dramatize those issues. To better understand this process, it is useful to explore how a seemingly innocuous outbreak of bird flu in 2003, which sparked worldwide fears of a deadly epidemic.

The avian influenza (H5N1) panic dominated news headlines between 2003-2007 and generated considerable public concern that the deadly virus would cause millions of deaths. In retrospect, we know that the much-publicized virus never emerged as a legitimate health risk in the U.S. and only caused a small number of deaths worldwide: The World Health Organization confirmed only 217 H5N1-related fatalities worldwide between 2003 and 2007 – none of which occurred in the U.S. (WHO 2008). By contract, autoerotic asphyxiation – the practice of self-strangulation to achieve sexual arousal – results in 205-

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[2] The research sample for this case study consists of 193 articles related to H5N1 bird flu published on *The New York Times, Fox News,* and *National Public Radio* websites, with the heaviest concentration of coverage coming between 2005-2006.

1000 deaths a year in the U.S. alone (Uva 1995)! Given such a low death toll, bird flu might appear as unlikely candidate to cause a widespread social panic. However, it became *defined* as a health risk largely on the basis of *proactive fear* rooted in the belief that a global outbreak was inevitable.

Given that so much about bird flu was unknown besides the claim that it would cause devastating harm at some point in the future, scientific expertise was important to publicizing the potential risk. Health experts were often quoted in news reports and became important sources of information that defined the H5N1 problem for the public. Being that bird flu was a "ratings winner," reporters hoping not to be out-scooped often presented claims made by experts about the dangers of bird flu as fact without fully explaining either the complex science of virus mutation - a virus becomes particularly dangerous to human health when it transforms into a strain that is easily transmissible between people - or the arguments made by scientists who were skeptical of H5N1 fears.

As news reports continued to speculate on the spread of the H5N1 virus and its seemingly inevitable emergence in the U.S., public health experts claimed "it would be irresponsible not to prepare for a worst-case situation" (Bradsher and Altman 2004). This doomsday scenario became a prevalent theme in news reports:

> *Several scientists have made predictions on how many people could die in a flu pandemic, and estimates have ranged from less than 2 million to more than 100 million…"One of those numbers will turn out to be right," Thompson said. "We're not going to know how lethal the next pandemic is going to be until the pandemic happens"* (Associated Press 2005).

In fact, some scientific experts claimed that avian influenza could be more dangerous than AIDS because "it is easier to transmit and much more contagious" (Associated Press 2006a;

National Public Radio 2005a), while others suggested that a pandemic would be over a thousand times worse than Hurricane Katrina (National Public Radio 2005b).

With new reports increasingly focusing on worst-case scenarios, there emerged shift in media coverage away from simplified narratives about the risk of the H5N1 virus and its spread. In their place appeared moral tales about who should be saved, who must be sacrificed, and how to most effectively vaccinate global populations in the event of a widespread H5N1 outbreak. For example, experts suggested that hospitals would be overrun and that patients with a lower chance of survival might simply be allowed to die (Knox 2006a). Such extreme measures were presented as perfectly reasonable options to minimize fatalities and slow the spread of the disease.

> *The (King County, WA) medical examiner's office is planning for as many as 1,000 deaths a day – more than 10 times the usual rate. Crematoriums and embalmers couldn't handle that load. The county's even planning a Web site to advise families on how to ice down a corpse until mortuary workers could collect it* (Knox 2006a).

All of this not only exacerbated fears, but also infused elements of morality into the panic. Expecting people to store and maintain the corpses of their loved ones not only placed a moral obligation on the uninfected, but also heightened the need to develop a vaccine that would provide immunity to as many people as possible. Many health experts, however, noted that the H5N1 virus was not only resistant to existing vaccines, and the logistics of developing an entirely new vaccine and producing sufficient quantities to inoculate enough persons to slow its spread would be difficult, if not impossible (Bradsher and Altman 2004a). Compounding these logistical problems, drug companies demanded that the government guarantee sales of the vaccine to ensure profit if a global outbreak failed to emerge. Additionally, they required federal immunity should any vaccine cause

unexpected side effects. This issue of corporate protection was particularly rooted in moral judgments, as many experts believed that clinical trials would have to be rushed through, or abandoned altogether, should the vaccine be immediately needed. Health experts further noted it was unclear how decisions would be made on who would receive medicines; over 5 billion people were projected to go untreated worldwide (National Public Radio 2005c).

These were the most intensely moral moments of the bird flu scare and exemplify how the thrust of the coverage moved away from scientized risk and toward morality and panic. Some speculated that a reasonable approach would be to let infected older Americans die so that a greater number of young persons could be saved. Others suggested that wealthier Americans would be best positioned to receive vaccinations, leaving the rest to either fend for themselves or rely on alternative treatments that might provide only limited protection against H5N1 infection.

Although the dramatic value of bird flu had begun to diminish after nearly four years of media attention, more broadly, the shifting nature of claims – from scientific knowledge and toward moral tales about life and death – helped sustain the panic's lifespan by injecting emotion and fear that resonated with audiences into what proved to be a non-existent threat. As with the meth panic, the H5N1 bird flu scare shows us that a fluidity exists between amoral and moral claims, and that in the risk society, rapid dissemination of scientific claims can incite panics that are ripe with moral overtones.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we examined the continued relevance of the moral panic in explaining an increasingly wide array of *amoral* social threats. The case studies that we have presented teach us that amoral risk and moral values are essential, interconnected parts of contemporary campaigns about deviance and broader social scares. Each, in a manner of speaking, breathes life into the other: the presence of risk produces the need to

make moral judgments, and individual or collective morality allows us to understand (or define) risk.

Whereas the moral panic concept was initially used to understand overwrought and value-laden reactions to deviance, particularly fears over youth gone bad (Cohen 1972), its application expanded with refinements by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994). These scholars placed greater emphasis on criteria like disproportionality, while subsequently (if inadvertently) de-emphasizing the *morality* of the panic and the *folk devils* responsible – criteria initially mandated in Cohen's definition (1972). However, in doing so, Goode and Ben-Yehuda moved to moral panic concept toward that of the risk society (Beck 1992) – which emphasizes that media-driven scares increasingly reflect concerns about biological, chemical, environmental, and medical issues (Ungar 2001). In advanced industrial societies such as the U.S., the causes of social harm are progressively more complex, unpredictable, and globalized. Unlike the moral panic, which poses a perceived threat to prevailing social values, the risk society cultivates "the potential of catastrophes" (Beck 1992:24). As claims of harm in the risk society are characterized by an intense degree of scientific uncertainty, it is difficult to establish whether they are, in fact, disproportionate. Given such divergences, the question remains whether the reality of our contemporary risk society has diminished the theoretical relevance of the moral panic.

If you have ever watched a television newscast or perused news online, than you have already been exposed to moral panics. Media reports are chock-full of tales of urban street crime, violent video games and music, a hyper-sexualized culture, and school shootings. Each of these relate to perceived moral failures in society. Still, the meth and avian influenza scares show that modern panics extend beyond moral boundaries and increasingly reflect "amoral" concerns. Environmental, scientific, and health hazards such as bird flu do not reside in the exclusive domain of the risk society, just as the meth panic was

not framed in purely moral terms. As Hier (2008) notes, “contemporary moralization finds expression in hybrid configurations of risk and harm” (p. 174).

We therefore argue that it is important to extend our understanding of what constitutes a traditionally *moral* panic. The two case studies presented here demonstrate that the moral component of social panics can wax and wane as various parties invoke both moral and amoral rhetoric. These narratives are often mutually reinforcing rather than competing, keeping the interest of both journalists and the public by infusing panics with new storylines that keep them fresh. We therefore suggest that the moral panic and risk society perspectives inform one another and should be regarded as complementary. For any classic concept to remain relevant it must evolve to reflect new theoretical developments. We hope this chapter illustrates how the moral panic and risk society perspectives can be used together in understanding a wide array of media-driven campaigns about deviance and other social threats.

CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS:

1.Think about the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington DC on September 11, 2001, and the ensuing Patriot Act, establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, and the declared "war on terror." Are such post 9-11 developments reflective of the risk society or can they be regarded as evidence of a moral panic over terrorism? Are both perspectives applicable? Discuss how.

2. Stanley Cohen theorizes that moral panics could not materialize without mass media coverage that exaggerates the nature and extent of a perceived deviant threat. Is it possible for news coverage to "manufacture" panic about the risks of a non-existent threat? Using an example like rap music or violent video games, explain how media reporting can define deviance without any actual evidence of social harm.

3. Stanley Cohen's concept of the "folk devil," typically identifies some group of persons responsible for some morally reprehensible behavior and threat to moral values. In the modern risk society, many of the supposedly threatening conditions that qualify as moral panics – at least according to disproportionality criterion - lack the "folk devil" element. For instance, the H5N1 scare discussed in this chapter, or the number of large oil spills in Alaska (1989), the Gulf of Mexico (2010), and Arkansas/Utah (2013) that have harmed both the natural environment and human health. Ungar (2001) notes that in the risk society, threats generate greater diffusion of blame – across governments and corporations, for example.

Has Cohen's folk devil concept outlived its usefulness, or can institutions be regarded as the new folk devils in the risk society?

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Section 9. Critical Criminology, Culture of Control, Mass Incarceration

Introduction.

Tammy L. Anderson.

On June 25, 2012, the US Supreme Court struck down mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles, arguing that such laws were a violation of the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual punishment. Nationwide, there are about 2,500 people serving life-without-parole sentences for crimes they committed as teenagers (Segura 2012). Such mandatory minimum laws appeared toward the end of the 20th century as the country shifted to a more punitive era in crime control – or to a "culture of control" (Garland 2001)-- from an earlier (1960s and 1970s) one grounded in reform and rehabilitation. The punitive shift relies on a just desserts or retribution model as generalized crime policy in the US. It represents what Simon (2007)—a reading included in this section-- calls "governance through crime," or the daily effects we encounter from a society obsessed with surveillance, security, and punitive penal practices.

This culture of control, that governs through crime and mass incarcerates thousands of young people daily, is the new focus of critical criminology and the subject of Section 9. Critical criminology is a school of thought concerned with how the distribution of power and wealth in society impacts the occurrence and control of crime. It maintains that the criminal justice system is sometimes used by politicians, law-makers, and the wealthy – what we might call the ruling class-- to subordinate those with much less power and resources. Critical criminology is based in Marxist theory, which maintains that society is fundamentally a place of conflict among unequal groups.

Whereas early critical criminologists like Quinney (1974) and Spitzer (1975) focused on how the economic privileges of Capitalists led to unequal crime control of the poor, today's scholars are concerned with the power of the State or government agencies and actors to create policies that levy a disproportionate blow to the lower classes in the name of increased security and protection. Section 9 features readings by Simon (2007) and Rios (2006) that discuss the contemporary State-policy focused, critical criminology ideas with delinquency, crime, and deviance. The classic reading by Platt (1977) provides important historical context to the creation of the juvenile court system in our society, which originated to "save" juveniles from the harsh realities of the sorts of punitive crime control policies we see in full-force in our society today.

How did we come full circle then? As Platt (1977) points out, the 20th century juvenile court was created to reverse the severe treatment of young offenders in the 19th century. Yet, this more humane juvenile justice system was rendered inadequate in responding to youth crime, specifically violent crime, shortly thereafter. By the end of the 20th century, teenagers – especially poor minorities--were being governed through crime (Simon 2007) and subjected to a "youth control complex" (Rios 2006) not only on the streets of America, but in the very safe places that were charged with helping to protect and shape them: schools.

Today, the media saturates us with disturbing stories and commentary about chaos, violence and mayhem on school grounds. News reports convey a "governance through crime" narrative by portraying schools as hot spots for crime and advocating increased security, surveillance and control on campus grounds. Recently, the National Rifle Association called for armed guards on all school grounds to prevent future Newton, Massachusetts gun violence by troubled teens, like Adam Lanza. Yet, official data collected by the Centers for Disease Control

shows not only that such mass violence is rare in our society, but that even smaller-scale victimizations are rare at schools. For example, 17 school-age children were killed on school grounds between 2009-2010 (CDC 2012), representing only 2% of all youth homicide in society. The same report finds that 12% of 9-12 graders were in a physical fight and 5.4% carried a weapon (usually a pocket knife) to school during the same time period. Did such acts of youth violence intimidate faculty and students, making them feel insecure and unsafe? Not really. According to the CDC (2012), 7% of teachers reported being threatened while on the job and 6% of students claimed they didn't go to school because they unsafe there.

The connections essay by Aaron Kupchik explains the policy approaches to controlling juvenile deviance and crime over time and highlights their recent punitive expansion to school grounds through what he calls "the school-to-prison pipeline[1]." Kupchik defines this as a "merging of informal (school punishment) and formal (arrest) social control… that causes youth to have criminal records and miss educational time, and increases the odds that they drop out of school." While we might think the school-to-prison pipeline is reserved for the students who get involved in fights or who bring weapons to school, Kupchik notes it can ensnare any student for minor acts, including Salecia Johnson, a six year-old Black girl, who was handcuffed and arrested for having a temper tantrum at school. Sixteen year-old Kiera Wilmot, also African-American, was recently sent through the school-to-prison pipeline as well, for setting off a minor explosion as part of a chemistry experiment at her Florida high school. Bowen (2013) reports that:

> "After the explosion Wilmot was taken into custody by a school resources officer and charged with possession/discharge of a weapon on school grounds and discharging a destructive device. She will be tried as an adult. She was then taken to a juvenile

[1] See also Aaron Kupchik's (2010) recent book *Homeroom Security* (New York University Press) for more on the school-t0-prison pipeline.

> assessment center. She was also expelled from school and will be forced to complete her diploma through an expulsion program."

Responses like these to juvenile misbehavior not only illustrate the criminalization of youth in our society today, but also how real the culture of control and governing through crime approaches concepts are in our lives today, just as today's critical criminologists proclaim. Perhaps the most interesting thing, then, about the Supreme Court decision described above is that it reverted back to the reform ideology of the original juvenile court to strike down the harsh life-without-parole sentence for teens. Justice Elena Kagan wrote in the majority opinion that:

> "Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender's age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it" and that "under these schemes, every juvenile will receive the same sentence as every other—the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shooter and the accomplice, the child from a stable household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one."

Does the elimination of such sentencing policies for youth, then, levy a blow to the culture of control idea? Will it reverse the mass incarceration trend Rios and others mention? More interestingly, will the Supreme Courts' decision mark a return to the reform era of the past, the sort that Platt describes in his essay? Such questions point to the circular nature of society's classification and control of deviance and lend value to the pairing of old and new ideas about and approaches to deviance that are featured in this book.

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Reading 34

The Child Savers

Chapter 5: The Child-Saving Movement in Illinois

Anthony M. Platt

DELINQUENT CHILDREN

Special provisions for the protection and custody of "delinquent" children apart from adult offenders existed in the United States long before the enactment of the juvenile court in 1899. Nineteenth-century legal doctrines and sentencing policies made allowances for the immaturity and disabilities of children.[1] When Illinois was admitted to the Union in 1817, a child under seven years was not considered responsible for a criminal act, though he could be whipped like a slave for refusing to obey his parents.[2] A revision of the state code in 1827 raised the age of criminal responsibility to ten,[3] and, four years later, children under eighteen were excluded by statute from the state penitentiary. Typical sanctions against children included corporal punishment, fines, and short jail sentences.[4]

In 1833, the criminal code included for the first time a provision that "persons under 18 shall not be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for any offense except robbery, burglary, or arson: in all other cases where a penitentiary punishment is or shall be provided, such a person under the age of 18 shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for any term not exceeding 18 months at the discretion of the court."[5] There was no further legislation pertaining to the treatment of juvenile offenders until 1867 when an act was passed providing for the establishment of the State Reform School at Pontiac for boys between the ages of eight and eighteen who lived outside Cook County.[6] A reform school (established in 1855) already existed in Chicago and was used for Cook County boys until 1871 when it was destroyed in the

great fire. An act of 1872 authorized the transfer of all boys who were serving any definite sentence in the Chicago Reform School to the State Reformatory.[7] The Pontiac reformatory was created for "the discipline, education, employment, and reformation of juvenile offenders and vagrants." The 1867 act further provided that "all courts of competent jurisdiction are authorized to exercise their discretion in sending juvenile offenders to the county jails, in accordance with the laws made and provided, or in sending them to Reform School."[8] The establishment of the State Reform School made unnecessary the use of the penitentiary for persons under eighteen who were convicted of robbery, burglary, or arson. Commitment to the county jail for these and other offenses was left to the discretion of the courts. The obvious implication of this provision was that the county jails were to be used for minor offenders, the reform school being reserved for more dangerous delinquents.[9]

The Reform School at Pontiac was in every sense a minor penitentiary. "The real purpose of the General Assembly," commented the Illinois Board of Public Charities, "was to provide for the erection of a prison . . . with a view to relieving the penitentiary and jails of the state from the various evils incident to overcrowding."[10] This view was indirectly supported by the Illinois Supreme Court in a case involving the Chicago Reform School, which was administered by a board of guardians appointed by the city judiciary. The reformatory, at an approximate annual cost to the city of $35,000, was designed for boys between the ages of six and sixteen who had committed minor criminal offenses. Sentences were indeterminate and boys could be held in the institution, depending on their conduct and attitude, until they were twenty-one. Parents and guardians had the power to commit their children to the Reform School with the permission of the board of guardians and superintendent.[11] The courts could also commit children who were found to be "destitute of proper parental care, or growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness or vice."

On September 9, 1870, a mittimus was issued by the clerk of the Supreme Court of Cook

County committing Daniel O'Connell to the Chicago Reform School. The boy's father applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus and, in his decision, Mr. Justice Thornton held that the act in question was unconstitutional because the boy had been committed without benefit of trial to what was really an "infant penitentiary" and "a necessary evil, the neighborhood of which decent people desire to avoid." The judge also asked:

> Can the Stare, as parens patriae, exceed the power of the natural parent, except in punishing crime? These laws provide for the "safe keeping" of the child; they direct his "commitment" and only a "ticket of leave" or the uncontrolled discretion of a board of guardians, will permit the imprisoned boy to breathe the pure air of heaven outside his prison walls, and to feel the instincts of manhood by contact with the busy world. . . . The confinement may be from one to fifteen years, according to the age of the child. Executive clemency cannot open the prison doors for no offense has been committed. The writ of habeas corpus, a writ for the security of liberty, can afford no relief, for the sovereign power of the State as parens patriae has determined the imprisonment beyond recall. Such a restraint upon natural liberty is tyranny and oppression. If, without crime, without the conviction of an offense, the children of the State are thus to be confined for the "good of Society," then Society had better be reduced to its original elements and free government acknowledged a failure. . . . The welfare and rights of the child arc also to be considered. . . . Even criminals cannot be convicted and imprisoned without due process of law.[12]

Child-saving organizations regarded the O'Connell case as an irresponsible decision designed to discredit and retard their efforts. The State Teachers' Association wanted an institution to which parents and other "responsible" adults could commit children for indeterminate sentences.[13] The Board of Public Charities argued that the Reform School was in fact a "house

of refuge" where juveniles were treated with "tender pity." The Supreme Court decision, said Frederick Wines, "greatly injured the morale and utility of the institution" and "cast an irremediable blight upon the inmates." Despite the protests of the child savers, the State Reform School act was revised in 1873 to incorporate the O'Connell decision and make it consistent with constitutional guarantees. The right to sentence during minority was taken from the courts as was the right to commit a child for want of proper parental care, mendicancy, ignorance, idleness, or vice. The right of guardianship was also revoked from the trustees. Instead, it was provided that any boy between the ages of ten and sixteen who was convicted of any crime which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable by imprisonment in the county jail or penitentiary, could be committed to the Reform School for not less than one year or more than five years. The courts were also given discretionary power to authorize jail sentences for minor offenses.

After land and money had been appropriated, the State Reform School was finally opened in 1871 at Pontiac, about a hundred miles from Chicago. Dr. J. D. Scouller, who was formerly a physician and Assistant Superintendent at the St. Louis Reform School, was appointed Superintendent and immediately contracted with private industry for the cheap labor of inmates. Although the trustees of the reformatory were prevented by law from "leasing the labor" of inmates for more than six hours a day, a contract was made with a Chicago shoe firm for the labor of fifty boys who were to be employed seven hours a day. A similar contract was made with Clark and Hill and Company for the manufacture of brushes. After these contracts were dissolved due to legal difficulties, many of the inmates were employed in cane-seating chairs for the Bloomington Manufacturing Company under the direction of the officers of the School. Such was the main "educational" program in the new reformatory. In the first four years after the opening of the institution, the legislature appropriated about $23,000, most of which was spent on developing land and farmstock rather than on improving living

conditions.[14]

On September 30, 1876, the State Reform School housed 180 boys.[15] Six years later, the School was seriously overcrowded with a population of about 250. “The insufficiency of room in the institution is such that the boys sleep in bunks touching each other. . . . The dining room, the school rooms, and chapel are all overcrowded.”[16] By 1888, the population had nearly doubled and, five years later, it was further increased when a law was passed permitting any criminal court in the state to sentence to the Reform School—now officially known as the Illinois State Reformatory—any male criminal between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one who had been found guilty of a first offense. The board of managers of the Reformatory were correspondingly empowered to transfer to the penitentiary any “apparently incorrigible prisoner, whose presence in the reformatory appeared to be seriously detrimental to the well-being of the institution.”[17]

Frederick Wines, Secretary of the Illinois Board of Public Charities, was appointed a United States Special Commissioner to attend the International Penitentiary Congress held in Stockholm in 1878. He was greatly impressed with the Congress’ recommendations for the treatment of juvenile offenders and visited several reformatories in England, including Hardwicke Court Reformatory—“a fine illustration of the possible results of intelligence and devotion in reducing the volume of crime. . . .” At other institutions, such as the Philanthropic Society’s Farm School in Surrey, he was pleased to find the inmates “occupied in cultivating the fields with the spade—the use of the plough being prohibited in order that the boys may experience the healthy influence of personal contact with the soil.” Wines came back from Europe convinced that it was the task of child-saving organizations to remove reformatories from the jurisdiction of the criminal law:

The object of reformatory institutions is well stated; it is not punishment for past offenses,

> but training for Future usefulness. . . . [T]he operation of the Illinois law is positively injurious. It proceeds from a morbid sensibility on the subject of personal liberty, and from a false idea of the relation of the juvenile offender to society, as well as of the object sought in sending him to a reformatory. It destroys the potency of the agencies employed for his reformation, by encouraging in his mind the hope that obstinate resistance to their influence, for a comparatively short period, will enable him to triumph over authority and to enter upon a life of vicious indulgence. Another wise suggestion in conflict with the practice adopted in our state, is that to the utmost extent possible the placing of vicious children in families or in public institutions should take place without the intervention of a formal trial. The statutes of Illinois fail to recognize the fact that confinement and control have a humane as well as a severe aspect nor do they distinguish between confinement for the protection of society and for the protection of the individual himself. This distinction was clearly perceived by the Congress and the application of the principle in Illinois is much to be desired.[18]

By 1885, Illinois did not have a reformatory for delinquent girls and the boys' reformatory was essentially a miniature prison, based on the "stern principle of retribution for offenses committed against the criminal law."[19] Wines was commissioned by the Board of Public Charities to investigate private and public facilities for delinquent children. In 1886, the Board reported that the institutional facilities were inadequate in size and resources. They proposed that "delinquents" should he managed according to the law of guardianship and that institutional care should be extended to "those children and others who swarm in the streets, gather about docks and wharves, and are almost sure to take up crime as a trade."[20] Ideally, the child savers wanted to intervene in the lives of "pre-delinquent" children and maintain control over them until they were immunized against "delinquency":

> If the prevention of crime is more important than its punishment, and if such prevention can only be secured by rescuing children from criminal surroundings before the criminal character and habits become firmly established, then it is evident that the state reform school can not accomplish all that we desire, since it does not receive children at a sufficiently early age, nor does it receive children who still occupy the debatable ground between criminality and innocence, who have not yet committed any criminal act, but who are in imminent danger at every moment of becoming criminals.[21]

CHILDREN IN JAIL

In 1869, the General Assembly of Illinois enacted legislation providing for the appointment of a Board of State Commissioners of Public Charities. The Illinois Board, the fourth such organization in the United States, was established "to consider new questions arising out of experience as to the best modes of treatment and improvement of the various classes of patients and inmates in our several benevolent institutions." Governor Oglesby, in recommending the legislation, urged the public to never "lose sight of the . . . ever-present claims of the vast multitudes in our midst" who are "afflicted with the terrible diseases which deprive them of sight, hearing and of reason."

The Board was composed of five persons appointed by the Governor to serve without salary for five years. These Commissioners hired Frederick Wines as Secretary to guide policy as well as to handle administrative matters. Although the Board was an integral part of the charitable machinery of the state, it had almost no administrative powers and was limited in making inspections, suggestions, and recommendations. The main scope of the Board's work was directed to the regulation of private organizations and they were authorized and required to

visit, at least twice a year, "all the charitable and correctional institutions of the State, excepting prisons receiving state aid, and ascertain whether the moneys appropriated for their aid are or have been economically and judiciously expended. . . ."[22] In addition to these investigative powers, the commissioners were required to supervise the girls' industrial schools (1879) boys' training schools (1883), private associations receiving children committed to them by the courts (1899), and agencies and institutions placing children in foster homes (1905). By the juvenile court law of 1899, the Board was also made responsible for approving the charters of associations desiring to supervise the care of dependent, neglected or delinquent children.

In the first ten years of the Board's work, the Commissioners bunched a critical and carefully documented attack on the county and city jail system in Illinois.[23] In 1869, agents of the Board inspected 78 jails where they found 511 persons, of whom 408 were awaiting trial. Ninety-eight children under the age of 16 were discovered in 40 of the jails. The Cook County jail, which had originally cost $120,000 to be built, consisted of 32 poorly ventilated cells in the basement of the courthouse. On the day of inspection, there were 114 persons in the jail—107 were awaiting trial—and as many as seven inmates were confined in one cell, deprived of fresh air, light, and basic comforts. "The jail is so dark," reported the Board, "that it is necessary to keep the gas burning in the corridors both day and night. The cells are filthy and full of vermin." The Board was especially concerned over the fact that 14 children were found in the jail. "Here the insane are confined, awaiting trial and transportation to the almshouse or asylum. Here witnesses are detained who, perhaps have never seen a crime committed, but are too poor to give bail for their appearance in court."

The county jail was found to be based on a system of terror: "It is un just and unloving, it assumes that a certain amount of suffering will expiate a certain amount of guilt, it confirms criminal tendencies instead of eliminating them, it is questionable whether it diminishes crime, and it is terribly expensive," The Board criticized the system for its lack of scientific

classification and inadequate educational and labor programs. “The effect of this promiscuous herding together of old and young, innocent and guilty, convicts, suspected persons and witnesses, male and female, is to make the county prison a school of vice. In such an atmosphere purity itself could not escape contamination.”[24]

The county jails in Illinois were found to be “moral plague spots” and “dark, damp, and fetid” places where the inmates’ self-respect was brutalized and crushed.[25] “Such a policy makes great criminals out of little ones.” The commissioners radically proposed that “nothing but the overthrow of the system will ever put an end to the present abuses, for they cannot be corrected by individual effort, but are inherent in the system itself.”[26] The county jails were incapable of reforming “the children of thieves or prostitutes, of gamblers and drunkards” who are “exposed to a thousand corrupting influences” on the city streets. “The atmosphere which many of them breathe,” commented the Board in 1872, is such that a future career of crime may be unerringly predicted for them. Shall we leave them to perish? And in perishing to prey upon society, to lead lives of violence, destructive alike to property and life? A thousand times, no. The state has a duty to perform towards its criminal population, no less sacred and obligatory than that which it owes to the simply unfortunate, and this duty rests upon the same double foundation of humanity and self-interest.[27]

Despite the Board’s efforts, there were few noticeable improvements in the county jail system.[28] An attempt to regulate the conditions under which minors were detained was made in 1874 by adding to the law regulating jail conditions a clause providing for the separation of minors from older offenders and those convicted of felonies. But this provision was a tokenistic and ineffectual remedy which could not be implemented in overcrowded and poorly constructed institutions.[29] At a New York meeting of the National Prison Congress, in 1876, Frederick Wines indicted the Illinois county jail system as a “failure and a disgrace to the intelligence and humanity of the state. We know of no evil which so loudly calls for a

remedy."[30] Illinois was not the only state to have a jail system "antagonistic to the theory of reformation." In Michigan, the statistics for 1873 revealed that 377 boys and 100 girls under 18 years were given jail sentences. Ohio, in 1871, committed 182 boys and 29 girls to county jails and Massachusetts had 2,029 minors in their jails during 1870; 231 of these children were under 15 years old, "One of the most painful features of this dreary picture," commented Wines, "is the large number of young people of both sexes, who are subjected to the contaminating influences of such a life."[31]

The Commissioners' fifth report included a comprehensive survey of all the county jails in Illinois, and it found little improvement in jail conditions.[32]

> In a moral sense, the atmosphere of the jail is stilling to every better impulse and aspiration; it is profane, obscene, ribald; . . . it is defiant, reckless, bitter. . . . It is the state—the General Assembly—which is to blame for relinquishing its own duty into the hands of boards of county supervisors, who can no more grapple successfully with the criminal class than they can bail out Lake Michigan with a sieve.[33]

During the 1880's, penal reformers in Illinois shifted their interest from the general physical condition of jails to the effect that these conditions had on particular groups, especially children. Frederick Wines' visit to England caused him to think about the reformatory system as a means of rescuing children from jails, where they were contaminated by contact with older offenders. The Board of Public Charities slowly gave up the idea of "overthrowing the system," and instead concentrated on improving jail conditions for children who needed special care and attention.

Children were regularly detained in the Cook County jail and the Chicago House of Correction, both before and after their trial. Their presence in such places was to be "deplored"

but it was the "fault of our laws" rather than the institutions themselves.[34] Sunday school and other elementary teaching was occasionally provided by piulanthropic individuals and organizations but this proved to be a superficial diversion.[35] Adelaide Groves, a Chicago socialite, informed the editor of a local newspaper that she visited "the boy's ward of the county jail, on Sunday afternoon usually, carrying with me books and writing material, stamps and pencils." She objected to the fact that "groups of idle boys and girls, teaching each other wickedness and sin, were permitted to roam at will through their town. . . . Shall we not, as a Christian city and people, stretch out a helping hand to the boys in the jail and bridewell?"[36]

Adelaide Groves suggested that Chicago needed special institutions—detention homes for before trial and reformatories for after trial—to replace the boys wards in the county jail and bridewell.[37] The existing reformatory at Pontiac was considered inappropriate because it was not a place of detention and it only housed children who had been convicted of a criminal offense. "Let a 'Detention Manual School,' with locks, and bolts, and bars, and keys, be provided by Cook County," wrote Mrs. Groves, "so that these hoys who have broken the laws in a greater or less degree may not be driven to still greater crime and degradation. . . ."[38]

In 1890, the Board of Public Charities found on the day of inspection nine children under sixteen in Cook County jail and forty-live children in the Chicago House of Correction. "What a shame," they commented, "to place these little boys in such a school of vice."[39] Adelaide Groves, in conjunction with the Chicago Woman's Club, was successful in establishing a regular day school in the county jail and a movement was begun to separate children from adults in the House of Correction. Two years later, jail conditions had not improved and the Board of Public Charities observed that "one-half of the boys committed for first offenses, under seventeen years, may be saved if they were sent to a reform school, taught to work and educated while there, and when their term is served the stigma of 'jail-bird' will not forever stick to them as it does now,"[40]

In summary, the Board of Public Charities found little public or political support for its efforts to reform conditions in county and city jails. The Board's policies were largely determined by its Secretary, Frederick Wines, who continued his father's work and introduced Illinois to the concepts of preventive penology. When the Board turned its interest to the problems raised by the detention of children in jails, it found allies in other child-saving organizations and a potential base from which successful reforms might be achieved.

CHILDREN OF THE STATE

Despite the failure to correct abuses in the industrial schools and to reform the county jail system, there was a general consensus of opinion among state welfare experts and private child-saving organizations that children should not be processed through the criminal courts or incarcerated with older offenders. In 1891, Timothy Hurley, president of the Catholic-controlled Visitation and Aid Society, was instrumental in introducing into the legislature a bill to authorize corporations "to manage, care and provide for children who may be abandoned, neglected, destitute or subjected to perverted training." The bill proposed that the county courts be empowered to commit to private child-saving organizations any dependent or neglected child or any child "being trained or allowed to be trained in vice and crime."[41] This bill failed to become law tuse its constitutionality was questionable and it failed to win the support of non Catholic organizations.

The child-saving movement gained momentum in 1893, a year for great activity and agitation by state and private organizations. The Chicago Woman's Club worked to establish an efficient school in the city jail and to secure a central police station that could be used exclusively for women and children.[42] The sociologist Charles Henderson. who later supported the juvenile court movement, was teaching courses in criminology and child welfare at the

University of Chicago.[43] The annual congresses of both the National Conference of Charities and Correction and the National Prison Association were held in Chicago in June; many Illinois representatives were present, notably Lucy Flower and Frederick Wines, who held executive positions.

In the same year that John P. Altgeld was elected Governor of Illinois, Julia Lathrop was appointed to the Board of Public Charities and Florence Kelly was appointed Chief Factory Inspector of Illinois. Both women were considered experts on the problem of dependent children and their appointment to positions of prestige gave the child-saving movement political power and helped to overcome factional disputes among sectarian organizations.[44] The presence of national reformers in Chicago and the efforts of Julia Lathrop were no doubt also responsible for the establishment of a state reformatory for delinquent girls in 1893.[45]

Governor Altgeld had a considerable influence on the child-saving movement. His politicai career, which was cut short by his pardoning the Haymarket "anarchists," was notable for its special interest in the welfare of minority groups, especially women, children, and criminals. He appointed wemen to political positions on the grounds that they were not as susceptible to bribery and corruption as men. He regarded children as innocent preys for industrial exploitation, and criminals as persons in need of guidance rather than repression. The penitentiaries, reformatories and jails, said Altgeld, were filled with "erring fellow-beings," whereas the "real" criminals were the industrialists and corrupt officials who were politically immune to criminal prosecution:[46]

> No government was ever overthrown by the poor, and we have nothing to fear from that source. It is the greedy and powerful that pull down the pillars of the state. Greed, corruption and pharisaism are today sapping the foundations of government. It is the criminal rich and their hangers-on who are the real anarchists of our time. They rely on

> fraud and brute force. They use government as a convenience and make justice the handmaid of wrong. We are developing a kind of carbonated patriotism which seems to derive its most sparkling qualities from respectable boodleism. Our country has great vitality, but these conditions must be arrested or else we are lost. Only those nations grow great which correct abuses, make reform, and listen to the voice of the struggling masses.[47]

Altgeld did not take a mere amateur interest in penology, for he was the author of a thoughtful pamphlet concerning *Our Penal Machinery and Its Victims* (published in 1884). It is a pamphlet in the true sense—a humanistic indictment of a "formal, iron-bound, and superficial" system, rather than a scholarly treatise. Alt-geld was horrified by conditions in penitentiaies and "lock-ups," by the overcrowded jails filled with unconvicted petty criminals, and by the economic injustices of sentencing practices. "Only recently have we begun to recognize the fact," wrote Altgeld, "that every man is to a great extent what his heredity and early environment have made him, and that the law of cause and effect applies here as well as in nature." He agreed with Enoch Wines that "human justice is a clumsy machine, and often deserves the punishment which it indicts," Adults and children alike are degraded, not improved, by harsh punishments.

> Does clubbing a man reform him? Does brutal treatment elevate his thoughts? Does handcuffing him fill him with goud resolves? Stop right here, and for a moment imagine yourself forced to submit to being handcuffed, and see what kind of feelings will be aroused in you. Submission to that one act of degradation prepares many a young man for a career of crime. It destroys the self-respect of others, and makes them the easy victim of crime.

Unlike most of the child savers, Altgeld was not afraid to acknowledge the economic inequalities behind the criminal law and its administration. He was not a sentimentalist when it came to the economic facts of life. The system, he wrote, "applies the *crushing process* to those who are already down; while the crafty criminal—especially if he be rich—is gently dealt with. . . ." What Altgeld was intimating was that the whole machinery of the criminal law was *politically* designed to intimidate and control the poor. Even the wealthy whores—"the petted children of sin [who] live in gilded palaces and dress in silks and satins"—were immune to prosecution. Altgeld was one of the first Illinois reformers to recommend the use of "probationary parole" and the indeterminate sentence, and he enthusiastically welcomed Enoch Wines' plan for establishing reformatories for young offenders.[48]

By 1893, the presence of hundreds of children in the jails was the central grievance of child-saving organizations. The Chicago Woman's Club became involved in jail reforms through the work of Adelaide Groves, who was made an honorary member of the Club for her philanthropic services. Mrs. Groves found the boys' wards of the jails to be "training schools" in crime, inhabited by "unkempt" and "vicious" children who would "soon be men, ripe for the penitentiary."[49] Discipline, hard work, silence, and segregation from adults were the answer to the problem. "We need a building and a yard," she wrote in one of her many letters to the press, "strongly constructed with a high wall, for these boys are great 'skippers.'"[50]

Chicago's eleven "police" courts typically handled children's cases and punished them with fines that were "laid out" in the House of Correction at the rate of fifty cents a day. In the first six months of 1899, 332 boys under the age of 16 were sent to the city jail, usually on charges of disorderly conduct which included everything from burglary to "flipping trains" and playing ball on the streets.[51]

In 1893, the Chicago Board of Education was persuaded to take over the supervision of boys under seventeen years who were committed to the city prison. The city council later

authorized the Board of Education to use money from the "school fund" to equip and operate a manual training school within the city prison. In 1897, the school was renamed after John Worthy, a commissioner of the prison, who encouraged and provided funds for the building of separate dormitories for delinquent boys.[52] The interest of educational authorities in the city prison was prompted by the fact that a high percentage of the inmate population was committed for truancy. By laws of 1883 and 1889, children between the ages of seven and fourteen were compelled to attend a public school for at least sixteen weeks in the year. Truant officers were authorized to "arrest children of school-going age, who habitually haunt public places, and have no lawful occupation, and also truant children who absent themselves from school without leave. . . ."[53] Although children under fourteen were prohibited by law from being employed, the truant officers or "attendance agents" were usually unable or unwilling to enforce this provision. In the second report of the Illinois factory inspectors in 1894. Florence Kelly reported that the job of rescuing children "from nicotine poisoning, from the miasma of the stock yards, and from the horrible conditions of the sweat shops" was frustrated by the lack of cooperation from the Board of Education. She complained that "unruly children are expelled from school to suit the convenience of teachers."[54]

The John Worthy School consequently became a glorified ware house for school troublemakers who could not escape—as most boys did—the truant officers and factory inspectors. The School's Superintendent, Robert Smith, was quite candid about the fact that he had to deal with "mischievous and incorrigible boys who will not go to school when they ought, and whose behavior is so bad when there that the teachers are only too glad to be rid of their presence in the classroom and wish they had stayed away."[55] At the Illinois Conference of Charities in 1898, Smith complained that his institution could not possibly reform a diverse group of offenders who were herded together in miserable surroundings for only brief period of time:[56]

> Under present conditions I do not wish to shoulder the responsibility of giving out to the citizens of Chicago that we have a place where mischievous and incorrigible boys are controlled and educated on the line of useful citizenship, when it is false. . . . The John Worthy School in its present condition is nothing more nor less than a school for crime, and until the city council of Chicago takes steps to isolate the boys from adult criminals, the evil will not be remedied.

Smith told the conference that the John Worthy School processed an annual average of 1,300 boys, of which over a quarter were truants. The average sentence in the institution was 29 days. "I would infinitely rather see my boy a truant," said Smith, "than run such a risk as having him imprisoned in the John Worthy School under present conditions."[57]

The concern for separate facilities for children was evident also in the juvenile court movement. According to the records of the Chicago Woman's Club, Mrs. Perry Smith recommended in 1891 the creation of a "juvenile court" so that children "might be saved from contamination of association with older criminals." Other influential members of the Club prevailed upon Judge Richard Tuthill to hold a separate court for children on Saturday mornings. The Club assigned a representative to this special court who acted in the capacity of probation officer and adviser to the judge."[58] By 1892, the New York courts were also hearing children's cases separately.[59]

The child savers recruited new members to their cause and sponsored fact-finding expeditions to other states. Lucy Flower,[60] a farmer president of the Chicago Woman's Club, visited Massachusetts to learn about their probation system; Jane Addams and Julia Lathrop attended the National Conference of Charities and Correction held in Toronto in 1897; and Hastings Hart, Secretary of the Children's Home and Aid Society, was a delegate to the

congress of the National Prison Association, where he recommended that dependent and delinquent children "be taken out of the slums and placed in clean homes, physically and morally, and put alone where they will not come into contact with their former associates."[61]

The child-saving movement was further legitimized by the Board of Public Charities, which, under the influence of Julia Lathrop, Ephraim Banning, and Frederick Wines, renewed its recommendation that the "general assembly should make some provision for the care of the destitute, neglected and dependent children of the State." The Board warned that "every child allowed to grow up in ignorance and vice, and so to become a pauper or a criminal, is liable to become in turn the progenitor of generations of criminals." What was needed, said the commissioners in their biennial report, was a massive effort to "rescue every child in the State exposed to destruction through neglect or abuse."[62]

Julia Lathrop, whose father was a lawyer, and Lucy Flower, who was married to one, realized that child-welfare reforms could only be accomplished with the support of political and professional organizations. "This is a legal matter," Julia Lathrop is supposed to have said. "It must not go to the legislature as a woman's measure; we must get the Bar Association to handle it."[63] Ephraim Banning, who served with Julia Lathrop on the Board of Public Charities, introduced the following resolution at the annual meeting of the Chicago Bar Association in October, 1898:

> WHEREAS, The State of Illinois and the City of Chicago, are lamentably deficient in proper care for delinquent children, accused or convicted of violation of law, lacking many of those reformatory institutions which exist in other progressive states of the union; and WHEREAS, Children accused of crime are kept in the common jails and police stations, and children convicted of misdemeanors are sentenced to the bridewell, where they are kept in immediate association with drunkards, vagabonds and thieves; and WHEREAS, The judges

> having charge of the trial of children are in our courts so overburdened with other work as to make it difficult to give due attention to the cases of children, particularly those of the dependent and neglected classes; and WHEREAS, The State of Illinois makes no provision for the care of most of the children dependent upon the public for support, other than the public almshouses—unlike many neighboring states which have long ago passed laws prohibiting the keeping of children in public almshouses: *Resolved*, That the president of this association appoint a committee of five of its members to investigate existing conditions relative to delinquent and dependent children, and to cooperate with committees of other organizations in formulating and securing such legislation as may be necessary to cure existing evils and bring the State of Illinois and the City of Chicago up to the standard of the leading states and cities of the Union.[64]

The President of the Bar Association, George Follansbee, appointed a committee consisting of Ephraim Banning, Harvey Hurd, Edwin Burritt Smith, John W. Eia, and Merritt Starr who cooperated with child-saving organizations to engineer a juvenile court bill through the legislature.

One month after the resolution of the Chicago Bar Association, the Illinois Conference of Charities devoted most of its program to child-saving issues.[65] The juvenile court plan was endorsed by a number of speakers, including B. M. Chipperfield, President of the State's Attorneys Association, who called for state supervision of delinquents. Major R. W. McClaughry, Warden of Joliet State Penitentiary, stressed the importance of removing children from the jails. "You can not take a boy of tender years," he said, "and lock him up with thieves, drunkards and half-crazy men of all classes and nationalities without teaching him lessons in crime." This criticism was echoed by the Superintendent of the John Worthy School who recommended that delinquents be remanded to educational authorities after their trial in

“juvenile court, presided over by a careful and most painstaking judge, empowered to commit them for longer terms than the present law permits. . . .” Frederick Wines best expressed the mood of the conference in his closing speech:

> We make criminals out of children who are not criminals by treating them as if they were criminals. That ought to be stopped. What we should have, in our system of criminal jurisprudence, is an entirely separate systems of courts fur children, in large cities, who commit offenses which would be criminal in adults. We ought to have a “children’s court” in Chicago, and we ought to have a “children’s judge,” who should attend to no other business. We want some place of detention for those children other than a prison. . . . No child ought to be tried unless he has a friend in court to look after his real interests. There should be someone there who has the confidence of the judge, and who can say to the court, “Will you allow me to make an investigation of this case? Will you allow me to make a suggestion to the court?”

The conference ended on a note of optimism and unity. “If we could only act together during one session of the Legislature,” said Julia Lathrop, “we could much improve the legislation of Illinois.” Reverend Jenkin Lloyd Jones, Chipperfield, Wines, and George Hobson (a member of the Board of Supervisors of Vermilion County) were appointed to a committee for the purpose of cooperating with other child-saving organizations in drafting a juvenile court bill. Similarly, the Chicago Bar Association examined the legal ramifications of child-welfare legislation and asked judge Harvey Hurd of Cook County Circuit Court to prepare a bill for the legislature. Hurd in turn consulted Timothy Hurley, of the Catholic Visitation and Aid Society, and Hastings Hart, of the Children’s Home and Aid Society. On December 10, 1898, Judge Hurd called a meeting in his office; attending were Lucy Flower, Julia Lathrop, Timothy

Hurley, Hastings Hart, State Representative John C. Newcomer, Superintendent A. G. Lane of the Public Schools system, County Jailor John L. Whitman, Carl Kelsey of the Children's Home and Aid Society, and Frank Soule, a businessman with philanthropic interests. Hurd was elected chairman and Hart secretary of this informal committee.[66]

The juvenile court bill, drafted by Judge Hurd in consultation with the Bar Association, Hurley, and Hart, was finally introduced by John Newcomer in the House of Representatives on February 7, 1889, and by Selon Case in the Senate on February 15. In March, a hearing was held before the judiciary committee of both houses sitting together in a joint session. To this hearing the Chicago Bar Association sent Hurd, Ephraim Banning, and Edwin Smith; other interests" were represented by Judge Orrin Carter, Hurley, and Thomas MacMillan. The constitutionality of the bill was defended by the legal spokesmen, while the representatives of child-saving organizations stressed its humanitarian implications. The juvenile court bill was passed without much delay or difficulty in the Senate but, "owing to repeated delays, it was not put on its passage in the House until the last day of the session and not finally voted on until late in the afternoon of that day." At this point, the Bar Association committee approached Governor Tanner and Speaker Sherman, "explaining the objects of the bill and securing their support and cooperation." Without their help, the bill would probably have failed to be passed.[67] On April 14, both Houses of the legislature passed "an act to regulate the treatment and control of dependent, neglected and delinquent children."[68]

SUMMARY

The juvenile court act of 1899 culminated nearly thirty years of reform efforts by child-saving organizations in Illinois. Its success was due in large measure to the fact that it was widely sponsored and in turn satisfied diverse interest groups:

1. Sectarian organizations supported the act because juvenile court judges were required to sentence children to institutions in accordance with their religious preference.
2. The industrial school legislation was not repealed by the act and industrial schools retained the power to release their wards or place them in foster bornes without the court's consent.
3. The Board of Public Charities regarded the juvenile court act as a confirmation of basic principles of preventive penology—comprehensive governmental control over "delinquent" youth, segregation of delinquents from adult offenders, access to "pre-delinquent" youth, indeterminate sentencing, and minimal judicial formality.
4. Administrators of reformatories welcomed the act as a means of facilitating the commitment and release of "delinquents" in a manner consistent with the requirements of the "new penology."

The juvenile court was not, as some writers have suggested, a "radical reform,"[69] but rather a politically compromised reform which consolidated existing practices. Conservative in origins, the act was passed with the help of influential members of the judiciary, the Chicago Bar Association, elite civic and feminist groups, state and private child-saving organizations, and politicians interested in "non-political" causes. Three themes in the juvenile court movement further reflect its conservatism and middle-class bias:

1. "Delinquents" were depicted as needing firm control and restraint if their reform was to be successful. The child savers were not indulgent sentimentalists; they recommended increased imprisonment as a means of removing delinquents from corrupting influences. Thus, it did not seem inconsistent to the President of the Illinois Humane Society that he should support the juvenile court for young offenders and corporal punishment and the

whipping post for older offenders.[70] It is inaccurate to regard the child savers as liberal reformers and their opponents as staunch conservatives, for the authoritarian impulse was implicit in the child-saving movement.

2. Although the child savers affirmed the value of the home and family as the basic institutions of American society, they facilitated the removal of children from "a home which fails to fulfill its proper function." The child savers set such high standards of family propriety that almost any parent could be accused of not fulfilling his "proper function." In effect, only lower-class families were evaluated as to their competence, whereas the propriety of middle-class families was exempt from investigation and recrimination.
3. The blurring of distinctions between "dependent" and "delinquent" children and the corresponding elimination of due process for juveniles, served to make a social fact out of the norm of adolescent dependence. "Every child is dependent," held the Board of Public Charities. "Dependence is a child's natural condition." It was one task of the child Savers to punish premature independence in children and restrict youthful autonomy. Proponents of constitutional protections for children were rebuked for impeding the "systematic and adequate effort for the salvation of all the children who are in need of savior."[71]

Notes

1. See Appendix, pp. 183–202.
2. This subject is cursorily treated by Andrew A. Bruce, "One Hundred Years of Criminological Development in Illinois," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 24 (1933): 11–49. For a more general analysis, see Wiley B. Sanders, "Some Early Beginnings of the Children's Court Movement in England," *National Probation Association Yearbook* 39 (1945): 58–70. See also, Leslie A. Cranston, *Early Criminal Codes of Illinois and their*

Relation to the Common Law of England.

3. "An infant under the age of 10 years shall not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor" (Revised Laws of Illinois, 1827, sect. 4).
4. Revised Laws of Illinois, 1827, sects. 29, 46, 47, 48, 50. See also, Helen Rankin Jeter, *The Chicago Juvenile Court,* pp. 1–2.
5. Revised Laws of Illinois, 1833, sect. 158.
6. *Ibid.,* 1867, sect. 16.
7. *Ibid.,* 1872, sects. 1, 2, 3.
8. *Ibid.,* 1867, sect. 16.
9. This point is suggested by Elizabeth Francis Hirsh, *A Study of the Chicago and Cook County School for Boys,* pp. 3–13, and by Evelyn Harrier Randall, *The St. Charles School for Delinquent Boys,* pp. 2–13.
10. *First Biennial Report of the Board of State Commissioners of Public Charities of the State of Illinois* (hereafter *BRPC1* ———), p. 72 (Springfield: Illinois Journal Printing Office, 1871).
11. *Ibid.,* p. 167.
12. *People v. Turner,* 55 Ill. 280 (1870).
13. *BRPC4,* p. 149 (Springfield, Illinois: D. W. Lusk, 1877).
14. *Ibid.,* pp. 152–56.
15. *BRPC10,* p. 10 (Springfield: Springfield Printing Company, 1888).
16. *BRPC7,* p. 92 (Springfield: H. W. Rokker, 1883). Two years later, it was reported that "the boys sleep in double-deck bunks, one over the other, placed close to each other, side by side and end to end, with passages at the ends to enable them to crawl into bed. The dining room barely contains room enough for them to eat standing—not enough for them to sit down at their meals. From every point of view, sanitary as well as disciplinary, this arrangement is

in the highest degree injurious and discreditable to a great and wealthy State" *(BRPC8,* p. *64* [Springfield: H. W. Rokker, 1885]).

17. Hirsh, *Study of School for Boys,* p. 5.
18. *BRPC5,* pp. 273–99 (Springfield: Weber, Magie and Co., 1879).
19. *BRPC9*. p. 52 (Springfield: T. W. Kokker, 1887).
20. *Ibid.,* pp. 52–84.
21. *BRPC6,* p. 104 (Springfield: H.W. Rokker, 1880).
22. *BRPC1,* pp. 2–3, 7. For a lengthy discussion of the Board's powers, see Johnson, *Public Policy and Privale Charities,* pp. 52 f.
23. "Mere suspicion of crime places the accused under ban, and deprives him of all rights, except to those of an enemy. The conversion of a criminal into an honest man seems to be looked upon as so hopeless an undertaking as to be unworthy of even an effort. He is treated as an outlaw, a foe to mankind, an Ishmaelite, whose hand is against every man, and every man's hand against him. . . . A man who becomes a criminal . . . does not cease to be a man. As a man, he has rights, which, as men, we are bound to respect. We have no more right to infringe upon his rights, than be has to infringe upon ours. We may demand restitution. We may use all wise and lawful means to cure him of his weakness and criminal tendencies. But to outlaw him, to cut him off as an unworthy member, is like amputating a sore finger, without first endeavoring to heal the sore. Injustice to the criminal is an injury to society" (*BRPC1,* pp. 126–27).
24. *Ibid.,* pp. 175–84.
25. *BRPC6,* p. 117.
26. *BRPC1,* p. 187.
27. *BRPC2,* pp. 197–38 (Springfield: State Journal Steam Print 1873).
28. *BRPC3,* p. 51 (Springfield: State Journal Steam Print, 1875).

29. Randall, *The St. Charles School*, p. 5.

30. *BRPC4.* p. 81. “Thus society, by its own want of foresight, its indifference, its indolent self-indulgence and toleration of evils which it would cost more effort to obviate than society is willing to make, actually trains offenders, stimulates and qualifies them to become great criminals. In effect, crime is not punished at all, nor is any intelligent attempt made to reform the offender, so long as the crime assumes the form of a mere misdemeanor. Not until it reaches the stage of actual felony does society make any earnest attempt to grapple with the evil” (*ibid.*, p. 187).

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 186–87.

32. Although twenty-five new jails were built in six years from 1870 to 1876, the Board complained that many of them merely perpetuated the old evils. “If we had been consulted with reference to some of these jails, we could have saved some of the counties from serious mistakes and unnecessary expense. The building of so many new jails is, in one aspect of the question, to be regretted, for the reason that the amount of money spent in their election, during ten years past, aggregating, as it does, three-quarters of a million dollars, might have been applied to better effect in the construction of district prisons, built by the state itself” (*BRPC5*, p. 180).

33. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

34. *BRPC7*, P. 307.

35. “The so-called school room is furnished wirh three long benches, one table, a chair and a stool. These benches are so crowded that the boys who are attempting to write upon slates strike their elbows into their next neighbor, who vigorously resists, therefore the writing lesson is not a success. The hooks are from the attics of our friends and embrace much ancient literature. . . . Fortunately the singing books are alike, and that lesson is received and rendered with the vigor of boys; they beat the time with their feet and heads. . . . Miss

Wright makes this her strong lesson, explaining the meaning of the gospel words, and letting them select the hymns to be sung" (letter from Adelaide Groves to *Chicago Inter Ocean,* November 12, 1884).

36. *Chicago Inter Ocean,* Jane 6, 1884.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Chicago Tribune,* November 6, 1888.
39. *BRPC11,* p. 194 (Springfield: H: W. Rokker, 1890).
40. *BRPC12,* p. 196 (Springfield: H. W. Rokker, 1893).
41. Timothy D. Hurley, *Origin of the lllinois Juvenile Court Law,* pp. 139–40.
42. Henriette Greenbaum Frank and Amalie Hofer Jerome, *Annals of the Chicago Woman's Club for the first forty Years of its Organization,* 1876–1976, pp. 125 f.
43. For an interesting survey of the teaching of sociology and criminology in American universities, see Daniel Fulcomer, "Instruction in Sociology in Institutions of Learning." *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction,* 1894, pp. 67–85.
44. "Up to that time, visitation of State and County institutions had been largely perfunctory . . . and limited in the main to the State Institutions. Miss Lathrop determined to visit and see for herself and in the course of the work she went to every jail and poor house in the State, even in the most out-of-the-way localities. She was shocked at the conditions she found, young children shut up with the most depraved adults and being trained in crime instead of being kept away from it. She determined not to rest until some remedy for the these conditions was found" (Hurley, Origin of the Illinois Juvenile Court Law, pp. 17–18).
45. Revised Laws of Illinois, 1893, pp. 119–23.
46. *Proceedings of the Annual Congress of the National Prison Association,* pp. 13–19 (Chicago: 1893). For an analysis of Altgeld's political career, see Ray Ginger, *Altgeld's America: The Lincoln Ideal Versus Changing Realities.*

47. Biennial message to the legislature by Governor Altgeld in the *Journal of the House of Representatives of Illinois* (1897).
48. John P. Altgeld, *Our Penal Machinery and Its Victims,* pp. 20, 24, 34–37, 41–42.
49. *Chicago Inter Ocean,* June 6, 1884.
50. *Ibid.,* December, 1884. Actual date is not known but a copy of the letter is available at the Chicago Historical Society.
51. Sophonisba P. Breckenridge and Edith Abbott, *The Delinquent Child and the Home,* pp. 1–2 (New York: Survey Associates Inc., 1916).
52. Robert M. Smith, "Boys in City Prison," *Proceedings of the Illinois Conference of Charities* (1898), in *BRPC15,* pp. 331–35 (Springfield: Phillips Brothers, 1899).
53. Revised Laws of Illinois, 1883, pp. 131–32: "An Act to Secure to all Children the Benefit of an Elementary Education." Revised Laws of Illinois, 1889, p. 237: "An Act Concerning the Education of Children."
54. *Second Annual Report of the Factory Inspectors of Illinois* (1894).
55. Smith, "Boys in City Prison," p. 331.
56. "For the lack of proper sleeping quarters, where they could be properly confined and isolated from the old and hardened criminals, these boys pass their time harming themselves and injuring the community by careers of vice, diversified by occasional short terms in the county jail or house of correction" (Smith, "Boys in City Prison," pp. 328–37).
57. *Ibid.*
58. "The work of this noble oganization was initial, persistent and effective. Well do I remember how many years ago, when it became my turn to hold the Criminal Court, I first visited the jail and found the cells of the old jail filled with boys, some of them under what was then called the age of responsibility, ten years. I requested the State's Attorney to have a calendar of all the boys' cases made out for me, telling him that I wished to dispose of

their cases before I began on the adults. . . . Mts. Lucy Flower, Mrs. Perry Smith and others . . . at once set to work to do what could be done to improve the situation. . . . The Club thereupon employed and paid for some two or three years a young lady who gave her service in behalf of the little children in the jail every day. No more loving and inspiring work was ever done by woman. . . . Then began the work of changing the law of Illinois with respect to the care and treatment of all boys and girls under 17 years of age, who were found in a condition of delinquency. In all the consultations and work done in the preparation of this law, which became the Juvenile Court Law of Illinois, the most humane and wisest law ever enacted in any state of the Union, the Woman's Club took a most important and effective part. . . . The first probation officer appointed by the Judge of the Juvenile Court was one of the remarkable women of Chicago, Mrs. Alzina P. Stevens, then residing at Hull-House. Mrs. Flower brought her to me and said that 'this lady, you will find, can be very helpful as a probation officer, and we will see that she is paid for her service,' as there was no provision in the law for the payment of probation officers—not even one . . ." (Richard Tuthill, the first juvenile court judge in Illinois, quoted by Frank and Jerome, *Annals of the Chicago Woman's Club,* pp. 179–80).

59. Hurley, *Origin of the Illinois Juvenile Court Law,* p. 14.
60. For a portrait of this reformer, see Harriet S. Farwell, *Lucy Louise Flower, 1837–1920; Her Contribution to Education and Child Welfare in Chicago.*
61. *Proceedings of the Annual Congress of the National Prison Association, Indianapolis, 1899,* p. 382.
62. *BRPC15,* pp. 62–72.
63. Hurley, *Origin of the Illinois Juvenile Court Law,* p. 18.
64. I would like to thank the Chicago Bat Association fot providing me with a copy of the original document.

65. *Proceedings of the Illinois Conference of Charities*, pp. 310–37.

66. Hurley, *Origin of the Illinois Juvenile Court Law*. pp. 21–32.

67. *Report of the Chicago Bar Association Juvenile Court Committee* (October 28, 1899). A copy of the original document was provided by the Chicago Historical Society. Louise Bowen gives another, more dramatic version of how the act was passed: "I happened to know at that time a noted Illinois politician; I asked him to my house and told him I wanted to get this law passed at once. The legislature was in session; he went to the telephone in my library, called up one of the bosses in the Senate and one in the House and said to each one, There is a bill, number so and so, which I warn passed; see that it is done at once. One of the men whom he evidently called said, 'What is there in it?' and the reply was. 'There is nothing in it, but a woman I know wants it passed.' And it was passed, I thought with horror at the time, supposing it had been a bad bill, it would have been passed in exactly the same-way" (*Growing Up With a City*, p. 107).

68. Revised Laws of Illinois, 1899, pp. 131–37.

69. Rosenheim, *Justice for the Child*, p. 7. A similar inference is made by Herbert H. Lou, *Juvenile Courts in the United States*, pp. 1–31, and Board of Commissioners of Cook County, Illinois, *Juvenile Court of Cook County: Fiftieth Anniversary Report* (1949).

70. *New York Evening Journal*, May 17, 1899.

71. *BRPC15*, pp. 62–72.

Reading 35

The Hyper-Criminalization of Black and Latino Male Youth in the Era of Mass Incarceration

Victor M. Rios

In its function, the power to punish is not essentially different from that of curing or educating. (Foucault 1995, 303)

Carceralization as a Youth of Color Phenomenon

In the era of mass incarceration, Black and Latino youth face a coming of age crisis determined by criminalization and carceralization. The majority of Black and Latino inmates are youth; almost three quarters of all Black and Latino jail and prison inmates in the U.S. are between the ages of 20-39.[1] As of 2003 12% of all Black males in their 20s were in prison or jail; almost 4% of Latinos and only 1.5% of whites in their 20s were incarcerated (Harrison, 2003). One in three African American youth ages 20–29 are incarcerated or on probation or parole (Harrison, 2003).

While Latino youth do not match the outrageous incarceration rates that Black youth contend with, they too are disproportionately confined, especially in areas with large Latino populations. For example, as of 2002, in California, Latino youth represented 36% of the states youth population, however, they made up close to 60% of the state's juvenile detainees (Villaruel & Walker, 2002); Black youth made up roughly 7.8% of the state's population, yet they comprised almost 30% of juvenile detainees (Males & Macallair, 2000).

In Black and Latino communities, mass incarceration has become a youth phenomenon.

In California, youth of color are 2.5 times more likely than white kids to be tried as adults and 8.3 times more likely to be incarcerated by adult courts. Ninety-five percent of all juveniles sent to adult court are youth of color. In Los Angeles a stunning 91% of all cases in the adult criminal court involve youth (Males & Macallair, 2000). Recent punitive expansion and the material effects of mass incarceration have come to affect some of the youngest populations in Black and Latino communities. The trajectory of this article is to account for the social effects of mass incarceration and criminalization on young males of color, those populations most affected by these systems that generate and exacerbate social misery.

These young adult deviants do not become on their 18th birthday, rather they are systematically constructed as criminals and face the wrath of the penal state and criminalization as early as 8 years of age (see for example Ferguson, 2000). Scholars have argued that in the contemporary historical bloc punishment and carceralization are at the center of racial inequality and social misery (Davis, 2003; Castells, 1997; Parenti, 2000; Wacquant, 2002). Expanding on this argument, this article will demonstrate that spillover from the ever-expanding power and punitiveness of criminal justice policies and practices affect every member of poor racialized communities in multiple ways, especially urban youth of color. Some scholars have begun to analyze this structure of punishment that extends its tentacles beyond the offender and systematically damages the transgressors family, friends, and community. Scholars have termed this spillover effect the “collateral consequences of mass imprisonment” (Chesney-Lind & Mauer, 2004). These scholars have argued that punishment not only affects the confined individual but rather expands itself to family members and the inmate’s community. Building on this argument I demonstrate how the punitive expansion of the state has created a new system of social relations that stigmatize and criminalize poor youth of color at an everyday level.

Mass imprisonment and the cultural, political, and economic arrangements that

accompany it have had a devastating social impact on young male adolescents in the inner city, specifically Black and Latino male youth. Furthermore, the lives of Black and Latino youth who are labeled "deviant" are enforced by institutional entities that treat them as serious criminal threats ready to commit savage acts of violence even if they have only been arrested for drug possession or status offenses. This collateral consequence of mass imprisonment has brought about a network of criminalization, surveillance, and punishment that serves as a main socializing and control agent for Black and Latino youth who have been labeled "deviant."

The Research Context: Studying Criminalized Experiences

The article is based on 40 in-depth, semi-structured "ethnographic interviews" (Spradley, 1979) I conducted in Oakland, San Francisco, and Berkeley, California with Black and Latino youth ages 14 to 18. Each of these cities has unique social, cultural, economic, and political landscapes. However, they are part of a larger metropolis—the San Francisco Bay Area—where extreme racial disparities in family incomes, disproportionate incarceration rates by race, and major disparities in educational, housing, transportation, and employment between communities of color and white communities exist. For example, as of 2002 in Alameda County (where Oakland and Berkeley are located), non-Hispanic whites held higher-paying, higher-skill jobs and they held 68% of all executive, administrative, and managerial positions. Minorities represented 42% of Alameda County's work force but made up 60% of service sector jobs.[2] The bay area has the highest general unemployment rate in the state, 8%, with people of color making up the bulk of those who are unemployed.[3] This number represents the general adult population. Some community workers and probation officers I have talked to estimate the unemployment rate for young males of color between ages 18–30

to be over 30%.

In each city, I grounded myself in a specific community setting where Black and Latino youth were mutually accessible. In the past twenty years all three cities' traditionally Black communities have seen a huge increase in Latino populations therefore transforming them into Black and Latino communities. In Berkeley and San Francisco I conducted research based at youth development community centers (Berkeley Youth Alternatives and Real Alternatives Project). In Oakland I conducted research based out of a youth-led organization that focused on political mobilization in the community (OLLIN). I asked youth development workers, youth leaders, and teachers to help identify and recruit "criminalized" youth.[4] After recruiting a first round of youth I asked them to connect me with youth who had a prior arrest. This allowed me to interview youth from similar environments with similar experiences in order to compare differences in personal attitudes, experiences, and ethnicity. After recruiting the youth I followed them to their schools, homes, juvenile court appearances, and leisure spaces.

Half of the youth I interviewed was Black (20) while the other half was Latino (20). I wanted to contrast and compare the experiences of both racialized groups. Were their experiences different even though they lived and grew up in similar environments? If the youth I observed and interviewed, Black or Latino, lived in the same neighborhoods and attended the same schools, were they criminalized in similar ways? Did they commit similar crimes? Did they have the same attitudes about the criminal justice system?

I recruited a control group of 10 youth who had never been arrested but lived in the same area and associated with the juveniles who had been arrested. Although these youth were "at-risk" and often participated in negative behaviors, they were considered to be "good kids" by their peers. This control group would show the difference in criminalization between those arrested and those who had not been arrested but had been identified in the community as

risks.

Six (out of 30) of the arrested youth were arrested between the ages of 12 and 14; 17 were arrested at age 15; and 7 had been arrested between the ages of 16 and 17. For most (28 out of 30), all arrests happened for non-violent acts such as vandalism, petty theft, and burglary. Out of the snowball sample of youth that I recruited only two arrests had taken place for violent crimes against other youth. A limitation to this study was that I did not recruit many violent offenders. However, the sample seems representative of juvenile delinquency in the inner city: most youth are arrested for non-violent offenses but are managed as a serious criminal risk despite their status. Of the two violent offenders that I studied, Tyrone had stabbed another youth and Jose had hit another youth in the head with a baseball bat. Their initial arrests and experiences were similar to the youth who had not committed acts of violence. The violent youth were arrested multiple times for non-violent offenses prior to their first violent offense. Both Tyrone and Jose ended up incarcerated for long periods of time after I conducted my interviews with them. Jose would later get arrested for shooting another youth in the leg. As of the fall of 2005 he was on trial facing five to twenty years in prison. Tyrone ended up arrested for assaulting a police officer. He was sentenced to fourteen months at the county jail.

For the 28 youth who were arrested for non-violent crimes, their experiences with the justice system were similar: they went to juvenile hall from 1–60 days; they were released on a monitoring device and/or on probation; and they were given specific conditions of probation—to go directly from school to home, not to associate with their former peers, and not to hang out on the streets. Ten of them ended up with a monitoring device shackled to their ankle that would beep and alert the probation department if the youth wondered away from their home.

Governed as Criminals

If social structures are visible and identifiable through the everyday "common sense" expressions and interactions that individuals in society have with one another (Garfinkel, 1967), then, the "youth control complex" became visible to me as I interviewed and observed my subjects in their everyday interactions and conversations about criminalization. However, beyond simply examining my subjects as agents whose behavioral patterns I could observe in order to understand larger social structures, I took seriously the experience and thinking that youth brought to the table. Taking the voice of youth seriously allowed me to conduct my research "from the ground up." From this perspective, I followed the logic and structure of the social worlds they inhabited. This approach led me to understand how the interactions that youth had with individuals who criminalized them were used to make sense of their social world.

The findings show that youth not only felt the direct effects of incarceration and police repression but they also experience what Jonathan Simon (1997) calls "governance through crime." That is, the everyday impact that citizens experience from encounters with a society obsessed with surveillance, security, and punitive penal practices. For Simon, in a society that over the past 30 years has increased its prison population over five-fold and that continues to generate draconian punitive sentencing, it is not only the criminal that suffers from the hyper-punitiveness but also the everyday law-abiding citizen. He argues that in today's society, politicians have heavily "governed through crime." For Simon, crime has become the central tool for governing the everyday citizen, even if they have never committed crime. Crime and punishment have been prioritized in the U.S. to influence the actions of the everyday citizen. It is not that the U.S. has a crisis of crime in its inner cities but rather, it is a crisis of "governance," both in the public and private sphere. This crisis of governance stems not from

an increase in crime but from the failure of traditional institutions of governance like the welfare state, labor market, and the education system and from the states inability to provide social and economic security (Simon, 1997).

The youth in this study are youth that have been affected by the decline of the welfare state and the expansion of the criminal justice system. As the youth attempted to deal with this social dislocation—this disorientation, where they could not expect any help or support from the government, where the government had become an abusive step-parent figure, beating its children, throwing them in a room with no windows nor doors—they began to lose hope in the government and in themselves. The youth felt that on an everyday level, their lives were being defined and controlled through discourses and practices of crime and policies related to crime even when they were not committing crime. As I continued to interview and observe them I realized that even if they did not want to commit crime, be seen as delinquent, or act like "thugs," they were already rendered as suspects by many in the community. Because of this, they developed identities that they often wished they could renounce. They began to resist and as they resisted they began to embrace their own criminalization.

Growing up a Criminal

Jose

Jose is a 17-year-old gang-involved youth from Berkeley that I have worked with since he was 13. He has been in and out of trouble since 6th grade and has been to juvenile hall four times. From an early age Jose has experienced policing and surveillance from both criminal justice and non-criminal justice institutions. Over time, Jose has come to understand this

combined effect of being criminalized from multiple directions as a single system out to dehumanize him. He explains,

> Man, it's like everyday teachers gotta' sweat me, police gotta pocket check me, mom's gotta' trip on me, and my P.O.'s gotta stress me. . . .
>
> It's like having a zookeeper watching us at all times. We walk home and we see them [probation officers and police], we shoot some hoops and we see them, we take a shit at school, and we see them. . . .[5]

Jose is describing an all too common phenomenon where penal practices, traditionally carried on by probation and police officers, have entered other social and private spaces including recreation (community centers), schools, and even the family.

Jose comes from a poor, single-mother household. He has a vivid memory of deviance he saw committed around him and that he committed as early as age 9. He remembers seeing fights on the way from school to home at least once a week. When asked how many crimes, of all types, he remembers seeing on a daily basis, he responds:

> Shit! I can't even count. Crime, I see it everyday, all day. It's like if you try to hide from it, it will find you anyway . . .[6]

Jose remembers his first act of deviance:

> The first time I was in third grade. I had set the bathroom garbage can on fire. We ran away, and they caught us and handcuffed us. . . . I was just trying to do something funny. Police came and arrested me and my friends. They only had a pair of handcuffs and they

> handcuffed me and my friend together. This is the first time I got arrested. I also flunked that year.[7]

Jose and 26 out of 30 previously arrested youth I interviewed report that teachers at school have direct contact with the school officer and his probation officer. After school, when Jose attends the local youth development community center to participate in leisure activities, he meets with his probation officer who is also stationed at the community center. His mother is forced to deal with the probation officer since he maintains direct contact with her and begins to influence the way she parents. Jose explains:

> My moms started trippin' on me like never before, you feel me? She started telling me to not wear baggy pants and to stop talking the way I did. I asked her who told her these things since she never tripped before and she told me that my probation officer had told her to tell me this stuff. . . . I got mad and I left and went to kick it at BYA [the community center]. When I got there my PO was there hanging out. I was mad at him so I left. I went to the park and the police were there trying to fuck with me too.[8]

For Jose and most of the other youth, their experience of being watched, managed, and treated as a criminal began at a young age and became exacerbated after their first offense, in most cases a misdemeanor. Their minor transgression had branded them with a seal that would make their one-time criminal act into a permanent criminal identity. For example, a few weeks after his first arrest for carrying a $10 bag of marijuana, Jose began to realize that everyone in the community knew about his arrest and probation. Beginning at home and ending at the local community program, adults now treated him differently. Jose began to feel watched, police began to randomly stop and search him, his teachers would threaten him with

calling his probation officer if he disobeyed at school, his mother constantly reminded him that he would end up in jail if he misbehaved.

After their first offense, most of the youth in the study were labeled and treated as criminals not only by police, courts, and probation but also by teachers, community centers, and even parents. The permanent "criminal" signifier began when the youth was assigned a probation officer. The officer served the role of informing the entire community that the youth had permutated into a risk. He was now to be monitored and controlled by an authority figure assigned by the state: the probation officer.

Probation

The probation officer served the purpose of punishing the youth by branding him a criminal in front of the rest of the community and marking his territory in all settings in which the youth was a participant. Community centers made office space available for probation officers to manage youth from a closer location to their home. Parents were constantly interacting with and often being chastised and influenced by probation officers. Teachers had direct contact with probation officers to inform them when the youth had misbehaved.

At the end of their initial arrest, all youth were given some sort of surveillance program. Most youth (24 out of 30) received a probation officer that they had to meet with once a week to once a month, the rest were given probation without a formal relationship. The meetings would often take place at neighborhood community centers located near the youth's homes. Out of 24 youth that had a probation officer, 18 of them met with them at local community centers or at school. The 18 youth that met with probation officers in their local community demonstrated a feeling that others perceived them differently than those youth who checked in with probation officers at the county probation office. Youth spoke of feeling humiliated

because everyone in the community knew that they were on probation. They felt like "criminals" even if they were trying to improve their lives. However, probation did keep a lot of the youth from committing further crime.

From the perspective of juvenile probation and many of the school authorities, the point of the probation officer being present at community centers and schools was to make sure that the youth who were on probation followed all the rules and did not commit another crime. For the most part, this goal seemed to work well with the youth that I interviewed; however, after the youth were released from probation, their chances of being rearrested increased drastically.

The youth believed that one of the biggest changes they faced after being released was the overwhelming presence of their probation officers. Youth went from having little direct supervision and control for most of their lives to having a disruptive control force in their lives waiting for them to, as one of the youth put it, "fuck up." In being present in all aspects of the youths' lives, probation officers could potentially have a positive impact in the youth's rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Often, the youth did follow the strict orders of the probation officer but only in the direct presence of the officer. In the accounts of the youth, at first probation officers helped them "stay in line" but later would become hindrances in their recovery. The probation officer served as a direct threat and locus of control for the youth only while the youth maintained direct contact with him or her.

As soon as youth were taken off their intensive probation program like Electronic Monitoring, weekly meetings, and home arrest, they began to commit acts that further criminalized them and often led to a second arrest. Youth often expressed that being contained, monitored, and threatened for so long to function normally made them unable to control themselves and operate normally in society when the direct authoritative treatment was removed. Youth were being taught to live normally in society under forceful supervision

and sanctions from the state. When the absolute force was removed, so was the positive behavior of the youth.

Ronny

Ronny's day-to-day experience provides a deeper insight to processes of hyper-criminalization experienced by youth. Ronny is a 16-year-old African-American male from Berkeley, California. He is currently on probation and is mandated to attend an "anger management" program at Berkeley Youth Alternatives for defying his probation officer. For school he is attending Independent Study, a program where students complete courses at their own pace without attending class. On a typical day, Ronny wakes up at about 10:00 or 11:00 A.M. and walks to Berkeley High School, arriving there at lunch time. Since Berkeley High School is an open campus, students fill up the local shops and restaurants in the main avenue, Shattuck. During 11:45 and 12:45 P.M., swarms of youth travel the streets surrounding the school. For Ronny, this is a time to catch up with friends and foes as they walk from the school to the street. Ronny usually hangs out at a corner near the main avenue and waits for his friends to meet him there. When they arrive he either stands there with them or catches up on events that have occurred in school or the community. If Ronny sees one of his many rivals, he confronts them and sometimes engages in them in a fist fight. It is during this time of day that Ronny is very likely to get arrested. Twice he has been booked by police during the lunch hour for fighting.

After the lunch hour adventure at Berkeley High School, Ronny walks to the Independent Study Office where he turns in work and receives a new packet. Sometimes Ronny goes to this office even if he has not done any work to turn in or does not have an appointment for that day. He explains that he is usually bored by the afternoon and wants a place to hang out.

He figures that the teachers might take him in and help him with his assignments; however, most of the time the teachers are not there or are busy with other youth. Ronny walks toward BYA (the community center) and waits outside of the center until 3:30 P.M. when they open the doors to youth. There he plays basketball with friends and takes his anger management class; meets with his probation officer; or talks with a center staff or counselor about his progress. He reports that, like his teachers, the community center staff often report him to his probation officer if he misbehaves at the center.

The center closes at 8:00 P.M. This is when Ronny walks to the park that sits adjacent to the community center. Often his friends meet there to play more basketball; smoke and drink; and talk about their lives until about 10:00 P.M. This is when most youth go home but Ronny walks home, checks in with his grandmother and walks out and sits on his front steps with a few friends who stay out late as well. Most of the time, Ronny's evenings are fairly mundane. But occasionally it is after the end of the program that Ronny and friends fight with rivals; conduct drug deals; and/or break into cars. Two of Ronny's arrests have taken place after 8:00 P.M.

A few weeks after starting his probation program, Ronny began to realize that even his own family had begun to question his innocence. Ronny explains:

> My grandma keeps asking me about when I'm gonna' get arrested again. She thinks just 'cause I went in before, I will go in again…at school my teachers talk about calling the cop again to take me away . . . cop keeps checking up on me. He's always at the park making sure I don't get in trouble again . . . my P.O. [probation officer] is always knocking on my door trying to talk shit to me . . . even at BYA [the local youth development organization] the staff treat me like I'm a fuck up again . . .[9]

Over time, Ronny and other youth I interviewed normalize being treated as criminals by most adult members in their community. They see it as an everyday way of life that they have to cope with and learn to navigate. Like Pierre Bourdieou's *Symbolic Violence* (1992) where the subject internalizes and perpetuates his own oppression, the youth internalize their criminalization and respond by "acting bad." Both resistance and expectations of negative encounters with school and justice authorities become normalized as routine features of the environments in which these youth live and navigate. In order for the state to succeed in criminalizing youth it has to make the youth believe that surveillance, brutality, crime, and criminalization is part of everyday life; it has to convince the subject that he indeed is a criminal, or in the words of the youth, a "thug." In this way, the dominated group accepts as legitimate its own condition of domination (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). The "bad kids" internalize their criminalization as a normal part of their everyday lives; hence, youth who are criminalized react to criminalization through criminality. Ronny concludes:

> Shit don't change. It doesn't matter where I go, I'm seen as a criminal. I just say, if you are gonna treat me as a criminal than I'm gonna treat you like I am one you, feel me? I'm gonna make you shake so that you can say that there is a reason for calling me a criminal . . . I grew up knowing that I had to show these fools [adults who criminalize youth] that I wasn't going to take their shit [sic] I started to act like a thug even if I wasn't one . . . part of it was me trying to be hard, the other part was them treating me like a criminal.[10]

At an early age Ronny developed an identity that made him act aggressively towards other youth. He talks about being forced to learn to interact with peers by "acting hard" around them. When I asked him what he remembered most about growing up around peers who were involved in delinquent behavior, he said that he had to pretend to be bad in order to get

respect, even if he did not want to be bad. Ronny was, as Elijah Anderson (1994) has explained, learning to "code switch." In order to survive the order of the streets and, as I explain, in order to resist the order of hyper-criminalization, Ronny was acting "bad" even if deep inside he simply wanted to do good. The youth have developed strategies of survival in order to cope with the violence of the state and other institutions that criminalize and punish them. However, as Paul Willis (1977) has demonstrated, in resisting their oppression, working class youth often dig themselves deeper into a hole, perpetuating their subordinate status in society. This was the case with the youth in this study.

Jr.

This theme continued to play out with many of the youth I interviewed. The youth knew they wanted to improve their lives and follow their probation program, however they were often influenced in other directions. Jr., a 15-year-old Latino from San Francisco, asked his probation officer for guidance when he came to the conclusion that he wanted to change this negative behavior and follow his instinct:

> I just wanted to start doing better so I told my probation officer to help me. He said that it's easy I had to stay away from all those crazy kids I hung around with. He also told me that if I got caught with them I would go back to jail. He told me to tell them that I would go to jail if I talked to them but they didn't believe me . . . he told me "its common sense" but he's not the one that has to walk on the street.[11]

Besides facing pressure from peers, the youth had to contend with the pressure of adults who were cynical about their ability to do well. Youth often reported that instead of finding ways

to support them through rehabilitation and academic and community support, adults from various institutions in the community managed the youth as risks rather than creating a support program.

Jr. reported that teachers at his school had direct contact with the school officer and his probation officer. When Jr. got in trouble in the classroom his teacher filled out a card from the school's police officer. The police officer would check in with the teacher every afternoon and if Jr. had a mark on his card the officer would come and make threats, handcuff him, and/or throw him in the back seat of the police car for long periods of time in front of his peers at the school. The constant surveillance and threats imposed by the police officer at his school made him feel that he was "doing time" in jail while at school. For Jr., school was like jail in the sense that the minute he stepped into it he was under strict supervision and faced the threat of severe punishment with every move he made.

After school Jr. would walk to the local community center to "hang out" and meet with his probation officer who was stationed at the community center. Jr. would walk into the center, greet the staff, check out a basketball and play with some of his friends. At seven o'clock he would drop the ball and walk a few offices past the gym to meet with his probation officer. His probation officer was stationed at the community center due to a grant that the community center received from the county juvenile justice department. The purpose of the grant was to provide services at the community center to juvenile delinquents. The condition was that the center was to provide a probation officer an office space to meet with clients. The result was a combining of social services with state surveillance in one location. As the study went on I realized that the punitive arm of the state, the criminal justice enterprise, had percolated itself into traditionally nurturing institutions like the family and the community center. This created a contradiction since the philosophy and practice of these two very different institutions have traditionally diverged: the criminal justice system, while at

times attempting to reform, is primarily concerned with managing crime and imposing sanctions on transgressors; the community center, a social service institution, is concerned with providing emotional, physical, and academic support to its clients, unconditionally, with the intention of developing individuals into healthy, independent, and responsible citizens. What happens then when the punishing arm of the state imposes itself physically and procedurally onto nurturing institutions?

When the punitive arm of the state crosses into traditionally nurturing institutions, delinquent kids become labeled and treated as criminals not only by police, courts, and probation, but also by teachers, community centers, and even parents. This is a problem when the latter institutions are meant to make productive citizens out of youth, not to render them as criminals risking that the youth internalize this criminalization and become ticking time bombs. Stanley Cohen (1972) calls this process "deviance amplification," where parents participate in labeling their kids as criminals and in the process end up alienating themselves from their children. In his classic study, Cohen (1972) illustrates how youth can fall into a spiral of deviance when, as an act of resistance to authority figures (i.e., police) they commit more and more intense acts of deviance. Rather than break away from hyper-criminalization, Black and Latino youth are unfortunately conforming and internalizing their oppression. However, beyond Bourdieu's pessimistic symbolic violence, the youth also demonstrate their ability to change their own internalized oppression. While the youth often internalize and naturalize their criminalization, they often do it as a form of resistance, as a strategy to defy the very same process of criminalization. They embrace the label of "thug" or criminal in order to navigate their social world. However, once given opportunities to embrace a less violent and more nurturing environment they abandon the negative attitude fairly quickly. For example, when I took the youth I interviewed to community events and college functions to provide them exposure to positive settings, their "presentation of self" (Goffman, 1959)

became positive; they began to express their desire to be change their lives, they expressed their hopes and dreams and began to ask, as Ronny put it, “How can I change my life? I mean I know I got a lotta’ shit going on but I been through the worse already. How can I make it better?”[12]

Hyper-Criminalization as Social Displacement

From a young age, poor urban Black and Latino male youth face stigmatizing and punitive interactions in various settings in their communities. As often well intentioned probation officers, teachers, community center workers, and police officers attempt to grapple with the deviance and risks that youth have, they adopt ideas and practices that further render young males of color suspicious and criminal. This in turn contributes to youth committing more deviance and crime. While most adults in the community attempt to support youth they have little programmatic or financial resources to provide deviant youth successful alternatives that might allow them to reform. However, reform and rehabilitation programs have continued to decline and instead, at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the public and politicians continue to call for punitive policies that treat juveniles as adults. In a time when crime control seems to calm anxiety in the public, a punitive carceral system of managing the poor has developed (see, for example, Castells, 1997; Parenti, 2000; Wacquant, 2001). This system is inexpensive, easy to implement, and at first appearance successful—it is a system of all-encompassing criminalization that manages youth as criminal risks in order to calm adult anxieties in the community. Non-violent youth offenders, the majority of deviant youth, are criminalized and managed as if they were serious criminal risks.

In the era of mass incarceration solidarity in society has formed around the notion that young adults who commit small acts of deviance will inevitably return and commit a severe

maybe even violent act. This leads many community members including teachers, youth development workers, and probation officers to treat all deviant youth as criminal suspects. Even some parents have demonstrated this ideology. A mother of a sixteen-year-old Latino youth I interviewed explained her perspective:

> Right now they are getting him [her son] for whatever little thing like marijuana and for stealing at the store but one day they are going to get him for robbing or shooting someone. This child is out of control . . . I think they need to incarcerate him for some time . . . until he learns to be good.[13]

Even those adults in the community who are well-meaning seem to, often unintentionally, align themselves with racist ideologues and politicians who continue to systematically call for containment and "incapacitation" of youth of color. William Bennet and John J. Dilulio are prime examples of influential ideologues who have generated mass hysteria and influenced punitive juvenile justice policies having a detrimental impact on youth of color.

In the mid-1990s John J. Dilulio, a fellow at the right-wing conservative think-tank, The Manhattan Institute (later becoming President George W. Bush's Dirctor of Faith Based Initiatives), coined the term the "Superpredator," claiming that poor, urban youth of color were an emerging violent and criminal risk to society and that serious punitive policies had to be created to "deter" and "incapacitate" them at as early an age as possible:

> Try as we might, there is ultimately very little that we can do to alter the early life-experiences that make some boys criminally "at risk." Neither can we do much to rehabilitate them once they have crossed the prison gates. Let us, therefore, do what we can to deter them by means of strict criminal sanctions, and, where deterrence fails, to

> incapacitate them. Let the government Leviathan lock them up and, when prudence dictates, throw away the key. (Dilulio 1995: 3)

William Bennett, former Education Secretary under Ronald Reagan and former Director of Drug Control Policy under George Bush Sr., helped Dilulio develop and dessiminate the "superpredator" thesis leading to punitive juvenile justice reform throughout the nation. Together they wrote, *Body Count*: *Moral Poverty . . . and How to Win America's War Against Crime and Drugs* (1996), a book that extended their argument for increased punitive measures against crime; in particular, juvenile crime.

As if influencing a punitive shift in the juvenile justice system and a national racist hate for youth of color in the late 1990s was not enough Bennett continues to attack and degrade Black youth. On September 28, 2005, he made the following statement:

> But I do know that it's true that if you wanted to reduce crime, you could, if that were your sole purpose, you could abort every black baby in this country, and your crime rate would go down . . . [this is] an impossible, ridiculous and morally reprehensible thing to do, but your crime rate would go down. (Caufield, 2005)

While this grotesque and genocidal ideology may seem extreme to some, youth of color are used to being treated by many through these assumptions. Moreover, the findings in this study suggest that this racist ideology is not only embedded in the mind of some influential white males but also in the everyday perceptions of everyday people responsible for the everyday well-being of children of color. That William Bennett has managed to influence punitive criminal justice policy and state-imposed racial violence unto communities of color is disturbing; that policy makers, the public, and the criminal justice system apply Bennett's

thinking to action is even more disturbing. However, the most disheartening finding in this study is that those institutions traditionally responsible for protecting and nurturing children and youth—the school, community centers, and the family—have begun to construct and treat deviant youth as criminal threats, mimicking the punitive grip of the criminal justice system. It seems that one of the most brutal yet unexamined collateral consequences of punitive criminal justice policies and mass imprisonment is that of the non-criminal justice institution being penetrated and influenced by the detrimental effects of the criminal justice system. Youth of color are hyper-criminalized because they encounter criminalization in all the settings they navigate.

While most of the adults in the community care about the youth they interact with, most are uncritical of how their epistemology shapes the way in which they treat and criminalize the youth they are attempting to support. I observed mothers asking their kids when they would be arrested again, teachers calling police officers to report spit ball incidents, and community center staff actively collaborating with probation departments. It was not only the field of the dejure policing and surveillance that affected these youth but also the field of de facto criminalization at school, home, and community centers that impacted them at an everyday level.

As the penal state expands to control and manage poor racialized bodies, a new unintended system of interconnected institutions has formed to brand, further degradate, and contain youth of color. This youth control complex, as an ecology of interlinked institutional arrangements that manages and controls the everyday lives of inner city youth of color, has taken a devastating grip on the lives of many male youth of color in the inner city. Youth experience and explain this massive structure that surrounds them as a unified and uniform criminalizing system whether in school, at home, or on the street. If we are to support poor youth of color in the era of mass incarceration and the decline of the welfare state, adult allies

should be critical of their interactions with criminalized youth. Otherwise, we may be perpetuating the very force we are attempting to dismantle—the hyper-criminalization of our youth.

Notes

1. As of 2003 out of a total of 832,400 incarcerated Black males 577, 300 were 20-39 years old. For "Hispanics" 270,600 out of a total of 363,900 were 20–39 years old (Harrison, 2003).
2. Association of Bay Area Governments, http://www.abag.ca.gov
3. http://www.frbsf.org Federal Reserve bank of San Francisco.
4. In the community youth who have been arrested or who have been labeled deviant or criminal by police, schools, or other adults are refered to as "criminalized" youth. I use the term in the same manner.
5. Personal Interview, Jose Ramirez [pseudonym], April 2004.
6. Personal Interview, Jose Ramirez [pseudonym], April 2004.
7. Personal Interview, Jose Ramirez [pseudonym], April 2004.
8. Personal Interview, Jose Ramirez [pseudonym], May 2004.
9. Personal Interview, Ronny Thompson [pseudonym], February 2004.
10. Personal Interview, James [pseudonym], October, 2003.
11. Personal Interview, Jr. Diaz [pseudonym], November 2003.
12. Personal Interview, Ronny Thompson [pseudonym], January 2004.
13. Refugio Munoz, Personal Interview, translated by author, October 2003.

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Reading 36

Governing through Crime

Safe Schools: Reforming Education Through Crime

Jonathan Simon

Governing Crime in Schools

Crimes, including crimes of violence, are a real part of the American school experience at the turn of the twenty-first century, and not only in the poorest communities. Since the mid-1990s, crime in schools has become the subject of almost frantic data collection, Numbers, like the 3 million school crimes per year cited by President Bush, bounce from Web page to magazine article to speech. In response to federal mandates, states have begun their own process of data collection. According to recent federal statistics, 56 percent of public high schools in the nation reported at least one criminal incident to police in the 1996–1997 academic year, and 21 percent reported at least one serious violent crime in that period. In more than 10 percent of all public high schools, there was at least one physical attack or fight involving a weapon, and in 8 percent there was at least one rape or sexual assault (Sheley 2000, 37).

Schools with serious incidents of violence have increasingly become high-security environments. Anthropologist John Devine describes a decade of ethnography at one such high school in New York in his book, *Maximum Security* (1996). Devine's ethnographic "cover" was running a tutorial program in which graduate students at New York University did both research and tutoring in academically needy public schools. Consistent with our genealogy, the older teachers interviewed by Devine could not remember any regular security guards in the school before 1968 or 1969, when some schools began to post a guard near the

main entrance in response to volatile demonstrations over teacher strikes and decentralization.[5]

By the late 1980s, the security response had become a dominant presence for both staff and design, "as space is rearranged to accommodate metal detectors and the auxiliary technologies they spawn" (Devine 1996, 76). New York employed 3,200 uniformed school safety officers at the time of Devine's observations, constituting the ninth-largest police department in the United States until it was integrated into the New York City Police Department by Mayor Giuliani. When various assistant principals and "deans" are factored in, the security apparatus that Devine observed amounted to 110 people in one school that had a teaching staff of 150 (78). Entrance to school required passing by a guard-supervised computer that read the student's ID and kept a time log of entrances and exits (80).

Devine consciously resisted being drawn into the debate about objective crime trends, the various metrics of violence in schools and how much it differs from years past, metrics that are themselves the products of governing through crime. He situated his account against both liberal critics of school policy, who saw school crime as a complete charade to justify oppressive administration of a failed educational program, and the conservative view that school violence demonstrated either the ultimately corrupting process of liberal secular education or that public schools were too chaotic to be saved. More relevant to the experience of students and staff was the very real possibility of guns being introduced into conflicts at school. Of the 41 schools with the greatest violence problems in the system, several of which fell into his tutorial program, Devine reports a total of 129 "gun incidents" in a year (23).[6] With an average of three gun incidents a year happening in each of these schools, it would be reasonable for every student, teacher, and staff person in the school to consider gun violence a real possibility to be taken into account in the management of everyday life.

One result of the prevalence of violence and the importance of responding to it is that

teachers have increasingly been withdrawn from the field of norm enforcement in favor of the professional security staff.[7] The corridors, the site of most significant social behavior in high school, are wholly the space of security personnel. The classrooms remain the sanctum of the teachers, but the security personnel are even called into classrooms when behavior becomes disruptive. Indeed, Devine (1996, 27) finds that security guards have become critical sources of normative guidance for students. Despite the vastness of the technosecurity apparatus—surveillance, metal detectors, drug tests, and locker searches—the remarkable fact is how much that apparatus overlooks, and how often it fails to function. This is not a system bent on discovering every violation, but rather one that ignores violations that do not reach a sufficiently dangerous level. "Meticulous observation of detail has given way to a willful determination *not* to see misbehavior and even outright crime."[8]

A central node in today's inner city schools—competing with the classroom and the playground as spaces of education and self-fashioning—are the spaces given over to in-school detentions that informants in Ann Ferguson's (2000) study of Chicago schools called "the punishing room."

> In the Punishing Room, school identities and reputations are constituted, negotiated, challenged, confirmed for African American youth in a process of categorization, reward and punishment, humiliation, and banishment. Children passing through the system are marked and categorized as they encounter state laws, school rules, tests and exams, psychological remedies, screening committees, penalties and punishments, rewards and praise. Identities that are worthy, hardworking, devious, or dangerous are proffered, assumed, or rejected. (40–41)

These in-school detentions are considered necessary to maintain an educational atmosphere

in the classroom and a better alternative than suspension, but they are producing something similar to what criminologists once called "prisonization" (Clemmer 1940), a powerful normative pull of peer culture that undermines the institution's goals.

At the level of whole school systems, many of these inner-city schools themselves have become larger instantiations of punishing rooms, identified by students and parents as places of disorder and risk. New York's highly hierarchical and largely merit-based system of high schools means that, for students living in the poorest sections, the only way to avoid the neighborhood high school is through competitive admission to one of the city's well-known magnet programs (Devine 1996). Crime plays a crucial motivating role in this dynamic. Students are exhorted to compete for the elite special-admission high schools and even the broad middle tier of educationally oriented magnet schools not simply for what admission would do for their college admissions prospects and future earnings, but quite specifically to avoid the chaos and violence of the large neighborhood high schools that are the catchall for those left behind.

Crime, and especially gun violence, has touched an astoundingly wide variety of American high schools. In the 1996–97 school year, for example, 10 percent of public schools nationwide reported at least one serious violent crime (Riley & Reno 1998, 11). A recent study found that "nearly all U.S. public schools are using a variety of delinquency prevention programs and disciplinary practices" (NIJ 2004, ii). When a problem for 10 percent becomes a paradigm for all, it is the mark of the hold of crime over our contemporary political imagination. Most violent crime is concentrated in sociologically identifiable communities, especially urban minority neighborhoods with high rates of unemployment and poverty. Thus out of every 1,000 teachers, nearly 40 in urban schools in 1996–97 were (nonfatal) crime victims, in contrast with 20 in suburban schools and 22 in rural schools. The framing of the danger as a national problem facing schools everywhere is an essentially

political act that has consequences for schools environmentally, physically, pedagogically, and in terms of governance.

As in the earlier era of reforming schools for racial equality, the federal government has played a crucial role in making crime a national problem for schools, and crime prevention a national agenda for school reform, using incentives and sanctions to spread it across state and local systems. David Kirp (1982) described the implementation of desegregation as creating a standard operational meaning of equality:

> Policy aspires to uniformity. Policy is proposed for the country as if equality had an unvarying meaning from place to place, and in terms of fixed goals, as if there existed an ideal end state. Such remedies as extensive busing, vouchers, special "magnet" schools, or metropolitan-wide districts are proffered with little attention to context; each is advanced as if it were a panacea for all the ills of racism. (xx)

In both desegregation and the war on crime, court cases and legislation have played a significant role in constructing a national problem and national solutions to making schools work. For racial equality, the signal year was 1965, when the Elementary and Secondary Education Act invested billions of federal dollars in poor schools provided they complied with desegregation orders.[9] For safe schools, the pivotal legislation was the Safe Schools Act of 1994.

A closer look at parts of the Safe Schools Act and the federal and state policies that have followed it identifies several main mechanisms through which crime is made a central problem of school governance.

Making Crime Visible

The Safe Schools Act operates far beyond the simple application of money to a local problem; rather, it requires changes in the way knowledge flows and decisions are made within schools. Although many of these provisions reflect the very best social science–informed policy thinking about crime and youth populations, they also represent the triumph of crime over other agendas for remaining schools. The creation of new pathways for knowledge to circulate within the school, and new rationalities of decision-making, are likely to keep schools locked into the dynamic of crime and security for a long time to come.

To qualify for federal money under the Safe Schools Act, schools must first demonstrate that they have a "serious problem with school crime, violence, and student discipline" (Eckland 1999, 312). This requires schools to develop their own data collection systems for crime, and to assess what kinds of incidents to count, an exercise that school administrators have every incentive to make as expansive as possible.

The law calls into existence a whole series of information streams about crime in schools that assures that whatever else happens, knowledge about crime is going to be brought to the attention of school officials, teachers, and parents. This helps assure that one thing almost everyone interested in schools will know about particular schools, along with the ubiquitous test scores, is information, potentially a lot of information, about the crime scene there. Parents looking for ways to assure themselves they are doing their duty to their children will have this information available. Higher public education officials looking for metrics to evaluate principals will have this information available. While seemingly innocuous, the establishment of such information flows assures a priority for crime in contexts where people are looking for ways to differentiate between competing alternatives (employees, schools, housing complexes, etc.).

Building a Crime Constituency in the Community

The Safe Schools Act also makes clear that schools must build community support for a security program. For example, selection criteria governing funding explicitly favors repeat awards for schools that can turn out the highest levels of participation by parents and community residents for funded projects and activities focused on school crime and safety. At the other end of the process, schools that receive funding must mount a significant campaign to make the public aware of both the crime problem and the progress being made to solve it. Both these features may be laudatory efforts to assure that federal funds flow to programs that receive at least tacit public approval through participation. The result is to build—within the heart of local school districts, one of the oldest institutions of American democracy—enduring structures of intervention, knowledge production, and consent formation, all designed in response to crime.

Hardening School Discipline

A prime target of the 1994 law was the existing disciplinary apparatus within schools. An earlier generation had insisted that, schools, without normalizing deviance, protect young people from criminalization and exclusion. In the early 1990s most schools remained highly protective of students, avoiding sanctions like suspension or expulsion that would genuinely disadvantage their educational prospects, generally distinguishing school discipline from that meted out by the police and court system. At this time, however, such policies became the target of a critique that has since been the cutting edge of governing through crime reform in many institutions. Informal and highly discretionary disciplinary systems are perceived as

having denigrated victims, failed to correct offenders, and betrayed the public interest in stamping out crime before it becomes dangerous to the general community.

This critique is built into the qualifying provisions of the Safe Schools Act. To qualify for federal funds under the Act, the school district must already have written policies detailing a) its internal procedures, b) clear conditions under which exclusion will be imposed, and c) close cooperation with police and juvenile justice agencies. The requirement that schools formalize their disciplinary policies is a crucial step in intensifying the flow of information from schools about the disciplinary violations now being constituted as quasi-crimes. At the harder end, violations that would constitute acts of juvenile delinquency under the prevailing legal code must be reported. At the softer end, the accumulation of statistics on incidents will become the raw material for the evaluation studies that the Act mandates as the follow-up to any successful application for funding.

Nationalizing School Crime Expertise

The school must also have put together a crime-fighting strategy. In practice, this means turning to one of a growing number of technologies and forms of expertise that have been nationally "accredited." The school must present a plan for drawing on a range of these resources, and a specific set of goals that the school hopes to achieve with them. These goals become critical in the audit side of the federal grant process. Future funding is contingent on measurable progress in implementing a plan (not necessarily in achieving true declines in crime). Schools that receive federal money must put in place comprehensive school safety plans that address long-term reductions in violence and discipline problems. Encouraged, but not required, is the formation of elaborate emergency plans to respond to school crises, such as the shooting incidents that sparked the law. The law also channels the expenditure of funds

into certain preapproved activities that include a host of branded programs whose mission in fact is to reinforce the link between crime and schools by defining routine school activities such as going to school or being at school as occurring in “safe zones” or in “drug- and weapon-free school zones.” For example, section 5965 of the Act provides a list of appropriate uses for funds.

> A local educational agency shall use grants funds for one or more of the following activities. . . .
>
> (11) Supporting “safe zones of passage” . . . through such measures as “Drug and Weapon Free School Zones”
>
> (12) Counseling programs for victims and witnesses of school violence
>
> (13) Acquiring and installing metal detectors and hiring security personnel.[11]

State responses have varied widely. Many states have enacted their own versions of the Safe School Act to create any authority in the school districts that is necessary to be eligible for federal funds.[12] Like the federal version, these state-level Safe School Acts commit the state to the proposition that school violence is the most important problem facing American education and that a security response is the only one possible. The laws typically require school districts to commence the forms of data collection and administrative reform necessary to meet the federal requirements. Some have adopted statewide zero-tolerance policies; others allow districts to do so or to define the incidents serious enough to trigger expulsion. Using fear of crime as an overarching rationale, all of them tighten the net of control around students’ movement in and out of schools.

The changes mandated by the Safe Schools Act involve the creation of fundamentally new pathways of knowledge and power within the school community. These pathways are

likely to change the educational experience and the status of students, teachers, and administrators in ways that will endure even when the specific conditions that called them into being have disappeared.

Placing a powerful premium on defining an act as one involving school crime or safety alters almost everyone's incentives. School administrators who hope to attract substantial federal and state money will find the crime banner the most productive one available. To be sure, for many schools this incentive will be counterbalanced by their becoming further associated with crime. Administrators are mandated to collect statistics on criminal incidents, and these statistics will ultimately be used to hold them accountable. To survive, administrators must map the sources of these numbers at the capillary level within the spaces they control, using their existing power to shape teaching and learning to better fit desirable states of data. Teachers and others with front-line responsibility for managing students will find themselves facing many of these new mandates and with less ability to reshape the work of others. They will also find that one of the few "buttons" that they can push that will both generate administrative attention and garner resources is the one labeled "crime." Parents or students who want something done will also find it most advantageous to define their children or themselves as victims and others as perpetrators of crimes or discipline violations. It is little wonder that a recent national survey of public schools reported that public school faculty assessment of a principal's leadership ability is "associated with a high level of prevention activity" (read as crime-focused curriculum, security measures, crime data collection efforts, and so on) (NIJ 2004, 5).

One important dimension of this is the eradication of barriers between the juvenile justice and school systems. During the last decade, as youth crime in general has come in for more legislative attention, states have enacted laws giving criminal justice officials greater access to school-based information and administrative systems. Until the Safe Schools Act,

however, schools had few incentives to cooperate. Now cooperation will be part and parcel of reconfiguring schools around crime. Juvenile probation officers and police will find themselves valued partners in forming strategic alliances that are viewed favorably by federal funding guidelines.[13] The diminished expectations of privacy accorded to students in primary and secondary education by the U.S. Supreme Court means that these law enforcement personnel will have every incentive to make the school their preferred hunting ground for suspects.[14]

Conclusion

I began by contrasting the influence of crime on schools today to the influence of the civil rights project and the objective of overcoming a history of racial discrimination through education. In both cases, a subject not directly related to education has become an external framework for reforming schools. In both cases, the federal government has tied its considerable resources and command over public attention to the issue. In both cases, state and local school authorities have changed the way they plan and operate schools to fit the new urgency.

Nineteenth-century public school buildings often resembled prisons and asylums because all three drew on a common technology of power for improving the "performance" of their inmates (Foucault 1977). If schools today are again coming to seem more and more like prisons, it is not because of a renewed faith in the capacity of disciplinary methods. Indeed, prisons and schools increasingly deny their capacity to do much more than sort and warehouse people. What they share instead is the institutional imperative that crime is simultaneously the most important problem they have to deal with and a reality whose "existence"—as defined by the federally imposed edict of ever-expanding data collection—is

precisely what allows these institutions to maintain and expand themselves in perpetuity.

Notes

5. These strikes and decentralization were very much part of the post-civil rights struggle in New York City, around the issues of racial equality and schools. See Podair 2002

6. It is interesting that this number comes from data collected by the teachers union

7. Ronald Stephens of the National School Safety Center was quoted in a newspaper story on school police as describing "the modern school officer" as "more akin to an educator than a guard" (quoted in M. Wilson 2004).

8. Malcom Feeley and I have suggested that this abandonemt of individualized normalization in favor of managing high-risk populations en masse is a broad feature of contemporary penality (Feeley & Simon 1992, 1994; Simon & Feeley 1995).

9. For a discussion of the law's impact, see Rosenberg 1991, 47.

11. 20 US.C.A. Sect. 5965

12. E.g., Missouri's Safe Schools Act, enacted in 1996: Revised Statuses of Missouri Sections 160 et seq.

13. 20 U.S.C.A. S. 5963 (b) (1) "In awarding grants under this subchapter, the Secretary shall give priority to…the formation of partnerships among the local educational agency…[and a local law enforcement agency."

14. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).

37. Connections: The Social Control of Youth across Institutional Spheres

Aaron Kupchik

Most theories of deviance have begun as explanations for why youth are often deviant. This is because children and teenagers are more likely than adults to participate in deviant and criminal acts, for many reasons: they have fewer responsibilities to protect, they are immature and less able to see future consequences of their actions, they are experimenting with different identities and behavior styles (i.e., finding out what kind of person they wish to be), etc. Youth tend to be very impulsive and to make mistakes, often harmful ones. For example, while I was doing research for a book several years ago I observed juvenile courts and criminal courts that prosecuted youth (Kupchik 2006). I was struck by how often I saw children being prosecuted for a similar offense: typically, two or more youth would order food to be delivered to their home, hide outside and wait for the delivery person, and then attack the delivery person, taking his/her money and the food. I kept thinking, "how foolish!", since the offenders would be luring the victim to their home address. But when they are in court, these youth talk about how they didn't really think about it, they just "did it."

In this chapter I describe different ways of thinking about how society responds to youth crime and deviance, with particular focus on three important readings by Anthony Platt, Victor Rios, and Jonathan Simon. Responses to youth deviance include both informal and formal social control. Informal social control includes topics such as how parents punish their children, or how social groups enforce social rules and norms (think, for example, about the way children learn what music, clothes, sexual partners, and expressions they "should" like). Formal control includes the ways that schools, police, courts, and other state agencies supervise and punish youth caught breaking rules or laws. The social control of youth is particularly important

because of the belief that children are still works in progress who have the ability to change. As a result, the control of youth is often intended to teach them and help shape them into the kinds of adults society wants them to be. The study of the social control of youth tells us a great deal about how social norms and values, and has always been central to the study of deviance.

The three readings in this section illustrate different perspectives on the social control of juveniles. The excerpted reading by Anthony Platt (2009), part of his classic book, *The Child Savers*, discusses the creation of the first juvenile court in Chicago in 1899. Platt argues that the court was created to punish poor and immigrant youth, while coaching these children to act like middle-class youth. More recent attempts to understand the social control of youth have focused instead on contemporary problems and issues that have arisen as a result of broad social changes, such as changes in the economy (e.g., what is known as "post-industrialism") and high rates of incarceration. The two other readings, by Victor Rios and Jonathon Simon, are good examples. These studies look at ways that control of youth now occurs outside of the formal justice system, for example in public schools, and how marginalized youth are stigmatized and punished in a way that is shaped by the contemporary labor market.

The Juvenile Court and Social Control of Youth

The first American juvenile court was created in Chicago, IL, in 1899. This court represented a substantial change, since prior to this time juveniles were prosecuted and punished alongside adults. Moreover, instead of just creating a court where juveniles' cases would be heard, the legal reformers behind the court created an entirely new method for dealing with juveniles in the legal system.

To understand the first juvenile court, one needs a bit of background into the thinking about children and delinquency from the 1890s. Several important factors influenced this

thinking, including: developing ideas about the vulnerability of children, the growth of cities, massive immigration to the U.S. (especially to urban areas), and the dominance of the factory as an employer in these areas. On the one hand, urbanization, immigration, and the proliferation of factories meant increasing numbers of poor, often immigrant youth were left to fend for themselves in dangerous city streets, as their parents worked long hours, and they no longer lived in rural areas with extended family and neighbors who would watch over them. On the other hand, new ideas about childhood held that children were innocent, fragile creatures who are very different than adults in many ways and who should be protected from the sins and dangers of adult life.

The creation of the juvenile court was a direct response to these two sets of concerns. The court's official goals were to protect and nurture youth by responding to each and every child who came before the court, doing whatever was necessary to help that particular child. According to the court, a child's *needs* were often more important than his/her offenses. In fact, children often appeared before the court because they were neglected or poor, not because they committed crimes. The court's responses to these youth varied considerably, since they were based on each child's situation rather than his/her behavior.

Critical Views of the Juvenile Court's Motives

In his book, *The Child Savers* (2009 [1969]), Anthony Platt raised several critical issues regarding the court's motives and how it worked. He pointed out that the court was funded by prominent business-people in Chicago, and was primarily the result of lobbying from several wealthy white women who sought to do good deeds by helping poor children. Though their rhetoric suggested that they were dedicated public servants who only wanted to help unfortunate youth, Platt argued that their real goal was to teach poor and immigrant youth (and their families)

middle-class norms. He saw their ties to businesses, and the financial help given to the court from corporate elites, as evidence that the court sought to produce trained laborers – young adults who could speak English, would show up for work on time, and would take directions without questioning them – rather than free-thinking citizens.

Platt also criticized the court's focus on children's needs rather than their offenses. The result, he argued, was class-based social control, since the court responded to poverty with punishment. A juvenile who went hungry, for example, might be "cared for" by the court through incarceration, since in a juvenile reform school (essentially a juvenile prison) the state could provide three meals a day. The juvenile court reformers promised to target youth in need and offer them state help; Platt argued that state "help" amounted to punishment, and as a result youth were punished for their poverty. Others echoed Platt's criticism and offered additional evidence that the court focused on poor youth and punished them for their poverty (e.g., Shelden and Osborne 1989).

The juvenile court did not simply punish delinquent youth unfairly; it also created entire categories of delinquency. With the creation of the court, new categories of behaviors which had previously only been considered deviant now led to arrest and prosecution. These behaviors include "status offenses," which are crimes based only on one's age, such as underage drinking, smoking, or curfew violations, as well as "incorrigibility" or being "wayward," terms used to describe disobedient or poor youth. One study (Chesney-Lind 1973), for example, found that gynecological exams were ordered routinely for cases of female juveniles in Honolulu's juvenile court, regardless of the offense, in an attempt to determine if the girls were sexually active. The claimed intent of such a practice is to best understand the life of each individual child and be able to respond to harmful behaviors (such as sexual activity). But the result is that behavior which

had previously been only deviant (but legal) became defined as crime, and that this happens in a way that enforces mainstream social norms.

Critical Views of the Court's Operations

Another problem with the juvenile court concerns how decisions are made about juvenile defendants. Robert Emerson's book, *Judging Delinquents* (1969), offers perhaps the best illustration of how court decisions are made; two aspects of how juvenile courts work are particularly relevant here. One is that juvenile court staff sort juveniles into three categories: normal, hard-core, and disturbed. Normal juveniles are run-of-the-mill youth who make bad decisions, commit youthful transgressions, and are likely to improve their behavior as they mature. Hard-core youth are those who are committed to a delinquent lifestyle, or so far into their delinquent behavior that they are unlikely to improve. Disturbed youth are those who face mental illness or some psychopathology that causes them to be a continuing threat to society. These assessments are made in varying ways, based on the offense for which a child is arrested, their interactions with court staff, and their social backgrounds.

A second insight is that the assessments of juveniles and the court's responses to them are shaped by inter-organizational political relationships. That is, the relationships between the court staff and other agencies, such as juvenile correctional facilities, the probation department, and child welfare, can profoundly shape how the court responds to individual youth.

Each of these insights continues on an important theme stressed by Platt: that the social control of youth is a socially constructed, context-dependent response to perceived deviance. Rather than acting in a formally rational way – where punishments are legally prescribed, consistently enforced, and made in response only to criminal behaviors –the juvenile justice system is subjective, inconsistent, and responds to perceptions of a youth's *character*. At the

same time, one might reasonably respond to these critical views of juvenile justice by asking what other options are available. Is the problem that juvenile courts seek to help youth who are judged as in danger (or a danger to others) using whatever solution seems best able to help that youth? Or is the problem that courts do so in ways that worsen racial, class, and gender inequality?

The Influence of Contemporary Social Problems on the Control of Youth

Recent perspectives on the control of youth have built on and extended this foundation of ideas by considering how contemporary juvenile justice practices increase inequality, how widespread ideas about childhood and dangerousness shape punishment of youth, and how the control of youth relates to broader social problems. The work of Simon, Rios, and other continue the critical work of Platt and Emerson to understand the process and consequences of controlling youth deviance in contemporary society.

Control of Youth in an Era of Mass Incarceration

As I describe above, the way society punishes children is unique from the punishment of adults; an entire juvenile justice system was created based on the idea that children are different, and more vulnerable, than adults, and that they require different interventions for different reasons. At the same time, however, the punishment of children is part of the broad landscape of crime control, and is shaped by trends in how society punishes deviance and criminal offenders, generally. Over the past several decades, this landscape of crime control has changed tremendously; we are now in an era of what is commonly called “mass incarceration,” marked by punitive justice and record-setting prison populations, despite decreases in actual crime (Garland 2001). Justice systems have become more punitive in an effort to sympathize with victims and

respond to public fears and insecurities, a process that socio-legal scholar Jonathan Simon (2007) calls “governing through crime.”

These trends shape the way that society punishes children, but not equally. Increasing punitiveness in the juvenile justice system has been disproportionately enforced on socially and economically disadvantaged youth. Instead of all youth feeling the impact of increasing punitiveness –it has been targeted at “other people’s children” (Feld 1999), or children who are poor and racial/ethnic minorities. Indeed, minority youth are far more likely than white youth to be arrested and punished, despite very similar rates of self-reported crime and drug use (see Arya and Augarten 2008). When white youth are arrested, judgments over them tend to be much more forgiving. For example, Bridges and Steen (1998) found that when probation officers assessed youth in order to inform judges’ sentencing decisions, they described white juvenile defendants as suffering from external problems for which they did not bear full blame, such as drug/alcohol addiction and parental abuse; Black youth, on the other hand, were described as having internal problems, meaning that they were just “bad kids” who deserved full blame. Much like what Platt found, it seems clear that poor and minority youth are targeted for punishment within a contemporary, more punitive, environment.

Another important issue is what ideas motivate the punishment of youth in the contemporary juvenile justice system. Again, this topic is a direct extension of Platt’s early thinking about the juvenile court’s supposed goal of treatment and rehabilitation. We can see substantial movement away from this initial goal, as juvenile justice systems across the country have changed their mission statements to de-emphasize treatment or rehabilitation and explicitly emphasize punishment (Feld 1999).

Another important recent trend has been the massive increases in youth being prosecuted in adult criminal court, rather than juvenile court. This process is called juvenile transfer, or waiver, and works differently across states. Sometimes judges decide which particular youth are beyond the capacity of the juvenile court to deal with, but more often a prosecutor decides this and directly files the case in criminal court, or a state's law establishes categories of offenders (by age and offense) that are automatically transferred. Since the late 1970s, states across the U.S. have revised their transfer laws to facilitate, and in many cases require, the transfer of greater numbers of juveniles.

One aspect of transfer to criminal court that is particularly interesting is that it contradicts the initial juvenile court's premise of the difference between children and adults, for some youth at least. Transferring a juvenile to the adult court is not simply about punishment, since states could instead pass legislation to increase punishments in juvenile court. It's also a symbolic declaration that certain juveniles are "adult-like," or are such serious offenders that they do not deserve the juvenile identity.

In my book, *Judging Juveniles* (Kupchik 2006), I look at how this relabeling from juvenile to adult plays out in courts. Borrowing from Emerson's work on the way that youth are categorized in juvenile court, I studied the ways that criminal court staff (judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors) consider the youthfulness of transferred juveniles: essentially, whether they thought of them and judged them as children or adults. I found that for most transferred youth, the punishment phase of criminal court processing looked a lot like a juvenile court in several ways. Judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys did their best to treat most transferred youth as juveniles, not as adults, in a way that contradicts much of what transfer laws intend. Court staff still viewed most transferred youth as children who made mistakes and have a

chance to mature and improve their behavior, despite the fact that they have been legally redefined as adults.

Control of Youth in an Era of Post-Industrialism

Another important social change since the pioneering work of Emerson and Platt that has affected the control of youth is the collapse of the industrial job market. The U.S. is now in a stage known as post-industrialism (e.g., Wilson 1987), meaning that factories and factory jobs have largely disappeared, especially in cities – instead, available jobs are more likely to require specialized training or skills, or customer service abilities. There are now far fewer blue-collar jobs in urban areas than were available in prior generations, which has contributed to urban unemployment and poverty.

In his work on the initial juvenile court, Platt argued that the court existed in part to train youth for future roles as factory workers. But what happens when there are no more factories in urban areas? Youth who grow up in poor urban areas face dismal educational prospects and little opportunity to compete in the current economy. Though some rise above these challenges, many experience perpetual unemployment or under-employment.

The preceding article, "The Hyper-Criminalization of Black and Latino Male Youth in the Era of Mass Incarceration," by Victor Rios, considers this puzzle. Rios studies the experiences of Latino and African American adolescents in California to understand how they are treated by police, by teachers, by parents, and in their communities. He finds that these youth clearly see their limited career opportunities, and struggle against this challenge to obtain an education and employment. But most are simply unable to find jobs or to succeed in school. Rios finds that instead of being given a fair chance to prove themselves and possibly succeed, "…most of the youth in the study were labeled and treated as criminals not only by police,

courts, and probation but also by teachers, community centers, and even parents." (p. 45). Moreover, there is little help available to them in the form of welfare provisions or other state assistance.

The result of this situation is a deep investment by the state in the policing and incarceration of youth. Unlike Platt's description of the early juvenile court, which sought to uplift and rehabilitate youth, Rios argues that the state seeks only to punish the Black and Latino male youth he studied. These youth are viewed as risks or threats to be managed and removed from society, not as wayward or unfortunate youth who need to be saved. His analysis shows how the social control of youth looks different in the contemporary era, given a new set of labor, financial and other social contexts. And yet many core elements of Platt's and Emerson's arguments still hold true, as youth are judged subjectively based on their perceived characters in a system that reinforces class and racial/ethnic inequality.

Social Control in Schools

Recent research also considers the social control of youth in schools. The preceding chapter by Jonathan Simon, "Reforming Education through Crime," from his book *Governing Through Crime*, describes how the broader context of policing and punishment in society that he calls "governing through crime" can be seen in schools as well. It is common now for contemporary public schools to have surveillance cameras, zero tolerance policies, random sweeps with drug-sniffing dogs, and full-time police officers on campus. These shifts in control of youth in schools are the result of broad social anxieties and fears. In contrast to previous eras, in which Americans felt more connections to each other and more confidence in government to help them solve their problems, citizens now feel a great deal of fear, distrust, and lack of social support. Politicians respond by reinforcing citizens' fears of victimization and using crime-

control rhetoric to justify legislation on a host of issues, in this case, school policy. Concerns about issues such as students' academic achievement translate into promises of increased school security.

Schools have always performed social control of youth, but the past few decades have brought about big changes in how schools control youth, with a shift toward increased punishment and invasive security. Despite the fact that schools are safer now than in past decades, with continually decreasing levels of violence and other crimes, schools have ramped up their security, increased their use of punishments such as suspension, enhanced their links to police departments and juvenile courts, and become more authoritarian. Simon shows how "governing through crime" has resulted in schools joining with other criminal justice system partners, consistent with Rios's argument that the policing and punishment of youth occurs across social institutions.

One element of this new school social control is that students now are commonly arrested for relatively minor misbehaviors. Studies of urban schools with large police presence find that students often are arrested for offenses such as insubordination or disorderly conduct, which commonly means that they simply didn't listen to (or that they speak back to) an adult (e.g., Nolan 2012). In other words, behaviors like fighting and mouthing off, which used to be frowned upon but tolerated as typical youthful deviance, are now subject to arrest in many schools (Kupchik 2010). This merging of informal (school punishment) and formal (arrest) social control is a new development in schools that causes youth to have criminal records and miss educational time, and increases the odds that they drop out of school. Consider, for example, Salecia Johnson, a six-year-old kindergarten student in Georgia who was handcuffed, put in a squad car, and arrested at school for having a temper tantrum in April, 2012 (see

Campbell 2012). In the current school climate, the use of handcuffs and formal arrest seem to be an appropriate response to a difficult child acting out; it is hard to imagine this happening in the past, instead of a teacher or principal handling the child.

Consistent with Platt's analysis of the initial juvenile court, contemporary school discipline and security results in the unequal use of punishment, such as suspensions. Several studies have now led to the same conclusion: that racial/ethnic minority youth are disproportionately punished in school. Some studies find that this is true even when one takes into account their actual rates of misbehavior, finding that they are singled out for punishment at a higher rate than white students (e.g. Skiba et al. 2000). School staff are more likely to view youth of color as having a negative attitude or being hostile, compared to white youth, and the result is that they receive more punitive responses from schools.

In *Homeroom Security* (Kupchik 2010), I study contemporary school discipline and security and find that there are several negative consequences to the punitive social control found in public schools today. One is that it increases inequality, since students who come from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely than others to be punished and miss educational time, and as a result they are set even further behind. This conclusion mirrors Platt's, but also follows sociological theory on the effects of how and what we teach students in school. Bourdieu and Passeron (1990), for example, describe how schools reward students not necessarily for being smarter or working harder, but for demonstrating middle-class behaviors. This furthers inequality, because middle-class youth are seen as high-achieving and lower-class youth as low-achieving, based only on behaviors (e.g., styles of dress, how they talk, what music they like, etc.) that have little or nothing to do with academics.

Another problem with school discipline is that because school rules are now so rigid and so central to how schools operate, school staff pay attention only to the rules and lose sight of students' actual problems, which are usually the reasons why students misbehave. For example, in my research I spoke to many teachers, most of whom told me that students tend to act up in class because they don't understand the material being taught. What do these teachers do in response? They kick the students out of class, meaning that the students miss more class time and fall further behind, ensuring that the problem causing the misbehavior grows worse. Just like Rios and Simon both argue, the social control of youth wins out over attempts to improve the lives of youth through social supports.

Ironically, these practices might actually make schools *less* safe. Research shows clearly that schools with more inclusive social climates are safer; these are schools where students feel valued, listened to, and part of the school community, and as a result they value the school and refrain from negative behaviors within it. But I find that policing and punishment in schools unravels these elements of schools by alienating students, making them feel unwanted and not listened to, which may actually increase the rates of misbehavior they would otherwise show.

Conclusion

As the preceding readings demonstrate, perspectives on the social control of youth tend to be critical. Although society views children as deserving care, support, and forgiveness, our systems of punishment tend to bypass these views in favor of punishment, particularly for racial/ethnic minority and poor youth. Platt articulates how such punitive treatment for youth instead of care and support was part and parcel of the nation's first juvenile court, while Simon and Rios continue this argument by showing its relevance in contemporary society, through punishment in schools and in communities. As Rios illustrates, racial/ethnic minority youth

today face a “youth control complex” that presumes they are criminals and treats them as such rather than offering them the social, emotional, and educational supports that might help them.

These perspectives on the social control of youth are important because the way that we guide, teach, and punish youth sheds light on dominant social norms. How society responds to youth deviance tells us what society fears. As these readings argue, society fears youth themselves, particularly youth of color, more than it fears the problems these youth face. Regardless of poverty, histories of abuse, immaturity, and social challenges that are not their fault, today’s children are arrested at school, transferred to criminal court, and punished more severely than youth of prior generations. Since we know that these practices produce more bad outcomes than good outcomes, their popularity suggests that we are more interested in punishment than in helping deviant youth. As Simon shows, this focus on punishment for youth illustrates a broader trend of “governing through crime” that is also responsible for rising prison populations. In other words, the fact that we punish youth this way despite all we know about the immaturity of children, their propensity for deviance, and our desire to help and protect them, speaks volumes about punitive social control in contemporary society.

The themes discussed here, including the ways that punishment is based on subjective perceptions and increases inequality among youth, raise many questions to which we have no answers. Perhaps most importantly, if such problems arise out of attempts to help youth, then is it possible to use the justice system to help children? If so, how do we do so in such a way that protects youth while punishing misbehavior appropriately?

Critical Thinking Questions

1. How did the initial juvenile court reflect social inequality? How are the inequalities experienced by delinquents today similar or different from those in the past?

2. How can society properly punish juvenile delinquents while still trying to care for and rehabilitate them?

3. Should schools use police officers to implement security? Why or why not?

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Section 10. Queer Theory, Communities and Citizenship

Introduction.

Tammy Anderson

Sixty-two year-old Emily Greene lives in Pagoda, a lesbian community in rural Alabama. Pagoda, like many others, disallows males or any female relatives (including children) who aren't lesbians. Dining out, hiring laborers to work on their homes and listening to music are all woman-centered endeavors in this lesbian-feminist place. In 2009, the New York Times estimated there were about 100 such settlements in the US populated by women mostly over the age of 50 (Kershaw 2009).

Yet, there is concern among Greene and other members that such communities are dying and won't be around much longer. Why? Younger lesbians don't see a need for them, since society has progressed in accepting homosexuals and affording them rights older lesbians like Emily didn't enjoy. Today's lesbians don't see the "we" versus "them" world that Greene's neighbor Rand Hall, does. Hall explains:

> "Outside the gate, it's still a man's world and women are not safe, period. It's just that simple…I don't have curtains, so I don't have to worry about someone watching me dress or undress." (quoted in Kershaw, 2009: 1).

In Section 3, we introduced you to the idea that deviance could be understood from a neighborhood or community level, one with physical or symbolic and cultural boundaries. By shifting from an exclusive focus on individuals to a more structural one concerned with neighborhood effects, social disorganization and collective efficacy, we gained an appreciation of how environments can shape deviance and our understanding of it.

Section 9 builds on these ideas by focusing on citizenship—equal rights and privileges--within communities. Readings by Kitsuse (1980) and Taylor (2011) describe how communities are used by society's outcasts or marginals —e.g., gay and lesbians—to retain unique cultural customs, lifestyles, "in-group" membership and solidarity while also calling for the recognition, respect, rights and privileges heterosexuals have enjoyed over time. Kitsuse and Taylor teach us about the outwardly political efforts of oppressed groups to attain these goals, while Ghaziani (2010) reports on a new trend within the gay community that breaks with this more "queer-centered" tradition. In his paper "There Goes the Gayborhood," Ghaziani notes the decline in separate gay neighborhoods and communities is due to several factors that have made gays and lesbians more likely to assimilate and integrate with their heterosexual friends and neighbors rather than confining themselves to gay-friendly environments and activities. This is the trend Greene and Hall worry will eventually eliminate lesbian communities like Pagoda.

In the past, homosexuals were viewed as suffering psychiatric problems and making deviant lifestyles choices which earned them stigma (Davis 2011). Today, gays are more accepted in our society, especially when they conform to heterosexual norms (e.g., parenting and monogamy) and abandon unconventional ways. While this "new normal[1]" may increase the acceptance of homosexuality in society, it may also levy new social controls that are protested by other homosexuals. In her reading, Taylor notes this is one type of consequence from outsiders' quests for citizenship; assimilating to society's dominant culture means all too often sacrificing one's distinctively queer self.

[1] Please see the recent NBC television show by the same name at http://www.nbc.com/the-new-normal/

In the physical space between the rural south and urban gayborhoods or the cyber reality of television and internet communities, there are many examples of how outcasts respond to dilemmas about community and citizenship. Ghaziani writes about gays and lesbians' efforts to abandon queer culture and integrate with heterosexual society via monogamy, marriage, and parenting. Kitsuse (1980), on the other hand, articulates a more politically resistant approach, maintaining that gays and lesbians are but one group of deviants who use legitimate political channels to "come out all over" or challenge conventional viewpoints of their conduct to gain citizenship.

Yet, quests for citizenship are not always so binary, formal, and clear. They can, as Taylor notes, be quite murky, less political and rather informal. They can take the form of maintaining a separate lifestyle as described above with lesbian communities. Moreover, citizenship quests of all kinds can be complicated by just who constitutes a member of the in-group and out-group.

Consider the bugchasers and gift-givers Swan and Monico write about in their connections essay. Bugchasers are a group of gay men who engage in risky sex with gift-givers[2] to contract the HIV virus. As Swan and Monico note, they are a subculture of a larger community of "men who have sex with men" (MSM) who value something entirely different: safe sex in private. So, when we are tempted to classify homosexuals as a singular group who are either assimilating to heterosexual culture or claiming their queer-centric ways, what we find instead is diversity within the pool of outcasts and multiple layers by which to consider how deviance and normality are defined and negotiated in society.

[2] Gay men who have HIV and are willing to infect a consenting sexual partner.

Most of us, heterosexuals and homosexuals alike, probably can't comprehend why anyone would want to voluntarily contract the HIV virus. As a subculture of a larger marginalized community (LGBT individuals), bugchasers seek a freedom to engage in any sexual activity they desire without having to take precautions to avoid HIV and other STDs that both their heterosexual and fellow homosexual citizens expect. In other words, if you already have the virus, you won't have to wear condoms like everyone else and deny yourself pleasurable, exotic sex. You would be free to live --and have sex as you please—without worrying about the pressures of society. A young barebacker from the Swan and Monico reading explains:

> "I guess it's payback, you know. After spending years, our cocks wrapped in plastic marching to the 'Safe Sex' rhythm. That didn't work. It was doomed from the start. We're human beings... men." (Quoted in Dean 2009, p. 54).

The lessons we can take from Section 10's readings and the themes of community and citizenship are many. So-called deviants are not simply people who we can stigmatize, shame, shun, and silence as so many deviance scholars theorized in the past. They are people who seek the same things we all do: civility, equality, recognition, respect, dignity, and solidarity. They will take multiple paths to achieve those goals, including resisting and challenging dominant institutions through political acts (like the anti-bullying efforts) Taylor describes, assimilating to mainstream culture and lifestyle as Ghaziani notes, or simply embarking on alternative lifestyles in more private communities that co-exist within society's mainstream, like the lesbians of Pagoda or the bugchasers in Swan and Monico's essay.

For sure, the field of deviance must – as Section 3 indicated—attend to how deviance is defined and managed through both real and symbolic neighborhoods and communities. We must

acknowledge, also, that norms and deviance vary by social context and across social groups. While an over-arching community and dominating group is ever present, there will also be many subcultures and communities that a wide variety of people will be engaged in and committed to. In these contexts, we will probably find behaviors, traits and conditions that both offend and excite or benefit and cost us. They will be things the sociology of deviance hasn't much considered, but we are hoping that by reading this text, you will.

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Reading 38

Coming Out all Over: Deviants and the Politics of Social Problems

John I. Kitsuse

Having presented this paper to the meetings of the Society in Boston last August, I dutifully circulated copies of it among my colleagues for their comments. I should have known. Not that they were unresponsive; they were very responsive. "You go too far; you don't go far enough. How about this and how about that, and how about cutting whole pages of the statement?"

What to do? Just set it aside, give it time, let it season. So I filed those responses away with the paper, hoping that by juxtaposition and by osmotic process they might interact symbolically and give new clarity, if not felicity, to the line of argument I had hoped to develop in the address.

Alas, time has not performed this miracle, and I am faced with the problem of how to prepare this paper for publication. The problem has led me to wonder what exactly the publication of a presidential address is supposed to represent. Is it a record of what was presented to the membership of the Society on a certain day and hour or, as I asked one of my colleagues, is that presentation to be considered a run-it-up-the-flagpole exercise which, finding the flag tattered and torn when it is brought down, should be patched together for more formal display? The question was perhaps rhetorical, and a colleague, good friend that he is, suggested that I "tinker with it as little as your sense of intellectual fastidiousness will permit. . . . Let it live as a lecture, a controlled outburst of thought, and leave details for the ragpickers to scrap at." Whereupon, he of course stepped forward to be among the first of the ragpickers.

Well, fair enough. Why not let it fly (as in the flag) and respond to as many of his and

others' comments as I can in a "postword." This seems such a reasonable solution that I suspect that there is something wrong with it, but I am ready to seize it as a perquisite of the office.

Still, it seems from some of the responses to the paper that a few introductory comments may be helpful to sharpen the line of argument that I want to develop. The questions that organized my thoughts for the paper were concerned with how we sociologists of deviance and social problems have conceptualized the problem of deviance. In refering to the "coming out process," I am less interested in the ways various stigmatized groups have engaged in the politics of social and legal "entitlement" than I am in how those activities might be conceived from the interactionist perspective on deviance. I am interested, then, in examining the interactionist conception of the social and moral situation of deviants in order to identify some theoretical issues articulating the study of deviance with the sociology of social problems.

My use of the term "coming out" may require further clarification. Although the term is commonly used in conjunction with closets, I will be less concerned with the conditions of secrecy, visibility and disclosure than with the issue of the social affirmation of self. Coming out as an act of self-affirmation is not limited to the matter of the visibility of the stigmatizing condition that Goffman took as the basis for the distinction between the "discredited" and the "discreditable." A person who has lived in shame and embarrassment with a disfiguring facial scar, a woman who has silently suffered demeaning treatment at the hands of overbearing male colleagues, of a black who has been socially and psychologically imprisoned by racial stereotypes may struggle with the issues surrounding the process of coming out no less than those who bear the less visible "blemishes of individual character" (Goffman, 1963) such as mental disorder, drug addiction, unemployment or illegitimate birth.

Finally, a prefatory comment on the term "deviant," which in a paradoxical way is both

too inclusive and too exclusive. In his book *Social Pathology,* Edwin Lemert (1951) commenting on the definition of deviance, wryly reports on an exercise he conducted using the social problems texts of the day (the 1940s) to estimate the numbers of different types of "pathological deviants" enumerated in them. He found 104,000,000 out of a U.S. population in 1935 of 127,250.000. Everyone is deviant to someone, but such a standard clearly blunts the concept. On the other hand, there are some among us who hold to the view that, sociologically speaking, a deviant is one who is defined and treated as deviant by others, a definition which may err on the side of excluding from consideration people in social categories that are not conventionally labeled or treated as *deviant,* but who nevertheless share the social psychological, social and political situation of those who meet the requirements of the labeling definition. I have in mind members of racial, ethnic and sex categories.

Erving Goffman (1963), commenting critically on the term deviant (and suggesting that, like victims of iatrogenic disorders, deviants are creations of social scientists who then study them), introduced the concept of "tribal stigma," related to "race, nation, and religion, these being stigma that can be transmitted through lineages and equally contaminate all members of a family" (1963:4). While he explicitly includes racial and ethnic attributes among tribal stigmas, sex does not qualify even though "a stigma. . . is really a special kind of relationship between attribute and stereotype" (1963:4). It seems clear to me, however, that the ambivalences and conflicts that women in the late 1970s are experiencing in their confrontations with self and others regarding their social and cultural situation reveal how much in common they have with those conventionally identified as deviants. If, as a technical matter, women do not qualify as bearers of tribal stigmas, perhaps we can add "genetic stigma" to Goffman's three types of stigma, to provide not only for genetic determination of sex characteristics, but also of body type, eye and hair color, left-handedness, and other

characteristics that in other times and places have been, and in some future place and time *may be* burdened with stigma.

* * *

There is little in the pre-'60s literature of either the sociology of deviance or of social problems that anticipates the variety and scale or organization that has marked the appearance of deviants into the politics of protest. Given our sociological conceptions of the effects of societal reactions on deviants, who would have thought that prostitutes would lobby the halls of legislative bodies to denounce "your tired old ethics"; or that mental patients would organize to demand discharge from institutions that provide only custody but not treatment; or that paraplegics would be able to leave the mark of their political clout on so many street corners across the nation; or that marijuana would be openly used at "puff-in" demonstrations on the steps of government buildings; or that American Nazis would claim the right to parade down the streets of the predominantly Jewish community of Skokie, Illinois; or that the chief of police of San Francisco would sponsor a program of recruiting gay men and women for positions on the force? Who would have thought such events could occur, and how have our theoretical conceptions of deviance deflected us from anticipating their appearance?

The meaning of the title "Coming Out All Over" may now be more evident. I want to argue that individuals who have been culturally defined and categorized, stigmatized, morally degraded and socially segregated by institutionally sanctioned exclusions engage in the politics of producing social problems when they declare their presence openly and without apology to claim the rights of citizenship. In such a view, deviants do not *constitute* social problems so much as they are, in the language of the '70s, *into* social problems (Spector and Kitsuse, 1978). They have come out to challenge conventional conceptions and judgments of their conduct, to question "expert" assessments of their disabilities, "handicaps" and devaluation of their capabilities, to reject the diagnosis of their various conditions and the

attendant prescriptions for corrective treatment, and to publicly demand their rights to equal access to institutional resources. Through such activities deviants have become some of the most active and visible practitioners of the arts of social problems in the ’70s. Building on and elaborating the strategies and tactics of the civil rights and antiwar movements of the ’60s, groups ranging from prison inmates to Gray Panthers have moved into the forefront of social action to provide new forms and styles in the politics of social problems.

As observers of these political events, we sociologists of deviance and social problems have had to share the embarrassment of our colleagues who were astonished by the phenomenal appearance and vigorous development of the black civil rights movement during the ’60s. The political activities of deviant groups have clearly been modeled on and shaped by the successes and failures of the civil rights movement. It is not surprising therefore that there should be an underlying similarity between the sociological conceptions of racial and deviant phenomena, and more generally of dominant-minority group relations. These conceptions, however, may have blinded us to the potentials and possibilities of political activism among stigmatized and socially disadvantaged groups.

In particular, the sociology of deviance has implicitly incorporated the conventional assimilationist conception of dominant/minority group relations from earlier formulations of the “race relations cycle.” The experience of waves of immigrant groups struggling to make their way up into the comforts of the American middle class was formally conceptualized as a process of discrimination, segregation and exclusion, then acculturation and social mobility, and finally the progressive assimilation of each succeeding generation into the dominant society. Similarly, the process of the social differentiation of deviants has been characterized from the perspective of those who stigmatize them as depraved, immoral, socially contaminated, and resistant to rehabilitative efforts. Confronted by such imputations, deviants, like immigrants, have been conceived to suffer the indignities of moralistic

patronization as well as punitive acts of discrimination. In this portrait, evidence of expressed resentment and occasional displays of defiance against such treatment has tended to be lost in a gloss that postulates an internalization of stigma and furtive, defensive withdrawal into deviant lives.

Thus, our theorizing about deviant/other relations has been shaped by a perspective that formulates "the problem" as a product of ignorance and prejudice, and "the solution" as a process of amelioration through gradual extension of understanding and acceptance by the society at large. In this formulation, the inequities of power between individual and society are underlined to give moral force to the characterization of deviant as "underdog." And it is consistent with this depiction of the deviant as underdog to locate the sources of politics and social change in programs of amelioration, championed by liberals activated by a moral and rational indignation. This process of amelioration, however, like the classic contact between Western and non-Western societies, implicitly assumes an asymmetrical exchange in which the characteristics that differentiate deviants from others are finally subordinated to the interests of social assimilation.

An important source of this formulation of the social differentiation of deviants may be found in Lemert's early theoretical statement. Twenty-five years after the publication of *Social Pathology* (1951), it continues to reward rereading for the provocative insights and direction it offers for theoretical and empirical development. What distinguished Lemert's statment was that it presented a dynamic formulation of the social construction of deviants from the societal perspective as well as of the formation of deviant identities from the perspective of the putative deviant. I have elsewhere discussed some of the ambiguities contained in his formulation (Kitsuse, 1972), but I want here to call particular attention to the framework within which Lemert placed the deviants' confrontation with the "societal reactions" toward them. He conceived of this confrontation as a process of "symbolic

interaction" in which the deviant might or might not become a "secondary deviant" contingent on "how much deviation he [sic] engages in, by the degree of its visibility, by the *particular* exposure to the societal reaction, and by the nature and strength of the societal reaction" (Lemert, 1951:23).

Although the provision for such contingent factors emphasized the dynamic character of the interaction between deviants and those who respond to them, the "societal reactions" set the terms of that interaction. Lemert states:

> The deviations remain primary deviations or symptomatic and situational [i.e., they are not symbolized as indications of secondary deviation] as long as they are rationalized or otherwise dealt with as functions of a socially acceptable role (1951:75).

The rationalizations and socially acceptable roles in question are, of course, resources that deviants are able to mobilize as socialized members of the same community that organizes the societal reactions against them. Thus, while Lemert's formulation provides for the possibility of reducing the deviant's inner conflicts about his or her aberrant behavior, this possibility is conditioned by the deviant's "reactions to the reactions of others." In short, the deviant's conception of self is conceived to be constrained by the morality of those who define and stigmatize him or her.

Similarly, Goffman's influential formulation of the process of stigmatization postulates a moral order shared by those who impose stigmas and those on whom they are imposed, a consensus that lends significance to the possibilities of being discredited. As Goffman notes at the outset of his treatise on stigma, "a language of relationships, not attributes" is needed such that those who stigmatize and those who are stigmatized interact within a common universe of meanings. Thus, the stigmatized in Goffman's analysis are painfully aware of

their degraded status in the eyes of others, and they are characterized as burdened with the ceaseless management of the conflicts and ambiguities of their "spoiled identities." Visible or invisible to others with respect to the various conditions that make them vulnerable to stigmatization, this conception of the situation of deviants renders them prisoners of their own acceptance and enforcement of the morality that the language of relationship expresses.

A more recent statement of the societal reaction theme in the sociology of deviance may be found in David Matza's depiction of an omnipotent and omnipresent "Leviathan" that monitors the corrective project of deterring "the possibility of innocent affiliation with guilty activity" (1969:149). In this extraordinary and often lyrical description and analysis of the process of "becoming deviant," deviants are relentlessly pursued and bedeviled by the pervasive effects of legal and moral censure. In Matza's formulation, the significant fact of the situation of deviants is "the moral transformation of activity" through the ban that burdens them with guilt (1969:146).

In characterizing the formulations of Lemert, Goffman, and Matza in this manner, I do not mean to say that they misconceive the situation of deviants. Indeed, that an individual who is publicly ridiculed, for example, as a transvestite, or dropped by friends as a drunk, or patronized as a cripple, or rejected by others as a dwarf—that such an individual might simply ignore or dismiss those reactions would seem extraordinary if not impossible. In fact, the use of these examples to pose the theoretical issue is likely to persuade us that our theorists have depicted the situation of the deviant quite correctly. That individuals confronted with the circumstances in my examples should be able to "shine it on," to let it be, would presuppose on the one hand a psychological armory invulnerable to ordinary communications of censure, and on the other, a free and easy access to alternate social worlds providing a wide range of moral perspectives and social opportunities. These are certainly not presuppositions that it would be reasonable to posit in the great majority of cases that I want

to consider here as deviance.

The homogeneity of social norms implicit in the concept of societal reaction, however, has led, I think, to an *over-socialized* conception of deviants in their transformation from primary to secondary deviation. Confronted with definitions of their acts as deviant, the transformation process is conceived to take several forms. Individuals may steadfastly define the acts in question as unintended, fortuitous, and due to a lapse of control or consciousness, and thus reject imputations of deviance ("I must have been crazy," "I was bombed out of my mind"); or they may employ counterdefinitions to neutralize the societal reactions to their acts ("This is no different from the way they rip us off everyday"); or they may respond to the societal reactions by symbolically reacting "to their own behavior aberrations and fix them in their social-psychological patterns" (Lemert, 1951:75): that is, accept themselves as deviants. These alternative "reactions to the reactions of others" do not, however, account for, nor do they provide an understanding of, the phenomenal number of self-proclaimed deviant groups that have visibly and vocally entered the politics of the '70s.

If "becoming deviant" in fact entails a confrontation with an omnipresent negative societal reaction and the construction and acceptance of a stigmatized self, what are the sources of the dramatic assertiveness with which deviant groups have rejected and denounced the accommodative adjustments that Lemert, Goffman and Matza have described? How does the conception of deviants who live lives of quiet desperation square with the political activities of deviant groups that are daily reported in the media?

* * *

In the twenty-five years since it appeared to challenge the prevailing functional theory of deviance, the interactionist view is now acknowledged, particularly by its critics, to have become the dominant paradigm in the sociology of deviance. The major line of criticism over those years has been to reject the interactionist definition of deviance as tautological and

banal, its methodology as subjectivistic and soft, and its major proposition that social control activities produce deviance rather than the reverse, as contrary to ordinary experience and evidence. Although this line of criticism persists among the positivists in the field, after years of exchange and debate, most interactionists have set it aside as an unproductive disagreement in the philosophy of social science.

There has, however, been another line of criticism directed against the interactionist view that has not been seriously engaged nor satisfactorily answered. This criticism has been stated most clearly by Alvin Gouldner (1968) as an issue in the practice of value-free social science, and subsequently echoed by others as representative of a "radical" perspective on deviance (Davis, 1975). Unfortunately, the language in which the criticisms have been expressed has been burdened with a rhetoric and, in the case of Gouldner's critique, *ad hominem* attacks, leading many interactionists to dismiss them as political rather than scientific critiques.

However, the issues Gouldner raised more than ten years ago may provide the basis for our examination of the "over-socialized" conception of the deviant that has developed from the distinctively interactionist conception of societal reaction and its social psychological analog, secondary deviation. Citing Howard Becker as representative of the interactionist view, Gouldner commented critically on the theoretical and methodological implications of conceiving of deviants as subordinates and underdogs within the society. Asserting that such a characterization is "inherent in the very conception of the processes by which deviance is conceived as being generated," he said:

> The underdog is largely seen from the standpoint of the difficulties that are encountered when the society's caretakers attempt to cope with the deviance that has been produced in him by the society. Becker's school of deviance thus views the underdog as someone who is being managed, not as someone who suffers or fights back. Here that

> deviant is sly but not defiant; he is tricky but not courageous; sheets but does not accuse; he "makes out" without making a scene. . . . It is in some part for this reason that the kind of research that are undertaken from this standpoint tend to exclude a concern with *political* deviance in which men do actively fight back on behalf of their values and interests. We thus find relatively few studies of people involved in the civil rights struggle or in the peace movement (Gouldner, 1968: 107).

Now if "deviant as underdog" is inherent in the interactionist conception of the deviance producing process, it is no less true that the inequities of power that make deviants the pawns of politics are central to that conception. In Gouldner's wide-ranging critique, the significance of politics in Becker's formulation of the process by which deviance is created is obscured by a thesis that links the interactionist view of deviance with a misplaced sentimentality. Gouldner has much to say about the liberal sociologist's identification with the underdog—with "man-on-his-back," rather than with "man-fighting-back"—and how this identification is an expression of a mote fundamental, self-interested alignment with the establishment. There is, however, nothing in his analysis to suggest how the deviant might get *off* his back to generate the politics of deviance that the interactionists have tended to ignore if not exclude altogether. Indeed, in one of the very few references that Gouldner makes to the "underdog's" view of reality, his comments reveal that the deviant *is* on his back:

> There is a hidden anomaly in any recommendation to look upon the world from the standpoint of underdogs. The anomaly is this: to a surprising degree, underdogs see *themselves* from the standpoint of respectable society; Negroes, in fact, often call one another 'niggers.' Thus, if we did not study underdogs from 'their own' standpoint we

> would, inevitably, be adopting the standpoint of the dominant culture. It is precisely insofar as the deviant and subordinate do accept a role as passive victims rather than as rebels against circumstances, that they do view themselves from the standpoint of the dominant culture (1968:107).

The use of such epithets among minorities in reference to each other can, of course, reflect an ironic consciousness of self and society. Gouldner's observation, however, may suggest that, whatever our political sympathies, as sociologists we share the knowledge of how invasive societal definitions are in their negative effects on the self-conceptions of minorities. The ideology of social pathologists that Mills (1943) described and analyzed more than thirty years ago may linger still in our attribution to deviants of a vulnerability and subordination to the moral authority of what is commonly characterized as white, middle-class, protestant culture and society. Even when we take the naturalistic view recommended by Matza and assume the "appreciative attitude," there may be a certain WASP-like wonder, and a titillation of vicarious identification in our efforts to conceive of difference as "merely" variant, and systematic deviation as "alternative lifestyle" that we should consider without prejudice and in their own terms.

Alas, our aspirations and training may have exacted the price of the same insidious socialization to societal strictures that we attribute to deviants. It is not a matter of "whose side we are on" as much as it is that our "appreciation" and sympathies may finally be constrained by a middle-class sensibility that limits our ability to assume that classic anthropological stance toward our subjects in which "nothing human is alien." So we may wonder, finally, how those adolescent males and tearoom habitués manage to sustain a definition of themselves as normal "straight" males; how *can* those people make "working the welfare system" a career that provides them with an invisible means of support; how *can*

spouses collude in acts of violence against their infant children; how *can* urban youth professionalize the victimization of aged pensioners to rob them of their monthly allowance; how is it *possible* for men and women to abandon family and home to establish themselves in new and unencumbered lives? The question persists below the surface of our professional neutrality: how is it possible for people to engage in such activities without feeling the inhibiting constraints of self and societal censure on their actions?

If in the past, the sociological image of deviants has depicted them as over-socialized to the societal reactions toward them, these emergent forms of deviance that have become staple items of our daily media fare suggest the inadequacy of such a characterization. The activities of middle-class born and bred street people, brazenly confronting the disapproval of "respectables" with an insouciantly applied touch for money, may lead us to question the attributions of self-conflict and subterfuge that have been imputed to alcoholics, prostitutes and welfare recipients, as well as to upwardly-mobile, assimilationst blacks, Jews, and other minorities.

In returning to this connection between deviance and minority groups, it is appropriate to acknowledge once again how systematically Lemert attempted to examine the implications of his theory. In a discussion specifying the subject matter of his theory, he makes the following comment in a footnote:

> We have raised the question in graduate seminars as to whether our theory is applicable to the study of minority or ethnic groups. Generally this question has to be left unanswered. While ethnic groups are often comparable to the type of deviant groups in which we are interested, it is also true that in some cases their large size and occasional positions of considerable power in local areas mean that they differ significantly from the deviant groups we shall be studying (1951:24).

Although Lemert, writing in 1950, certainly should not be burdened with having failed to anticipate the size and organized power of deviant groups in the ’70s (e.g., the gay and lesbian populations in San Francisco, or the paraplegic groups across the nation), he is less than persuasive in arguing for the exclusion of minority and ethnic groups on those theoretical grounds. Indeed, the anomaly of this exclusion is underlined by numerous references to immigrant groups, religious sects and American Indians in his discussion of the differentiation of deviant populations. It is more likely that he excluded them as a consequence of the essentially social-psychological focus of his theory on the social differentiation of isolated individuals rather than group members.

The conventional view of racial and ethnic groups is that their members are socially differentiated on the basis of group rather than individual characteristics. Thus, their experience of differentiation is seen as a group experience, unlike the deviant who is conceived to experience the defining censure of society as an individual, personal crisis of negative identity unmediated by subcultural rationalizations or supports. Affiliation and participation in deviant social organizations are considered secondary and contingent possibilities, providing group contexts for the systematization and confirmation of their status as deviants.

In effect, deviant social organizations are analogs of the individual’s symbolization of self as secondary deviant. They are collective reactions that organize patterns of responses to the problems posed by societal reactions to deviance, just as the individual’s reactions to the negative reactions of others lead to the ultimate acceptance of a deviant social role and efforts to systematically organize a life based on that role.

This, then, is the image of the passive “man-on-his-back,” seemingly incapable of resisting or opposing the inexorable process of attributions of abnormality and inadequacy,

stigmatized as morally defective, progressively excluded and subordinated as deviant, and driven to seek comfort and support in the shelter of deviant subcultures. From the perspective of the late ’70s this image of the deviant may border on caricature, but it is an image that, radical critics notwithstanding, applied only too well to the situation of homosexuals, unmarried mothers, ex-mental patients, the physically handicapped, and others in the period before the ’60s. This over-socialized conception of the deviant, however, has led us to expect the social differentiation of secondary deviants turned inward to segregated if not closeted lives within subcultural communities, nervously engaged in the “management of spoiled identities” in their daily encounters with “normals.”

A closer examination of these accommodations, free of such a conception of the situation of deviance, might reveal the heavy psychological and social costs exacted by the tacit acceptance of societal definitions of deviants—and beneath the surface acquiescence, a residue of resentment and anger toward those who deny them the common rights of citizenship. Secondary deviation may rationalize shame and guilt and thus neutralize them as daily concerns, but the alienation of self, created by the artifice and guile practiced to avoid the indignities and penalties of disclosure, may be experienced as a gratuitous and finally unsupportable imposition of tumble and pain. Since deviants themselves may have learned to accept the dynamics of then behavior and the penalties of their various conditions as beyond choice or control, their vulnerability to arbitrary acts of discrimination, to demeaning treatment, to the derisive taunts of the smallest child as well as the most arrogant police officer, may feed a highly volatile reservoir of outrage and anger.

This outrage and anger, galvanized by the political ferment of the late ’60s, is perhaps most clearly symbolized by the explosion of violence in what has become known as the “Stonewall Rebellion” of 1969 (Humphreys, 1972). In that event, now commemorated in gay communities throughout the country as the beginning of their “liberation movement,” a

police action in a Greenwich Village gay bar became the occasion for an unexpectedly violent response from the patrons within, soon joined by gays and others in the surrounding area. The rebellion dramatically challenged the prevailing conception of this deviant population as the prototypically vulnerable and helpless victim of public and private harassment and sanctions. Condemned and persecuted throughout history in law, religious doctrine and social convention, male homosexuals have borne the brunt of a degrading stereotype that depicts them as effeminate, frivolous, passive, physically weak, emotionally unstable, morally perverted, and a threat to men and boys alike. This characterization of the situation of homosexuals was implicit in the sociological literature before the ’60s, giving no hint of the potential volatility of their apparent accommodation to their deviant status.

Spectacular as it was as a rousing display of the rage of the oppressed, the “Stonewall Rebellion” is even more significant for its effect on the transformation of the imagery of the homosexual for self and society. For participants as well as for the audience, the rage that gays directed against the police fundamentally altered conventional stereotypes. It provided the basis for actively opposing societal conceptions of *what* gays are, *why* they are what they are, and *what*, if anything, should be done about it. If “homosexuals” fit the image of the deviant on-his-back, “gays” exemplify what might be termed “the new deviants”—fat people, little people, ugly people, old people, and a growing number of others—who have called into question the very concept of “deviant,” not by denying what they are, but by affirming and claiming it as a valued identity deserving of the rights accorded any member of the society.

Deviants are coming out all over, not in acts of confession, but rather to profess and advocate the lives they live and the values that those lives express. In cities and suburbs, singly and together, among male and female groups, married and unmarried, people who have suppressed and muffled central aspects of their lives in guilt, shame and embarrassment are coming out to challenge the legitimacy of social, legal and scientific conceptions of their

“afflictions,” preferences and values. The new deviants are critically examining their accommodations to social tolerance that have been the bases of their carefully managed marginal lives, accommodations that daily tax their nerve and energy. Quentin Crisp, the “naked civil servant” (Hanson. 1976), with his flamboyant display of gaiety, pays the cost of such accommodation no less than Katherine Butler Hathaway, author of *The Little Locksmith* (1943), who nurtured and sustained a reflective life beneath the unobtrusive and self-effacing manner of the physically deformed.

As the title of a recent documentary film declares, “The Word is Out” (Mariposa Film Group, 1978), not only about homosexuals who are the subjects of the film, but about paraplegics, fat people, the blind, the victims of rape and a growing number of “disvalued” people; and the word is that they reject the costs of accommodation as unjust, gratuitous and unacceptable. The gays marching down the streets of cities large and small, the handicapped on public transportation systems, religious cult groups in air terminals, “women against rape” in police stations, and others clearly demonstrate that the new deviants are not celebrating the sweet Aquarian call to let the sunshine in. Rather they are invoking, pressing, and pushing the democratic ideology, claiming all the rights, privileges and protections for personal freedoms and equal access to institutional resources. They do not shrink from the hostile responses of those they confront, and they do not ask tolerance for who and what they are and do, but demand recognition of the moral and legal bases of their claims. They give no quarter, though they may demand much more to redress the inequities of the past. Their political stance is direct and clearly expresses the confidence of civil rights activism: why should we accommodate; why shouldn’t we demand; what do they want from us?

And in pressing their claims, the new deviants have attempted, often successfully, to shift the negative identities of deviance to those who have imposed identities on them. In some quarters—one might suggest academia as an example—charges such as racist, sexist, ageist

or weightist, not to mention pig, prude and philistine, have assumed sufficient force as epithets to drive the accused into the closets vacated by those who accuse them. Indeed, the politics of deviance is so fluid and volatile that it is becoming difficult to tell who is in and who is out of the closets.

Although it remains to be seen whether or not the activities of the new deviants have fundamentally altered their political as well as cultural situation in an enduring way, it is important to note the theoretical issues that those activities present. Our theoretical formulations of the social or the social psychological situation of deviants do not provide an adequate framework for the investigation of the developing politics of deviance. If secondary deviation is instituted when deviants "react symbolically to their own behavior aberrations and fix them in their socio-psychological patterns" (Lemert, 1951:75), then we might propose the concept of "tertiary deviation" to refer to the deviant's confrontation, assessment, and rejection of the negative identity imbedded in secondary deviation, and the transformation of that identity into a positive and viable self-conception. As an extension of the natural history of deviant lives outlined by Lemert, the concept of tertiary deviance would direct us to investigate questions of how it is possible for the stigmatized, ridiculed and despised to confront their own complicity in the maintenance of their degraded status, to recover and accept the suppressed anger and rage as their own, to transform shame into guilt, guilt into moral indignation, and victim into activist.

Such questions suggest the importance of shifting our analytic focus from the definitions of deviance imposed by societal reactions to counterdefinitions of those reactions by deviants as ignorant, hypocritical, elitist and even morally reprehensible. Lynn Osborne (1974) has provided the beginnings of such an analysis in a provocative essay, titled "Beyond Stigma Theory," on the life and art of archcriminal/homosexual/author Jean Genet who, in accepting the deviant identity imposed on him, intensified his mortification as an outcast and thus

transformed his situation of deviant in society. Osborne states that Genet, in this process of transformation:

> (a) became a wielder instead of a victim of the force of definition; (b) gave moral coherence to his behavior by constructing a value system which resolves the contradictions inherent in the values of the "Good Society"; (c) overcame his guilt; and (d) became a part of society in a typically perverse way: 'Everybody's evil—the only difference is that I openly admit it' (Osborne, 1974:82).

Osborne proposes Genet's transcendence of his deviant identity as a model for the analysis of the deviant as actor in contrast to deviant as reactor to societal definitions of what he or she is and does. Although this analytic model specifies several crucial elements of identity transformation, its general utility is limited by the singularity and extremity of Genet's vision of life as an act of opposition to conventional social realities. The twenty-six gay men and women who talk about their lives in "The Word is Out" provide a good representation of the range of issues and conflicts with which deviants struggle in finding their individual ways to public disclosure. Two or three of them recognizably reflect Genet's political and philosophic stance, but for the majority of those interviewed in this remarkable documentary film, it is difficult to conceive that Genet's individual and single-minded project of confronting society with its own corruption could provide a model for the analysis of their identity transformations. Listening to their reflections on the confusions, conflicts and ambiguities that have shaped their lives, it is clear that a less of them broke out as acts of defiance, while others were helped, coaxed, and even dragged out of their closets. Indeed, it is truly remarkable that, speaking so directly and publicly into the camera's eye, they are able to reflect on the ambivalence that colors their consent to this form of public disclosure—a

consent they have given in the knowledge of their past, present and future vulnerability to police harassment, witch hunts, occupational discrimination, and the pain of the betrayal and rejection of family and friends.

Perhaps a more serious limitation of what Osborne calls "Geneticism" as a model of identity transformation is that the outcome defines but does not move beyond the affirmation of the existential condition of the deviant as outsider. Genet lives his life as a clarification of this condition and embraces it as away of being in society. But tertiary deviants do not come out to assume the role of social critic—they come out to claim the right to go in and stay in *just like everybody else.* In taking this stance, they differ not only from Genet but also from the accommodations through which secondary deviants have lived in society. Whereas the tertiary deviant might say, "Here I am, warts and all; these warts have nothing to do with my right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," the secondary deviant's message is more nearly, "Here I am with these wants, but I've done all I can to keep them respectably under control and out of public view." As for Genet, his statement might be, "Here are my warts; look at them and think about how they fascinate you! *Va t'en!*"

In using the metaphor of warts, I do not mean to trivialize the genuine struggle and anguish that the display of stigmata represents, but it appropriately underlines the versatility with which even the most minor difference of physiognomy, accident of birth, manner of speech, postural habit, esthetic preference, personal preoccupation, interactional style, tic and quirk may become institutionally amplified and fashioned into moral and characterological defects. Whatever the changes that may remain from the politics of deviance in the '70s, deviants and the institutional practices they have confronted will no longer be innocent of the relativism of self and society. Society's "problem" may likewise amplify the troubles they share to identify society as "the problem." From a theoretical point of view, then, we face the issue of incorporating this new level of deviant/other interaction into our formulations of

deviance and social problems.

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Reading 39

There goes the Gayborhood?

Amin Ghaziani

Lesbian and gay residential patterns are shifting today. A recent flurry of media reports captures popular anxieties that urban enclaves long considered "gay neighborhoods"—places with a visible clustering of gay residents and tourists; gay and gay-friendly commercial establishments; and gay community symbols such as the rainbow flag—are disappearing as more straights move in and fewer gays express interest in residing in or relocating to them. The Chicago Tribune measured the pulse of these changes in two 2007 features, "Culture Clash: Boystown Shifting as More Families Move In" and "Gay Neighborhoods Worry About Losing Their Distinct Identity."

And in an eye-catching companion piece, one of Chicago's free daily papers, the RedEye, ran a cover story playfully titled "There Goes the Gayborhood." A provocative photograph of one of the rainbow-colored pylons that adorn North Halsted Street and designate it as the city's main gay artery accompanied the piece—but the colors were fading and bleeding. The story reported, "With more families moving in and longtime residents moving out, some say Boys-town [the informal moniker of Chicago's gayborhood] is losing its gay flavor… Some residents and activists welcome the gay migration, saying it's a sign of greater equality, while others say Boys-town is losing its identity."

The social forces contributing to this gay outmigration (and replacement by straights) stretch beyond the Windy City. San Diego's Hillcrest, Houston's Montrose, Atlanta's Midtown, Miami's South Beach, D.C.'s Dupont Circle, Boston's South End—each is an example of a traditional American gay neighborhood, and each seems to be on a list of endangered urban species.

It’s quixotic to think that gay neighborhoods have always been around and will never change. Neighborhoods and the cities that surround them are organic, continuously evolving places. But neither should we sing a requiem for the death and life of great gay villages, as some media reports presage. Thinking within this binary box isn’t sociologically productive. We might instead ask why gay neighborhoods initially formed, and what factors explain the changes we’re witnessing now. With these questions as our guide, we can use media attention to understand the relationship between sexuality, residential choice, and urban forms.

World War II was pivotal in the formation of gay territories. Many men and women were dishonorably discharged from the military for their homosexuality, and rather than return home disgraced, they remained in port cities such as San Francisco. According to the U.S. Census, from 1950 to 1960 the number of single-person households in San Francisco doubled and accounted for 38 percent of the city’s total residential units. During this time, bars helped create dense gay networks that made gays more visible and, over time, inspired them to assert a right to gather in public places.

A lot has changed since then. Gay life in the U.S. is now so open that it may be moving “beyond the closet,” says sociologist Steven Seidman, despite a persistent privileging of heterosexuality by the state, societal institutions, and popular culture. This mere possibility prompted British journalist Paul Burston to coin the term “post-gay” in 1994 as an observation and critique of gay culture and politics. The term found an American audience four years later when Out magazine editor James Collard argued in the New York Times, “We should no longer define ourselves solely in terms of our sexuality—even if our opponents do. Post-gay isn’t ‘un-gay.’ It’s about taking a critical look at gay life and no longer thinking solely in terms of struggle.” In a separate Newsweek feature, Collard elaborated: “First for protection and later with understandable pride, gays have come to colonize whole neighborhoods, like West Hollywood in L.A. and Chelsea in New York City.

It seems to me that the new Jerusalem gay people have been striving for all these years won't be found in a gay-only ghetto, but in a world where we are free, equal, and safe to live our lives."

The way Americans understand sexuality affects people's location patterns (why they choose to live where they do) and urban forms (why neighborhoods look and feel the way they do). The closet era (think pre-World War II) gave rise to discrete locales where individuals with same-sex desires could find each other. The coming out era (World War II to 1997, but especially after the 1969 Stonewall riots in New York), in contrast, witnessed the development of formal urban gay enclaves like the Castro. And finally, the post-gay era (1998 to today) impacts these gay neighborhoods by potentially unraveling them and rendering them "passé," as the New York Times characterized them in October 2007. The Advocate remarked that same year, "As the country opens its arms to openly gay and lesbian people, the places we call home have grown beyond urban gay ghettos. The Advocate welcomes you to this new American landscape." When the magazine polled its readers, asking if they'd "prefer to live in an integrated neighborhood rather than a distinct gay ghetto," 69 percent said yes.

One year later in an Advocate article titled "Where the Gays Are," UCLA demographer Gary J. Gates reported that, according to the 2000 U.S. Census, "Same-sex couples live virtually everywhere in the country," and their numbers are "increasing in some of the most conservative parts of the country." Gates's research shows that "same-sex unmarried partners"—the only category the Census included in 2000 to count lesbians and gay men and one that clearly ignores single people—were present in 99.3 percent of all U.S. counties. Why do postgay gays tend to think outside the gayborhood box?

We have to look at the factors driving the transition to today's putatively post-gay era, notably the role of assimilation, or the social process of absorbing people (in this case,

lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people) into mainstream society. The assimilation of American gays has generated feelings of acceptance, integration, and safety, which is reversing an earlier propensity of lesbians and gay men to concentrate in discrete urban enclaves. This new socio-psychological profile works in two ways. First, assimilation contributes to an overextension of the gay residential imagination. As Don Romesburg, co-chairman of the GLBT Historical Society of Northern California, told the Washington Post in 2007, "What I've heard from some people is, 'We don't need the Castro anymore because essentially San Francisco is our Castro.'" The pattern persists in smaller cities, too. Consider Northampton, Massachusetts: "There are gay enclaves, but there's no place I know where the gay population is so integrated into the community," said Julie Pokela, a local business owner and former head of the Chamber of Commerce. Some people have dubbed her entire city "Lesbianville, USA."

[INSERT FIGURE 39.1 HERE]

Although very different, San Francisco and Northampton both show how assimilation has broadened the spatial positioning of homosexuality from the specific streets of a gay enclave to an entire city itself. But here we encounter a contradiction: if an entire city is a gay village, then no particular neighborhood is uniquely so. San Francisco-as-our-Castro looks and feels different from the Castro as a discrete gay urban entity. Thus, assimilation may expand a gay person's horizon of residential possibilities, but it also shrinks the situating of homosexuality in urban space.

Second, assimilation motivates some gays to think of their sexuality as indistinguishable from straights, and this compels them to select residences outside of traditional gay villages. As an example, a 2004 New York Times story interviewed a lesbian couple that had relocated to a New Jersey suburb. Neither woman considered herself "any sort of activist," and both wanted "a suburban family life that is almost boringly normal." But why not relocate to a

place like Asbury Park with its visible concentration of gay residents? “We’re specifically not moving into gay neighborhoods here. Within the state of New Jersey, we feel comfortable living anywhere,” said one woman. Her partner added, “Here, we’re just part of a neighborhood. We weren’t the gay girls next door; we were just neighbors. We were able to blend in, which is what you want to do, rather than have the scarlet letter on our heads.” It seems that postgay residential choice comes with a desire to deemphasize the differences between gay and straight. “There is a portion of our community that wants to be separatist, to have a queer culture, but most of us want to be treated like everyone is,” Dick Dadey, executive director of Empire State Pride Agenda told the Times in 1994. “We want to be the neighbors next door, not the lesbian or gay couple next door.”

Straights are on board, too. A 2010 Gallup poll found that, for the first time in history, the percentage of Americans who find gay and lesbian relations morally acceptable crossed the symbolic fifty-percent threshold. In fact, many straight women who live in gayborhoods say they feel safer in them. But why would straight men move there? Sociologist Michael Kimmel told New York Times columnist Charles M. Blow that “men have gotten increasingly comfortable with the presence of, and relative equality of, ‘the other.’” If they respond to gay identity disclosure today with “Gay? Whatever, Dude” (as Blow titled his piece), then a gay neighborhood is hardly out-of-bounds. Crossing the symbolic moral threshold, along with the preference structure of many single straight women, has resulted in a ratio of single heterosexual women to men that makes gayborhoods especially attractive to the latter—minus all the baggage that comes with homophobia.

So, what should we make of media cries like “There goes the gayborhood”? The transition to a post-gay era is generating a particular attitude and corresponding behavior: gays are deselecting traditional gay neighborhoods and straights are selecting them as a place of residence. Assimilation is expanding the gay urban imagination and residential repertoire

at the same time that it's erasing the identifiable location of gays in place. This post-gay effect manifests in big cities and small towns alike. Gays in both places seek neighborhoods that are demographically diverse and where their sexual orientation adds to an already lively mix. But recall that 31 percent of Advocate readers still preferred to live in "a distinct gay ghetto." The post-gay trend, in other words, is uneven and incomplete —and there is no compelling reason to believe that it signals the definitive end of American gayborhoods, as some media reports predict. A sociological approach shows that it's not a zero-sum game.

Reading 40

Queer Presences and Absences: Citizenship, Community, Diversity – or Death

Yvette Taylor

Recent policies in the US and UK context – such as the Civil Partnership Act (2004) and the repeal of US military policy 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' – have been conceptualised as key moments of coming forward, whereby LGBT citizens have gained new public visibility and viable presence within a human rights framework. Yet the success of 'the world *we* have won' (Weeks, 2007) within these new presences often works to re-create a dominant 'we', as a classed and racialised construction, neglecting the intersectional dimensions of sexual citizenship (Taylor, 2010). Indeed, in celebrating new queer presences, the absence of 'others' must also be considered: queer and feminist literatures on the politics of grief, loss and mourning have shown the ways that some lives are already lost to public/activist/institutional concern, representing an outsider status beyond community and citizenship (Taylor et al., 2010).

Such debates and their complex implications came to the fore around the recent suicide of student Tyler Clementi at a US campus following a suspected act of homophobia. Rather than locating homophobia solely within the site discussed, or on the bodies of the young people accused, this piece hopes to make broader resonances in relation to both institutional and activist responses to the event, which I address as key moments of sexual citizenship-making. I argue that the creation of broader publics, as called upon by different actors in the demand for citizenship, community and diversity, can be seen as contradictory, relying upon and re-creating privacy as the proper concern and place of civil engagements. This is witnessed in responses to different queer deaths and the affective relations – from 'hate' to 'love' – which are generated interpersonally and institutionally in pinpointing blame, in moving forwards

and in securing rights, as a moment of loss and possible gain. I ask which lives are already lost to public concern, to community activism and institutional apprehension, questions which I suggest are significant to the dis-junctures in diversity rhetorics and realities often enacted in community claims for citizenship.

I arrived at Rutgers University in early September 2010 ready to research US sexual citizenship, hoping to situate this against earlier work on UK citizenship, and the intersections between sexuality and class in same-sex parental rights (Taylor, 2009a). This sense of identification and community in what is the most diverse US public university according to publicity ('Jersey Roots, Global Reach') made me ponder on the advantages and disadvantages of such a strong version of sameness and difference. The rhetorical appeal of 'internationalisation' and 'diversity' and the reality of elitism and exclusion (Taylor, 2009b, 2011) within Higher Education has been widely commented upon, where institutions produce guidelines on 'dealing with' diversity (frequently invoking legal compulsion, employment worth and cultural variety). Yet many have pointed to the structuring of education as it solidifies, rather than challenges, social divisions, reinforcing a classed and racialised version of 'community'. The significance of this to *sexual* citizenship, always played out within a broad landscape of inequality, community and diversity, became all too apparent in the suicide of a first-year Rutgers student, Tyler Clementi, who jumped to his death from the George Washington Bridge on 23 September 2010. Clementi's death came soon after two fellow students allegedly filmed him having sex with another man. In the official response that followed, it was asserted via an email from the University President that Rutgers is 'extraordinarily proud of its diversity and the respect its members have for one another'. A two-year project 'focusing attention on civility in the context of one of the most culturally and racially diverse research universities in the nation' was highlighted as a re-commitment to 'the values of civility, dignity, compassion, and respect' in shared, painful times (see

Project Civility[1] at http://projectcivility.rutgers.edu/). I wondered what and whose pain would be shared, owned, claimed and forgotten (Butler, 2004).

In recalling this my point is not to hold this young person's life and death up as the shattering point of community: in the immediate days that followed, the media presence on campus put a spotlight on all; from fellow student residents to those researching LGBT issues. All were asked to convey what this meant, how to convey 'Rutgers' loss' and what a suitable response would be – sometimes with a microphone emerging from nowhere to capture and quickly relay those thoughts across campus and country. Perhaps unsurprisingly many students began to resent such intrusion and the debate shifted from one of sexuality and LGBT rights to one of privacy for all Rutgers' students. There was also an increasing tone of resentment against campaigning groups organising die-in events (which performed more urgent and dramatic protests than 'sit-ins'), speak-outs and silent vigils: couldn't 'they' just go away now and let things get back to normal, understood as a 'cosy diversity' where all had suffered and all were now included, of course (Ahmed, 2009). Responses were both highly visible – re-circulated again through the very technologies (cell phones, web cams) blamed as the bad objects of 'today's youth' – and yet invisible, as homophobia was mis-placed in being situated entirely at Rutgers. This pinpointing removed responses from a historical, social perspective more able to account for homophobia *and* heterosexism. Most problematically, homophobia was seen to reside wholly in the bodies of the two young people accused of filming Clementi: two 18-year-old students of colour, who then became the targets of racist abuse (Haritaworn, 2010, discusses a similar racialisation between 'queer lovers' and 'hateful others'). Blame and praise circulate at these moments of community (re)building, as our points of success, shame, loss and gain. At a speak-out event I listened with disbelief at others' disbelief: why didn't these 'minority' young people simply know better? By being

‘minority’ they were dually tasked with a non-discriminatory stance towards all issues, as well as being the embodiment of institutional diversity.

Formal institutionalisation and retraction of rights intersects with (in)formal structures of participation, including campaigning groups, differently effecting material and subjective claims-making (Taylor, 2007, 2009a). Within days of Clementi’s death, Garden State Equality, a state-wide New Jersey LGBT advocacy group, demanded the accused students be prosecuted for hate crimes and given the ‘maximum possible sentence’. *Campus Pride*, a US nation-wide group for LGBT college students, also pressed Rutgers for the pair’s immediate expulsion with little mention of an investigation or disciplinary hearing. Online endorsements circulated as over 18,000 people signed up to press for manslaughter charges. Signatories called for the accused to ‘return to their countries’, ascribing homophobia to *other* countries and cultures thus exempting US society for its deeply ingrained heterosexism: this positioning occurred despite both accused students being American citizens from the New Jersey area.

Under the banner of ‘Justice Not Vengeance’, a newly formed LGBT group ‘Queering the Air’ decried the rhetoric of blame and shame as a foil for anti-Asian racism. The centrality of ‘justice not vengeance’ as deployed by this activist group nonetheless slipped in re-centring a (certain) student as in need of recognition and resources. The main focus of this group was to attain gender-neutral housing for LGBT students at Rutgers, where members’ unique needs and diversity were to be recognised as part of the institution’s commitment to ‘diversity’, which was seen to have failed in the (gendered) allocation of rooms in university dormitories rather than as chosen by students. Diversity was strategically deployed by this queer group in claiming ‘Our Rutgers, Our Future’ where space and protection were demanded to secure *their* privacy by virtue of being ‘diverse’ and in need: the Clementi suicide was seen partly as an outcome of failed privacy and lack of housing choices. I attended various meetings and

was shaken to hear real infringements of privacy and reports of sexual assault as a fairly common occurrence on US campuses (see Gonzales et al., 2005). Problematically I heard how these assaults could be publicised, capitalised upon, put to use in this new 'window of opportunity' in demanding institutional responsiveness and securing privacy. This moves public concern and activism back into the private realm as a supposedly protected – though breached – space; it displaces the danger and differences already in place in leading 'private' lives, and encourages an individualistic response (as residents) as opposed to an intersectional one more able to grasp the tensions between broad 'publics' and limited 'privates'. In other words, grief gets rearticulated and reduced as a loss of personal privacy, even property, devoid of a broader recognition of who is already included and excluded from constructions of citizenship, residency and community. The group, formed with perhaps the best of intentions and pragmatic objectives, ended up being pitted against other groups as more pragmatic and outcome driven and, as an outsider, a visiting queer academic, I felt confused where my affiliations should be assigned. Those who attended other events – including the Project Civility meetings which were somewhat problematically tasked with 'restoring community' – were made to feel somewhat suspect and not really that queer. My presence was directly queried as my own confusions were expressed (I was asked if I was from the media, being unrecognisable to these inside-outsiders). My own quick criticism cannot necessarily convey political and ethical complexities but in both institutional and activist responses the detachment between culpability and capability was stark, re-inscribing a binary between those who were to blame (the accused students, the institution) and those in need of saving (LGBT students with unique and diverse needs, institutional reputations).

Much campaigning has now occurred inside and outside of Rutgers. The 'It Gets Better' campaign started by openly gay columnist Dan Savage was initially posted on YouTube and has now launched its own website (see http://www.itgets-better.org/). On the website there is

an opening pledge: ‘THE PLEDGE: Everyone deserves to be respected for who they are. I pledge to spread this message to my friends, family and neighbors. I’ll speak up against hate and intolerance whenever I see it, at school and at work. I’ll provide hope for lesbian, gay, bi, trans and other bullied teens by letting them know that ‘‘It Gets Better’’’. YouTube clips have been archived on this site, given the enormity of responses, providing an insight for queer youth into what the future might hold for them (see Vitellone, 2008, for a critique of such logics): ‘Many LGBT youth can’t picture what their lives might be like as openly gay adults.. . . So let’s show them what our lives are like, let’s show them what the future may hold in store for them’ (http://www.itgetsbetter.org/). Celebrities and ordinary ‘survivors’ are invited to talk about troubled childhoods and developed, successful adulthoods as indicating full ‘recovery’, where bullies by contrast are positioned as ‘losers’, ‘weak’, ‘less worthy’ and ‘inferior’. Vice-President Joe Biden reassures that ‘There’s not a single thing about you that’s not normal, good or decent’, urging us to contribute and make ‘us’ feel better about ‘our country’. Even US President Barack Obama has added his own tale of survival and overcoming of hardships to the voices which echo ‘It Gets Better’ as an incentive for young queer youth to hold on, keep going and never kill themselves. The youth of tomorrow are imbued with a regenerative futurity, a multicultural ‘diverse’ inclusivity, but this is denied to those ‘already lost’ to public concern and ‘our’ communities – as homophobic others who should be expelled from institutions and nations.

Such sexual stories, circulating via ‘It Gets Better’, can function to re-generate as well as disrupt communities, shaping new public repertoires around which communities mobilise (Plummer, 1995) and revealing ‘intricate interconnections of class, race, nationality, gender – and sexuality’ (Weeks et al., 2001: 196). Many clips from queer people dissent from the happy message of upward mobility and movement to a queer city, emphasising that some don’t ‘get out’ to be out (Taylor, 2007). And others too, it seems, function as the sticky

repository for the 'lack' of tolerance, affluence and becoming. We are asked to lament the deaths of some – those young people who could have 'been something' – yet in this economy of grief (Butler, 2004) others are already lost, serving only to remind us what we are not (homophobic) or what we are now (diverse). Much discrimination, and even much death, is passed over in these moments, when we remember young white victims, such as Tyler Clementi and Matthew Shepard, whose death in 1998 inspired the opening of The Matthew Shepard Foundation as a forum to 'embrace diversity'. I am not suggesting that we should forget the grief here but rather we should remember to situate these horrific incidents alongside the endless forgetting of the loss of young Black lives, such as Sakia Gunn, a 15-year-old African American lesbian, who was murdered in an economically deprived Black neighbourhood of Newark, New Jersey in 2003.

Articulations and realisations of sexual citizenship need to go beyond the patchwork map of legislative rights pursued by the good campaigner in celebrating our moves forward, our diverse potentialities, or in mourning our injuries. The sexual skirmishes which have featured in, for example, recent Proposition 8[2] and US military 'Don't ask, don't tell' debates suggest a wider, differential mapping of same-sex rights beyond middle-class universities. In the US context the 1049 protections and benefits extended to married couples under federal law are commonly cited as a reason for same-sex marriage and, notably, as a way to secure futures and 'protect' children. But throughout differential state-by-state negotiations there has been a dis-connect – or a series of them – where members of ethnic groups (African Americans and Latinos have been cited) are positioned as homophobic and in favour of reduced LGBT rights. This (mis)positions all LGBT people as white: it also implies that discrimination based on sexual identity is read as different and separate from racial discrimination and that sides must be chosen. In contrast, Kandaswamy (2008) argues that US lesbian and gay activists' pursuit of benefits, accrued through same-sex marriage, should be better understood as part of

the struggles – and differential benefits – within a racially stratified welfare state. Queering citizenship, then, must mean more than citizenship for queers and must be situated within persistent intersections of race, class and sexuality on and off campus. In queering the place and practice of diversity as individual, institutional and activist responses, it is crucial to theorise the constructions, places and possibilities of *advantage* as well as *disadvantage*. The risk in leaving privileged lives unproblematised is that these are understood as fitting, standard and chosen; as the trajectories of agentic and capable subjects able to take full advantage of citizenship while being injured by others' lack, failure and culpability.

Efforts to negotiate between hateful others and loving words or actions are not always so straightforward. In spouting hateful, hurtful rhetoric Clint McCance, a school board member in Arkansas, commented on Facebook that 'they want me to wear purple because five queers killed themselves. The only way im wearin it for them is if they all commit suicide' *[sic]*. Now mobilised, the 'It Gets Better' campaign successfully and very visibly challenged this with an online petition (accumulating 100,000 signatures) forcing McCance to resign the next day in a live CNN news broadcast. A *Queer Rising* event hosted a Love-in at Times Square on 15 October to call 'attention to the power of love': we are not scary, the email invite declared; we are not 'threatening' or 'shameful' 'and HATE speech is a DIRECT CAUSE of suicide and violence within our community' *(Queer Rising).* Love was articulated as cure, with couples joining hands: singles were welcomed and encouraged ('We will be pairing-up single strangers to hold hands!'). This loving coupledom may itself be a fundamental part of – and problem for – campaigning groups reinforcing normative polarisations around 'love' and 'hate'. In relocating sexual citizenships away from such intimacies and injuries as self-evident truths, there is a need to explore further the way we are called upon to mobilise the values of 'civility, dignity, compassion, respect', as well as the spaces and sentiments of privacy, intimacy and care in often very conservative ways. In celebrating and lamenting

queer presences, other lives are rendered absent and beyond the concern of publics/activists/institutions. Thus, there are injustices associated with visibility and invisibility (Adkins, 2000) where the coming forward for some may re-create a dominant visible 'we', able to lay claims to sexual citizenship while effacing broader structural positionalities in terms of race and class. We are all implicated in the *doing* of diversity, community and inequality, rather than being at the centre – or margins – of diversity by virtue of our identities. The Tyler Clementi case reveals the links between queer politics, sexual citizenship and diversity paradigms, where certain lives and deaths are already lost to public grieving and calls for institutional and activist inclusion: we would do well to attend to these losses as we seek citizenship gains.

Notes

1. Project Civility is a series of events and seminars which promise to reduce 'hostile encounters' and increase 'thoughtful communication' as part of 'campus culture'. A blood donation campaign was also part of these 'community efforts' – indicating a very embodied return to larger communities, somewhat problematic in the context of gay men still being banned from donating blood in the USA.
2. Proposition 8 was a California ballot proposition passed in November 2008. In 2010 the US district judge ruled that the ban on gay and lesbian marriage violated the right to equal protection under the US Constitution: at present the ruling will remain suspended while Proposition 8's backers attempt to have their case heard by the court of appeals.

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41. Connections: HIV and Bug Chasers across Queer Collectives

Holly Swan and Laura Monico

Introduction

"30 y.o. HIV Neg Boy looking for HIV POZ men who want to initiate me into the POZ life"

"…prefer thin guys (thinner the better) and if you have AIDS you go to the front of the line. Never had a guy with AIDS…"

"I have a real fetish for getting the gift and spreading it after I first get it"

The above quotes are personal ads from an online website for gay men (Graydon 2007, p. 282-284). What makes them unusual, and a bit shocking, is the express desire to become infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), or to infect others with it. Indeed, in both popular and scholarly literature, a contemporary phenomenon has been described where a group of men who have sex with men (MSM) actively seek to become infected with HIV, or 'bug chase' with their counterparts known as 'gift givers' (MSM who actively seek to transmit HIV to others). The first two quotes are from bug chasers; the third is from a gift giver. Questions that sociologists who study deviance have asked is: How can we make sense of this phenomenon? And, what are the social factors involved in the emergence of this group of individuals?

To address these questions, we will use three concepts that were introduced in the preceding readings in this section: citizenship, community, and marginality. By connecting these concepts together, we will be able to make sociological sense of bug chasing as a deviant collective.

Citizenship, Community, and Marginality

In "Queer Presences and Absences: Citizenship, Community, Diversity – or Death" (this section of this edition), Taylor discusses the issue of marginality. Specifically, she talks about boundaries between 'us' and 'them', the 'offender' or the 'offended', and what is required for belonging in each group. Often, as Taylor points out, these boundaries are fuzzy. In an effort to clarify them, people who 'belong' to one group enhance their own bounds of citizenship by defining (sometimes aggressively) the boundaries of the 'other' group. This kind of sorting, however, often creates a sense of marginality or alienation among members of ***both*** groups.

While Taylor presents the negative consequences of marginalization, Kitsuse discusses a different perspective in "Coming Out All Over: Deviants and the Politics of Social Problems." In this address, Kitsuse argues that deviant individuals can embrace the marginalization that they experience from "normal" individuals and use it as a requirement for citizenship in a *new,* albeit deviant, community. This marginality becomes a sense of pride for the community because members are empowered by their involvement therein, rather than feeling marginalized and alienated as Taylor describes.

Finally, in "There Goes the Gayborhood?," Ghaziani illustrates the importance of context (in this case, urban neighborhoods) in providing spaces for people to confront these issues of citizenship, marginality, and perhaps assimilation – a group being fully absorbed into a wider society or culture. Until this point, our discussion of citizenship, community, and marginality has been very abstract. But using Ghaziani's article, we can see these concepts at work in a concrete and tangible way. The context, or spaces, within which members of a community interact can help determine how groups will be sorted, the degree to which these groups will blend with one another, and the amount of cohesion and solidarity members will experience.

Two additional concepts from the sociological study of deviant collectives are also helpful I understanding how the themes in this section apply to bug chasing: subculture and scene. Sociologists usually understand subcultures as a type of community that is distinguished from the larger society because of an alternative set of values and behavior patterns that are required for citizenship in that community. Members of a subculture tend to want to distance themselves from mainstream society and its normative social structure and do so by making a clear distinction between an 'us' and 'them.' Because of this distancing, subcultures tend to have very clear membership boundaries.

Contrary to subcultures, boundaries of scenes are much more fluid and individuals can choose when to become a part of them and when to leave. Because scenes do not have clear boundaries like subcultures, members of a scene often come from many different social, cultural, and economic backgrounds. Sociologists such as Straw (2004) and Anderson (2009) have demonstrated that there are three different ways for a scene to emerge: a shared location (e.g., Los Angeles), cultural genre (e.g., electronic dance music), or loosely defined activity (e.g., activism). Besides providing opportunities for citizenship and community, subcultures and scenes also offer protection against the marginality that can result from breaking away from the dominant cultural norms of society.

Using these concepts, how can we make sense of the bug-chasing phenomenon? What kind of community is it? How does it offer citizenship, solidarity, and integration to its members? Conversely, how does this quest for citizenship and community further alienate bug chasers and MSM who are living with HIV in society? The remainder of this essay will use bug chasing to connect the concepts of citizenship, community, and marginality. We also draw on the sociological concepts of subcultures and scenes to make these connections. In essence, we

demonstrate that bug chasers desire citizenship, freedom, community, integration, and solidarity rather than the marginality they have experienced in the larger community of bare-backing MSM. To achieve this, bug chasers and gift givers have embraced particular social scenes that have allowed the bug chasing subculture to emerge and thrive.

Conceptual Connections: The Case of Bug Chasers and Gift Givers

Within the larger community of MSM there is a subset of men who engage in barebacking (the intentional participation in unprotected anal intercourse). As a subset of the larger MSM community, barebackers exist as a marginalized community of their own. To overcome their marginality within the larger MSM community, barebackers have developed a unique collective lifestyle, identity, and values to provide a sense of citizenship within their own community. Specifically, barebackers value and connect with each other through the practice of unprotected anal intercourse (UAI). For barebackers, UAI represents exclusivity, defiance, and unadulterated pleasure (Moskowitz and Roloff 2007). In this way, barebacking enables MSM to resist the overabundance of safe-sex messages in the larger gay community that began with the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This stance and behavior deviates from the dominant cultural norms of protection from HIV and other STDs. Take for example this blog post from an HIV-positive barebacker:

> The need for seed. Once a natural part of queer culture has become a sleazy kink. We glorify it. We enjoy it. I guess it's payback, you know. After spending years, our cocks wrapped in plastic marching to the 'Safe Sex' rhythm. That didn't work. It was doomed from the start. We're human beings. Men. We're not above nature, we ARE nature. (Quoted in Dean 2009, p. 54)

This quote illustrates the political purpose that UAI provides for barebackers. Barebacking reclaims unprotected sex in a community that values safe sex and provides a ticket to citizenship in the otherwise marginalized community of barebackers.

In a recent post on www.thebody.com, a popular blog site for HIV/AIDS issues and concerns, Terry-Smith nicely summarized the sentiment that the marginalization of the MSM, and particularly the barebacking community within the larger society has made these individuals seek out a new community for citizenship, solidarity, and empowerment:

> A lot of [gay] people feel that society has treated them like crap and they feel liberated about being positive because they feel that HIV has shown them how to be stronger and to find themselves as well. When someone feels like they are a part of a society so strongly, it hurts when that society shuns them…they will look to another community for that same sense of belonging. (2013).

Thus, it is from this already marginalized community of barebackers that a further subset of individuals has broken off into an even more alienated community of bug chasers (Moskowitz and Roloff 2007; Dean 2009). Although bug-chasers share the cultural values of barebackers, they have broken from the parent culture of barebacking because of the reason that they engage in UAI. Whereas a primary motive for UAI among barebackers is to resist the dominant ideals of safe sex, the intent of bug chasers is seroconversion, or to contract the HIV virus. Consider this quote about bug-chasing from a barebacking website as quoted in Dean (2009):

> Who's afraid of the big, bad bug? Not our little piggies. We'll huff and we'll puff and we'll blow your Dick Down! Chase those bugs all over town like the horny toad you are. Get dangerous and seek out new perversions and fetishes. No matter

> what you promised, never pull out of Dodge. Breed, get seed and get on your knees to feed. Everybody needs protein, right? (p. 48)

Moskowitz and Roloff (2007) and others have argued that bug chasers exist as a marginalized deviant community within the already marginalized community of barebacking among men who have sex with men.

As mentioned, the bug chasing community necessarily requires its members to engage in unprotected anal intercourse. This community also values exclusivity, defiance, unadulterated pleasure, and the eroticization of HIV and AIDS. A study by Graydon (2007) examined messages on personal advertising websites and found that the language used when discussing bug chasing often referred to HIV as a 'gift' (hence the name of the bug chaser counterpart, the gift giver). Through rejection of the safe sex messages of the larger MSM culture and by embracing HIV and other sexually transmitted infections, bug chasing subculture members use a 'gift giving' discourse to exemplify the shared cultural value of performing UAI with the intention of getting HIV. Take these personal ads as evidence, quoted in Graydon (2007): "I beg for the Gift only GiftGivers can share"; "…Bareback Bottom Bug Chaser Seeking Well Hung Gift Givers to share their gifts with me…" (p. 281-282). In other words, rather than viewing HIV infection as a marginalizing status, members of the bug chasing community embrace HIV as a 'gift' that provides one citizenship to the HIV community.

Each of the criteria discussed so far serves to strengthen the bonds of the group (us) and distinguish them from the larger parent culture (them). Following some of the arguments of Taylor, Graydon mentions that members of the bug chasing subculture further enhanced these us/them boundaries by using a 'brotherhood' discourse. For example, one bug chaser posted, "Let's get together and make me part of the brotherhood of the GiftedBareBackers. Please help

me be a part of the family" (Graydon 2007). The use of this type of language reinforces the idea that bug chasers and gift givers are part of a unique group, a special group of barebackers that are different from the majority. This unique group that exists within the barebacking subculture is reinforced through their common backgrounds, lifestyle, values, and identities. The blogger Terry-Smith nicely sums up this point when he writes:

> The HIV community has been through a lot since HIV/AIDS had been discovered and named. Some people who are [HIV] negative view the community as one of acceptance, where one is able to be sexually free. Bug chasers, in my opinion, want to belong to a community and that need for belonging has somehow manifested itself as a need that's targeted towards the HIV community. Basically some feel that being a part of the HIV community makes them a part of something special. (2013).

Bug Chasing Communities: The Importance of Scenes

The elements of scenes, outlined at the beginning of this chapter (i.e., geographic locations, diverse backgrounds, spaces of social and cultural activity, and blurry boundaries between members), provide an important context for understanding the spaces within which the bug chasing subculture emerged and currently exist (like Ghaziani describes). The internet, specifically the virtual community of barebackers, has been critical as a space for the bug chasing subculture to emerge. In these spaces, advertisements can be posted for events happening within particular MSM scenes of certain geographic locations, such as San Francisco or New York that may be more or less tolerant of the bug chasing subculture. For example, this advertisement for a birthday party was posted online:

> B[irth]day fuck fest at my hotel in SOMA [a San Francisco neighborhood] just off Harrison [Street]. I have a few neg[ative] bottoms lined up to take some Neg and Poz loads…This will be my 37th b[irth]day party and I want a gift to keep on giving. (Dean 2009)

Online advertisements for barebacking parties, such as this one, will often indicate whether bug chasing and gift giving are acceptable at that party. Moreover, seeking sexual partners online allowed for the bug chasing subculture to emerge because even though participants in the virtual scene may be located in different geographic locations, they can interact in a shared virtual space on the internet.

The online scene is also an important context for strengthening the bonds among this community's members. The shared background, lifestyle, and values among the members of the bug chasing subculture all contribute to a shared identity among these men. In particular, these men identify as barebacking MSM, and as either a bug chaser or a gift giver (both bug chaser and gift giver are essential identities of the subculture). These identities are represented and maintained on the website profiles of the subculture members.

The following post borrowed from the Graydon's 2007 study exemplifies the use of website posting to both represent one's own identity as well as to construct the other identities of the subculture, "Bareback Bottom Bug Chaser Seeking Well Hung Gift Givers to share their gifts with me". In this post, the subculture member is representing his own identity consistent with the subcultures values (a barebacker, bottom, bug chaser) and he is also helping to enforce the elements of the subculture by specifying that he is seeking someone with a gift giver identity. This post illuminates the sub-cultural value of unprotected anal intercourse for the sake of HIV infection and demonstrates how this value is maintained through the bug chasing and gift giving

identities. In other words, while the primary purpose of the online communities is to offer a virtual space for individuals seeking this behavior to find a partner to engage in the practice with, they also serve as a medium for creating and defining the norms of the subculture through interactions among the users.

Members of the bug chasing subculture also tend to be active members of the party-n-play (PNP) scene that encourages the mixing of drugs (both legal and illegal) with unprotected sex (Moskowitz and Roloff 2007). In PNP scenes, stimulant drugs (such as Ecstasy and Crystal Methamphetamine) are combined with sexual enhancement drugs (such as Viagra) to release inhibitions and increase the appeal of UAI among members (i.e., barebackers and bug chasers). For example, one barebacker cited in Dean (2009, p. 86)) noted, "the crystal [methamphetamine] took me where I could enact that fantasy." Shared participation in the PNP social scene, as well as the social and political purpose of UAI among bug chasers, serves to strengthen the bonds of citizenship between the members of this subcultural community.

Conclusion

In this section, we have attempted to connect several concepts that sociologists have used to understand how individuals negotiate identities in meaningful groups when experiencing marginality elsewhere. These concepts include: community, citizenship, and marginality.

There can be an infinite number of communities within a larger society that engage in group membership sorting, where individuals are placed within one group or outside another. Communities engage in this kind of sorting all of the time – it is a continuous social process. Ultimately when an 'us' and 'them' relationship emerges, individuals are inherently included into one group while simultaneously excluded from another. The criteria upon which individuals are included and excluded create the boundaries of the group. We call the inclusion of an

individual into a group their citizenship. And in the same way a person is a citizen of a country, they can also be a citizen of a subculture or scene. For groups considered to be a subculture, these boundaries of citizenship are strong and clear-cut, often based on shared backgrounds, behaviors, and values. For groups considered to be a scene, on the other hand, the boundaries of citizenship are fluid, and individuals can choose to enter and exit the group whenever they please.

The readings in this section help us to understand that being included or excluded from a group is neither inherently positive, nor inherently negative. Taylor contributed the concept of marginality to this discussion, and explains that some people experience negative consequences of being excluded from a group and fight (sometimes aggressively) to make fuzzy boundaries more clear. But as Kitsuse teaches us, some people experience a positive consequence of exclusion by embracing their marginal status and using it as a boundary of citizenship to form a deviant community that gives them a sense of empowerment. We see these dual experiences in the Ghaziani article, where some members of the gay community embraced what the changing gayborhood could offer their community, whereas other members fought to maintain its purity.

In this connections piece, we sought to demonstrate that bug chasers desire citizenship, freedom, community, integration, and solidarity rather than the marginality they have experienced in the larger community of barebacking MSM. Quotes from actual bug chasers helped to illustrate how members of this subculture embrace their marginal status, and the ways in which they are empowered by their citizenship in a group that is excluded from the larger community of barebacking MSM.

Bugchasers don’t simply use language to embrace their marginality. They also get involved in particular social scenes that helped the bug chasing subculture to emerge. Bug

chasers used both the internet and party-n-play scenes as tools to find and include more bug chasing members, as well as strengthen the boundaries of citizenship that distinguish them as a group. While on the surface it would appear that bug chasers would experience negative consequences from being excluded from an already deviant community of barebacking MSM, these sociological concepts help us to understand that many of the members experience a positive consequence of their group membership that promotes a sense of both freedom and solidarity.

Critical Thinking Questions

1) Compared to subcultures, do scenes have more or less fluid boundaries? How does the fluidity of the boundary affect participation and membership in a subculture versus a scene?
2) Is the internet a necessary resource for individuals to collectively engage in sexually deviant behaviors? Do you think *bug chasing* would have emerged as an identifiable activity without the availability of the internet?
3) How can embracing a *marginal status* empower members of groups who have been excluded and stigmatized? What are the positive consequences of personally embracing a marginal status?

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Section 11. Critical Race Theory, Multiculturalism, and Identity

Introduction.

Tammy Anderson

> "The increasing tendency towards seeing people in terms of one dominant 'identity' ('this is your duty as an American', 'you must commit these acts as a Muslim', or 'as a Chinese you should give priority to this national engagement') is not only an imposition of an external and arbitrary priority, but also the denial of an important liberty of a person who can decide on their respective loyalties to different groups (to all of which he or she belongs)." — (Sen 2009:)

The quote above by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen suggests, at one level, that multiculturalism is about race, ethnicity, identity, rights, and difference. At a deeper level, however, it may also have something to do with norms, social expectations, social control and, therefore, deviance. Today, leaders of world's wealthiest countries have declared multiculturalism dead or a danger to the very fabric of their societies (BBC News Europe 2010). They criticize it for producing greater segregation, isolation and alienation of minority communities when it was intended to do the opposite. Some have argued that the quest for group differentiated rights or accommodations, has disallowed racial and ethnic minority groups to become "proper" Brits, Germans, Canadians and Americans. For example, speaking Arabic, Farsi or Spanish instead of English or German; using public funds to build Muslim temples and community centers instead of shoring up Christian organizations; allowing Black American Studies courses on college campuses to meet US history requirements; demanding Halal meat instead of Sara Lee's *Ball Park* franks; and, perhaps, listening to Bhangra, Latin Fusion, or Homo Hop music instead of Top 40 or other commercial hits, fosters segregation rather than the integration we need and desire.

Have you noticed that this argument could also be about the conformity to social norms, objections to difference, and efforts to control deviance? Section 11 is about critical race theory, multiculturalism, identity and the future of deviance. It includes readings by Cohen (2004), Viesca (2004), Jones (2009) and my connections essay on music scenes. The Cohen reading outlines a critical race theory of "intentional deviance," where racial and ethnic minorities or "outsiders" balance preserving their cultural heritages while conforming to the white, middleclass mainstream. Cohen argues this type of deviance is a daily task for the majority of Black citizens. She is not writing about the small subset of "underclass" lawbreakers (e.g., Black, male gang members and criminals) that all too often "color" our views about minorities. The Jones' paper gives us one case—22 year-old Kiara-- to better understand the critical race theory viewpoint. By profiling her, Jones shows us that race, gender and class are ongoing performances that feature norm violation and consequences. Finally, Viesca (2004) writes about the more political response of Hispanics to both global and local forms of oppression and state control. Hispanic's chosen avenue of resistance is music, specifically Latin Fusion music scenes in Los Angeles. This is also where my connections essay on marginality, identity and music scenes fits in. Together, these readings signify that in multicultural identity work, *"doing difference (Collins 1995) gets very close to "being deviant."*

Multiculturalism is a term social scientists use to denote the moral and political claims of oppressed or marginal groups in society. Multicultural efforts seek recognition for cultural and religious difference and the fair participation of minority citizens in society (Kymlicka 1998). Thus, a central goal for the oppressed is to attain equal treatment for who they are, rather than being pressured to assimilate or settling for being tolerated by the majority. Critics of multiculturalism believe it delivers, instead, even greater alienation and isolation of minorities

and the oppressed and erodes the ties that ought to bind members of a society (Kymlicka 1998). At a basic level, then, multiculturalism is about integration and separation.

So, are we promoting integration or segregation when defining something as deviant? Durkheim, Erickson, and Moynihan (discussed in Section 1) believe doing so promotes integration, while symbolic interactionists (Sections 5 and 7) and conflict theorists (Section 9) believe it leads to segregation and exploitation or oppression. A key distinction among them was whether society was a place of similarity and consensus or difference and conflict. Fears about multiculturalism assume that embracing and making room for group differentiated customs and rights (Kymlicka 1998) is somehow bad and dysfunctional. Homogeneity or sameness is better for us and assimilation and integration help us attain it.

What multiculturalism reveals then is that the origins of deviance begin with ***difference***, especially ***culturally-based differences***. Throughout time, the US has demonstrated its preference for sameness despite claims of being a nation where individuals can chose their own paths to meet their own dreams. Sameness, not otherness or difference, is built into our norms, values, identities, and lifestyles. Penalties of all kinds—economic, social, formal or informal—are levied for variation.

One problem with sameness is that it is branded with the cultural characteristics of the usual privileged group: white, male, middleclass, heterosexual, young, and "healthy" or "able-bodied. " Consequently, assimilation – the kind Merkel and other worlds leaders desire—means adopting white, male, heterosexual, middleclass ways. This is why Kiara from the Jones article looks pretty for the pictures, while being her more authentic self (poor, street-smart, and African American) on the streets of her own neighborhood.

The surest path to equality is through assimilation, i.e., trading in one's culture for that of the dominant group. Thus, equality is not necessarily a right of citizenship; it becomes something people must earn by conforming to dominant culture's customs, norms, ways, ideology, identities, styles, behaviors, etc. It does not come from difference and deviation and the authors of the readings in this section are well-aware of that.

The sociology of deviance can inform this multicultural predicament and advance its place in sociology at the same time. If cultural sameness is society's price tag for equality, then some groups will always have to pay more for citizenship. Refusals to pay it will result in increased supervision and control. The sociology of deviance must, therefore, attend to such price differentials among groups and the mechanisms of control used to sustain them.

Sociologists and criminologists must also more broadly consider the benefits of difference and deviance. There are positive things about deviance and many come from groups we think of as marginal, i.e., those from varied cultural heritages or backgrounds who lack power in society (minorities, homosexuals, females, gays, elderly, disabled). Music scenes are one place where we can see this play out. For example, the Viesca reading teaches us that performing and listening to Latin Fusion sounds amounts to a powerful form of resistance by Hispanics. It also provides a powerful counter-message to the pejorative labels, stigma and discrimination young Hispanics encounter for being their authentic selves. Viesca (page 735) states:

> At the very moment when political and economic leaders scapegoated multilingual "mongrel" communities and cultures, music groups associated with the East L.A. scene challenged the cultural and political pretensions of white/Anglo culture. In the process, they exploited the contradiction between the nation's political reliance on fictions of

cultural homogeneity and the nation's economic dependence on securing low-wage labor, markets, and raw materials from Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

In my connection essay, I also note that music and its related cultural styles are a beneficial to those involved to help rectify cultural identity issues and marginality.

The multicultural project has been much more about race and ethnic issues than it has been about gender, sexuality, class, disability or age. In my connections essay, I point this out by showing that while music scenes have emerged to address issues of representation and recognition by race and ethnicity, they have been guilty of reproducing sexism, misogyny, heterosexism and homophobia. Viesca (2004) notes the same pattern. The reading by Jones also calls attention to the difficulties had by the oppressed in securing respect and equal treatment by overlapping identities, especially race, class and gender.

Herein lies another opportunity to learn about deviance. How do people conform to the overlapping and often contradictory norms associated with their intersecting identities of class, race, ethnicity, gender, age, and so on? What consequences do they bear from fighting or failing at some and not others? What sacrifices do they make?

Given these observations, sociology professors and students must consider how the principles of multiculturalism are relevant to deviance now and in the future. We think you will find some answers to the questions posed here from the readings in this section. Our attention to them will not only aid the future study of deviance; it may also enrich our lives in this ever-changing, diverse, global world.

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Reading 42

Deviance as Resistance: A New Research Agenda for the Study of Black Politics

Cathy J. Cohen

This article is motivated by a series of conversations I have had and observations I have made about the study of Black politics, African American Studies, and the condition of African American communities.[1] At the heart of such concerns has been what I believe to be a fundamental contradiction between the crises facing Black communities and the passive routinization of much of what passes for the academic study of Black people. As both the discipline of African American Studies and the sub-field of Black politics become more enmeshed in the curriculum and structures of colleges and universities, research in these areas seems to mirror the increasing specialization of disciplines and distancing between researcher and worldly experience that characterize the academy at this moment. It is the observation of disconnect between me and my colleagues and the communities from which many of us hail and purport to study that has motivated my interest in building a field of inquiry others have labeled Black queer studies.[2]

I must admit to being a skeptic of the transformative potential of anything we might label Black queer studies, especially as such efforts begin to resemble a recovery project of the lost tribe of Black gay exceptionals. It is, of course, a worthwhile undertaking to include as part of the canon of African American Studies, for example, those Black gay writers of the Harlem Renaissance or Black gay activists of the Civil Rights Movement who for too long have been hidden and silenced by those who would police the representation of such critical periods and events. Furthermore, I, like other scholars concerned with the future of African American Studies believe that the full inclusion of gay, lesbian, and queer lives would not only open up new realms of research in African American Studies, but should also lead to the

reconsideration and reconceptualization of now standard narratives in the field. For example, John D'emilio, in his book *Lost Prophet*: *The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin* (2003), not only rightly inserts Rustin into African American and American history, establishing him as an architect of the Civil Rights Movement, but also helps us to interrogate the concept of leader and the standards used to construct public leaders both in and outside of Black communities. Barbara Ransby, in her book, *Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement*: *A Radical Democratic Vision* (2003) makes a similar intervention around the issues of gender, sex, and leadership. However, in spite of the insights to be gained from a project of inclusion, the approach to queering African American Studies that I advocate is one based in an expansive understanding of who and what is queer and is, therefore, rooted in ideas such as deviance and agency and not exception and inclusion.

Queer theorists and queer activists since the 1980s, in an effort to challenge seemingly stable and normalizing categories of sexuality, introduced or reintroduced the analytic concept of queer. Individuals such as Judith Butler (1990), Eve Sedgwick (1990), Diana Fuss (1991), and Michael Warner (1993) produced what are now thought of as some of the grounding texts to the field of "queer theory." Working from a variety of postmodernist and poststructuralist theoretical perspectives, these scholars focused on identifying and contesting the discursive and cultural markers found within both dominant and marginal identities and institutions that prescribe and reify "heterogendered" or normalized understandings and behavior. These theorists presented the academy with a different conceptualization of sexuality, one which sought to replace socially named and presumably stable and natural categories of sexual expression with an understanding of the constructed and fluid movement among and between forms of sexual behavior.

Despite complicating our understanding of sexuality, heterosexism, and heteronormativity, some queer theorists, and more queer activists, write and act in ways that

unfortunately homogenize everything that is publicly identifiable as heterosexual and most things that are understood to be lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender or "queer" (Cohen 1997). Further diminishing the returns from this very important theoretical work has been the incredible silence in many of the writings by queer theorists on the subject of race, in particular the structural access to power that results from the designation of Whiteness in a relatively persistent racial order where White and Black root opposite poles of at least one dimension (Kim 2000). Disappointingly, left largely unexplored has been the role of race and one's relationship to dominant power in constructing the range of public and private possibilities for such fundamental concepts/behaviors as desire, pleasure, and sex.[3] So while we can talk of the heterosexual and the queer, these labels/categories tell us very little about the differences in the relative power of, for example, middle-class White gay men and poor heterosexual Black women and men.

For me, this serious shortcoming in queer theory is not the end of my interest in or use for this field of scholarship. Instead, in spite of noted absences in queer theory as it is currently constituted, there are still important insights to be gained from this literature that will enhance the study of sex and race in many disciplines including African American Studies.[4] If, for example, we use the theoretical insights into the construction and malleability of categories as well as the work of processes of normalization found in queer theory in tandem with the detailed understanding of power, in particular as it is structured around and through axes such as race, gender, and class found in African American Studies, we have the possibility of reconstituting both African American Studies and queer theory with an eye toward recognizing and transforming how people live and the desperate conditions they too often face.

A focus, for example, on poor single Black women, with children whose intimate relationships and sexual behavior are often portrayed as directly in conflict with the

normative assumptions of heterosexism and the nuclear family, but who also often live under the constant surveillance of the state through regulatory agencies such as welfare offices, courts, jails, prisons, child protective services and public housing authorities, might do much to advance the work of both those who locate themselves exclusively in African American Studies or queer theory. In contrast to many privileged gay, lesbian, and queer folks, poor single Black women with children, structurally unable to control an exclusive "ghetto" or area of a city where their dealings with the state are often chosen and from an empowered position, are reminded daily of their distance from the promise of full citizenship. Their lives are indicative of the intersection of marked identities and regulatory processes, relative powerlessness and limited and contradictory agency. It is here that Black queer studies must be rooted and a politics of deviance must begin.

Thus, I continue to be interested in the possibility of constructing a field of investigation based in African American Studies and borrowing from queer theory and Black feminist analysis that is centered around the experiences of those who stand on the (out)side of state sanctioned, normalized White, middle- and upper-class, male heterosexuality. I am talking about a paradigmatic shift in how scholars of Black politics and more broadly African American Studies think and write about those most vulnerable in Black communities—those thought to be morally wanting by both dominant society and other indigenous group members. The reification of the nuclear family, the conformity to institutionally prescribed and informally regulated gender roles and intimate sexual relations are but the tip of the normative moral super structure they confront daily.

Sadly, while the moral prescriptions of this normative structure pervade nearly every aspect of our lives and have been used consistently to marginalize African Americans further, little attention has been paid, at least in the social sciences, to how the normalizing influences of the dominant society have been challenged, or at least countered, often by those most

visible as its targets. Reflecting Michel Foucault's idea of simultaneous repressive and generative power, individuals with little power in society engage in counter normative behaviors, having babies before they are married, structuring their relationships differently from the traditional nuclear family, or rejecting heterosexuality completely. These so-called deviants have chosen and acted differently, situating their lives in direct contrast to dominant normalized understandings of family, desire, and sex. It is these instances of deviant practice, resulting from the *limited agency* of those most marginal in Black communities that are the heart of this work.

Scholars, especially those interested in the evolving nature of Black politics, must take seriously the possibility that in the space created by deviant discourse and practice, especially in Black communities, a new radical politics of deviance could emerge. It might take the shape of a radical politics of the personal, embedded in more recognized Black counter publics, where the most marginal individuals in Black communities, with an eye on the state and other regulatory systems, act with the limited agency available to them to secure small levels of autonomy in their lives. Ironically, through these attempts to find autonomy, these individuals, with relatively little access to dominant power, not only counter or challenge the presiding normative order with regard to family, sex, and desire, but also create new or counter normative frameworks by which to judge behavior.

And while these choices are not necessarily made with explicitly political motives in mind, they do demonstrate that people will challenge established norms and rules and face negative consequences in pursuit of goals important to them, often basic human goals such as pleasure, desire, recognition, and respect. These visible choices and acts of defiance challenge researchers to identify how we might leverage the process people use to choose deviance to choose political resistance as well. It just might be that after devoting so much of our energy to the unfulfilled promise of access through respectability, a politics of deviance,

with a focus on the transformative potential found in deviant practice, might be a more viable strategy for radically improving the lives and possibilities of those most vulnerable in Black communities.

Finally, it is important to remember, as theorists of stigma and deviance have written, that understandings of what is respectable and stigmatized or normal and deviant are constructed and relational. Erving Goffman (1963) in his book *Stigma* writes, "Society establishes the means of categorizing persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories. ... We lean on these anticipations that we have, transforming them into normative expectations, into righteously presented demands" (p. 2). Howard Becker (1973) in his study of the sociology of deviance continues along this line of reasoning and suggests that scholars be attuned to the distinction between rule-breaking behavior and the labeling of such behavior as deviant. He writes, "... deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an 'offender.' The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label" (p. 9).[5]

In the rest of this article I will explore the feasibility of a politics of deviance in Black communities. I begin this investigation with a brief review of the major frameworks for studying Black politics. I then recount the ways deviance has been examined in some of the canonical texts in African American Studies. Finally, I detail how we might build an analytic model detailing the relationship between deviance, defiance, and resistance.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY OBSESSIONS: A BLACK POLITICS OF RESPECTABILITY, ELITES, AND PUBLIC OPINION

A review of much of the recent scholarship exploring the politics of African Americans reveals at least three dominant analytic frameworks of study: mobilization, respectability, and public opinion. While each of these approaches to investigating Black politics allows for the inclusion of those most vulnerable and seemingly "deviant" in Black communities, absent in each approach is a serious examination of the potential for politics in the everyday decisions and actions of these individuals and groups. For example, possibly the most widely read form of analysis of Black politics has been scholarship documenting and analyzing the organized efforts, formal and informal movements, and less structured uprisings originating in Black communities, meant to alter hierarchies of power and resources based at least partially in racial distinctions (Horne 1995; Kelley 2002; Marable 1991; Morris 1984).

Work ranging from an analysis of Black revolts under slavery to the nationalist efforts of leaders like Marcus Garvey to the election of Black politicians to the mass mobilization defining the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements are all part of this tradition. However, more often than not, such scholarly analyses have sought to highlight those structured, coordinated, and seemingly purposeful acts assumed to comprise meaningful political struggle. Furthermore, these studies have at times been so consumed with the actions of leaders, usually male leaders, and well-established political organizations that they have ignored the everyday contests over space, dress, and autonomy that may pervade the lives of average Black people. Most of this literature, even when presumably exploring the work of "everyday" people, looks to those clearly defined political spaces like churches, civil rights organizations, and unions to find politics and political work, negating social spaces where most politics is lived (Harris-Lacewell 2004; Kelley 1994; Scott 1990).

Of course, a politics of mobilization has not been the only lens through which African American politics has been explored and described. A second dominant framework used to understand Black politics has been that of respectability. In this approach respectability is

used to categorize a process of policing, sanitizing, and hiding the nonconformist and some would argue deviant behavior of certain members of African Americans communities (Carby 1987, Gaines 1996, Higginbotham 1993). In this literature respectability is understood as a strategy deployed primarily by the Black middle class but also by other individuals across the Black class strata to demonstrate their adherence to and upholding of the dominant norms of society. It is hoped and expected that such conformity will confer full citizenship status, bringing with it greater access, opportunities, and mobility. And while some recent scholarship has cast a critical eye on the exclusionary processes associated with a political strategy of respectability, it is important that we not trivialize or demean this vehicle to political advancement since for many African Americans it was not only a mechanism to leverage dominant power but also a means to demonstrate the basic humanity and equality of Black Americans (Carby 1987, Gaines 1996, Higginbotham 1993, McBride 1998). It is, however, important to underscore, as critics of respectability remind us, the relative positioning necessary to prove that one is respectable and acceptable compared to other less fortunate "souls" who compromise the excluded.

Historian Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham (1993), in her examination of Black women's involvement and leadership in the Baptist church in the early twentieth century, describes the use of a politics of respectability to counter the dominant racist constructions of Blackness and gender. She writes, "While adherence to respectability enabled Black women to counter racist images and structures, their discursive contestation was not directed solely at White Americans; the black Baptist women condemned what they perceived to be negative practices and attitudes among their own people. Their assimilationist leanings led to their insistence upon Blacks' conformity to the dominant society's norms of manners and morals. Thus the discourse of respectability disclosed class and status differentiation" (p. 187).

Thus, another approach to studying the politics of African Americans, an approach first deployed by scholars in the humanities, has been an interrogation of the extra-institutional, some might say, social and cultural actions of Black Americans. Through the framework of respectability the researcher is primarily concerned with the actions of those who would regulate, most often middle-class Black Americans and working-class Blacks with middle-class aspirations. Again, lost in this analysis are the agency and actions of those under surveillance, those being policed, those engaged in disrespectable behavior. Missing from this understanding of Black politics is what Robin Kelley calls "a politics from below" (1994, p. 5).

The third and final approach to the study of Black politics I will mention briefly is the overwhelming focus on the public opinion of Black Americans found in the social sciences today, especially in the field of political science. Increasingly, as researchers in the social sciences became committed to the use of large N datasets to map out the political attitudes and behaviors of ordinary people, so too did scholars in the field of Black politics demonstrate increasing expertise in the use of statistical analysis in conjunction with newly developed datasets such as the National Black Election Study and the National Black Politics Study to explore the declared politics of Black respondents. The work of scholars such as Michael Dawson (2003, 1994), Larry Bobo (2000), Katherine Tate (1998), and many others has provided new insights into the ideological and behavioral dimensions of African American politics in the late twentieth century.

Unfortunately, while this literature often includes close analysis of differences in political attitudes and behavior based on class and in some cases sex and gender, the in-depth exploration of how such differences might be molded into a new politics for the twenty-first century has largely been ignored. This scholarship tends to excel in identifying and explaining differences found among African Americans and between African Americans and

other members of racial and ethnic groups, most often White Americans. Left for a later day has been any sustained discussion of how the differences identified manifest themselves in the everyday lives and politics of Black people. Similarly, scholars of this orientation seem to shy away from more theoretical and normative discussions of what should be done to change the patterns of inequality, alienation, and anger evident in their data.

Thus, while all three of these approaches to analyzing politics and political work in Black communities have generated important insights, illuminating the multiple forms of resistance and ideas about politics found among Black Americans, there exists an inherent bias in each framework toward the recognition and study of a politics that is declared and traditionally organized. I am not suggesting that the political activity of poor, working-class, and marginal Black people has not made its way into our published accounts of Black politics. Instead, I contend that the politics of those most marginal in Black communities are usually discussed when they conform to traditional understandings of what constitutes legitimate politics, ranging from engagement with formal political institutions to the traditional, extra-systemic politics of riots, boycotts, and protests, to the adherence to dominant norms and expectations regarding behavior. Again, missing is an examination of the possibility of oppositional politics rooted outside of traditional or formal political institutions and, instead, in the daily lived experiences of those most marginal in Black communities.

Given these absences, those of us concerned with the lives and politics of Black people might do well to recalibrate our lens of examination toward those deemed “deviant” in Black communities, for here lies not only understudied populations but more importantly groups engaging in behaviors that I believe hold the potential for new understandings of how Black politics might once again become radically transformative for Black communities and the country at large. By transformative I am not arguing merely for better policies or a slight shift in the distribution of wealth and power, important as these advances are. Instead, I am

suggesting that through a focus on “deviant” practice we are witness to the power of those at the bottom, whose everyday life decisions challenge, or at least counter, the basic normative assumptions of a society intent on protecting structural and social inequalities under the guise of some normal and natural order to life. However, not only do these individuals daily act in opposition to dominant norms, but they also contradict members of Black communities who are committed to mirroring perceived respectable behaviors and hierarchal structures.

I am urging scholars to take a critical and respectful look at such behavior, instead of the instinctive reaction of rushing to pathologize such acts. With careful investigation we might begin to understand why the same people who daily “reject” formal and informal incentives for conformity, choosing instead alternative and oppositional live-styles, are most often *not* engaged in the kind of mass mobilization that organizers and academics contend would significantly improve their lived condition. It is time for a new generation of scholars to put forth a new analytic framework for the study of Black politics, that of deviance. This, of course, means hearing from and listening to those who many would silence and make invisible in Black communities, individuals like single Black mothers, including those on welfare and/or teen-agers; gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and queer members of Black communities; Black men on the “down-low” having at times risky sex with both men and women; and young Black men and women who are currently or have been incarcerated and who seem to engage uncritically in unlawful behavior with knowledge of the growing consequences of such behavior. Only by listening to their voices, trying to understand their motivations, and accurately centering their stories with all of its complexities in our work can we begin to understand and map the connection between deviant practice, defiant behavior, and political resistance.

PATHOLOGIZING BLACK DEVIANCE: AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDIES AND BEYOND

I am not suggesting that the topic of deviance has not found its way into the work of those studying and commenting on Black communities. The observance of and fascination with those labeled deviant has long existed in the social sciences and in African American Studies. By now we have all become accustomed and well equipped at pointing out the constant pathologizing of Black communities. The researchers of the Eugenics period, the Moynihan Report in 1965, work on the underclass, and the publishing of *The Bell Curve* (1996) have all been rightly incorporated into our understanding and narrative about the continued marginalization and attack on Black people. Less familiar, however, may be the pathologizing, in particular of the poor, women, lesbian and gay, and young Black people, that is part of the multiple traditions, to borrow a phase from Rogers Smith (1993), that comprise the field of African American Studies.

Beginning with W. E. B. Du Bois's *The Philadelphia Negro* and extending through St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton's *Black Metropolis* to more recent Black community studies, like those authored by Elijah Anderson and William Julius Wilson, there has always been a tradition of pathologizing the behaviors of the African American poor and working class, especially women. In defense of these authors and other similar texts, the fundamental objective of such studies, I believe, is to describe the contours of Black communities and to mount a rigorous examination of the systemic discrimination experienced by these subjects. However, far too often, as the researcher works to differentiate the lived conditions of segments of Black communities, internalized normative judgments about the proper and natural structure of family, intimate relationships and forms of social interaction creep into the analysis and prescriptions about what must be done. It is here, under the guise of

objectively studying Black communities that the assumed importance of the nuclear family, appropriate gender relations, and the efficiency of the capitalist system imposes an understanding of difference that results in the pathologizing of all those who would choose differently on such fundamental and often assumed truths. The result can be the textual presentation of the Black poor and other Black "deviants" as not only suffering from the systemic discrimination experienced by all Black Americans, but also as allowing cultural deficiencies to lead one down a deviant path. It thus becomes the duty of an enlightened Black elite to rescue this wayward group of Blacks, modeling for them the appropriate modes of behavior; those that will lead to assimilation, acceptances, and access. Briefly, let me offer two examples of work in this mode.

If we begin with Du Bois's groundbreaking work in *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899), we find an astonishing piece of research emblematic of the ideals of objective social science study, but driven ever so forcefully with a mission of proving the respectability of the Negro race. With the help of his assistant Isable Eaton, Du Bois sets out to survey the conditions of the seventh ward of Philadelphia, mapping the lived condition of Black Americans as no scholar had before him. By the end of his work, Du Bois had visited or talked with nearly 5,000 individuals. Through his travels he observed the wide range of experience and lived condition thought to make up the Black experience. Throughout the book, Du Bois reminds the reader of the historical and continued discrimination that has shaped the lives of Black Americans. He does, however, also present what some have called the "ugly facts" of some Black communities including the high levels of crime, pauperism, and family disorganization. For Du Bois such behaviors could not be explained merely by discrimination and so it was incumbent on the author to offer what he believed to be a complex explanation for such occurrences, one that made visible discrimination, agency, and difference among the Negro

classes. This complex or contradictory tone is apparent throughout the book as is evident in this discussion of crime.

> It would, of course, be idle to assert that most of the Negro crime was caused by prejudice; the violent economic and social changes which the last fifty years have brought to the American Negro, the sad social history that preceded these changes, have all contributed to unsettle morals and pervert talents. Nevertheless it is certain that Negro prejudice in cities like Philadelphia has been a vast factor in aiding and abetting all other causes which impel a half-developed race to recklessness and excess...
>
> Thus the class of Negroes which the prejudices of the city have distinctly encouraged is that of the criminal, the lazy and the shiftless; for them the city teems with institutions and charities; for them there is succor and sympathy; for the educated and industrious young colored man who wants work and not platitudes, wages and not alms, just rewards and not sermons—for such colored men Philadelphia apparently has no use (pp. 351-352).

It was in the end differences among Black Americans, in particular class differences among Black Americans, where Du Bois rooted his argument against grand racial theories of the inferiority of the Negro. How could a biological concept of race account for behavior and ability when such diversity in each attribute was evident in Philadelphia's seventh ward? Du Bois was especially intent on noting the variations in family structure as an indication of the profound differences among the multiple classes and characters of Black Americans. It was the absence of a strong nuclear family and its corresponding bourgeois sexual mores that aided systemic discrimination in destroying Black communities.

Kevin Gaines, in his writing on Du Bois's *The Philadelphia Negro* reiterates this point about the importance of family structure to Du Bois's understanding of the Black condition and the limits of Black progress. He writes,

> Bourgeois sexual morality provided Du Bois with a crucial means of articulating class differences among blacks, facilitating in his study a problematic linkage of poverty and immorality, and equating the disturbing presence of unmarried black women with promiscuity. He associated unemployment with idleness and sin, but his vision of lower-class status especially faulted all signs of the absence of the patriarchal black family...
>
> Du Bois's discussion of the weakness of the family stemmed from the uplift assumption of the home and family as signs of progress and security, and sources of strength. Indeed much commentary on urban poverty targeted the status of the family as the barometer of social health or pathology. (p. 166)

While Du Bois's unflinching adherence to the assumption of the necessity and inherent preference of the nuclear family might be accepted as an indication of the times in which he was writing, we should be suspect of those writing today who continue to demonstrate uncritical allegiance to such assumptions. Unfortunately, such is the case of most recent writing on poor Black urban communities, especially those classified under the title the "underclass." Beginning largely in the 1960s, researchers began to categorize what they perceived as more severe indicators of destructive behaviors and characteristics found in poor urban communities. While scholars had always noted the escalated rates of out-of-wedlock and teen-age births, crime, welfare dependency, female-headed households, joblessness, and drug use in poor urban communities compared to other geographical areas, in the 1960s such

behaviors were increasingly described as common-place, persistent, and disproportionate, especially among a sub-population of the urban poor deemed the "underclass."

As we might suspect, there are varied approaches to explaining these behaviors and exploring these communities in the literature of the "underclass." The point of this essay is not to survey the range of texts available. Instead, I want to examine briefly one of the most structurally based interrogations of the idea of an underclass to see how patriarchal and gender norms limit the analysis, prioritizing a move toward respectability in thinking about something as concrete as policy prescriptions. To that end, I believe a brief review of William Julis Wilson's *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1987) will be helpful. Regarded by many in the academy and the Clinton administration as one of the most important scholars writing on the subject of the urban poor, Wilson seeks to provide a more rigorous and "balanced public discourse on the problems of the ghetto underclass" (p. 19). Wilson centers his analysis on the structural changes faced by the Black urban poor, highlighting in particular the shift in available jobs for members of the Black urban poor from living-wage manufacturing jobs to low-wage service employment. While job opportunities were shrinking for the urban poor, middle-class and working-class African Americans experienced economic access and, thus, allowed some Black Americans to exit the inner-city for neighborhoods with better schools, services, and security. This exit has meant greater social isolation for the urban poor, resulting in a concentration of all ill effects associated with poverty and sustained marginalization.

While Wilson's concern with the exit of the Black middle-class has been problematized by numerous scholars, with one of the most hard-hitting treatments being that penned by Adolph Reed (1991), for this article I want to draw the reader's attention to the normative assumptions of Wilson's analysis and, more specifically, the prominent framing of a politics of respectability in Wilson's policy prescriptions to address the needs of the underclass.

Continually in this work one is struck by the importance of the nuclear family structure and dominant gender relationships for the author. For example, after detailing the increased probability of living in poverty for female-headed households, Wilson does not urge a policy intervention that would focus on raising the wages of women, including single women and teen-agers who are heads of households. Instead, Wilson locates the remedy for the poverty experienced by women and children in the reemergence of viable families, specifically expanding women's marriageability pool of employed men. He writes, "[t]he black delay in marriage and the lower rate of remarriage, each associated with high percentages of out-of-wedlock births and female-headed households, can be directly tied to the employment status of black males. Indeed, black women, especially young black women, are confronting a shrinking pool of 'marriageable' (that is economically stable) men" (p. 145).

The Truly Disadvantaged, in the tradition of *The Philadelphia Negro,* is a well-researched and often insightful work into the structural and demographic changes confronting poor Black communities. And while Wilson does not offer explicit normative judgments about the inherent deficiencies of poor Black people that other "underclass" scholars promote, he does question many of the assumed standards of respectability thought to be shared among enlightened and appropriate people, independent of race or class. For example, never in the text does Wilson fundamentally question the importance of, nor does he raise the possible negative consequences of, the dominant and imposed nuclear family structure. Never does he openly worry about the impact of strict gender relations on the lived experience of young Black males—no doubt some of them gay—at the center of his analysis. Moreover, never does he attempt to explore the creativity, adaptability and transformative possibilities that exist in the alternative family, intimate, and social relationships and behavior thought to distinguish the underclass. He never explores what Ted Gordon calls the "cultural range" of Black communities where "there appears a repertoire of practices and meanings which, when

seen in relation to the dominant culture, extends from resistant to accommodative" (1997, p. 40).

For example, is it possible that the socialization of young boys to believe that they have not fulfilled their manly obligations unless they are able to provide for their families, means that young men who have no access to the low-skilled, high wage jobs of past years and thus no legal means of "providing" for their children, partners, and other family members decide to engage in dangerous and illegal activity to meet or appear to meet such norms? Furthermore, is it possible that traditional narratives of masculinity encourage men who are structurally unable to meet such ideas to detach from any engaged role with their children and partners? Similarly, is it possible that the shared care-taking strategies of young, single women with children, where both family and friends aid in the "raising" of children—often because their help is required in light of limited resources—could help us better understand and appreciate the benefits to be gained from communal practices in child rearing?

I am not suggesting that norms of masculinity explain all of the counter normative behavior with regard to family structure that Wilson outlines in his book. I do believe, however, that we must examine such ideas, norms, and processes of socialization as both part of the cause and possible "solution" to these phenomena. In the same way that scholars develop and advocate new economic programs they believe will create living-wage jobs for both men and women who are under- and unemployed, so too must we explore and put forth new ways of defining and teaching what it is to be a contributing and healthy man or woman in this society and in Black communities. Structural interventions, while critically important, will never provide sufficient solutions to normative *and* structurally constituted crises.

Clearly Du Bois and Wilson do not represent the breadth of approaches and the body of literature that has developed on the Black poor. They do, however, represent the general complacency found among those who study such communities, leaving unexamined the

normative structure that is used to pathologize certain choices and demonize specific communities. I offer their work as a lesson to us all about the instinctive move, even among some of our most dedicated and respected scholars, to judge and pathologize the lives of those most vulnerable in Black communities. At the root of such judgments sits an unexamined acceptance of normative standards of association, behavior, and even desire that limits our ability to respect the subjects under consideration and to explore their lived decisions with an eye toward its transformative and oppositional potential.

It would be disingenuous of me to suggest that those studying the Black poor have only engaged in the pathologizing of those communities. There is a contrasting literature on the Black poor that has explained their seemingly deviant behavior as reflecting the limited and adaptive choices of a marginalized group. Whether it is ethnographies like Carol Stack's *All Our Kin* (1997) or Mitch Duneier's *Slim's Table* (1994), these works have stopped short of demonizing the actions of the Black poor, seeking instead to understand the reasons for such choices and the functions they serve. However, still left unexplored in these texts are the possibilities for broader and more radical transformation. No doubt the political potential of these acts is ignored, in part because the intent of these and other ethnographic studies is to detail what exists and offer reasoned explanations of why these patterns are maintained. Rarely is an ethnographic work focused on the question of what might be, especially in the political realm and especially beyond the neighborhood or community under study. Thus, because of past limitations in focus, question, and method, I believe a new focus on the relationship between deviant practice, discourse, and politics is necessary.

DEVIANCE, AGENCY, AUTONOMY, AND RESISTANCE

Throughout this article I have argued for a renewed focus on those acts of perceived deviance in Black communities, not to explain their functional or dysfunctional characteristics, but instead to investigate their potential for the production of counter normative behaviors and oppositional politics. As I stated earlier, I am interested in why individuals with little access to and protection from dominant power choose to engage in behaviors that are largely deemed, at least by dominant narratives, to be outside the realm of acceptable behavior. These choices can threaten or call into question one's status within Black communities, but more often they jeopardize the formal standing of already marginal individuals in relation to the state.[6] In addition to these individual acts of deviance, I am also interested in how deviant choices that are repeated by groups or subgroups of people can create a space where normative myths of how the society is naturally structured are challenged in practice (the decision to have a baby before one is married) and in speech (the statement "I don't need a man" by the same single mother). While I accept the warning of Dorian Warren that cumulative acts of individual agency are not the same as collective agency, I do believe that in this counter normative space exists the possibility of radical change, not only in the distribution of resources, but also definitional power, redefining the rules of normality that limit the dreams, emotions, and acts of most people.

Observing and probing the agency of people who, understanding the expectations of the larger society and their communities, choose differently from what is prescribed must be the point from which we start to build a new research agenda for African American Studies in general and the study of Black politics in particular. The centering of those most marginal in Black communities is, for me, the real work of queering Black studies. Using a theoretical framework closely associated with the commitments of Black feminists, queer theorists, and students of Black politics, where the counter normative behavior and marginal position of different segments of Black communities are highlighted, not with an eye not toward

pathologizing or even justifying such behavior, but instead with an eye toward recognizing and understanding its possible subversive potential, we can reorient our respective fields to focus on the potential libratory aspects of deviance.

I am not suggesting that researchers ignore the deviant positioning of the choices and behaviors of individuals relative to normative standards. In fact, it is their diminished position that makes such choices in part worthy of study. My hope, however, is that our research not stop there, merely noting their deviant status and the seemingly self-destructive "nature" of such acts. Instead, I am suggesting that we also explore why people believe they made these decisions; did they understand, expect, and experience negative consequences from these choices; and does such behavior demonstrate some degree of agency on the part of marginalized individuals that can be mobilized for more explicitly political goals? These deviant choices, which are by no means chosen freely in the liberal sense, have the ability to help us delineate the relationship between agency, autonomy, and opposition that has been missing in many of our most insightful analyses of oppositional politics by oppressed people.

Specifically, I hypothesize that many of the acts labeled resistance by scholars of oppositional politics have not been attempts at resistance at all, but instead the struggle of those most marginal to maintain or regain some agency in their lives as they try to secure such human rewards as pleasure, fun, and autonomy. In no way is this statement meant to negate the political potential to be found in such behavior. It does underscore, however, my stance that the work marginal people pursue to find and protect some form of autonomy is not inherently politicized work and the steps leading from autonomy to resistance must be detailed and not assumed. We must begin to delineate the conditions under which transgressive behavior becomes transformative and deviant practice is transformed into politicized resistance.

For example, Jim Scott in both the *Weapons of the Weak* (1987) and *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (1990) implores the reader to look beyond the public transcript of formal interactions between the dominant and those much less powerful to understand the full range of political acts of resistance being pursued by those dominated. Scott writes:

> Until quite recently, much of the active political life of subordinate groups has been ignored because it takes place at a level we rarely recognize as political. To emphasize the enormity of what has been, by and large, disregarded, I want to distinguish between the open, declared forms of resistance, which attract most attention, and the disguised, low-profile, undeclared resistance that constitutes the domain of infrapolitics ...
>
> Taking a long historical view, one sees that the luxury of relatively safe, open political opposition is both rare and recent ... So long as we confine our conception of the *political* to activity that is openly declared we are driven to conclude that subordinate groups essentially lack a political life or that what political life they do have is restricted to those exceptional moments of popular explosion. To do so is to miss the immense political terrain that lies between quiescence and revolt and that, for better or worse, is the political environment of subject classes (1990, pp. 198-199).

Similarly, Robin Kelley in *Race Rebels* (1994) argues that if we expand where we look for political acts and what counts as politics, one can find numerous everyday acts of resistance in the lives of "ordinary" people. Extending this line of reasoning, Kelley argues that independent of the intended effect, marginal people can and do resist daily, through acts ranging from the outright challenge to those in power to participation in cultural forms thought to be deviant. He writes:

> Like Scott, I use the concept of infrapolitics to describe the daily confrontations, evasive actions, and stifled thoughts that often inform organized political movements. I am not suggesting that the realm of infrapolitics is any more or less important or effective than what we traditionally understand to be politics. Instead I want to suggest that the political history of oppressed people cannot be understood without reference to infrapolitics, for these daily acts have a cumulative effect on power relations. While the meaning and effectiveness of various acts differ according to the particular circumstances, they do make a difference, *whether intended or not* (p. 8, emphasis added).

While I, too, believe that an expanded frame for recognizing resistance or more generally political acts would reveal daily examples of what Scott calls infrapolitics, I worry that both Scott and Kelley collapse important and necessary distinctions that exist in the choices and intent of those labeled marginal and deviant. Specifically, while I believe that some choices that are labeled deviant such as the choice to live one's life as an out gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or queer person may be driven by a conscious intentionality to resist the heteronormativity of the society and the second-class position of gay subjects, surely not all acts of deviance are examples of politicized resistance to either larger or local manifestations of domination and oppression. Some acts labeled deviant are defiant in nature, where individuals make a conscious decision to go against established rules either publicly or through hidden means. However, every counter normative defiant act is not political, either in intent, result, or both, where political resistance is the intent to defy laws, interactions, obligations, and normative assumptions viewed as systematically unfair. Thus, one of the significant challenges facing scholars is to determine how to differentiate deviant practice, defiance and resistance.

It is the distinction I make among deviance, defiance, and resistance and the significant role I assign to *intent* in marking politicized resistance that I believe helps us to build on the important insights provided by Scott and Kelley while offering more analytic precision to our efforts to identify and understand the political potential contained in deviant behavior. Again, I am not suggesting that Scott and Kelley do not recognize the difference between, for example, cultural expression and political resistance, but in their writings there exists less clarity about the boundaries between these categories. For example, in describing the work and pleasure of "dance halls, blues clubs and 'jook joints'" in the South, Kelley writes,

> In darkened rooms ranging in size from huge halls to tiny dens, black working people of both sexes shook and twisted their overworked bodies, drank, talked, engaged in sexual play, and—in spite of occasional fights—reinforced their sense of community...
>
> I am not suggesting that parties, dances, and other leisure pursuits were merely guises for political events, or that these cultural practices were clear acts of resistance. Instead, much if not most of African American popular culture can be characterized as, to use Raymond Williams s terminology, "alternative" rather than oppositional. Most people attend those events to escape from the world of assembly lines, relief lines, and color lines, and to leave momentarily the individual and collective battles against racism, sexism and material deprivation . . . .
>
> Knowing what happens in these spaces of pleasure can help us understand the solidarity black people have shown at political mass meetings, illuminate the bonds of fellowship one finds in churches and voluntary associations, and unveil the *conflicts* across class and gender lines that shape and constrain these collective struggles (pp. 46–47).

Again, while I agree with Kelley s call to study nontraditional sites of social gathering in Black communities, it is his claims about the creation of communal bonds in social spaces that transfer to more explicitly political and civic formations that I believe demand greater elaboration and empirical investigation. I hypothesize that most acts labeled deviant or even defiant of power are not attempts to sway fundamentally the distribution of power in the country or even permanently change the allocation of power among the individuals involved in an interaction. Instead, these acts, decisions, or behaviors are more often attempts to create greater autonomy over one's life, to pursue desire, or to make the best of very limited life options. Thus, instead of attempting to increase one's power *over* someone, people living with limited resources may use the restricted agency available to them to create autonomous spaces absent the continuous stream of power *from* outside authorities or normative structures. And while an act of defiance can be misinterpreted as having political intent and a direct challenge to the distribution of power and may result in the actual redistribution of power, I would contend that the initial act was not one of resistance. Thus, understanding the distinction between deviance, defiant acts, and acts of resistance lies in recognizing the perspective or intent of the individual. It is my emphasis on understanding intent as it relates to the agency of marginal individuals where I believe I part ways with Kelley and Scott.

I want to be clear. I am not suggesting that acts somehow deemed as deviant or defiant have no relationship to the category of acts I label resistance or are devoid of political consequence. Instead, I am suggesting that such acts cannot be read as resistance independent of some understanding of the intent and agency of the individual. While there may be political possibilities in the deviant or defiant acts of marginally positioned people, that potential has to be mobilized in a conscious fashion to be labeled resistance. This distinction is not arbitrary, but one that signals the need for intervening mechanisms to transform deviant and defiant behavior into politically conscious acts that can be used as a point of entry into a

mobilized political movement. Of course, the following question logically is what type of intervening mechanisms are necessary? While I believe there exists multiple possibilities of effective interventions, from a relatively traditional approach to politics, one such intervention might be an increase in the number of grassroots organizations focused on talking to and organizing young people, including the so-called "deviants" of Black communities. For example, organizers that will listen to the stories of young people, who can relate to the cultural vehicles of this group, who recognize the counter normative potential that exists in their non-traditional living and sexual arrangements and who can aid in developing and articulating a political agenda that speaks to their lived condition are one example of an intervening mechanism I would recommend. In fact, some of the most interesting political work around the country is happening among organizations trying to mobilize those segments of society too often deemed deviants—young people who are unemployed, not in school and possibly struggling with children, people incarcerated and now reentering their communities, and undocumented workers.

Unfortunately, too often scholars concerned with the politics of marginal communities have ignored the distinction of defiant or resistant acts and acts of politicized resistance, misdiagnosing the resources that exist and the resources needed for political mobilization. It might be that marginal subjects with a politicized consciousness choose localized attempts at control and autonomy because they have no mobilized outlet to confront the larger political context. Or they reject politics because they believe that the mobilized organizations that do exist have no interest in and commitment to the issues that animate their lives; those disrespectable life and death issues in hiding in Black communities. These are empirical questions waiting for study.

It is possible that eventually the cumulative impact of individual deviant choices may indeed have an effect on power relations as Kelley suggests, creating spaces or counter

publics, where not only oppositional ideas and discourse happen, but lived opposition, or at least autonomy, is chosen daily. And through the repetition of deviant practices by multiple individuals, new identities, communities, values, and politics may be created where seemingly deviant, unconnected behavior was thought to exist. And to go one long step further, it might also be that in those counter normative choices lie the seeds for challenging many of the normative structures that have defined some in Black communities as deviant. Thus, it is possible that through deviant choices individuals open up a space where public defiance of the norms is seen as a possibility and an oppositional worldview develops. But again, while this newly created space of autonomy and difference may in fact change the incentive and norm structure for that subgroup, the original choice was not one of resistance even if the continued practice of deviant behavior has long-lasting political consequences. Of course, this example suggests that intended political resistance is not the only way to achieve political results, although it may be a necessary and effective component to protect and maintain newly created spaces and norms. My instinctive move toward collective mobilization leads me to believe that the modeling of public defiance and the opening up of new counter normative space is not enough. Organizations, networks, and groups have to be mobilized that will engage those making deviant decisions in a sustained discussion about opposition, agency, and norms in and out of Black communities. Consciousness must be raised as processes and institutions of regulation are exposed.

CONCLUSION

It is my belief that a new focus on those previously understood as deviant in Black communities opens up important research questions for social scientists, different from the work of earlier scholars like Du Bois, reflecting the changing political and racial landscape of

the twenty-first century. The benefit of a new approach to Black politics with a focus on deviance is not that we arrive at some unexamined position of support for every counter normative and seemingly self-destructive behavior that exists in Black communities. Instead, at its best, questions about the construction of Black deviance should lead us first to an engagement with the normative assumptions that structure Black politics and the lives of Black people, interrogating whose rule-breaking will be labeled deviant, altering significantly their political, social, and economic standing.

Second, a focus on deviance, different from Du Bois's attempt to mask those seen as culturally inferior, should lead to the inclusion of previously silenced and absent members of our communities, expanding our understanding of who constitutes Black communities and reconstructing the boundaries of membership and identity. This means that we must pay attention to power within our communities, something Black feminists have demanded for some time. For me this is the process of the queering of Black studies: making visible all those who in the past have been silenced and excluded as full members of Black communities—the poor, women, lesbians and gays—those people on the margins of society and excluded from the middle-class march toward respectability. But we must remember that reconstituting and expanding the membership of Black communities is not enough, we must also understand and detail the work of power that constructs and disseminates the idea of outsider or deviant within and outside of Black communities.

Third, a centering of deviance should also generate new theories and models of power, agency, and resistance in the lives of largely marginal people, cognizant of the different intents involved in defiant acts and acts of politicized resistance. Despite my disagreement with some of his analysis, I see the work of Robin Kelley, in particular in *Race Rebels,* as taking on this charge in exceptional fashion, providing the reader with a much more complicated understanding of the work, politics, and leisure habits of the Black working

class. Kelley attempts to demonstrate how behavior previously deemed as deviant, decadent, or even self-destructive was driven in part by a politics of resistance or infrapolitics as James Scott has labeled such processes. While I believe that both Kelley and Scott at times see and impose an oppositional motive in the lives of the poor and oppressed where it does not exist, I hold both scholars in very high esteem for their attempt to interrogate the assumptions of what constitutes resistance, opposition, and agency, broadening how we think about politics and the possibility for transformational politics from below.

Fourth, a focus on acts of deviance in Black communities should also direct our attention to the power and oppression being imposed on Black lives from structures and institutions outside of Black communities. We must all remember that the normative categories of "respectable" and "deviant" have significant political consequences beyond the academy in determining one's access to needed resources. If we take, for example, the idea of the family, specifically the ideal of the nuclear family, we find its continued prominence or at least one's conformity to it, as a standard in determining the distribution of political, economic, and social resources. Not too unlike the policing of intimate relationships of women on welfare by caseworkers in the 1960s and 1970s, there has emerged a new commitment on the part of the government to compulsory marriage among the poor.

Anyone familiar with the Bush administration's policies toward women's reproductive rights both here and abroad has seen up close the use of normative ideals of the family and the "unborn child" to structure a policy agenda. The promotion of fatherhood programs and paternity requirements that seek to tie funding for the poor to being married is now a common standard by which agencies and organizations are judged with regard to funding. Even President Bush's recently passed AIDS initiative to provide money to treat AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean was stalled in Congress as other conservatives sought to restrict HIV and AIDS prevention and education funds from those international organizations and agencies

providing integrated family planning—including counseling around abortion. Continually, the Bush administration has used family structure as a litmus test for the allocation of needed resources both here and abroad. In line with this move have been efforts to restrict everything from head start to welfare assistance based on conformity to the nuclear family structure.

However, the diminished political status of those defined as deviant is not only the result of right-wing politics. As I noted earlier, within established Black political organizations there is also reluctance to embrace those issues and subpopulations thought to be morally wanting or ambiguous (Warren 2000). Despite the feelings of some in Black communities that we have been shamed by the immoral behavior of a small subset of our community, some would label the underclass, scholars must take up the charge to highlight and detail the agency of those on the outside, those who through their acts of nonconformity choose outsider status, at least temporarily. It is an intentional deviance given limited agency and constrained choices. These individuals are not fully or completely defining themselves as outsiders or content with their outsider status, but they are also not willing to adapt completely or conform. The cumulative impact of such choices is possibly the creation of spaces or counter publics, where not only oppositional ideas and discourse happens, but lived opposition, or at least autonomy, is chosen daily. Furthermore, it may be that through the repetition of deviant practices by multiple individuals new identities, communities, and politics are created and a space emerges where seemingly deviant, unconnected behavior might evolve into conscious acts of resistance that serve as the basis for a mobilized politics of deviance. Only through serious and sustained examination can we begin to understand what is possible through deviance. I hope that this new space of possibility is at the center of studies of Black politics in the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. This paper was originally prepared for the conference "The Ends of Sexuality: Pleasure and Danger in the New Millennium" Northwestern University, April 4–5, 2003. My thinking has evolved since its first inception because of the helpful comments of Brandi Adams, Alan Brady, Michael Dawson, Victoria Hattam, Sheldon Lyke, Patchen Markell, Barbara Ransby, Beth Richie, Dorian Warren, Deva Woodly, Iris Marion Young, and the participants of the University of Texas, Center for African and African American Studies' Race, Gender, and Sexuality Series. Of course, any and all shortcomings in the argument and the article are the responsibility of the author.
2. I am lucky to be a part of an amazing community of scholars in Chicago committed to the development of a field of research we might call Black queer studies. Some of the members of this intellectual and social family include Jennifer Brody, Jackie Goldsby, Sharon Holland, Lynette Jackson, E. Patrick Johnson, Waldo Johnson, Dwight McBride, Darrel Moore, and Beth Richie.
3. The recent revelations of mixed race children by racist and prominent White men such as Thomas Jefferson and Strom Thurmond as well as the recent hysteria of purported "down-low" sexual behavior by some unknown number of Black men underscores the possible disjuncture between one's expressed public and lived private sexual behavior and power.
4. See for example, the work of Tricia Rose (2003); E. Frances White (2001); Jennifer DeVere Brody (2000); Dwight McBride (1998); Philip Brian Harper (1998); Kendal Thomas (1997); and Siobhan Somerville (1994) and Ann DuCille (1990).
5. Throughout the paper when I use the term deviant I am referring to those groups of people who have been constructed as engaging in substantial rule or norm-breaking behavior, whose counter-normative social behavior is attributed not only to individual choice but to

deficiencies in their fundamental or inherent character, making such behavior predictable or inevitable. Among such individuals, deviant behavior in one social realm, such as in the composition of family, is seen as connected to deviant behavior in other realms, such as norms around work. I am not talking about, for example, individuals who have a pattern of rolling through stop signs instead of coming to a complete stop— rule-breaking behavior. Instead, I am focused in this paper on those individuals thought to break the assumed agreed upon norms of socially acceptable behavior. See, for example, Becker 1973 for an extended discussion of deviance.

6. It is important here to note that normative structures around such essential ideas as family, work or sex can vary between their macro or dominant articulation and their micro group-based articulation and practice. Thus, having children before one is married may result in harsh consequences from the state with regard to financial support for example, but be largely accepted and seemingly embraced in Black communities.

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Reading 43

The Battle of Los Angeles: The Cultural Politics of Chicana/o Music in the Greater Eastside

Victor Hugo Viesca

Chicanos are, when you call yourself that, you know your history, you know where you came from, you know where you need to go.
—Yoatl, Aztlán Underground[1]

I try to find my own Chicana sensibility in the dance.
—Martha Gonzales, Quetzal[2]

East Los Angeles is the center of a flourishing musical cultural scene with a renewed "Chicana/o" sensibility.[3] This scene is being led by a collective of socially conscious and politically active Latin-fusion bands that emerged in the 1990s, including Aztlán Underground, Blues Experiment, Lysa Flores, Ozomatli, Ollin, Quetzal, Quinto Sol, Slowrider, and Yeska. These groups compose original songs that weave together the sounds of the Americas, from soul, samba, and the *son jarocho* to reggae, rumba, and rap. Multilingual lyrics in Spanish, English, *Cálo*, or Nahuatl that speak to themes of urban exile, indigenous identity, and multiracial unity are layered over the music to produce a sonic Chicana/o imaginary of the global city in the twenty-first century.[4] Several of the bands within the scene have released full-length albums on their own independent record labels such as Xicano Records and Film (Aztlán Underground and Quinto Sol), De Volada Records (Slowrider and Blues Experiment), and Lysa Flores's Bring Your Love Records (see discography). The bands often collaborate with one another, producing or playing on each other's records and touring on the same bill. While their music is sold primarily in California, where they perform most often, the Eastside scene is building an enthusiastic and global following through the growing popularity of Quetzal and Ozomatli. Since releasing their self-titled debut in 1998, Quetzal has released two successful and critically acclaimed albums on the premier folk label Vanguard Records. Ozomatli has sold more than half a million records of their first two CDs, their eponymous debut and the Grammy award-winning *Embrace the Chaos* (2001).

The popularity of the Eastside scene in California reflects a consumer market inhabited by millions of Latina/os with a bilingual and bicultural sensibility.[5] Latina/os make up a third of California's population and a near majority of Los Angeles County residents. Notably, more than 70 percent of Latina/os in Los Angeles are of Mexican origin.[6] The musicians and the audience of the Eastside scene are predominantly bilingual ethnic Mexican and Latina/o youth of the one-and-a-half, second, and third generations.[7] The cultural formations of the East L.A. scene emerge from this Latina/o population, as subjects of their lyrical voices, as potential consumers, and, most important, as cultural producers.

Along with visual artists, activists, and audiences, the musicians of the Eastside scene form an emergent cultural movement that speaks powerfully to present conditions. This community represents a form of political possibility that inheres in postindustrial culture, one that is grounded in the new spatial and social relations generated in Los Angeles in the transnational era.[8] Thus, it is critical that we consider how these cultural activities reveal an understanding and negotiation of these forces. The very conditions of oppression and disenfranchisement that characterize the new economy have enabled (and required) a particular counterresponse, a response that is necessarily different from older forms of struggle. The Eastside scene is both a product of and a means for countering the impact of globalization on low-wage workers and aggrieved racialized populations. The Eastside scene serves as a floating site of resistance, a mechanism for calling an oppositional community into being through performance. Groups within the scene link together diverse parts of a spatially dispersed community through the activities of live performance, listening to recordings and radio, and following the bands to marches, demonstrations, and direct action protests.

The Chicana/o Cultural Politics of the Eastside Music Scene

Musicians in the Eastside scene look to the past and to the present for cultural traditions and formations that they can use to construct their own political and aesthetic practices of Chicana/o identity. One manifestation of this tendency is the affiliation with an indigenous Mexica(n) identity,[21] signaled by the names of many of the bands in the scene. Scott and Randy Rodarte named their language of Nahuatl.[22] Quetzal retains the Nahuatl

name for a native bird of southern Mexico that is considered sacred by the Aztecs and the Mayans. Ozomatli is named after the Aztec god of dance who is represented as a monkey figure in the famous Aztec Sun Stone. Quinto Sol refers to the historical period of the fifth sun, the present era according to Aztec philosophy. Aztlán Underground uses the name of the original homeland of the Aztecs, Aztlán, to signify their indigenous identity and origin in the Southwest. This understanding of Aztlán was popularized by Chicana/o artists and activists of the Chicano movement in the 1960s, who reclaimed much of the United States Southwest as the homeland of the Chicano/Mexicano nation. The band names that do not explicitly suggest an indigenous Mexican identity implicitly signal their affiliation with other recognizable ethnic Mexican cultural formations. Slowrider, for example, alludes to the popular barrio art of car customizing, or lowrider culture, while Yeska is slang for marijuana, evoking the 1940s' Pachuco argot of *Cálo*.

The connection to Mexican culture is further expressed in the use of traditional Mexican music styles and instruments. The *son jarocho,* an Afro-Mexican song and dance form originating in Vera Cruz, Mexico, is an important element in the music of Quetzal. Quetzal Flores, its founder and lead guitarist, composes much of the band's music around the rhythms of his *jarana,* the small, four- to eight-stringed guitar that is the main instrument of the *son jarocho.*[23] When performing and recording songs in the *jarocho* style, band member Martha Gonzales stomps on the *tarima,* a wooden box with sound holes that is an essential percussive element of the Veracruzan *son.* Raul Pacheco, guitarist and vocalist for Ozomatli, makes use of the *bajo sexto,* a twelve-stringed Mexican bass guitar that is the rhythm instrument for *conjunto* groups that play music from the northern states of Mexico as well as the Texas-Mexican variation, *Tejano.* The hardcore/hip-hop sound of Aztlán Underground is layered with the percussion, flutes, and rattles of indigenous Mexico.

These expressions of indigenous and ethnic Mexican identity are not anchored in claims for a separate nation-state of Chicana/os based in the Southwest. Rather, these stylistic markers are used to reaffirm an ethnic origin and identity that precedes the nation-state. As Aztlán Underground explained,

We wanted to bring back the understanding of Aztlán and place of our origin. The connection to the land that was torn from us. To dissect the way in which they have colonized us and made us believe in the white ways and not our own from the Spanish to the English. We wanted and want to resurrect our true identity is how we started. So we united the ancient with the present by fusing our native instruments with hip-hop and our message to create a bridge to our identity.[24]

This turn toward traditional musical practices is similar to the experience of East L.A. band Los Lobos, who first used the *son jarocho* and other traditional Mexican music styles in their own Latin-rock fusions in the late 1970s. Their adaptation of traditional Mexican elements highlighted the impact of the Chicano movement in East Los Angeles just prior to their emergence. As Steven Loza noted, "A large part of the group's desire to appropriate folkloric jarocho genres into their repertoire was based on an urge not only to preserve such music, but to promote it as a viable art form in an urban and, in many respects, a culturally hostile environment."[25] The musicians of Los Lobos are mentors to the East L.A. scene. David Hidalgo played the *requinto doble* and accordion on Ozomatli's song "Aqui No Sera" on their debut album, and saxophonist Steve Berlin produced Quetzal's third album, *Worksongs* (2003).

In the context of the contemporary economic and political marginalization of ethnic Mexicans in Los Angeles, the musical practices that emerge from the Greater Eastside continue to serve as a strategic site for the production and negotiation of emergent national, racial, class and gendered identities. Although Chicano/a culture speaks to the shared experiences, institutions, and practices of Mexican Americans as a distinct ethnic community, other expressions of cultural affiliation are also at play. Interethnic identification and unity through culture rather than nationality or color are integral components of a new Chicana/o sensibility being forged in the current East L.A. scene. Neither assimilationist nor separatist, this complex of Chicana/o cultural production affirms its cultural heritage and history of place in Los Angeles while creatively engaging in and adapting to the diversity of communities and cultural forms that make up the city.

One of the most vital influences of the Eastside scene has come from Mexican immigrant culture. The *banda* music scene that dominates much of the Mexican immigrant cultural, social, and radio space of Los Angeles has captured the imagination of thousands of Mexican American youths in the Greater Eastside. *Banda* originated in Sinaloa, Mexico, and was transformed into "techno-*banda*" in the 1980s when musicians in northwestern Mexico adapted elements of rock and roll and replaced traditional brass instruments and bass drums with the electric bass, modern drums, timbales, and synthesizers. *Banda*'s popularity exploded in Los Angeles in the early 1990s as local Spanish-language radio stations began programming the music in response to the musical preferences of recent immigrants. Nightclubs, radio stations, and swap meets that catered to the emerging ethnic Mexican majority in Los Angeles produced a thriving dance and music scene based on the sound of the *tambora* (bass drum) and the dance of the *quebradita* (little break). Many of the immigrants in the initial market audience had come from rural areas that had not previously sent many migrants to Los Angeles. This audience responded enthusiastically to *banda's* rural immigrant identity. *Banda* artists presented themselves in the *vaquero* (cowboy) style of dress, wearing hats, boots, and jeans, and sang of life on the ranch and the experiences of crossing the border in the *ranchera* voice of the region." In the nativist era of Pete Wilson and Proposition 187, *banda* was a potent source of community prestige for ethnic Mexicans who turned to the musical culture as an active affirmation of their own Mexican background. Mexican American youths and adults now compose a major base of consumers and producers of this transnational musical culture, and the music's impact has transcended the *banda* scene itself.[27] Ozomatli, Ollin, and Quetzal all incorporate elements of *banda* and *ranchera* music into their repertoire.

The Eastside hardcore (punk) scene was another formative musical culture influencing the East L.A. scene. Members of Aztlán Underground, Blues Experiment, Ollin, Quinto Sol, and Slowrider actively engaged in this precursory scene. Punk produced by ethnic Mexican and Latina/o youth in East and Southeast Los Angeles has had a popular following since the late 1970s, despite little radio airplay, minimal recorded work and record labels, and only a few short-lived clubs.[28] Punk is often performed in backyard gatherings, one of the more common ways to celebrate the weekend in the working-class suburbs of the Greater Eastside. The Rodarte twins of Ollin and Robert Tovar of Blues Experiment, as well as members of Aztlán Underground and Quinto Sol, paid their dues in hard-core bands such as Bloodcum, Peace Pill, Subsist, and Golpe de Estado.

The popular music that dominates the audible spaces of contemporary urban radio and local nightclubs has been a fundamental element of the new musical practices of the Eastside scene as well. The increasing popularity of Jamaican reggae in the urban United States is reflected in the music of both Quinto Sol, which blends roots-reggae with Latin rhythms like cumbia, rumba, and son, and Yeska, whose take on Jamaican ska is fused with the sounds of Latin jazz. The electronica sounds of dance music can be heard in the work of Quetzal and the remixes of Slowrider. Yet it is hip-hop that has had the most generative influence on the Eastside scene. Ozomatli and Slowrider incorporate a DJ and an MC into their albums and live performances. One of the pioneers of West Coast *and* Chicano rap, Aztlán Underground is considered one of the innovators of the rap-rock genre.[29] Rap groups that are affiliated with the Eastside scene, such as 2Mex, the Black Eyed Peas, and La Paz, record more traditional versions of hip-hop by rhyming over break beats produced electronically.

The cultural hybridity of the Eastside scene is not new to urban Chicana/o musical practice. The rise of Eastside jump blues bands like the Pachuco Boogie Boys in the 1940s and the growth of the Eastside sound in the 1960s and 1970s showed particular affinities between ethnic Mexicans and African Americans in music, audiences, and band membership.[30] What is different about the contemporary Eastside scene is the politicization of these hybrid practices into new forms of political expression. The evolving social movements and cultural practices of Chicana/os are producing an emergent form of oppositional identity that not only draws on their history and collective memory but speaks to new ways of thinking and practicing community across national and ethnic lines. The use of the *son jarocho* by Quetzal, for example, is not only an expression of Mexican identity, but it is a link to the cultural struggles waged by African slaves. As Quetzal Flores explains, "We performed at an academic conference in Kentucky about the influence black culture had on the Americas earlier this year. One of the professors made the point that, as maniacal and genocidal as slavery was, black culture survived and thrived. That's son. The slaves had drums; the Spaniards took them away. The slaves said, `All right, fuck you. I'll stomp on wood then,' and created this wondrous music. It shows how rich humans are. Human resilience will always prevail. And that's what we try to convey—the problems and beauty of Los Angeles."[31] Quinto Sol bassist Martin Perez characterized his band's movement away from punk to the Latin fusion style and community-oriented lyrics that distinguishes the East L.A. scene as a desire to raise the political consciousness of his community. According to Perez, "We used to play in punk rock bands that maybe were politically aware but not too conscious. That was why we started playing roots. We saw what Bob Marley was doing for his people and we thought, `Hey, our people need a message too.'"[32] Aztlán Underground echoed this sentiment when asked about the formation of the group: "By 1988, when we first were turned on to black nationalist groups such as Public Enemy and BDP (Boogie Down Productions) in hip-hop, we were moved by their message and realized that there was nothing for our people to look to and we were confined to embracing the dominant culture. Ways of the Iztac.[33] So we wanted to break the notions that we were illegal by affirming to our people our native identity and roots, which are lost in these western schools that teach us George Washington is our father, huh!!" [34]

The political ideology of Chicana/o identity manifested in the current Eastside scene is distinct from previous generations of Chicano nationalism and expression. Several activists and later critics have pointed to the exclusive and masculinist aspects of the "Chicano" subject of the political and cultural movement of the 1960s and 1970s.[35] Richard T. Rodriguez has noted how the representations of Chicano nationalism in contemporary "Chicano rap" echo the dominant masculinism of the past. The masculinist element of Chicano rap, such as (Kid) Frost's representation of "La Raza," makes it susceptible to sexism while its concern with traditional notions of Mexican culture such as la familia or carnalismo (brotherhood) may reproduce within in it notions of the Chicana/o community as exclusively or predominantly masculine."
In contrast, the East L.A. scene acknowledges and attempts to sustain a vision of gender equity and respect for different sexual orientations. As Quetzal Flores has noted, "[T]he whole East L.A. scene is into the mode of making a conscious effort to acknowledge the struggle of women and for us as men to act on that as well." 37 The participation of woman is critical to the maledominated Eastside scene. Martha Gonzales and violinist Rocio Maron are central members of Quetzal and their cultural community. The music they produce stakes a claim for a particular female perspective. As Martha notes, "I learned the traditional *tarima* but then took it out of its element into rock 'n' roll. It's not just about the footwork, but there's an upper body movement that affects the sound as well. I try to find my own Chicana sensibility in the dance."[38] The folk-rock of Lysa Flores eloquently expresses a Chicana standpoint as well. Flores composes songs that deal with her quotidian struggle as a proud and independent woman of color, reflected in her representation as "Queen of the Boulevard" in her self-produced album *Tree of Hope* (1998). Indeed, Chicana feminists are at the forefront of this scene, including spoken word artists such as the all-female crew Cihuatl Tonalli (Woman Force), and the women of color performance art collective Mujeres de Maiz (Women of the Corn).

Another aspect of the new political ideology is being shaped by the struggle to build a politicized cultural community. Quetzal Flores, a child of organizers for the United Farm Workers, argues that Chicana/o identity has to be reformulated in terms of community: "I think that being Chicano now is still valid and still very important in terms of identity and self-determination, but I think more and more people are starting

to take this position: how to create an identity as a way to build a foundation so that you can communicate and collaborate with other communities."[39] This idea of community building extends through all of the groups of the Eastside scene. These artists have not only shared the stage at concerts throughout Los Angeles, but have also come together to record and/or produce one another's albums. Yet this collaborative work is not limited to musicians. In addition to the women's collectives mentioned above, visual artists, dramatists, and filmmakers have been an important element in the constitution of the East L.A. scene. Chicano visual artists Chaz Bojorquez and Joseph "NUKE" Montalvo designed the cover art for two independent compilation albums: *Sociedad=Suiciedad* (1996) and the 2000 release *Mex-America.*[40] The Chicana/o comedy troupe ChUSMA, Spanish slang for "Outcasts," have collaborated with the East L.A. music scene since their founding in 1997. The Latina/o theater troupe Culture Clash's critical and popular play *Chavez Ravine* (2003), about the displacement of an ethnic Mexican community in 1950s Los Angeles, was supported by Ollin's musical production. Additionally, the media-arts collective Smokin' Mirrors has produced videos for Quetzal ("Grito de Alegria" and "Elegua Jarocho") and Aztlán Underground ("Blood on Your Hands").

Conclusion

In August of 2000 the internationally popular rock-rap group Rage Against the Machine performed for the thousands gathered in the "designated protest area" of the Democratic National Convention (DNC) held at the Staples Center in downtown Los Angeles. In solidarity with the demonstrators, lead singer Zach de la Rocha stormed through Rage's tribute to Mayan and Mexica resistance, "People of the Sun," and songs from their 2000 release *The Battle of Los Angeles*, including "Maria," about the struggle of Latina immigrants, and "Guerilla Radio."[54] The latter song remarks on de la Rocha's work with Centro de Regeneracion in Highland Park, a Chicana/o cultural center he cofounded in 1996, where, among other activities, he subsidized the micro-radio station Radio Clandestina.

Although Rage Against the Machine emerged out of the hard-core scene in Orange County, the group was affiliated with the East L.A. scene through the activism of de la Rocha, who was a resident of East Los Angeles and the son of Roberto "Beto" de la Rocha, a well-known artist, activist, and founding member of the seminal Chicano art group Los Four. Zachs Chicano identity informed his band's commitment to the struggles of immigrants, people of color, and the Zapatistas. Rage provided access to progressive organizations and media by setting up tables for such groups in their concert performances and by offering links to their organizations on Rage's official Web site. In 1999 Rage invited Aztlán Underground to open its concerts in Mexico City, while Ozomatli opened what turned out to be Rage's final show at Los Angeles' Grand Olympic Auditorium in 2000.

The possibilities of collective organization that had been practiced at the Peace and Justice Center inspired Zach de la Rochas formation of another significant but also short-lived experiment in community building through cultural practice. He renamed the People's Resource Center in Highland Park the Centro de Regeneracion.[55] There, many of the same artists and activists who had participated in the struggle over the Peace and Justice Center maintained their commitment to providing youth a space for cultural expression and training. Along with music workshops and the development of Radio Clandestina, Centro members also organized graffiti workshops and youth film festivals.[56] Although the Centro lasted only two years, it was an important space in the ongoing institutionalization of the community politics, cultural practices, and social networks of the Eastside scene in the nineties.

The cultural politics waged by the contemporary Chicana/o music scene in Los Angeles registers in precise and detailed fashion the injuries done to lowwage workers and racial others by globalization and transnationalism. But new social forces create new social subjects, who in turn create new social imaginaries. At the very moment when political and economic leaders scapegoated multilingual "mongrel" communities and cultures, music groups associated with the East L.A. scene challenged the cultural and political pretensions of white/Anglo culture. In the process, they exploited the contradiction between the nation's political reliance on fictions of cultural homogeneity and the nation's economic dependence on securing low-wage labor, markets, and raw materials from Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Speaking from the interstices

between commercial culture and the new social movements, Chicana/o musical culture and its political work offers us invaluable bottomup perspectives on the terrain of counterpolitics and cultural creation at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Notes

1. Quoted in Brian Cross, *It's Not About a Salary ... Rap, Race and Resistance in Los Angeles* (London: Verso, 1993), 264.

2. Quoted in Nancy Redwine, "Quetzal Flashes Its Brillance, in Two Shows," *Santa Cruz Sentine4*, December 11, 2003.

3. An earlier draft of this essay was prepared for the Mexican American Studies History Workshop, sponsored by the Center for Mexican American Studies and the Department of History at the University of Houston. I would like to thank the organizers of the workshop, Luis Alvarez and Raul Ramos, and all of the participants for their valuable suggestions and comments. I am also indebted to George Sánchez, Barry Shank, and Raul Villa, readers for *American Quarterly*, for their helpful comments and prudent guidance on this article. This essay is dedicated to the work and vision of all of the organizers and artists of the Eastside scene.

4. See Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *New York, Chicago, Los Angeles: America's Global Cities* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). See also Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, and Tokyo*, 2d ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).

5. Lisa Catanzarite, *California's Growing Latino Population: Census 2000 Dismantles Stereotypes* (Los Angeles: UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center, March 2003). According to Catanzarite, 71 percent of Latinas/o adults and 80 percent of Latina/o youth, ages five to seventeen, in Los Angeles are bilingual.

6. U.S. Census Bureau, *"State and County Quick Facts*, "Htm1ResAnchor http://quickfacts.census.gov/ qfd/states/06/06037.htm1(accessed on April 28, 2004).

7. I use "ethnic Mexican" to refer to people of Mexican descent residing in the United States, including native-born or U.S.-raised Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants. I use "Latina/o" to describe U.S. residents of Latin American descent across race and national origin. The 1.5 generation refers to immigrants who were raised in the United States.

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10. Ibid., 95.

11. Victor Valle and Rodolfo Torres, *Latino Metropolis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 21.

12. Quintosolmusic. com (accessed on May 3, 2004).

13. Mike Davis, "L.A. Inferno," *Socialist Review* 22. 1 (January-March 1992): 57–81.

14. Nora Hamilton and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, *Seeking Community in a Global City: Guatemalans and Salvadorans in Los Angeles* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001).

15. Manuel Pastor, "Economics and Ethnicity: Poverty, Race, and Immigration in Los Angeles County," in *Asian and Latino Immigrants in a Restructured Economy*, ed. Marta López-Garza and David R. Diaz (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2001), 106–7.

16. Mike Davis, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (New York: Vintage, 1992), 267–322. For a historical study of the criminalization of ethnic Mexicans in Los Angeles, see Edward J. Escobar, *Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity: Mexican Americans and the Los Angeles Police Department*, 1900–1945 (Berkeley: University of California, 1999).

17. This latter proposition severely affects youth in Los Angeles County, the source for nearly one-third of the state's juvenile offenders, most of whom are African American or Latina/o. See Vince Beiser and Karla Solhei, "Juvenile Injustice: Proposition 21 Aims to Send Thousands of California Teenagers to Adult Prisons," *L.A. Weekly*, February 11–17, 2000.

18. George Lipsitz, *The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998).

19. Lisa Cacho, "`The People of California Are Suffering': The Ideology of White Injury" *Cultural Values* 4.4 (fall 2000): 390. Although the measures prescribed by Proposition 187 were ruled unconstitutional by the state, several aspects of the initiative survived as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act that were signed into law by a democratic president in 1996.

20. Yvette C. Doss, "Choosing Chicano in the 1990s," in *Urban Latino Cultures,* ed. Gustavo Leclerc, Raul Villa, and Michael Dear (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications), 151.

21. Mexica is the proper name for the cultural group who migrated from Aztlán in the north to the central valley of Mexico, where they constructed the great city of Tenochitlan, now Mexico City, in the twelfth century.

22. Randy Rodarte, interview with author, October 21, 2003.

23. Quetzal Flores biography located at quetzalmusic.org (accessed April 28, 2004).

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26. Helen Simonett, *Banda: Mexican Musical Life Across Borders* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 2001).

27. See Josh Kun's essay in this issue.

28. Duane Leyva, "Teenage Alcoholics: Punk Rock in East Los Angeles," Htm1ResAnchor http:// muisctap.net/DuanesPunkPitNotes/elapunk.pdf (accessed on June 29, 2004). One of the more popular groups to emerge out of the current scene is the hard-core bilingual group Union 13.

29. See the Aztlán Underground interview in Cross 1993.

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31. Gustavo Arellano, "Have Jarana, Will Travel: Quetzal Find Success Making Money for Others," *OC Weekly,* November 28-December 4, 2003.

32. Quoted in "Quinto Sol," *Reggae Nucleus, n.d.,* HtmIResAnchor http://www.quintosolmusic.com/ news.htm (accessed April 27, 2004).

33. In Nauhuatl the term *iztac* refers to the color white.

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37. Quoted in Chris Gonzales Clarke, "Forging the Sound of the New Millenium," in *Motion Magazine,* 1998, Htm1ResAnchor http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/quetz.html (accessed April 27, 2004). 38. Quoted in Redwine, "Quetzal Flashes Its Billiance."

39. Quetzal Flores, interview with author, April 21, 2003.

40. *Sociedad=Suiciedad* (BYO Records, 1997). In the compilation *Mexamerica* (Angeline, Records, 2001), East L.A. bands collaborate with musicians from Tijuana and Mexico City.

41. Tlapoyawa & Ilwixochitl, "Q&A with AZTLÁN UNDERGROUND."

42. Quetzal Flores, interview with author, April 21, 2003. In 1997 Quetzal and Martha co-organized the Chicano-Indigena Encuentro in Chiapas.

43. See Neil Harvey, *The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy (Durham: Duke University Press*, 1998). See also the essays collected in John Holloway and Eloína Peláez, *Zapatista! Reinventing Revolution in Mexico* (London: Pluto Press, 1998).

44. *Revolutionary Worker*, March 26, 1995, 1.

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Reading 44

"I was Aggressive for the Streets, Pretty for the Pictures": Gender, Difference, and the Inner-City Girl

Nikki Jones

It is a late June afternoon and I am standing outside of a café on Fillmore Street in San Francisco. I am holding flyers for Kiara[1], a young woman I met a few hours earlier. Kiara is 22 years old with a light brown complexion and long, wavy hair that suggests a multiracial heritage. Her style of dress is 1980s-retro. She wears a purple lace glove with the finger cut off on her right hand, a short-sleeved jacket over a yellow and green Brazil fútbol jersey, and tight denim jeans that ride low, causing her belly to peek out sometimes between her jeans and her jersey. Two large star-shaped earrings dangle from her ears and a small white flower is tucked into her hair. She was born and raised in the Fillmore, a once-vibrant Black neighborhood that is now quickly gentrifying after decades of blight and neglect. I have conducted field research here since 2005 and just finished interviewing Kiara inside the café. Kiara's grandmother, like many older Black Fillmore residents, migrated from the South. She owned the house in which she raised Kiara after Kiara's mother was killed by her father, who, Kiara tells me, was a big-time drug dealer in the neighborhood before he was sent to prison. Kiara remembers how her father's tough reputation influenced how others interacted with her in the neighborhood; even though she was a child she garnered a level of respect. She learned early on how to manage her interactions with others differently in different situations: "[as a child] I had the street element, and I was aggressive for the streets, pretty for the pictures."

Kiara is helping to collect signatures for an antiredevelopment campaign in Hunter's Point-Bayview, a larger and even more distressed Black neighborhood in San Francisco. Kiara offers to give me a tour of the Fillmore and I follow along as she walks with clipboard in

hand. Kiara's play on mainstream and local expectations of race, gender, class, sexuality, and power is on full display during her brief interactions with strangers. She confidently, assertively, even aggressively approaches men on the street to sign her petition and then draws on normative expectations of manhood and femininity to encourage them to add their names to the list: Babies and women are in danger, she tells them, letting the implication that real men would sign up to protect babies and women hang in the air. She switches from aggressive to demure just long enough to flirt with a man passing by on the street and then to defiant when she passes the police station on the corner. "They don't give a fuck!" she declares loudly. A few moments later we stop to observe the RIPs scratched into the concrete sidewalk of a neighborhood block "where a lot of the trouble happens." Kiara calls these scratches that mark the murders of young Black men "modern-day hieroglyphics." She gets silent and still, but just for a moment. She has work to do so she keeps on moving.

Twenty years after the publication of West and Zimmerman's "Doing Gender" (1987) critical and feminist scholars have the analytical tools to observe and represent Kiara's interactions on this city block in ways that illuminate how gender, race, and class are accomplished during situated interaction. An interactional analysis of Kiara's walk through the Fillmore reveals moments where the accomplishment of gender, race, or class emerges as most significant. Such an analysis is also likely to reveal moments when Kiara violates or manipulates the normative expectations associated with categorical identity, and the consequences of her doing so. Yet, as Patricia Hill Collins writes in her critical response to "Doing Difference" (1995), such an analysis, on its own, is not likely to reveal how the social contexts in which these interactions take place are shaped by the "messy" intersection of various systems of oppression (1995, 491–94). Kiara and other neighborhood residents describe these oppressive forces as "Redevelopment," referring to the urban redevelopment agency that many longtime Fillmore residents hold responsible for decades of neighborhood

underdevelopment and exploitation. Another oppressive force that has shaped life for young people in the neighborhood—boys and girls—is the local police force, including the city's gang task force, which has grown stronger in the nation's never-ending War on Drugs.

If we focus only on interactional accomplishments of categorical identity we can miss the chance to illuminate the recursive relationship *between* Kiara's interactions with others, her identity (or identities), and these larger oppressive forces, which are shaped by various overlapping and intersecting–isms. To be fair, I do not think such an omission is a necessary or desired outcome of the theoretical frameworks of "doing gender" or "doing difference" (West and Fenstermaker 1995). However, the ubiquitous use (or misuse) of the respective frameworks can sometimes leave the impression that a scholar's most important objective is to "test" the respective theoretical approaches—spotting gender or difference here, there, and everywhere—not, instead, to use these frameworks to illuminate the complicated and sometimes contradictory ways in which situated interaction is linked to structural circumstances.

My recent ethnographic work on Black girls and inner-city violence does not set out to test either framework. My analysis is deeply and *simultaneously* informed by the interactional concerns of West, Zimmerman, and Fenstermaker *and* the theoretical and political concerns of Patricia Hill Collins, Howard Winant, and other critical race and feminist scholars. After the sometimes contentious but important debates on how to conceptualize intersecting identities and oppressions, I find that drawing on both approaches helps me to more accurately represent the lives of young women like Kiara. Drawing on both interactional analysis and Black feminist thought encourages us to situate Black women's and girl's experiences, *including their interactional experiences*, at the center of our empirical investigations. Such an integrative approach challenges us to develop better explanations for how interaction, identity, and various structural–isms are linked. Additionally, such an approach pushes social

scientists to consider Black women and girls not simply as problems to be solved or explained (e.g., single mothers or "violent" girls) but rather draws attention to the dilemmas and contradictions that Black women and girls encounter and in some measure reconcile in their everyday lives. This is a Black feminist interactional studies, perhaps.

At the same time that she is "doing gender" or "doing difference" with others, for example, Kiara is also deeply invested in a struggle for survival. "It's about being a survivor," she responds when I ask her how she developed the strong sense of independence that she revealed during our interview, "and we have to survive." This overarching concern for survival was also revealed during my field research amongst African American innercity girls in Philadelphia (Jones 2004 & 2008). In a recent article, for example, I describe how inner-city girls work the "code of the street," (Jones 2008) which is described by urban ethnographer and race scholar Elijah Anderson (1999) as a *system of accountability* that governs formal and informal interactions in distressed urban areas, especially interpersonal violence. At the heart of "the code" is a battle for respect and *manhood.* In *Black Sexual Politics* (2004), Patricia Hill Collins writes that as Black men embrace "the code," they embrace a hegemonic masculinity that is based on the *coupling* of strength with dominance—white men with wealth and power are able to demonstrate such masculinity through economic or military dominance (in addition to physical dominance). Poor Black men in distressed urban areas must rely primarily on physical domination, which makes them and others in their community more vulnerable to violent victimization.

African American inner-city girls may have no manhood to defend, yet the shared circumstances of inner-city life engender a shared concern for physical safety and survival. Over time, girls coming of age in distressed urban areas come to realize too how respect, reputation, and retaliation— the three R's at the heart of the code—organize their social worlds. Much like Kiara, the girls I met knew quite well the situations in which presenting

oneself as “aggressive,” “good,” or “pretty” paid off. Listening to the stories of these girls, it is difficult to imagine them as held hostage to accountability. Instead, they strategically choose from a variety of gender, race, and class displays depending on the situation, the public identity they are invested in crafting, *and* in service of a survival project that has historically defined the lives of poor, Black women and girls in the United States—a project with especially high stakes in neighborhoods like the one in which Kiara has grown up.

These stories complicate our understandings of “doing gender” and “doing difference” in ways that take account the complexities of structure and its intersections with race, class and gender. Twenty years after the publication of “Doing Gender,” and over a decade after “Doing Difference,” maybe the most fitting tribute is not only to offer a critique but also to use our knowledge of the social worlds of girls like Kiara to complicate these frameworks in ways that may or may not have originally been imagined by their authors.

NOTE

1. Kiara is a pseudonym.

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45. Connections: Marginality, Identity and Music Scenes

Tammy L. Anderson, Ph.D.

"Suckas don't like me,
mad cuz they girl wanna say they like me."

(from *Suckas Don't Like Me*, JenRo, Ro Records)

Introduction

Asian and Hispanic lesbian rapper JenRo was born and raised in the San Francisco Bay area. From a very early age, she was nurtured by a musically-talented family and gained immediate recognition. JenRo began writing songs and performing for people in her community, mostly Blacks, Asians and Hispanics, at the age of 10. A local drug gang even commissioned her to write a song and by the time she turned 15, she was the only female rapper competing in local competitions against more experienced and older males (www.latinrapper.com/artistsjuly2.html).

JenRo is part of the Homo Hop or Queer Hip Hop scene. Tim'm T. West, MC of Deep Dickcollective, explained that the Homo Hop genre and scene were:

> "an effort to give credence to a sub-genre of hip hop that the mainstream was ignoring. It's not a different kind of hip hop, but places identity at the center of production, which is a blessing and curse. I'm a hip hop artist, ultimately, who happens to be queer. Homo Hop, as a mobilizing medium for queer artists, did, in fact, serve a purpose. (Woo 2013)"

Like others, JenRo's lyrics have often been about her difficulties being a minority, lesbian rapper or experiences as a sexual and racial minority group member. This has put her at odds not only with the mainstream music industry and society's norms, but also the dominant themes of hip hop and rap music—which celebrate maschismo and heterosexuality. On her

facebook page JenRo states “Dear music, thank you for being there when nobody else was.” This statement, and the quote by West, indicate that music furnishes an important source of support and an opportunity for an empowered identity to people who are marginalized in society due to their ethnic, racial and sexual identities. When we talk about the marginalization of minority groups, we mean relegating or confining Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, gays, lesbians, trangender and lowerclass people, for example, to lower statuses in society that can block their opportunity and integration in society.

Today, sociology has a good understanding of how music helps resolve individual and collective identity issues among marginalized people from diverse, multicultural backgrounds. By producing and consuming diverse types of music in unique spaces, young people have addressed their marginality and resisted their classification as “other” or deviant in society. While doing so, people from more dominant groups (white, heterosexual, and middleclass males), have increasingly gravitated to music scenes, in part, because they value diversity and want to experience others’ music and cultural styles. A sort of multicultural integration and solidarity –even if only temporary—can result. Evan - a 30 year-old white male that I interviewed in my rave culture project (Anderson 2009) - described this experience at a house music party in Philadelphia:

> “There was a party on Sundays called *Heart & Mind*, which was the epitome of what house [*music*] was about - community - people - Black, White, Latino, gay, straight, everybody. I could be dancing with her, turn around and there will be a guy behind me and I’m dancing with him. Then turn around and I will be dancing with a Latino, then turn around and I will be dancing with another African-American girl. And the music was

> all over the place too. But, everybody was there for the same reason. That is the spirit of EDM - that community bond."

Section 11 addresses the link between critical race theory, multiculturalism, identity and marginality and its relevance to the field of deviance today and in the future. It includes readings by Cohen (2004), Viesca (2004) and Jones (2009) and this Connections essay on music scenes. The purpose of this section is to consider that a possible pathway forward for the study of deviance is in attending to social change and scholarly contributions in multiculturalism and marginality or "otherness." Multiculturalism is a term social scientists use to denote the moral and political claims of oppressed groups in society. Their goal is to attain equal citizenship, rather than simply toleration by the dominant majority.

Why is multiculturalism important to the study of deviance? Because the US is becoming increasingly diverse, its economy is interdependent with nations across the globe, new legislative actions and policies are expanding rights to oppressed groups, and modern forms of communication (i.ee., Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, Tumblr etc.) expose us to people, places, and experiences we might have never learned about or encountered previously. These advances mean that norms, social roles and expectations, and cultural forms and styles –and definitions of deviance-- have changed over time and will continue to do so in the future. For the most part, the field of deviance has ignored multiculturalism and has too often conveyed either a pejorative or pessimistic view about racial, ethnic, gender, sexual and other minority or oppressed groups in society. Szasz (1970) believes sociologists' use of the phrase "social deviants" has been an obstacle to understanding this:

> The term "social deviants"… does not make sufficiently explicit—as the terms "scapegoat" or "victim" do—that majorities usually categorize persons or groups as

"deviant" in order to set them apart as inferior beings and to justify their social control, oppression, persecution, or even complete destruction. (Szasz 1970: xxv-xxvi).

Such viewpoints of minorities and "others" has cost deviance some credibility and utility in sociology, reducing it to the study of nuts, sluts, and perverts (Liazos 1972). For example, Best (2004) noted a major blow to deviance followed from the out-migration of classic topics in deviance (e.g., disabled, women, minorities, LGBT populations) to new subfields in sociology catering to multicultural interests. These groups used to be hot topics in classic studies of deviance, where scholars theorized about them from a sort of pathology or powerlessness perspective. Today, gender studies, race and ethnic studies, LGBT studies, disability studies and the intersectionality project[1] are just a few of the contemporary sub-fields of sociology that have given us a more positive and empowered viewpoint on multiculturalism, identity and marginality. Thus, the field of deviance lags behind in both explaining how multiculturalism and marginality impact deviant behaviors and identities and also in applying contributions from these subfields to deviance theory and concepts. *Therefore, the purpose of this connections essay is to explain how music scenes and musical pursuits by young people can not only teach us about the link between multiculturalism, identity and marginality, but also how those lessons can be extended to the study of deviance and carve out a promising path for its future.*

Multiculturalism, Identity, and Marginality in the Field of Deviance

The field of deviance has historically discussed outsiders, marginals, and people like JenRo and Tim'm T. West using terms such as degeneracy, pathology, labeling, stigma and anomie. Degeneracy and pathology defined racial, ethnic and sexual minority groups in

[1] Studying the intersection between multiple identities, such as gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality and class.

derogatory ways—as biological inferiors-- whereas labeling, stigma, and anomie highlighted their powerlessness, inability to thwart social pressure, and blocked opportunity. In fact, few early studies considered how racism, sexism, heterosexism, or class privilege impacted how deviance was defined in the first place, or led to the classification of deviant traits and behaviors in society.

One reason for this is that norms, social expectations and identity traits have been based on a white, patriarchal, heterosexual and middleclass ideal. Consider the leading televisions shows at the height of the field of deviance—1950s-1970s. According to TV.com, the Brady Bunch, Gunsmoke, Bonanza, Perry Mason and the Twilight Zone – along with a few news magazine shows—round out the top ten most popular in the 1960s. Each of these shows feature all white casts that convey stories and situations of the white, middleclass and heterosexual lifestyle. According to the Museum of Broadcast Television:

> What was consistently projected, without public fanfare but in teeming myriads of programs, scenes, news priorities, sportscasts, old movies, ads, was the naturalness and normalcy of social whiteness. …According to television representation, the United States was a white nation, with some marginal "ethnic" accretions that were at their best when they could simply be ignored, like well-trained and deferential maids and doormen (http://www.museum.tv/eotvsection.php?entrycode=racismethni).

A similar pattern can be found in popular music of the 1950s and 1960s, even though they were the defining decades of the Civil Rights era. For example, rhythm and blues, rock and roll and Motown originated in black cultures during this time period. However, few blacks found access on mainstream radio or in industry recording studios and when they did, they had to “tone down” their blackness for a more “appealing” white aesthetic and style (Shank 2001;

McMichael 1998). According to the People's History (http://www.thepeoplehistory.com/50smusic.html):

> Rhythm & Blues (R&B) and Rock 'n' Roll popularized "black" music and many African-American musicians rose to prominence and enjoyed success, but while some were able to reap the benefits of their work, many others were forgotten or denied access to audiences through segregation. A lot of people believe that during the fifties many of the white artists stole music from African-Americans and capitalized on it for their own benefit in a way that the original artists could not. A perfect example of this happening is when Pat Boone was made to cover Little Richard's song "Tutti Frutti" and Boone's version topped higher on the charts, while considered by many to be the inferior version of the song.

Symbolic Deviance: Being "Other" = Being Deviant. Departures from a white, middleclass, heterosexual standard have been judged not only "different," but at times dysfunctional, dangerous, and immoral. Being "other," (i.e., not white, male, heterosexual, or middleclass and above), is, consequently, often equated with being deviant, simply because of the stereotypes or xenophobic ideas majority and privileged groups have about the cultural backgrounds and practices of minorities. Even though Goffman (1963) coined the term "tribal stigma" to note possible discrimination and social consequences for racial minorities, classic deviance research has paid insufficient attention to society's culturally biased norms, roles, expectations, and social structures.

This marginality can have significant consequences for groups in society. For example, the Cohen reading in this section points out that labels such as "heterosexual" and "queer" obscure the power differences between middleclass gay white males and poor black heterosexual

females. Yet, since society's norms reflect the nuclear family, traditional gender roles, and a middleclass way of life, gays and minorities with such labels are confronted daily with a sort of "normative moral superstructure" (Cohen 2004: p. 29) that defines them as outcasts. Public condemnation, stigma, discrimination, inequality in opportunity, increased surveillance and punitive social control are even more serious penalties experienced by individuals who are "demographically or culturally different" from society's norms.

When people are deemed "other" or even deviant in this symbolic fashion--simply due to their demographic makeup or cultural heritage-- research shows they respond in at least two important ways. The first is to assimilate, i.e., to adopt the beliefs, values, norms, and ways of the mainstream (cite). Assimilation requires detachment from one's background and culture and a redefinition of the self according to dominant society's standards. A second response, however, is to resist, celebrate one's "otherness," shore up solidarity among fellow group members, and engage in the politics of difference and recognition .

This more resistance-based comeback often begins within or when individuals decide to take matters into their own hands. For example, the Jones (2009) reading in this section calls attention to a young black girl named Kiara. Kiara responds to her "otherness" and multiple forms of oppression by manipulating the mainstream society's expectations for her as a Black female, raised in a poor urban area.

These acts of resistance can ultimately attract "normals" or those who aren't marginal at all. When this happens, innovation comes to society, culture changes and norms are redefined. Thus, the alternative ways and cultural practices of minority groups are often visionary and can advance society in both small and large ways. The field of deviance must polish its lens to see

these possibilities rather than fitting them to a pessimistic and dated framework of "social deviants."

Take hip hop, for example. Numerous studies (****) have shown the value of local hip hop scenes to young Black males and females like Kiara. The music fosters an awareness of and appreciation for Black experiences in Africa and America. Hip Hop's pioneers were mostly black and Hispanic youth or young adults living in stressful, inner-city conditions in the 1970s and early 1980s. By combining rhythmical talk over electronic beat patterns, young DJs and rappers produced a new musical genre that simultaneously told stories of oppression, while fashioning a new form of leisure activity (Kitwana 2002). The music stylistically different from more commonly recognized genres like country, blues, jazz, pop, and rock because it featured talking instead of singing and electronic instruments (i.e., drum and bass machines) instead of more classical ones that required "training." Moreover, hip hop originated in poor minority communities with rappers and artists articulating messages about local conditions and historical oppression (Rose 1994). This was a dramatic departure from the artist profile and lyrical content of the commercial mainstream (Watkins 2005).

The popularity of hip hop grew so quickly, though, that by 1979 it went commercial and had crossed over to the white mainstream. It has dominated the 1980 and 1990s US music industry and secured a global popularity (Watkins 2005). Hip hop has not only reshaped music industries and the larger economies that house them, it has also altered culture in profound ways. There are hip hop clothing lines and other aesthetic styles, language, and forms of interaction (dancing, dating and courtship) that have gravitated out of the "ghetto" and into the American mainstream.

Actual Deviance: Being "Other" and "Acting Deviant." A second way minorities have been viewed as deviant is more overt and about actual deviant behavior. Marginal groups may engage in deviant behaviors that violate codes of conduct or laws in society. They may do so for some of the very same reasons majority group members do (i.e., peer pressure, boredom, opportunity etc.), or their behavior might be inspired by their oppression in society.

Music scenes often feature deviant acts and/or condone a deviant lifestyle. For example, hip hop has been championed by gangs active in selling illicit drugs and has been accused of being misogynistic, exploitative, and homophobic (Watkins 2005). Recall that JenRo was commissioned by a drug gang to produce a hip hop song for them. Also, rapper Nelly was criticized and boycotted at Spellman college (an all-black university) a few years ago for his misogynistic song "Tip Drill" that describes men taking turns having sex with a female, which some interpreted as condoning gang rape (Willens 2004). Hip hop has been documented a "music of choice" among gang members and drug dealers active in a wide range of deviant and criminal behaviors (Baker and Homan 2007; Kitwana 2002; Rose 1994).

Certainly, hip hop is not the only music scene to feature deviant behavior. Following on the heels of hip hop, is the growing popularity of narcocorridos south of the U.S. border in Mexican towns riddled with drug-trafficking violence. Narcocorridos are Mexican folk songs that celebrate drug dealers as social bandits, heroes, and rags-to-riches entrepreneurs (Campbell 2005). The music glamorizes the drug trade and associated violence, serving as a form of entertainment for all. According to Edberg (2004: 120-121) a unique drugtrafficker persona is commonly portrayed in narcocorridos: (1) the juxtaposition of poverty and wealth on the U.S.–Mexico border; (2) racial and class hierarchies in Mexico; (3) cross-border conflicts; (4)

Mexican *personalismo*, i.e., individual centered agency and power; and (5) images of northern Mexican machismo. Artist Mario "El Cachorro" Delgado sings:

His cartel is well-known

it's called La Vecindad

His jealous enemies

want to take him out

but "8″ isn't alone

his people are killers, too (cited in Schatman 2011, Wired Magazine)

And from the Wikipedia page on nacrocorridos, posted text describes the lyrics in a song called "El Cabron" (2005) by Los Capos.

"Ever since I was a lad (child) I had the fame of a badass, already hittin the parrot (Cocaine) and blowing dope (Cannabis/Weed) with more reason. It's because in my beloved Mexico anyone there is a badass" (English translation. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narcocorrido)

Understanding that norms, standards and social roles and expectations are based on a white, middleclass, heterosexual ideal can help us see how marginality and deviance work on a symbolic level to shape our beliefs, values, biases and prejudices. Given our variable backgrounds, we may each have different viewpoints about what is normal and deviant in society. This underscores the subjective definition of deviance: that what might be seen as normal to one person could be viewed as deviant by another. In addition, we know from the Cohen (2004) reading that "moral superstructures" inspire actual deviant behavior by marginal groups. While deviant acts can often be attempts to challenge power relations in society, Cohen (2004) maintains most are not. Instead, they are symbolic and simply done to increase autonomy

or satisfaction in one's life or to make the best of a bad situation. Symbolic and actual responses to marginality via music scenes are discussed below.

Music Scenes as Solutions to Identity Problems

To understand how music scenes help marginal people, from highly diverse backgrounds, resolve symbolic deviance matters and participate in actual deviance, two identity concepts— collective and personal— require explanation. Collective identity refers to a shared sense of "we-ness" and the bonds and commitment people get from others as being part of a group (Melucci 1995), whereas personal identity is how people define themselves (**). Attempts to address symbolic deviance or rectify power inequalities through music are likely more collective identity issues associated with group marginality. On the other hand, individual involvement in music endeavors is a more personal identity matter. Thus, music scenes provide both collective and personal identity solutions to marginal groups and people.

Collective Identity. Discussion of the role of music in shaping collective identities for marginal or oppressed groups in society emerged in the pre-Civil Rights era or mid 1960s-1970s. Sociologists (Denison and Peterson 1972; Frith 1981; Eyerman 2002) studied music's role in fashioning collective identity and mobilizing movements for social change among the oppressed. Oppressed people demanded a politics of recognition-- by their own cultural styles and groups identities—rather through the deviance lens cast by the white middleclass maintream.

Teens and young adults from a wide range of ethnic and racial backgrounds have created or contributed to musical genres based on their cultural heritages and histories. These musical styles are showcased in local scenes. Music also has the power of political expression, as they offer marginal and stigmatized groups a voice or outlet for resisting the sort of moral superstructure Cohen (2004) notes above. Youth-oriented music scenes have also offered

alternative fashions or new aesthetic styles, as well as group or collective identities, political action, and social change (Denisoff and Peterson 1972; Eyerman 2002; Frith 1981; Shank 1994).

People have multiple identities and they can be a source of richness and/or conflict. For example, England has been troubled by anti-Asian sentiment resulting in "Paki-bashing" of people hailing from Pakistan and India. Tensions between white Brits and East Asian Brits or immigrants runs high, leading to East Asians being stigmatized, stereotyped, and even victimized. One way Pakistani and Indian youth have responded to this dilemma is by creating Bhangra music scenes (Bennett 2000). Bhangra music comes from the Punjab province of India and Pakistan. It is a style that combines classic Punjab folk music with Western pop music. For young East Asians, Bhangra events are sites of celebrating traditions from their homelands. It has worked to make ethnic traditions appealing to young East Asians and shore up their pride in a national collective East Asian identity, even when that identity is challenged by a white British mainstream. Moreover, the popularity of Bhangra music has garnered increased respect and admiration among non-Asian and white British populations (Bennett 2000).

The reading by Viesca (2004) describes a similar phenomenon for Chicanos in Los Angeles. He contends that the Latin Fusion or Eastside music scene there serves as a "mechanism for calling an oppositional community into being through performance" (p. 725) for Latino youth and young adults. This music scene, with groups like Aztlan Underground, puts on live performances, radio shows, demonstrations, and protests to resist the marginalization and oppression Latino communities have experienced over the course of time. The scenes also celebrate cultural activities, including those that are considered deviant in the Californian mainstream. For example, Viesca (2004) notes that Latin Fusion bands derive their names from traditional culture, expressing an indigenous Mexican identity. He writes that names like

"Slowrider, for example, alludes to the popular barrio art of car customizing, or lowrider culture, while Yeska is slang for marijuana, evoking the 1940s' Pachuco argot of *Cálo*" (page 725).

Music is used to send people of a marginalized group important messages about who they are in line with the recognition goals of multiculturalism. It also seeks to counter idea that being "other" equals being "deviant." Lyrics send empowering messages about identity and a group's culture, which opposes the stigmatizing view of the group had by the mainstream. These lyrics serve also as a call to action for positive social and political change, if not on a structural level at least on a community and individual one. Viesca (2004) notes that the eastside Latin Fusion music scene in LA has produced an oppositional identity that draws on Chicano history and outlines new forms of interaction that transcend ethnic barriers. For example, Viesca (2004: 726) claims:

> The use of the *son jarocho* by Quetzal, for example, is not only an expression of Mexican identity, but it is a link to the cultural struggles waged by African slaves. As Quetzal Flores explains, "We performed at an academic conference in Kentucky about the influence black culture had on the Americas earlier this year. One of the professors made the point that, as maniacal and genocidal as slavery was, black culture survived and thrived.

*Personal Identity***.** On less political level, music plays a fundamental role in shaping youth identity. DeNora's (2000) research shows the self is located in music or that people, especially youth, define themselves through it. Music scenes also serve as a solution to personal identity problems for youth. Such troubles may emanate from trauma, blocked opportunity, family discord, and school failure. Often, minority or oppressed groups find themselves at high risk for personal identity problems and seek out youth scenes and subcultures as a way to cope

(Anderson 1995; 2009). In a recent study, Leblanc (2005) found that girls gravitated to the punk rock scene after experiencing family trauma (divorce of parents or being sexually abused). It served as a pseudo-family that enabled them to rebel against their parents and reject mainstream expectations and conventions. A punk rock lifestyle became a means of survival for these personally and socially marginalized young women. In my own research on rave culture (Anderson 2009), I also found young people across numerous race, ethnic, gender, and sexual identity groups used music scenes—like techno, house, trance and other EDM genres- to resolve alienation and personal identity issues. The reading by Viesca (2004) notes that the Latin fusion scene in LA is also a way for young Chicanos to fashion a personal identity—one that gets tarnished through childhood trauma or negative experiences—but also one that suffers a broader social marginalization from structural changes. Music scenes like Homo Hop, Hip Hop, narcocorridos on the Mexican border, Latin Fusion, Bhangra and rave culture are, therefore, enticing collectives for young "marginals" in search of belonging and personal identity empowerment.

The "Accidental" Reproduction of Marginality and Inequality by Empowered Music Scenes.

Sometimes music scenes—and the identities they fashion to thwart or resist marginalization— end up reproducing still other forms of oppression, namely sexism and homophobia. Thus, not all multiculturalist efforts resolve marginality and oppression or realize the goals of equity. People often address one type of marginalization – class or race—and not others. Imagining and addressing the problems that can arise from the intersection of multiple identities is quite difficult. By telling Kiara's story, Jones (2009) makes this very point. Kiara might be empowered, for example, by hip hop's racial messaging, but she is subordinated by its

misogyny and sexism. What is her response? She manipulates race and gender expectations to her own personal advantage.

In the reading by Viesca (2004), we also learn how addressing one form of marginality and symbolic deviance ends up perpetuating others. In reverting to an authentic Chicano or Mayan cultural sensibility, Viesca notes that Chicano men reproduce sexism, patriarchy, herterosexism and homophobia. This leads them into difficulties with female and gay members of the Latin Fusion scene or the larger community. Researchers have found similar patterns and experiences with narcocorridos on the Mexican border (Campbell 2004). In fact, some argue that race has been the predominant social message in popular music in the US, inspiring the most innovation. It is no wonder, then, that sexism and heterosexism have lingered.

Conclusion

Music scenes are places that celebrate uniqueness, diversity, and respect. Such contexts have atmospheres that encourage people to be "themselves," while creating and performing music that meets their entertainment needs or sends socio-political messages about who they are and how they would like to be treated by others and recognized in society. They also allow people, especially those hailing from oppressed minority groups, to carve out meaningful lifestyles, new identities, via new social worlds (Anderson 2009; Bennett and Peterson 2004).

While it is true that music scenes and the musicians, DJs, producers, and other stakeholders therein have, at times, been guilty of creating hostile climates for participants (women and homosexuals), they have achieved the central goals of multiculturalism: recognition of cultural difference and awareness of social oppression and the consequences that has for individuals. At times, what young people accomplish in music scenes impacts the larger society, but it doesn't have to.

Mainstream society might look onto oppressed group's creative expression or their daily activities with a deviance lens, defining them symbolically as "different" and "marginal" and categorizing their behavior as non-normal or even threatening, such that surveillance and social control are warranted. But there will also be members from the majority, privileged group who appreciate, seek out, and learn from these so-called marginals. This is where the goals of multiculturalism can be met. Yet, music scenes are not the only spaces with a multicultural cast of players who attempt to promote atmospheres of diversity, respect, and acceptance. Such places can be found everywhere in our lives and as we interact together in them the field of deviance should attend to the new norms, social expectations, aesthetics, lifestyles and behaviors that will result.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. In what ways can the values, identities, and cultural ways of ethnic, racial, gender and sexual minority groups challenge our understanding of what is normal and deviant in society? Use examples to make your points.

2. Is a white rapper authentically hip hop? Can a white person be an insider in a hip hop music scene? Can a black person be a member of a white power music subculture? Why or why not? Explain this as a case of marginality, identity and deviance.

3. Do you believe music is a more effective way for young people to resolve their differences by race, ethnicity, sexuality and gender than it is for older adults? How so? Why?

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Section 12. Biomedicalization, BioPower and Biocitizens

Introduction.

Tammy Anderson

On February 11, 2012, singer-actor Whitney Houston was found dead in a hotel bathtub. Her death was ruled an accidental drowning related to cocaine use and heart disease (Dolak and Marikar, April 5, 2012[1]). By now, most of us know Houston's story: a remarkable rise to fame and fortune in the 1980s followed by dramatic fall into addiction by the late 1990s. Less than a year before her death, another celebrity also ran into trouble with cocaine addiction. On March 7, 2011 actor Charlie Sheen was fired from his popular TV show "Two and a Half Men" by CBS due in part to Sheen's erratic behavior related to his extensive abuse of drugs, especially cocaine. Both Sheen and Houston had been in rehab numerous times over the course of their careers and both were arrested for drug possession in years prior.

How can we explain Whitney Houston and Charlie Sheen's drug abuse? Once we settle on those explanations, how should we respond to drug addicts like Houston and Sheen, or others less famous, and will we find different approaches necessary? What can our answers to these questions reveal about our future reactions to behaviors, traits, and conditions that straddle the line between sickness and immorality?

Section 12 covers a promising area for the future of the sociology of deviance: biomedicalization, biopower and biocitizens. The readings in this section view biomedicalization, a growing theory in the broader discipline of sociology, as an important "next step" in the medicalization of deviance (see Section 4). Biomedicalization refers to biologically-

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[1] See (http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/whitney-houston-death-surprising-details-coroners-report/story?id=16076589#.UG7iQrX1ryU).

based efforts and innovations to “fix” those traits, behaviors and conditions now considered types of illness instead of moral failings or deviant behavior (Clarke et al. 2003). The readings identify important areas of study for deviance in the future, but also potential dilemmas we could face in our own lives or collectively as a society: How will we distinguish between disease and deviance? What will be the preferred methods of intervention and control? When will we respond in a humanitarian or more punitive fashion? Who will benefit and who will suffer based on these decisions?

Recall a lesson from Section 4, that the evolution in understanding deviance as a biological inferiority passed on through the family (degeneracy) to a patient with a disease requiring medical attention (medicalization) allowed for greater sympathy and mitigation of the social consequences such as stigma, prejudice, and discrimination. The more recent shift to biomedicalization, presents us with even more alternatives and dilemmas. For example, what should we do with the cocaine addict? A familiar response has been to handle the matter through the criminal justice system. Should drug addicts be sent to prison for breaking the law and forced into prison drug treatment programs? Upon their release, should their probation officers make them attend Narcotics Anonymous meetings, randomly drug test them, and hold them accountable to a life of abstinence from all drugs and alcohol? Or should their control be of a medical nature, where doctors prescribe treatments to manage their withdrawal symptoms and cravings?

The first recommendation calls for state intervention, public funds, institutional support and surveillance, and personal accountability. The second path is much more focused in scope and impact and can be handled by the private healthcare system. It simply requires the drug addict to have medical insurance, consult a doctor, and follow his or her treatment plan. Which

alternative would you recommend for addicts from different backgrounds, dependent on drugs such as OxyContin, Vicodin, Percoset, Valium, Adderall, or heroin?

According to Vrecko (2010), biomedicalization poses new ethical and moral questions by shifting our attention from the poor choices made by rational persons, to our own internal biology, or selves (Vrecko 2010). Invariably, this will also shift our ideas about who is responsible for addressing deviance: the public or private sector, government, or ourselves. For example, the first path described above requires a long, hard journey through a web of personal choice, moral strengthening, social cooperation, as well as institutional support and surveillance. On the other hand, taking medications, (the second path), is what Vrecko (2010) conceives of as a more voluntary and private form of self-control. When we follow doctor's orders and specified medical regimens to treat problematic traits or conditions, we are being good "biocitizens." What this means is that we agree with the medical classifications offered to define us, conform to expert medical advice, and take initiatives to fix such problems biomedically, without inconveniencing others. This is an efficient and fairly inexpensive form of social control. But are some addicts just too problematic and incapable of being good biocitizens? Do some simply need, or even deserve, criminal justice control and more punitive interventions?

Let's return to Whitney and Charlie. According to the popular website www.famouscelebritydrugaddicts.com, Whitney Houston's addiction can be explained by her problematic childhood, marriage to musician and bad boy Bobby Brown, and the excesses of their celebrity lifestyle. However, the website's page on Charlie Sheen explains his cocaine problems as a chronic illness – in line with a biomedical model—and that he should be treated as a patient similar to someone suffering from cancer.

In my connections essay with Philip R. Kavanaugh, we further examine this issue by asking if opiate addiction (e.g., Oxycontin, Vicoden, Percoset and heroin) is defined biomedically, as a brain disease (NIDA 2007), then isn't it best treated through medications that cater to Whitney, Charlie and other addicts, rather than punishing them through the criminal justice system? Howard Markel, a physician and Professor of the History of Medicine at the University of Michigan, is one of many medical experts who think so. Markel supports the new DSM-V definition of addiction that removes the "committing illegal acts" criterion, and replacing it with a "craving" criterion. Like many others, Markel also supports the new category of mental illness called "Addiction and Related Disorders."

> The conclusion to draw here is that though substances like cocaine are very effective at triggering changes in the brain that lead to addictive behavior and urges, they are not the only possible triggers: just about any deeply pleasurable activity - sex, eating, Internet use - has the potential to become addictive and destructive…We should embrace the new DSM criteria and attack all the substances and behaviors that inspire addiction with effective therapies and support (Markel, 2012:1).

The Dworkin reading in this section shows us that these trends in medicalizing undesirable traits, conditions, and behaviors – such as depression – and controlling them with biomedical technologies (like anti-depressant medication and other pharmaceuticals) will continue to expand into the future and will ultimately target our most simple emotions and goals: everyday unhappiness or anxieties. Like other skeptics, Dworkin (2001) is concerned that such broad criteria for mental illness (like the new classifications for depression and addiction disorders in the DSM-V) will pathologize human emotion and lead to overdiagnosis and the expanded and unnecessary treatment of perfectly healthy people. Allen J. Frances, Professor of Psychiatry and

Behavioral Sciences at Duke University is also concerned such medical expansion will create "false epidemics," while health insurance companies are panicking about the hundreds of millions of dollars annually that will have to be spent treating this growing range of maladies (Markel 2012).

For sociologists studying deviance, we can expect this biomedicalized future to redefine norms, social roles, the expectations we have for ourselves, and those that others have for us. It will test our beliefs and convictions about which particular deviants are deserving of this emerging form of biocitizenship, and of broader social inclusion: drug dealers, prostitutes, property crime offenders, risk-takers, feedees and the obese, tattooed friends and coworkers, bugchasers or those who practice unsafe sex, juvenile delinquents, transgender prisoners, and so forth. Sociologists must pay careful attention to the institutional influences that continue to define, and redefine, deviance. As medical facilities, in conjunction with private drug companies, the FDA, and other federal organizations such as NIDA continue suggesting deviance is located in our disordered brains and bodies, it will become more important to examine who benefits from this characterization, who gets excluded, and how (and why) definitions of deviance continue to change in the biomedical era. Doing so will require the field of deviance to move beyond its usual conceptual territory.

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Reading 46

The Medicalization of Unhappiness

Ronald W. Dworkin

The use of psychotropic medication in depressed patients has increased in the United States by more than 40 percent over the last decade, from 32 million office visits resulting in a drug prescription to over 45 million. This is in marked contrast to the period between 1978 and 1987, when the number of office visits resulting in a psychotropic drug prescription remained relatively stable. The bulk of the increase can be accounted for by the aggressive use of SSRIs (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) in patients. It is the class of drugs that includes Prozac, Zoloft, and Paxil. The question is: Are more Americans clinically depressed now than in the past, or has medical science started to treat the far more common experience of "everyday unhappiness" with medication, thereby increasing the number of drug prescriptions?

No one knows the answer to this question. We do know that the number of patients diagnosed with depression has doubled over the last 30 years, without any great change in diagnostic criteria. But this simply raises another question: Are doctors more aggressive in diagnosing depression, or are they simply diagnosing "everyday unhappiness" as a variant of depression and reporting it as such?

These questions are at the center of a major debate within the medical community over who the new patients being treated with antidepressants are and what treatment guidelines are being used. There is suspicion among some doctors that it is not the sickest patients who are being given psychotropic drugs but those patients who complain the loudest about being unhappy. Some physicians blame managed care for the problem of over-prescription. Because the office environment under managed care is so rushed and impersonal, many doctors take the path of least resistance by prescribing medication

whenever a patient is feeling "blue." Also, managed-care companies save money when depressed patients receive medication rather than an indefinite number of counseling sessions.

This suspicion is well founded, but the origin of the problem does not lie solely in managed care. The sources of over-prescription are much more complex. Physicians are being encouraged to think about everyday unhappiness in ways that make them more likely to treat it with psychotropic medication. It is part of a growing phenomenon in our society: the medicalization of unhappiness.

In the past, medical science cared for the mentally ill, while everyday unhappiness was left to religious, spiritual, or other cultural guides. Now, medical science is moving beyond its traditional border to help people who are bored, sad, or experiencing low self-esteem—in other words, people who are suffering from nothing more than life.

This trend first became widely known with the publication in 1992 of *Listening to Prozac,*. Peter Kramer's book, which became a national best-seller, described the positive benefits enjoyed by depressed patients when they were put on Prozac. The drug apparently increased self-esteem and reduced negative feelings when nothing else could. The book led many in the medical community and the broader public to look more favorably on a liberal use of antidepressants.

Medical science should aggressively use drugs like Prozac for patients suffering from clinical depression. This is totally appropriate—and important. But medical science errs when it supposes that a connection exists between everyday unhappiness and clinical depression, something it increasingly does. It is hard to know where everyday unhappiness ends and clinical depression begins, and there is no easy way to distinguish between borderline depression (i.e., low spirits without any physical signs or symptoms) and everyday unhappiness. Traditionally, doctors have relied on their wisdom, intuition, and personal

experience to separate the two. Such a method is neither precise nor foolproof, but it is possibly the best we can aspire to. The problem is that medical science has placed everyday unhappiness and depression on a single continuum, thereby interfering with the efforts of doctors to make fine but necessary distinctions.

Medical science has adopted a method of classifying mental disorders that blurs the line between sickness and health. And more radically, it has embraced a theory that explains all mental states in terms of their biochemical origins. Medical science has done this in order to make the problem of unhappiness simpler and more comprehensible to doctors. But the new science actually works against the efforts of doctors to separate everyday unhappiness from depression. The upshot is that physicians are more likely to treat mere unhappiness the way they would treat serious mental illness-with psychotropic drugs.

Categories of unhappiness

One way that science establishes a link between clinical depression and everyday unhappiness is through a diagnostic instrument called the DSM. First published in 1952 and now in its fifth edition, the DSM (*Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*) *is* the essential diagnostic tool in the psychiatric field. It is a classification scheme for the entire range of human mental pathology. The DSM includes 16 major diagnostic classes (e.g., mood disorders, anxiety disorders, substance-abuse disorders), and these categories are divided up again and again in accordance with certain signs and symptoms. The DSM was originally developed by psychiatrists and psychologists, but even primary-care physicians refer to its nomenclature and categories in determining whether or not a patient has a significant mental illness.

The original purpose of the DSM was to satisfy the psychiatric profession's need for statistical and epidemiological data. But by establishing a relationship between clinical depression and everyday unhappiness when no such relationship existed before, the DSM has led inexorably to a liberal use of psychotropic medication.

Prior to the development of the DSM, feelings of unhappiness were not considered related to any of the authentic disease states that existed in medical science, such as depression or schizophrenia. While clinical depression had an official status in medical science, everyday sadness did not. The DSM changed this by creating large categories of mental illness and then ever-increasing subcategories, replete with subtypes and specifiers. "Major depression," for example, was broken down into a host of subtypes, including "minor depression," which was broken down further into symptoms of everyday unhappiness like pessimism, hopelessness, and despair. With the creation of the DSM, everyday unhappiness suddenly gained a fixed position in medical science, if only as a subcategory of a subcategory of a major mental illness.

The DSM incorporates everyday unhappiness into medicine in another way. It encourages doctors to use its multiaxial system, which allows the mental state of a patient to be assessed in different ways. For example, Axis I is used for reporting any major mental disorders. Axis III is used for reporting a patient's general medical condition. Axis IV is used for assessing a person's psychosocial and environmental problems. It is within Axis IV that everyday unhappiness takes a position within medical science. For example, one can find on Axis IV job dissatisfaction, discord with one's boss, or trouble with one's spouse. Such everyday troubles are given their own special diagnostic code in a companion book called the *ICD-9* (*International Classification of Diseases*). Trouble with one's spouse, for example, is listed as Partner Relational Problem, and is assigned number V61.1. Through the use of this multiaxial system, everyday unhappiness is brought into the orbit of medical science.

By itself, this does not lead to an increased reliance on psychotropic medication. The problem arises because the categories of mental illness in the DSM are so porous as to allow everyday unhappiness to pass into the category of a more significant disease. The diagnosis of "minor depression," for example, requires only a feeling of sadness and a loss of pleasure in daily activities-a mood that may characterize the pain of everyday life as well as any medical pathology. Because "minor depression" often gets treated with medication, so too does everyday unhappiness.

"Adjustment disorder with depressed mood" is another DSM category that has the potential to be confused with everyday emotional trouble. Included in this diagnostic group would be the person who is sad and tearful because of some painful event, like the termination of a romantic relationship or a sudden business difficulty. Distinguishing an adjustment disorder from the despondency that people might feel during one of life's routine downturns can be very difficult. Because adjustment disorders are often treated with medication, everyday unhappiness is too.

Another catch-all category is "Depressive Disorder NOS (Not Otherwise Specified)." An example of a patient with "Depressive Disorder NOS" was described to me by a psychiatrist as someone who says, "Doctor, I'm feeling sad and my sleep is restless. I don't know if I'm depressed or getting depressed, but I'm feeling down. My appetite is fine and I've got plenty of energy, but I'm unhappy." Such a patient may be a candidate for antidepressants.

Doctors have long recognized this deficiency of the DSM, but it was not a serious problem in 1952 when it was created. Psychotropic medications were not as readily available as they are now, so doctors could not use drugs to treat everyday unhappiness even if they had wanted to. With the development of psychotropic medications, doctors now can. The combination of safe, effective drugs like Prozac and a relatively imprecise method of

categorizing mental pathology results in a wide use of psychotropic medication in borderline cases of depression.

Many psychiatrists argue that over-prescription is largely the fault of primary-care physicians, who provide the majority of mental-health care in this country. In the view of the psychiatrists, primary-care physicians are not sufficiently well versed in the nuances of the DSM to use it properly. In one study, over 30 percent of the family practitioners interviewed confessed to needing further training to treat emotional disorders, even though it was part of their routine practice to do so. But even though mental-health professionals are more experienced in treating depression, patients do not want to be referred to a psychiatrist or therapist for fear of the stigma attached-the fear of being thought "crazy." For this reason, they insist on being treated in the primary-care setting, where expertise in managing mental illness is not great. Again, the result is an increased use of psychotropic medication in cases of everyday emotional trouble.

The "laws" of sadness

While the potential for diagnostic error may cause some doctors to think twice about aggressively writing drug prescriptions, a new medical theory actually justifies the liberal use of psychotropic drugs. Doctors now point to a biochemical mechanism that comes close to uniting serious mental pathology and everyday emotional trouble under a single principle. It is called the "biogenic amine theory."

According to this theory, blocking the reuptake of serotonin or other neurotransmitters in the brain has a positive effect on the human psyche. Chemical compounds like serotonin, dopamine, noradrenalin, and acetylcholine are the means of communication across nerves.

Since many of the drugs used to treat depression increase the amount of these neurotransmitters available in nerve spaces (called synapses), it is reasoned that depression might be caused by a deficiency of amines at the level of the nerve junction.

The biogenic amine theory has been in existence for several decades. It was developed through a series of inferences after the first generation of antidepressants, called tricyclics, was created. Because these drugs brought about an improvement in mood, and because they had a specific effect on the amines in nerve terminals, researchers concluded that amines must regulate mood.

While Kramer's *Listening to Prozac* examined the effects of Prozac on patients who were clinically ill, new research focuses on the effects of Prozac and other SSRIs on everyday unhappiness. According to medical science, the normal Spectrum of individual differences in mood and social behavior may be tied to the same mechanism of neurotransmission that governs real mental pathology. One study postulates that different components of the human personality may have their own neurochemical substrates. These unique substrates, such as dopamine and serotonin-the same substrates involved in the biochemistry of clinical depression-may modulate the expression of everyday happiness and sadness.

Physicians have this theory in the back of their minds when they see depressed patients. They admit that depression may have many causes, but they still insist that moods are ultimately determined at the neuronal junctions of the brain where antidepressants work. In their view, all unhappiness necessarily leads back to these junctions in the same way that all roads once led to Rome.

This mindset prepares the way for a broad use of antidepressants. Because the DSM is a relatively arbitrary classification scheme, physicians think that even though their depressed patients may not fit the necessary diagnostic criteria for depression, they "almost do." And because the criteria for depression change with virtually every new edition of the DSM, being

slightly off should not prevent a patient from receiving drug treatment, especially since his unhappiness, whatever its cause or level of intensity, will find its way back to the neuronal junctions of the brain as readily as all forms of depression.

Patients think in a similar vein. They understand that the classification scheme by which physicians measure the intensity of depression is arbitrary, and that the difference between a DSM-sanctioned depression and a more mild depression is not at all like the difference between being pregnant and not being pregnant. One cannot be a "little pregnant," but one can be a little depressed. In the minds of patients, the various shades of depression merge into a single unity that expresses itself eventually at the brain's neuronal junctions.

The proven value of psychoactive drugs in treating a wide spectrum of depressed patients encourages people who are just unhappy to ask for them. It seems unfair that patients who fit the DSM criteria for depression get to enjoy the quick benefits of drug treatment while those who do not are forced to endure the long, often painful process of talk therapy—a process that seems obscure and confusing and, to some, a bit dubious. Thus symptoms of depression are increasingly treated according to their level of intensity rather than according to their specific cause, which is unknown anyhow.

Is this happiness?

The neuronal junctions of the brain where psychotropic drugs exert their effect are looked upon by medical science as a kind of corridor between matter and mood. Here at the subcellular level, the mystery of the human mood is believed to play itself out. A quantum of neurotransmitters is released at the neuronal junctions and a person's mood either rises or

flags. The feeling of happiness gains an absolute unit of measurement in medical science and becomes, for all practical purposes, a visible phenomenon.

The flaw in this theory can be understood in the following way: Matter and mood are two different phenomena, as different as light and air, and so can have no physical interface. Just as light and air cannot affect one another, since there is no place in the universe where they "meet," neither can matter and mood affect one another, since there is no place in the physical world where they meet. One is finite, the other is infinite; the two are composed of different substances and so can never be joined together in physical reality.

It is true that neuronal junctions exist in the brain and that complex changes occur within these junctions during mental activity. But this does not necessarily make them a place where matter and mood share a common boundary. To say that they do is like watching a person get into a car, then seconds later watching the car move, and from this observation making the deduction that the car moves because someone gets into it. It is a false science to infer from the study of matter a knowledge any deeper than that of knowing the forms of matter and their relationships. It is a false science to say that on the basis of material knowledge, one can pretend to "know" and understand the emotional experience of life.

Kramer suggests that feelings like homesickness or loneliness are mediated through neurotransmitters like serotonin, or possibly encoded in neurons, and the fact that Prozac eases these conditions seems to confirm this view. But the notion that matter and mood can have a direct connection with one another—that somewhere at the neuronal junction, loneliness and serotonin "meet"—is tantamount to saying that the human mood is material, and that it can be touched by matter. Buried within the biogenic amine theory is an illogical belief—that neurotransmitters are shedding their physical existence, becoming even smaller than atoms, and ultimately merging with pure thought or idea.

The error in the biogenic amine theory can be understood in a slightly different way. Augustine once said that the human heart has more moods and emotions than hairs on the head or stars in the sky. What he meant by this is that happiness has an infinite number of shades, reflecting the infinite that is the human soul, which mirrors the infinite that is God. Even if every particle of serotonin crossing the synaptic cleft of a nerve terminal could be measured, along with every particle of noradrenalin and dopamine, the number of particles would still be finite, while the moods of a human being would still be infinite. By definition, there are simply not enough particles to express every conceivable human mood.

Creating virtual realities

But what about drugs like alcohol or narcotics? They alter our moods when ingested, producing feelings like euphoria and indifference. Is this not a case of matter affecting mood by way of a common border inside the brain?

No, it is not, and this is key to understanding how drugs like antidepressants really work. Alcohol and narcotics do not produce such feelings by being received directly into the "substance" of human emotions. On the contrary, they simply alter human consciousness in a way that allows the mind to shift its mood. These drugs work by dampening certain aspects of brain function—*they create an altered mental state*—such that true reality becomes concealed from a person's consciousness. The dampened brain functions allow a person to imagine an alternate "reality" that is generally more pleasing.

For example, when a man contrasts his humble circumstances with some ideal of success, tension arises in his psyche. His conscience berates him, and he feels the well-known misery of failure. He might try some diversion, like golf or stamp-collecting, in order to hide

from himself what he does not want to face, but sometimes the diversion does not sufficiently block the sight of things that he dislikes. So he starts to drink, and the alcohol alters his consciousness in such a way that he is diverted. After ingesting alcohol, the eye of his mind no longer sees the images that were causing him so much pain. At this point, the man starts to feel better, even "happier."

Drinking is a reliable method of dealing with unhappiness not because it exerts a direct effect on a person's mood but because it helps conceal from view what he does not want to see. It is by dampening or altering brain functions and by affecting consciousness that alcohol transforms how we feel.

It is the same with antidepressants. They are merely another form of stupefaction. True, people who take them because they are unhappy are not like alcoholics or drug addicts—they function at work, they are well mannered, and they do not vomit in the streets. But although their method is "cleaner," they are attempting the same thing as the person who uses alcohol to raise his spirits. Unlike the drunk, their minds remain awake, clear, and lucid, but the drugs have still tampered with their brain functions, hiding from them what they do not want to see.

This point was revealed to me in the case of one friend who was taking Prozac for general unhappiness, though not under my supervision. He said, "I feel a lot better. I don't have to look into the abyss anymore. I see my problems, but they don't seem as daunting as they once did." With the help of a psychoactive drug, he was able to retire further and further from his mind's sight those images that were painful to him. He still saw their visible outlines, but his new mood was based on an altered perception of their image. He was no longer menaced by them because they had grown distant to him.

The same phenomenon can account for what Kramer calls "cosmetic psychopharmacology." Kramer reports with amazement how one of his female patients, after

taking Prozac, changed from a social misfit into an accomplished coquette, capable of maneuvering smoothly from one man to the next, even of securing three dates in a single weekend. But is this any different from what alcohol might do for someone with similar hesitations? Is this really a "new self" courtesy of Prozac? Of course not. A woman wants to flirt with men, but her self-doubt tells her not to do so. The result is tension and unhappiness. So she takes alcohol in order to silence the critic within and feel "liberated." This is nothing new.

Prozac nation

Yet despite the rather obvious nature of antidepressants, medical science studiously avoids putting antidepressants in the same category as alcohol and narcotics. It struggles to preserve the deceit of a special mood-matter link at the level of the neuronal junctions. Why is this so? Why does it bother to support the irrational notion that mood and matter share a common interface? To the degree that it is a conspiracy, it is one enjoined by our entire culture: People desperately want to believe in such a link; they want to believe that the cause of happiness is located in the physical world, and that happiness somehow comes about scientifically in the form of a pill. The promise of such a view is security and comfort.

First, to admit one's dependence on psychoactive drugs is to shield oneself from life's imponderables and unpredictability. If happiness is serotonin, and serotonin is happiness, then these drugs guarantee happiness, for one can take psychoactive drugs for years. It is with this attitude that people with mild depression might substitute the chance of real happiness with some semblance of happiness achieved through medication.

Second, to declare happiness a law of necessity allows science to emphasize the subcellular processes inside the brain at the expense of everything else. Science can say: "It is man's basic nature to want happiness, but if the natural desire for happiness is linked to the physical nature of his brain, it cannot be linked to culture, which varies from society to society. The search for happiness begins and ends in nature, and so there is no reason to go beyond science." By believing this to be true, people can put aside other approaches to coping with daily troubles—which is convenient, since these remedies, whether they involve talking to a friend or asking for divine guidance, are never a sure thing.

Third, the notion that happiness is a law of science appeals to human pride. If unhappiness is chemical or biological, along with its treatment, a person need not ask, "Why am I unhappy?" In the past, this question provoked serious introspection and self-examination, as the effort to cope with unhappiness merged with larger questions about life and existence. Religion and philosophy demanded that people see themselves as part of a larger whole and taught that happiness depended on more than self-satisfaction. But if happiness is a law of science, then one does not have to go through this humbling experience. Through drugs, one can find happiness as a single, isolated individual.

Fourth, and perhaps most crucial, depressed persons equate the pleasant mood evoked by psychoactive drugs with happiness, even though, in the depths of their hearts, they are not sure exactly what they feel. Still, people do not want to live a lie, and so they will accept their drug-induced "happiness" as the real thing only if they believe that science has truly uncovered the biology of happiness. And this is what the biogenic amine theory of matter and mood represents. It reassures people who take medication that their good feeling is indeed happiness.

For people suffering from clinical depression, the mental state produced by these drugs must be considered an improvement, and often, a necessary one. But for those people

who suffer from unhappiness, perhaps because of stress or because they are in bad relationships, these drugs are nothing more than a shortcut to a particular mental state that they believe to be happiness but is not.

Your mind on drugs

What exactly do people feel when they take antidepressants? It is difficult to say because each person expresses the feelings aroused by medications like Prozac differently. There is simply no universal feeling. Nevertheless, a broad understanding of the phenomenon is possible, and what emerges among medicated patients is a definite change in consciousness.

In most of the testimonies published, patients note that the good feeling arising from the influence of mood-modifying drugs does not come about immediately. It often takes several weeks, and this delayed effect is considered to be so predictable that doctors warn their patients about it. The slow onset of the drug causes the change in people's attitude to be barely perceptible. There is generally no minute or hour that marks the onset of their improved mood.

And so it is not surprising that after people start taking medication, life continues by virtue of its own momentum. If, before taking the drug, people biked for recreation or shopped because it was their favorite pastime, they generally do so afterward. Except in rare cases of "cosmetic psychopharmacology," described by Kramer, the tastes and interests of a person do not change; the person on medication remains the same person.

For this reason, however, it cannot be a change in life that causes the uplift in spirit, since for the people taking these drugs, life does not change. Generally, most people calculate their happiness by external circumstances. But psychotropic drugs enable people to feel better

even though their external circumstances are unchanged. The cause and effect relationship that has dominated their lives is not working properly, and while they feel better, they are confused.

Patients on psychotropic drugs still react to specific external events in an appropriate manner. Their mood goes up or down according to what happens in their environment. But while these patients may smile at a party or laugh at another's jokes, I have often observed a general lack of congruence between outside circumstances and a medicated patient's good feeling, and this observation is commensurate with the amazement expressed by these people at feeling well despite the lack of change in their outside circumstances. The outside world becomes, in a way, detached from their inner life. Its influence decreases.

Casual conversation with hundreds of patients taking psychotropic medication serves as the basis for this opinion. One patient of mine who was asked on a pre-operative evaluation how medication helped him replied, "I see the same things as before, but I don't care so much. I still feel good no matter what happens." Another patient in the same situation said, "I don't know why. I just feel really good about myself." For such people, the relationship between their outer life and their inner life becomes like two wheels that once rotated in tandem, and continue to do so, but are now ever so slightly off, with barely different speeds, such that while they appear to be connected by an axle, it is impossible for them to be so.

People medicated for depression often talk about enjoying activities that they did not enjoy prior to starting medication. But again, there is something suspicious in their pleasure. For example, two friends of mine told me that they "felt better" on medication, which enabled them to play tennis and feel good again while doing so. Yet it was not so much that they extracted pleasure from playing tennis but, rather, brought the pleasure they enjoyed through medication into this activity. It was a pleasure that they experienced for no discernible reason,

and it mildly confused them since, deep down, they were the type of people who felt good only when external circumstances were going their way. Yet nothing in their lives had changed but a pill.

It has been observed that people who are not depressed and who take psychoactive drugs sometimes feel uncomfortable. The above observation might explain this phenomenon. The mood of such people is altered by drugs, but in a way that they cannot understand. They become like the traveler in a boat who feels confused by the imperceptible changes beneath his feet, and worse, has no beacon on the horizon on which to fix his gaze. He cannot establish a connection between what he is feeling and what he is seeing, so he starts to feel queasy. Nothing in the outer world seems to move, and so he cannot ascribe his inner feeling to an outside event. And if he does find a beacon sitting on the horizon, he cannot readily admit to himself, "Yes, I feel this way because of what I see," since what he sees never produced a feeling like this before. The whole thing makes no sense, and so he starts to feel seasick.

Know thy self

Psychoactive medication, much like alcohol And narcotics, causes a disconnect between the inner and outer life. This is the problem with using it to treat everyday unhappiness. The disconnect caused by medication is very different from the state of thoughtful detachment encouraged by many cultures for the purpose of insulating people from everyday disappointment. The latter contributes to wisdom, stability, and maturity; the former creates a state of mind that is stuporous and purposely unknowing.

Medical science should confine itself to the treatment of clinical depression, rather than extend itself into the realm of everyday unhappiness. Medical science "helps" unhappy

people by clouding their thoughts, by making them less aware of the world, and by sapping their urge to see themselves in a true light. People medicated for everyday unhappiness gain inner peace, but they do so through a real decrement in consciousness.

Reading 48

‘Civilizing Technologies’ and the Control of Deviance

Scott Vrecko

Biological and Cultural Matters in Behavioural Addictions

The distinction between drug and non-drug addictions has become increasingly blurry over the last few decades. By the end of the 1980s it had become largely agreed upon by brain scientists that the addictiveness of ‘substances of abuse’ could be understood to arise not out of the particular properties of drug themselves, but out of their similar effects on parts of the brain involved in the control of emotions and motivation (cf. Kushner, 2010; Keane and Hamill, 2010). Drug use had come to be understood as being rewarding because of substances’ abilities to activate, either directly or indirectly, the brain’s ‘pleasure systems’ that are involved in rewarding ordinary behaviours that make us feel good, such as having sex or eating. As scientists came to posit that these and possibly other brain mechanisms ‘may be common to the establishment and maintenance of all addictions, be they chemical or behavioural’ (Marks, 1990, p. 1391), the ‘reality’ of behavioural addictions began to be taken much more seriously than they had formerly been, by researchers and also by other cultural authorities.

Some of the new ideas about behavioural compulsions that emerged in the 1980s are nicely framed in a 1993 report in *The Economist*, entitled ‘High and hooked’ – one of the many media pieces that have, over the last couple of decades, considered the science and nature of behavioural addictions. Accompanied by a photo montage of vials, a syringe and other drug paraphernalia – as well as a roulette wheel, running shoes and a Nintendo Gameboy – the article informs readers that: ‘Foreign bodies in the synapses are not an

absolute prerequisite for an addiction [...]. Other behaviours that carry an intensity with them – and thus presumably overstimulate some parts of the brain's wiring – can produce similar effects' to those of drugs like cocaine and heroin (1993, p. 124). The article insists that while many people still currently see as problematic the application of the addiction concept to domains unrelated to drug use, there is no reason to believe that compulsive forms of sex, gambling and so on are necessarily in a different class from 'compulsive chemical-taking'. Indeed, on the basis of emerging evidence that activation of the dopamine system is the common denominator of all compulsions – supporting the so-called 'dopamine hypothesis' of addiction – the article suggests that we might think of crack heads, heroin junkies, pathological gamblers and others likewise addicted to the pleasure-inducing chemicals in their brains in similar terms: as 'dopamine heads'.

Right around the time when the dopamine head was being conceived, the renowned cultural theorist, Eve Sedgwick, was also taking stock of changing ideas about behavioural problems, and provided an account of behavioural addictions that was very different from the science reported in *The Economist.* Extrapolating from Berridge and Edwards' (1981) historical research on the emergence of the 'addict' as a taxonomic category (involving a shift in attention from bad behaviours, to pathological identities) and on the expansion, over the course of the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, of substances classified as 'addictive', Sedgwick's analysis focused on the then-current developments that brought 'not only every form of substance ingestion, but more simply every form of human behavior' – from eating and refusing to eat, working and shopping, to exercising, having sex and being in a relationship – 'into the orbit of potential addiction attribution' (1993, p. 131).

Sedgwick's essay sheds light on how tropes of addiction are increasingly used in modern societies to demand more self-control from individuals who experience fewer societal constraints on their lives and behaviours; on how individuals identified as addicts are

expected to work on themselves in an ever-expanding array of 12-step programmes and self-help groups; and on how even those of us who currently consume and behave in non-compulsive, unproblematic ways may find ourselves subjects of preemptive regimes of monitoring and control, as when we more or less constantly reflect on the nature of our behaviours and our risks of becoming one or another type of addict. (*Did I drink too much last night? Am I spending too much time on the internet? Could I stop if I wanted to? Do I have a problem? Would I know if I had a problem?*) There is little doubt that Sedgwick's analysis of how we increasingly live by the metaphor of addiction in everyday life remains relevant to cultural politics. Recently writing in the UK's *Guardian* newspaper, for example, Anthony Giddens – a leading public intellectual, advisor to the UK's Labour Party, and member of the House of Lords – expounded exactly the sort of position with which Sedgwick may have taken issue. Using a definition of addiction that includes non-substance compulsions, Giddens called for the UK government to commit to developing strong interventions for dealing with any and all compulsive behaviours: 'Whenever individuals' behaviour is controlled by habits that they should control, we are at the fulcrum of the relationship between domination and freedom', he writes. 'Government has been reluctant to intrude, but now it must' (2007, p. 32).

While Sedgwick's analysis remains a powerful reminder of the ways in which addiction is bound up with politics, governance and ideals of individual freedom, there is a danger that her insights could be dismissed as irrelevant to conceptions of addiction used within the biosciences today. Avoiding engagement with the possibility of there being a biological component to addiction, she restricts her analysis to 'addiction attribution' rather than addiction *per se;* that is, to 'the rapidity with which it has now become a commonplace that, precisely, any substance, any behavior, even any affect may be pathologized as addictive' (p. 132). This focus results in insight into some of the consequences of the discursive framing of

addiction, and the labelling of addicts (cf. Reith, 2004); but it also raises the question of whether addiction is just about discourse, identities, labels and so forth. While it seems that Sedgwick's refusal to consider the biological is based on her recognition of the circularity of addiction concepts (they only refer to what those who utter them intend), and the lack of a transcendent basis for defining addiction, I believe that contemporary forms of biological technoscience have social significance even if they cannot prove the existence of a universal form of addiction. For regardless of whether or not neurobiological findings, such as those early ones reported in *The Economist*, provide enough evidence to definitively confirm the physiological reality of behavioural addictions, they nevertheless do have real effects – for example, insofar as they change the way in which behavioural problems are conceptualized in popular culture and the media, and play a role in increasing interest in biological approaches to managing behavioural compulsions.

Pharmaceuticals and the Neurotyping of Behavioural Addictions

A wide range of psychiatric medications such as mood stabilizers, tranquilizers and antidepressants have been used in managing behavioural compulsions, with at least some success (Potenza, 2001; Grant *et al*, 2003). But these prescription drugs have also been used therapeutically in relation to an array of other psychiatric disorders unrelated to addiction, including schizophrenia, panic disorder, dementia, narcolepsy and attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder; and it is consequently difficult to describe these multi-purpose interventions as though they specifically target distinctively addiction-related biological processes. For example, the efficacy of the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) antidepressants in managing pathological gambling could implicate the serotonin system in some gambling problems; but this would be (and is) taken to indicate that some gambling

problems arise in relation to a depressive disorder – not an addictive one. Thus, while the introduction of the SSRIs into addiction medicine may be taken as a therapeutic advance (insofar as it provided a new means for helping some patients), it cannot, in and of itself, be taken as a development of particular theoretical or conceptual importance for the field of addiction biopsychiatry.

However, in the late 1990s an opiate antagonist, 'anti-craving' medication already used in the treatment of heroin addiction and alcoholism – naltrexone, which acts directly on the endorphin system, and indirectly on the dopamine system – began to be introduced into the management of behavioural compulsions; and this move *has* been described as a development of almost paradigm-shifting proportions in the field of addiction studies. The first published suggestions of naltrexone's efficacy in managing behavioural compulsions appeared in 1998, when clinicians reported their success in treating a compulsively gambling patient with it in a letter to the *Canadian journal of Psychiatry* (Crockford and el-Guebaly, 1998). In the same year, a researcher at the University of Minnesota published a peer-reviewed article in the *Journal of Clinical Psychiatry* in which he reported promising results from an open study of naltrexone in the treatment of pathological gambling (Kim, 1998). These and subsequent studies of naltrexone (Grant *et al*, 2006; Grant *et al*, 2008) are understood to 'bolster the argument that pathological gambling is, at least in part, an addiction illness' (Arehart-Treichel, 2006, p. 28) because naltrexone is understood to act on exactly the parts of the brain that have come, since the 1980s, to take centre stage in addiction neuroscience: the reward system. Evidence of naltrexone's efficacy is interpreted as indicating that *claims* of neuroscience experts that behavioural compulsions are addiction-like brain problems can be backed up with objective evidence: If pathological gambling is not an addiction, then why would an addiction treatment work on it?

After first being used in relation to problem gambling, naltrexone and other anti-craving

medications (such as nalmefene and rimonabant) have subsequently been found to be effective in the management of an array of other problems, such as those involving compulsive sexual activity (Raymond *et al*, 2002; Ryback, 2004; Bostwick and Bucci, 2008), disordered eating (Marrazzi *et al*, 1995; Yeomans and Gray, 2002) and urge-driven forms of shopping, buying and stealing (Grant and Kim, 2002; Bullock and Koran, 2003; Grant, 2003, 2005). The effects of these medications have been mobilized not only by scientists, but also in the media, to bolster claims about the addictive nature of behavioural problems. Characteristic of these reports are suggestions that naltrexone 'blocks the interaction between cells and chemicals in the brain that create feelings of pleasure' (Cox, 2001, p. 1A), and that when individuals who take such a pharmacotherapy, known to dampen the activity of the brain's dopamine system, they may 'also find that the number of cigarettes they smoke decreases. Also chocolate, gambling, pot – anything with craving decreases' (Symons, 1999, p. 2).

Whereas in the early 1990s it had become possible to *think* in terms of a neurobiological kind of addict, brain-targetting anti-craving medications make it possible to *act* upon oneself as such a subject. For example, a piece in the *Montreal Gazette* frames the effects of naltrexone as definitive evidence of the real, addictive nature of compulsive buying:

> Do you shop till you drop? Are you in financial straits because you are addicted – *yes, addicted* – to that rush of endorphins that comes from buying things willy-nilly, even if they only nearly fit?
>
> [...] now, help is nigh. For a drug that is used to treat alcoholics and heroin and cocaine addicts has been proven to help compulsive shoppers, too. (Fitterman, 2003, p. D2)

That the objective, material effects of biology-targeting medications often speak louder than

the words of scientists who claimed that behaviours could be considered addictions is perhaps most evident in reports featuring the stories of individuals whose doubts about expert explanations disappear as they personally experience the effects of naltrexone. For example, a newspaper story on an early gambling study reports an experimental subject who was so doubtful of naltrexone working that he almost withdrew from the trial; but after deciding to remain in the study, and despite his doubts, within a week of beginning the medication he reports having noticed that 'the urges [for gambling] went away. They just stopped' (quoted in Marcotty and Lerner, 2001).

I am convinced – by anecdotal reports (Deluca, 2001), clinical trial research (Modesto-Lowe and Van Kirk, 2002), and qualitative interviews that I have done with users of anti-craving medications (Vrecko, forthcoming) – that these pharmaceuticals do something to the bodies and minds of individuals taking them; at least in the most successful instances these medications stop cravings, almost as if by magic. It is tempting to reflect upon such evidence and conclude that because these medications target the brain's reward system, and can be used to manage compulsive behaviours, behavioural addictions must indeed involve a disease of the brain's reward system (this style of pharmaceutical reasoning assumes that our treatments prove what we have long suspected, namely that behavioural addictions are biologically analogous to drug addictions). However, when we pay close attention to the work and practices of those clinicians and researchers that study naltrexone and behavioural problems, it becomes clear that anti-craving medications do not simply materialize our pre-existing conception of behavioural addictions. Instead, they help create a new one, insofar as they play an active part in reconfiguring, or 'mangling' (Pickering, 1995), clinical and laboratory understandings of behavioural problems.

Most clinical systems established to manage repetitive, problematic behaviour have relied on behavioural phenotypes as a fundamental means of sorting out individuals. Problem

gamblers, overeaters, kleptomaniacs and so forth, have by and large been understood as 'behavioural kinds': that is, it has been assumed that it was the particular type of behaviour that an individual engaged in that provided a basis for knowing her, and for grouping her together with others who could be dealt with in similar ways. Any differences among individual pathological gamblers, for example, would be considered less important than the similarities in their behaviours; and the same would go for binge eaters, kleptomaniacs and so on; people caught up in different behavioural problems were separated and distinguished from one another. Anti-craving medications, however, made it possible for researchers to question the apparent unity of existing behavioural classifications. On the basis of the finding that some subjects respond well to naltrexone but others do not, researchers have begun to distinguish among different subspecies that exist within behavioural kinds – each of which can be understood and managed in different ways. In relation to the early studies of naltrexone that mainly focused on pathological gambling, researchers came to see their objectives, and their patients, in new ways. They discovered that the 'real question is not so much whether the medication will help gamblers, but in the end, which kinds of gamblers it will be good for' (Toneatto, quoted in Van Den Broek, 2003). Among the clinical populations that met the behaviourally oriented diagnostic threshold for pathological gambling, clinicians came to see themselves as 'really dealing with only the subset of gamblers who had intense cravings, uncontrollable impulses' (Kim, 2002), and not the 'other sub-types, such as perhaps gamblers with undiagnosed attention-deficit disorder, who would call for a different type of intervention.' (Grant, quoted in Van Den Broek, 2003).

Researchers encountering the subdivisions of clinical populations that are made apparent by the effects of the medications they use (in relation to the management of gambling as well as other behavioural problems) suggest the need for new schemes of classification: among pathological gamblers and other behavioural compulsives, potential naltrexone responders

need to be distinguished from other classes of subjects, not on the basis of behaviour, but on mind/brain states – what some researchers refer to as 'endophenotypes'. In an important sense, the pathological gambler, the compulsive shopper and the overeater cease to be 'behavioural kinds' of individuals, and become subsets of new neurobiological kinds. Problematic conduct is understood only as a symptom of an underlying neuropathology, and pioneers of naltrexone therapies for behavioural addiction are explicit in their moving beyond the targeting of particular behaviours, towards the targeting of biological matters. As one researcher explained the rationale behind this shift: 'We don't have a gambling center (in the brain) or a kleptomania center, but we do have an urge center' (quoted in Chin, 2001).

Treating addiction, or civilizing the craving brain?

Just as the 'dopamine head' suggested the formation of a neurobiological human kind within popular culture, assertions made by researchers studying anti-craving medication suggest that a new kind of addict has appeared within the field of addiction studies – one that can be known in terms of a particular neurotypology, and that can be managed with a medication that acts on parts of the brain associated with craving. As already indicated, however, it would be misleading to suggest that anti-craving medications represent a new treatment for a pre-existing disorder; indeed, it would be misleading to even suggest that anti-craving medications represent a 'treatment' for *a recently reshaped* biological disease (which is one possible interpretation of the developments discussed in the preceding section). For medications like naltrexone do not treat a brain disease: they do not cure brain lesions in an ontologically distinct population of diseased individuals, and they would, of course, be deemed ineffective if they brought about neurobiological changes, but did not alter subjective and social outcomes. What such medications *do* do, is reduce the intensity and frequency of

impulses that individuals experience to engage in a problematic behaviour. This, in turn, reduces the risk that such behaviour will produce the negative personal and social consequences that characterize (for example, in diagnostic criteria) behavioural compulsions.

While I do not believe that there are any *a priori* reasons to avoid the use of biological interventions in order to deal with social or personal problems, particularly when such interventions are valued by those taking them, I do think that we should avoid the inaccurate suggestion that all that anti-craving medications do is 'treat' a biological abnormality in order to restore a normal state (since this runs exactly the risk alluded to at the outset of this article: of reifying a useful diagnostic concept into something that can be taken as a simple biological disorder). One possibility for critically conceptualizing the logic and use of anti-craving medications such as naltrexone – in a way that is consonant with neuroscientific understandings – is to think of such interventions as part of the family of *civilizing technologies.* In a general sense, anti-craving medications are used as a means of producing states in which individuals are healthier, more responsible and more able to adhere to the duties, expectations and obligations of their families and societies. That is, a state in which individuals are better citizens. It is worth reminding ourselves, here, that the words 'citizen' and 'civilization' have a common root; in ancient times, a citizen was originally a person who had the right to inhabit a city-state and who, by exercising rights and fulfilling duties like other citizens, helped build a civilization. And indeed, the term 'a*ddict*' derives from a process in Roman law in which a court would decree, or *dict*ate, that an individual is to be given over to (*ad-*), or enslaved by, another (free) individual. The addicted was a slave, unable to take part in the civilization of free men.

The notion of a 'civilizing technology' is intended to invoke an additional register of meaning beyond etymology, to suggest that anti-craving medications may in some ways be usefully considered in relation to what the historical sociologist, Norbert Elias, referred to as

the ‘civilizing process’ (1994). Elias conceptualizes civilization as ‘a specific transformation of human behavior’ (p. 42), and his work examines how, in a multitude of ways, different behaviours – for example, those relating to the eating of meat, blowing one’s nose, yawning, spitting, bathing, sleeping and sexual activity, sport and violence – have been socially reshaped over time. Behaviours are ‘civilized’ to the extent that a standardized code of conduct emerges within a society, and ‘[t]he individual is compelled to regulate his conduct in an increasingly differentiated, more even and more stable manner’ (p. 445). While his focus is on medieval societies and processes, technology enters the picture as Elias astutely points out that the civilizing process often involves technological developments; for example, when ‘people learn to exploit lifeless materials to an increasingly greater extent for the use of mankind’ (p. 7).[5]

There is a still deeper connection to be made between Elias’s work on civilization and current addiction technoscience. Although Elias is usually read as being concerned with forms of conduct such as those described above (and indeed his work does consider the minutiae of a great number of forms of behavioural regulation), he in fact describes his most fundamental interest as the control of urges, motivations and desires – the elements of human life that *preceed* action, and which he (writing in the golden age of psychoanalysis) relates to the ‘instincts’ and ‘drives’. He is concerned with a ‘kind of circuit in the human being, a partial system within the total system of the organism’, the control of which ‘is of decisive importance for the functioning of society as of the individuals within it’ (p. 157), and is a central aspect of the civilizing process.

The essential motivational circuit that interests Elias very much resembles the ‘reward circuitry’ that is described by addiction neuroscientists, and that is modulated by medications like naltrexone. Recall the neuroscientist’s formulation of addictive behaviours quoted above: ‘We don’t have a gambling center (in the brain) or a kleptomania center, but we do have an

urge center'. Scientists describe this center in a variety of ways (for example, as the 'reward circuitry', 'pleasure centre', the limbic region, the 'motivation system'), all of which relate to the understanding that this part of the brain rewards (with pleasurable feelings) behaviours that are essential for species survival, such as eating and sexual activity. The reward/pleasure system is framed as having decisive importance for the functioning of society and its constituent individuals, given that it is understood to motivate all human behaviours. But it can also give rise to a series of social and personal problems – from drug abuse, alcoholism and gambling, to obesity, violence, overspending and debt and sexually transmitted infections – if not adequately kept in check (cf. Burnham and Phelan, 2000). This system is understood to be one of the first parts of the brain to have evolved, and to be more or less the same among humans, non-human primates and other animal species; scientists assert that what separates humans from other animals is that in our evolution we have developed a more advanced and rational brain region (the prefrontal cortex) that can subdue the 'lower level emotional responses' of the older limbic system.

Neuroscientific explanations of addictive behaviour explicitly formulate compulsions as arising out of primitive (which is in a sense to say 'uncivilized') urges that result when the lower brain, rather than the distinctively civilized higher brain, exerts control over conduct. As a leading textbook on substance abuse and addictive behaviour puts it: 'The neurologic substrate for addiction is located in the limbic system. Within the limbic system is housed the biologically primitive circuitry for the drive states such as hunger, and thirst' (Lowinson, 2005, p. 203). That a variety of addiction treatments may be linked both indirectly and directly to a civilizing logic is clear when even psychosocial experts frame the efficacy of their interventions in terms of neurobiological models. Sex addiction psychotherapists, for example, assert that '[successful treatment mandates the restoration of cortical control over such pre-conscious primitive motivation' as are experienced by patients (Carnes *et al*, 2005,

p. 100). And while a range of psychological therapies can indirectly influence the ‘primitive’ system, naltrexone offers a more direct civilizing influence. As one researcher explains, in a newspaper article on naltrexone’s use in addiction treatment: ‘there’s this real battle between that lower part of the brain and the upper part. The lower part is saying, “Yes. Do it! I want it now!” and the upper part is saying, “No. Better not”‘ [...] That’s where medication comes in [...]. Medication can lower the shouting of the lower part of the brain (quoted in Powell, 1995, p. 1C). Naltrexone, as a civilizing technology, reduces the urgency of purportedly primitive impulses, and allows for increased control over physiological processes associated with undesirable conduct.

If it makes conceptual sense to think about addiction treatments as ‘civilizing technologies’, it is by no means clear that such technologies should be unequivocally endorsed. Indeed, my intention here is to provide a critical assessment, rather than an endorsement, of such interventions. While Elias and addiction scientists may believe unquestioningly in the necessity of civilizing ‘primitive’ impulses and desires, I do not. Certainly, I think that Elias’s *empirical* insights into behavioural regulation, and particularly into how such forms of regulation are co-produced with new forms of technology, are useful to think with; especially given the extent to which the theme of civilization resonates with the discourses of addiction science. But I think it best to leave aside the value judgments that Elias makes about the materials and processes he studies. Civilizing processes may be necessary for producing certain kinds of societies, but whether those kinds of societies are preferable to other ones is not a question that empirical study can answer. Indeed, as contemporary work in the fields of postcolonial studies and cultural theory has convincingly demonstrated, the assumption that some people and cultures can possess ‘more civilization’ than others is a political, historical and cultural product, and we need to be extremely careful about the kind of policies and interventions that we may wish to make in pursuit of ‘civilized’

life (cf. Said, 1995; Bederman and Stimpson, 1996; Van Krieken, 1999). Thus, my suggestion that addiction interventions may be situated within a civilizing logic is intended to induce a pause for critical thought; a pause to think about why we (our governing officials, our scientists, ourselves) so often encounter and support programmes to regulate the behaviours and emotions of some individuals in the name of 'treatment', and about what it exactly is that these programmes seek to do.

Conclusion

This article has sought to build upon the important contributions that critical cultural studies have made to the interdisciplinary field of addiction studies, by questioning contemporary neuroscientific accounts and practices that, without interrogation, might lead to addiction being taken as a bona fide biological disease that exists independently of culture and politics. While critical social analyses of behavioural addictions have tended to be dismissive of, or unwilling to consider in a serious way, scientific accounts and biological aspects of human behaviour, the approach taken here has been to avoid dismissing biology out of hand, and instead to think about how developments in the biosciences – even if they cannot yield an essentially biological representation of addiction – are nevertheless involved in processes of social change and social regulation.

Over the last two decades, analyses of addiction within the humanities and social sciences have convincingly demonstrated that, on a cultural level, addiction has long been (and remains) a hybrid entity. Psychological, spiritual and moral accounts of addiction remain potent today, and addiction continues to be conceptualized and managed in many spheres as a sort of 'disease of the will' – a condition that is attributed to a lack of willpower, a deficiency of character or a psychological maladaptation that impairs the capacities of self-control

possessed by normal persons. Within such understandings, the addicted subject is not thought to be afflicted by particularly urgent cravings that are more powerful than cravings experienced by 'normal' individuals; instead, the problem is that the subject suffers from deficiencies in self-control, which make her unable to 'say no' (to the impulses that normal people are able to resist). Although these ideas hearken back to the moral therapies of the nineteenth century, scholars such as Eve Sedgwick have powerfully demonstrated that tropes of, and anxieties about, the loss of self-control remain powerful 'ideological codes' in contemporary society (on ideological codes see Smith, 1998; see also Campbell, 2010). Indeed, Sedgwick convincingly argues that issues of willpower and self-control have become increasingly salient within the anomic conditions of consumerist, international capitalism, as a means of keeping commodity fetishism and unlimited trajectories of demand in check, and of inducing individuals to maintain their consumption (of alcohol and other drugs, and of all types of commodities) within a realm of controlled autonomy.

However, the continuing importance of these cultural ideas about addiction does not mean that addiction, as a hybrid entity, remains unchanged. Indeed, I have suggested that an exclusive focus on cultural and societal matters may obfuscate significant shifts that occur within the specific domains of addiction biopsychiatry and neuroscience: as indicated above, the interventions of contemporary medicine have been formulated and justified on the basis of modulating the biochemical mechanisms that produce the intense, pathological cravings that many individuals experience as overwhelming. Thus, I have argued that the contemporary brain sciences have not taken as their project the governing of wills, but rather, the civilizing of problematic cravings and desires. This may represent a shift away from the explicit ambitions of disciplining the addicted subject into a responsible and autonomous individual, but crucially, it does not represent an end to the cultural politics of pleasure and desire, as much as a new biosocial mutation in these politics – a mutation with which this

article represents at least a preliminary engagement.

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Notes

1 I focus on one particular analysis, rather than an overview of cultural and constructionist work on addiction, in order to avoid presenting a strawperson argument; I focus on Sedgwick (1) because she is one of the world's most renowned cultural theorists, (2) because her cultural analysis of behavioural addictions appears to be almost universally acclaimed within the social sciences and humanities, and to have inspired a number of other social analyses, and (3) because her account was written exactly when biological accounts of behavioural addictions were emerging, and yet it insists on an exclusively socio-cultural analysis.

2 This shift has been brought about in relation to developments alluded to above, when

researchers began to identify the brain's reward system as the common denominator for different drug addictions (suggesting the underlying cause of addiction was not to be found in the chemical properties of drugs themselves, but in the anatomical properties of the brain), and when, in the early 1990s the reward hypothesis of addiction began to guide the field of scientific addiction research.

4 Elias examines these processes through an investigation of changing 'manners' in medieval and post-medieval European societies – considering, for example, the emergence of norms against publicly burping or passing gas, and the introduction of cutlery into eating practices.

5 As a treatment, naltrexone may appear somewhat different from Elias's objects – things like handkerchiefs, private bathtubs, nightclothes and cutlery – which have become part and parcel of everyday life. But, of course, Elias's point is that such objects were not always everyday matters: they began to be used by only a few individuals, their use was often surrounded by controversy, and they only gradually entered everyday culture.

48. Connections:

Biomedicalization of Drug Addiction and the Reproduction of Inequality

Tammy L. Anderson and Philip R. Kavanaugh

Introduction

In this essay we discuss the relationship between biomedicalization, inequality and drug addiction, specifically to opiates, to inform possible developments in the future of deviance in our society. If the medicalization of deviance means that non-normal traits, behaviors and conditions are defined using medical language and viewed from a medical perspective (see Section 4 above), then we can understand biomedicalization as a next step, or biologically-based efforts and innovations to "fix" those traits, behaviors and conditions (Clarke et al. 2003).

By discussing biomedicalization across a range of behaviors and conditions, the readings in Section 13 forecast some interesting possibilities for the study of deviance and raise important questions about the persistence of discrimination and inequality that have characterized it throughout time. For example, if opiate addiction (e.g., Oxycontin, Vicoden, Percoset and heroin) is defined medically, i.e., as a brain disease (National Institute on Drug Abuse [NIDA] 2007), then isn't it best treated through medications that cater to the individual addict, rather than punishment by the criminal justice system? Will such treatments be available to all addicts or will there be differences among them?

Specifically, we review two Medication Assisted Treatments (MATs) – methadone and buprenorphine (trade name Suboxone) – for opiate addiction to inform the relationship between biomedicalization, deviance and inequality. It is motivated not only by the trends and observations Dworkin (2001) and Vrecko (2010) address, but also by past attempts to medicalize

addiction (Anderson, Lane and Swan, 2010; Campbell 2010) and the resulting inequality and discrimination experienced by addicts. Our essay asks the reader to think critically about the impact of biomedicalization on deviance and inequality, and in light of the broader observation by esteemed drug historian David Courtwright (2001:4) who notes: *"what we think about addiction very much depends on who is addicted."*

Consider two opiate addicts --- Primo and Adam—who are trying to get their lives back together after years of debilitating consequences from drugs. Their stories highlight our key themes of biomedicalization, deviance and inequality. Primo is a 20-something Hispanic male who transitioned from a crack dealer and recreational heroin user to a legitimate blue-collar worker, addicted to heroin and looking for an MAT to regain control over his life. In the passage below, ethnographer Bourgois (2000) describes Primo's experiences with methadone.

> Primo began sniffing two $10 bags of heroin every weekday before and during work, and six-to-eight bags each weekend to celebrate. When Primo's union laid him off at the end of the summer he suddenly ran out of money and discovered that he "had a monkey – King Kong – on [his] back." He attempted to quit "cold turkey," but two days later in the midst of wrenching opiate withdrawal symptoms he received a phone call from the union offering to rehire him. In order not to lose this opportunity for well-remunerated – even if unstable – legal employment, Primo immediately enrolled in the methadone clinic that was located next to the luxury condominium where he mopped and hauled garbage. Because Primo was legally employed, the methadone clinic offered him preferential hours – a 45-minute window of time – to receive his medication, during his lunch hour. For the next three years, Primo became a very stable porter despite the fact that he was laid off for at least 2 weeks every three months in order to prevent him from qualifying for seniority and health benefits. Because of his methadone addiction, Primo would travel downtown past his site of employment every day at lunch hour to continue receiving his medication even during the weeks when he was laid off. This relationship between Primo's methadone addiction and his reliability at work fell apart when his conveniently located methadone clinic closed down due to budget cuts and neighborhood gentrification. He began arriving late from his lunch break due to the distant commute to his new ghetto-located clinic.

On the website of The National Alliance of Advocates for Buprenorphine Treatment (http://www.naabt.org/buprenorphine-treatment-stories/trading-addictions.cfm), we can read Adam's story. While his age and race-ethnicity are unclear, certain markers in his story indicate

he has a higher social class standing than Primo. For example, he talks about losing a precious and expensive family heirloom to his addiction and burning through a large tax refund to finance his addiction to pain pills. The clearest indicator of his more privileged class position and difference from Primo, however, is how his story is packaged neatly within the U.S. healthcare system where his efforts to stop using opiates are supervised by doctors in private practice. An excerpt from Adam's story provides a stark contrast to Primo's:

> Three days into withdrawals I was so lost and depressed. I started searching the internet for anything that could help me. I had used a lot of methadone off the street, but I knew that was not a direction that I wanted to go. In-patient rehab was an absolute last resort that would have destroyed my job and hurt those around me. I was going to beat this thing or take my own life if I couldn't. I then came across the naabt.org forum. People there gave me direction. I found an excellent doctor (neurologist/psychologist-- a gift from God for me) with a real understanding of addiction and Suboxone therapy. No games, no lies and no blind enthusiasm. He clearly explained what sub does, and told me, in no uncertain terms, that the success or failure of this treatment was up to me. Suboxone could only help me cure my addiction in the long run if I was determined to do so. In terms of trading one addiction for another, my doctor explained it like this: 'You are trading addictive behavior for medical behavior, and this therapy will give you the chance to address the true causes of your addiction'.

The class-based differences between Primo and Adam are not isolated cases. Reporting on opiate addiction in NYC, Bourdet (2012) concluded: "opiate maintenance treatment is a tale of two cultures. People who can afford Suboxone get to keep their addiction private. People who are restricted to methadone clinics pay the price of stigma." Her research was based on a buprenorphine study in NYC that found MATs like suboxone are based largely on the depth of the addicts' pocketbook, rather than the severity of their addiction. Assessing what these stories can teach us about biomedicalization, deviance and inequality today first requires a brief discussion of the evolution of medicalization in society.

Medicalization, Biomedicalization and Inequality

The enormous growth of medicine over the last half-century is hailed by many citizens as simple evidence of scientific progress. However, the rise of the medical industry-- as seen in the increased prestige of fields such as psychiatry as well as the increased use of pharmaceutical drugs-- must also be viewed as a significant change in how conditions and behaviors are defined in our society. By medicalizing, or recasting, certain deviant behaviors as medical conditions-- such as the misuse of alcohol or drugs as "alcoholism" or "drug addiction" or hyperactivity or child misbehavior as "ADHD" or "conduct disorder"-- their perceived causes shift from the irresponsible or immoral behavior of an individual to that of a medical illness, disease, or condition requiring treatment. This is what Conrad and Schneider (1992) note as a transformation in defining deviance "from badness to sickness."

While recasting deviant behaviors as medical conditions may be useful in managing stigma and easing reintegration into society (Goffman 1963), as the medical industry continues to expand, the number of stigmatizable conditions has grown right along with it! Clarke et al. (2003) contend this marks the beginnings of the biomedicalization era – an era where physical differences between our bodies have become pathologized – but ultimately correctable, with one of the many available technoscientific products or procedures. Undesirable physical features can now be altered with plastic surgery; obesity with stomach stapling; erectile dysfunction in older persons with pharmaceutical drugs like Viagra or Cialis. In the biomedical era it is our bodies-- not just behavior-- that can be labeled deviant. Yet Western biomedicine holds the promise of correcting the deviant aspects of our selves physiologically, masking our deficiencies with new and ever-emerging medical interventions, allowing us to pass as normal (Goffman 1963).

Biomedicalization is a shift from enhanced control over the external world around us to a transformation of our internal biology, or selves (Vrecko 2010; Rose 2007). Moreover, unlike

mechanisms of formal social control, such as law, medication is often a voluntary or desired (and so more effective) form of control, directed at the self, by the self – with the encouragement of our trusted family doctors. As Dworkin (2001: 90) notes:

> "… even though mental-health professionals are more experienced in treating depression, patients do not want to be referred to a psychiatrist or therapist for fear of the stigma attached… For this reason, they insist on being treated in the primary-care setting, where expertise in managing mental illness is not great… The result is an increased use of psychotropic medication in cases of everyday emotional trouble."

But, as sociologists have long noted, stratification (i.e., the dividing of a society, and its people, into hierarchical levels based on power or socioeconomic status) and inequality occur at all levels of society (Massey 2009), and the medical realm is certainly no exception. While medicine has continually expanded into new areas of life, new forms of drug treatment --- like MAT's for opiate addiction-- and other medical innovations have long been made available to "white middle- and upper-class groups, while punitive and exclusionary tendencies… have prevailed for people of color and the poor" (Clarke et al. 2003:170). So, the latest cutting-edge biomedical treatments are available only to those with the financial resources (i.e., private insurance—see Bourdet 2012 and the case of Adam described above) to access them.

While the most vulnerable and disadvantaged segments of society are denied access to the latest biomedical advances, pharmaceuticals and medication have become increasingly widespread among more affluent groups. In fact, they are often deemed necessary to keep up with the demands and expectations of our society. The use of psychotropic medication for those with attention deficit problems (Loe and Cuttino 2008) or mental health problems like depression or mood disorders – as referenced by Dworkin (2001)-- has risen precipitously over the last two

decades. In fact, the readings in this section both note that biomedicine is an expanding industry, featuring a growing number of diagnosable disorders. Dworkin (2001: 86) notes:

> "In the past, medical science cared for the mentally ill, while everyday unhappiness was left to religious, spiritual, or other cultural guides. Now, medical science is moving beyond its traditional border to help people who are bored, sad, or experiencing low self-esteem – in other words, people who are suffering from nothing more than life [itself] (Dworkin 2001:86).

Biomedicine, therefore, becomes the latest site for stratification in society, one where class- and race-based inequalities could be perpetuated. We contend that stratified biomedicalization (Clarke et al. 2003) and the attendant class- and race-based inequality are especially visible in the area of drug addiction and has remained so over time despite claims to the contrary.

Biomedicalization, Inequality and Drug Addiction.

After more than a century of debate about addiction being a criminal or medical matter (Campbell 2000; Courtwright 2010), the harsh criminal policies for drugs that prevailed in the latter 20th century, are giving way to a medical or disease approach based on the neuroscience of drug addiction (Anderson, Swan and Lane 2010; DuPont 2009). Its proponents claim it will provide better and more humane treatment for all, including reduced stigma and discrimination toward addicts. Nora Volkow (2009), Director of the National Institute of Drug Abuse, recently told the US Congress:

> "Recent scientific advances have revolutionized our understanding of drug abuse and addiction, which is now recognized as a chronic relapsing brain disease expressed in the form of compulsive behaviors. This understanding has improved our ability to both prevent and treat addiction."

And in a 2007 speech to the US Congress, then Senator Joseph Biden, claimed:

> "Addiction is a neurobiological disease, not a lifestyle choice, and it's about time we start treating it as such. By changing the way we talk about addiction, we change the way people think about addiction, both of which are critical steps in getting past the social stigma too often associated with the disease."[1]

Medical experts' discovery that drug craving is rooted in a disordered brain has opened the doors to treating opiate addicts with pharmaceuticals like methadone and suboxone. And they soon began using the latest psychotropic medications to control an ever-widening array of undesirable behaviors; like gambling and overeating, for example (Vrecko 2010). However, experts soon realized these drug treatments didn't work for all those who had addictions. Rather than addressing possible problems with MAT's like methadone and suboxone, experts decided that only certain "types" of addicts were treatable in this manner, and so developed more nuanced classifications of addicts based on differences in their brain functioning – rather than emphasizing the similarity of their deviant behaviors. Vrecko (2010) refers to biomedical interventions-- like methadone and suboxone—not as "treatments," but rather as "civilizing technologies," because they are "used as a means of producing states in which individuals are healthier, more responsible, and more able to adhere to the duties, expectations and obligations of their families and societies. That is, a state in which individuals are better citizens" (Vrecko 2010:45). Adam personifies this viewpoint. Suboxone "civilizes" him within the auspices of the private health care industry. Meanwhile, Primo and the poor opiate addicts Bourdet (2012)

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[1] From NIDA Director Reports, February 2008 http://www.drugabuse.gov/DirReports/DirRep208/DirectorReport14.html (Accessed January 11, 2010).

studied in NYC find themselves lodged in the publicly-funded and stigmatized methadone maintenance system, or in some cases, under the control of the criminal justice system.

The neuroscience approach currently dominating talk about addiction gained momentum during the 1990s' Decade of the Brain (Leshner 1997). "Indeed, on the basis of emerging evidence that activation of the dopamine system is the common denominator of all compulsions… we might think of crack heads, heroin junkies, pathological gamblers and others likewise addicted to the pleasure-inducing chemicals in their brains in similar terms: as 'dopamine heads'" (Vrecko 2010:39). This move to a newer biomedical explanation follows a century of debate over the causes and solutions to drug addiction. For example, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, both heroin and cocaine were hailed as effective medical treatments (Brecher 1972). Both drugs, however, soon became the focus of moral and legal crusades as abuse and addiction to them spread dramatically (Courtwright 2001). Another important part of these campaigns was race and class-based scapegoating, featuring the definition of poor Chinese opium and Black cocaine addicts as criminals wreaking havoc on middle class white society (Musto 1999). The result: the passage of the Harrison Narcotics Act in 1914, which would effectively define opiate and cocaine addicts as junkies and criminals.

Since the early 1900s, addiction to opiates (e.g., heroin) and cocaine has been defined as a criminal matter – and those addicted to them as junkies. This criminalization model was dramatically expanded by Presidents Nixon, Reagan, G.H. Bush, and Clinton into a full-out war on drugs in the last quarter of the 20th century. As a result, both heroin and cocaine addicts have been heavily stigmatized in society and have encountered sharp social control tactics administered by a punitive criminal justice system (Provine 2007).

But while the punitive criminal justice response was dominating the American public's consciousness about illegal drugs and drug addicts in the latter 20th century, there was also a growing sense among experts and stakeholders that addiction was best handled by the medical profession through treatment, in varying forms - including cognitive-behavioral, as well as pharmacological-biomedical. The phrase "medicated-assisted treatment" (MAT) refers to the biotechnologies that treat individual drug addiction, specifically to federally regulated - but legal - opioid preparations such as OxyContin, Percoset and Vicodin - as well as strictly illegal ones (e.g., heroin). According to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Association (SAMHSA, http://dpt.samhsa.gov/patients/mat.aspx, 2013):

> "MAT is the use of medications, in combination with counseling and behavioral therapies, to provide a whole-patient approach to the treatment of substance use disorders. Research shows that when treating substance-use disorders, a combination of medication and behavioral therapies is most successful" (page 1).

Methadone's "Addicts" versus Suboxone's "Patients"

The two most popular MATs used to treat opiate addiction today are methadone maintenance treatment (MMT) and opiate substitution using buprenorphine, trade name Suboxone or Subcutex. Methadone has been the primary biomedical treatment for opiate addiction, specifically heroin addiction, since the 1960s and 1970s (Dole and Nyswander 1967). It is classified as a Schedule 2 drug by the Federal government, which means its distribution is controlled by the Feds and cannot be administered privately by physicians. Instead, it is disbursed at small hospital-like clinics under strict federal control and subsidy. These clinics (often located in low-income, high crime urban areas) sit on the edge of medicalization and criminalization of addiction, or what Conrad and Schneider (1992: 218) refer to as a kind of

"medical-legal hybrid," with both clinical and criminal justice jurisdiction. Importantly, methadone clinics are NOT staffed by primary care physicians and have limited medical staff. Harris and McElrath (2012) studied sentiments about heroin addicts on methadone and found:

> Individuals who held power over methadone provision often framed client identities around the master status of "addict[2]." Furthermore, methadone maintenance treatment (MMT) clients were treated as addicts regardless of their stage of recovery. The saliency of this identity was manifested through (a) rules and regulations that equated addicts with deviants and criminals, (b) contractual power differentials, (c) labels that incorporated a clean/dirty dichotomy, and (d) clients' lack of input into treatment decisions.

Bourgois (2000:170) describes that people view Primo in a similar manner:

> As Primo's addiction illustrates, MMT is often experienced as a hostile and/or arbitrary forum for social control and enforced dependency among street addicts. It seeps into the fabric of one's most intimate relationships, distorting (in Primo's case) respectful interaction with children, wives, and intellectual friends.

And, since Primo believes methadone users are viewed as "broken down, toothless garbage heads," (Bourgois 2000:180) it sounds as if he buys into the stereotype adopted by the wider society.

Burprenorphine is another MAT for opiate addiction that often goes by the trade name of Suboxone. As a trade brand, suboxone has its own private company and website (see http://www.suboxone.com/) and is used, primarily, to treat people—like Adam-- addicted to prescription opiates like Oxycontin, Vicodin, and Percoset. It is intended as a long-term treatment for opiate dependence and medical experts recommended it as part of a comprehensive

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[2] In this case the word addict denotes the stigmatized label of "junkie."

response to addiction that also features counseling and other forms of social support. Suboxone was released to the public in 2002 as a Schedule 3 drug, which means pharmacists and doctors can fill prescriptions in private healthcare settings. To date, nearly 10,000 physicians have taken the training needed to prescribe these Suboxone and other buprenorhphine analogs (from NIDA notes 2006. See http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/topics-in-brief/buprenorphine-treatment-opiate-addiction-right-in-doctors-office).

Both Suboxone and methadone are used to treat patients with opiate dependency or addiction. Suboxone is *partial opiate agonist* (i.e. its effects are limited even when taken in large doses) but Methadone is a full opiate agonist. The implications of this are that Suboxone is harder to abuse so patients are allowed to take it home. Conversely, methadone is more easily abused, so addicts often start treatment by having to go to a clinic each day to take their medication. In later stages of the treatment they are allowed take-home doses of methadone, but usually only a week's worth. Suboxone is believed to work best for shorter-term addiction to opiates, while methadone is found to be more effective with heavier and longer-term opiate addicts. Additionally, the withdrawal symptoms from Suboxone are less intense and there is also a diminished risk of overdose compared to methadone (http://www.diffen.com/difference/Methadone_vs_Suboxone).

Implications of Stratification and Inequality in Addiction

Recall that addicts have been alternatively cast as patients and junkies over time. It is our contention that medicalization and biomedicalization reproduce these images and perpetuate a stratified system of inequality between them. "Patients" are viewed as having a disease, often with biological origins, that requires medical treatment. "Junkies," on the other hand, are morally depraved and dangerous by choice. They must be socially controlled-- often with punitive criminal justice policies-- because of their deviant lifestyles (Agar 1977; Bourgois

2000). The significance of medicalizing some opiate addicts and criminalizing others is likely to become even more problematic, we maintain, with biomedical responses. First, addicts rendered "patients" might receive MAT's and avoid legal sanctions - an example of Vrecko's (2010) "civilizing technology" -- while others could be viewed as junkies and processed through the criminal justice system; which may be conceptualized as a "decivilizing" process (Elias 2000). Second, all opiate addicts might be defined in some respect as "patients" suffering a disease, but some, like Adam, have greater access to a preferred MAT that protects them from stigma, discrimination and other complications.

While Bourdet (2012) discusses class-based inequalities in MATs for opiate addiction, another likely discrepancy is in the racial breakdown of the addict population. Sociologists have noted, for example, racial disparities in health care and across conditions other than addiction despite increased medicalization in society (Ackers 2010). A study by Nunn et al. (2009) specifically found that MATs like methadone and buprenorphine are, in general, unavailable to prisoners, which are disproportionately Black and Hispanic. More to the point is a study by Ackers (2010). In Pittsburgh's Hill District, she found lower-income and disproportionately black addicts were treated as criminals (i.e., arrested and incarcerated) while wealthier white addicts – who purchased drugs in the Hill District—were sent to rehabilitation programs rather than prison.

The two-tiered system of public and private treatment - discussed above - is well-documented in social science. Researchers have found addicts treated in publicly-funded programs get lower-quality services than those attending privately-funded ones (Sullivan et al. 2005). In light of this reality, Knudsen, Ducharme, and Roman (2006) warn that since Suboxone is more expensive than methadone and is more often made available to opiate addicts through

prescription by primary-care physicians. Thus, inequality between public and private treatment programs may persist, with the heavily stigmatized methadone being the MAT of choice in public programs that service poor and minority addicts. In her doctoral dissertation research on drug treatment programs, Laura Monico (2011) has also found that MAT for opiate addiction plays out along two lines, reproducing inequality: heroin users were treated with MMT-methadone maintenance treatment (the more stigmatized form of MAT), while prescription opiate addicts were treated with Suboxone (a less stigmatized and newer medication).

Conclusion

In this essay we have argued that cutting-edge biomedical technologies, that promise to redefine "badness as sickness" (Conrad and Schneider 1992) or "civilize" deviants (Vrecko 2010), might instead reproduce stratification in society and inequality among groups. We reviewed past and current thinking and policies about opiate addiction to make our case. Since history has shown that addiction has been viewed as a disease for some and a hedonistic or criminal behavior for others, a few questions become relevant for the study of deviance as biomedicalization gains evermore momentum in society: (1) For what types of deviant behavior and individuals will biomedical explanations and frameworks apply? (2) To what extent will biomedical interventions lead to stratified systems of treatment for addicts and other deviants? (3) How will biomedical responses to deviance impact stigma, citizenship, and social control?

Experts, stakeholders and institutions involved in biomedical campaigns, like the National Institute of Drug Abuse, believe that defining and treating opiate addiction as a medical disease will not only help reduce the physiological consequences of addiction, but also the stigma and social suffering addicts face in society. Their efforts are humane and should be commended. At this point in time, however, we can see some familiar inequalities perpetuated as a result of biomedicalization.

Available evidence on private treatment groups or government agencies shows a bifurcated system emerging where prescription opiate addiction to Oxycodone, Vicodin, and so forth-- emanating from the treatment of pain-- are treated with Suboxone and the experience is medicalized by private health agencies and doctor's offices. Addiction here is viewed as a medical condition in more affluent areas among middle class whites, especially when abuse of legal drugs like OxyContin or Percoset lead to heroin addiction. This is Adam's story. This more benevolent image holds even when those legal drugs are used in ways not prescribed and/or are obtained through criminal or deviant channels. Unlike Primo, Adam and other privileged addicts can escape the stigma of the methadone clinic.

Conversely, opiate addiction is often constructed as a social problem in poor areas populated with minority groups, especially with those addicts – like Primo-- who did not get into heroin via prescribed pain medication. In fact, addiction is more likely to be viewed as a social problem anywhere when the drugs involved are illicit or illegal for anyone to have (Campbell 2010; Kushner 2010). Such addicts are more likely to be defined as junkies; culpable, in some ways, for their deviance. They are viewed through a hybrid lens (Conrad and Schneider 1992) that prioritizes criminal justice interventions, or dubious and stigmatized medical treatments like methadone.

The medicalization of drug addiction, and the classification of addiction as a brain disease promises beneficial results for addicts by defining them as patients to be treated and rehabilitated. This narrative is a refreshing change from the criminalized narrative that governed approaches to drug misuse throughout the 20th century. Acker (2002) noted that the development of methadone maintenance to treat heroin addiction took place at the same time white middle class heroin use began escalating in the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, poor minority heroin

addicts – like Primo-- find themselves treated at the heavily stigmatized government-sponsored methadone clinics while middle class white "hillbilly heroin[3]" addicts – like Adam-- get treated with suboxone in the privacy of a doctor's office.

An important question to consider, then, is if other medicalized types of deviance will also feature stratified biomedical interventions and resulting inequality between those afflicted. Answering this question will require sociologists to pay closer attention to the relationship between biomedical trends and their impact on deviance and inequality in the future.

Critical Thinking Questions:

1. Although definitions of addiction have changed to emphasize the causal role of one's disordered brain functioning, Conrad and Schneider (1992:218) have argued that drug addiction remains a kind of "medical-legal hybrid." For example, in 2011, roughly half of all federal prison inmates were serving time for a nonviolent drug offense. Why do you think this number remains so high, even in the biomedical era? Why is drug misuse still criminalized to such a sharp degree?
2. In 2001, Portugal became the first European nation to abolish all criminal penalties for personal possession, use, and sale of drugs, including marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and meth. Jail time was replaced with therapy. An independent study found that five years after decriminalization, illegal drug use among Portuguese teens declined substantially, while the number of people seeking treatment for drug addiction more than doubled. Do you suppose such a policy would be effective in the U.S., Canada, or other Western nations? Defend your position.

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[3] Hillbilly heroin is a street name for prescription opiates like Oxycontin.

3. One of the key points we argue is that the biomedicalization of drug addiction has reproduced inequality due to differential access to the best treatments. Scholars contend that the biomedical era is relatively new, tracing its origin to the early-mid 1990s. Has there simply not been enough time for medical scientists to develop effective medicines for different kinds of drug addictions? Do you think the inequality we currently see in addictions treatment will attenuate or worsen as biomedicalization advances? Why?

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Contributor Biographies:

Robert Agnew (1953-) is the Samuel Chandler Dobbs Professor of Sociology at Emory University, and served as president of the American Society of Criminology. He received his PhD from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and his main research interests are criminology and juvenile delinquency.

Howard S. Becker (1928-) is an American sociologist who has made major contributions to the sociology of deviance, sociology of art, and sociology of music. His 1963 book, *Outsiders*, provided the foundations for labeling theory.

Nachman Ben-Yehuda is a professor and former dean of the department of sociology and anthropology at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Israel. His work includes: *Sacrificing Truth*, and *Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance* (with Erich Goode).

Joel Best is professor of sociology and criminal justice at the University of Delaware. He received his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley. His research focuses on deviance and social problems, along with awards, prizes, and honors in American culture. He is a former President of the Midwest Sociological Society and the Society for the Study of Social Problems, and a former Editor of the journal *Social Problems*.

Cathy J. Cohen is the David and Mary Winton Green Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Her work include *Democracy Remixed: Black Youth and the Future of American Politics*, *The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics*, and *Women Transforming Politics: An Alternative Reader* (with Kathleen Jones and Joan Tronto).

Stanley Cohen (1942-2013) was professor of sociology at the London School of Economics. He was a major contributor to the fields of criminology and sociology and is credited with coining the term moral panic in his 1972 study, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics.*

Peter Conrad is Harry Coplan Professor of Social Sciences and chair of the Health: Science, Society, and Policy program at Brandeis University. He is a medical sociologist who has researched and published on several topics including: ADHD, the medicalization of deviance, and the experience of illness. His most recent book is *The Medicalization of Society*.

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) was a French sociologist who formally established the academic discipline. He is commonly known as the father of sociology.

Ronald W. Dworkin is a practicing physician who also holds a PhD in political science from Johns Hopkins University. Widely published, he is the author of *The Rise of the Imperial Self* and *Artificial Happiness*.

Kai T. Erikson (1931-) is an American sociologist whose research revolved around the social consequences of catastrophic events. His work includes: *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance*, *Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in the Buffalo Creek Flood*, and *A New Species of Trouble: Explorations in Disaster, Trauma, and Community*.

Amin Ghaziani is an assistant professor of sociology at the University of British Columbia. He earned his PhD in sociology and organization behavior fro Northwestern and principally researches sexualities, though he often connects this with culture, social movements, and cities.

Ryken Grattet is professor of sociology at the University of California, Davis and a research fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California. He received his PhD from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and his areas of specialization include: law, deviance, organizations, methods, criminology, and public policy.

Erving Goffman (1922-1982) was a Canadian-born sociologist who was very influential in the 20th century. One of his major contributions to social theory was his study of symbolic interaction in the form of dramaturgical analysis, which he began in his book, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. His work also includes: *Asylums, Stigma, Interaction Ritual, Frame Analysis*, and *Forms of Talk.*

Erich Goode is an American sociologist, who teaches at the University of Maryland. He received his PhD from Columbia University and specializes in the sociology of deviance. His work includes *Marijuana Smokers, Drugs in American Society,* and *Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance* (with Nachman Ben-Yehuda).

John M. Hagedorn is an associate professor in the Criminal Justice Department at The University of Illinois–Chicago. He was principal investigator of a five-year National Institute on Drug Abuse study of male and female gangs, drug abuse, and drug dealing. His published work includes *Forsaking Our Children: Bureaucracy and Reform in the Child Welfare System,* and *People & Folks, Gangs, Crime, and the Underclass in a Rustbelt City.*

Katherine Jones is a graduate student in sociology at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Her interests include gender, sexuality, culture, and intersectional analysis.

Nikki Jones is an associate professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She received her PhD in sociology and criminology from the University of Pennsylvania, and her areas of expertise include: urban ethnography, urban sociology, race and ethnic relations, and criminology and criminal justice. Her published work includes: *Between Good and Ghetto: African American Girls and Inner-City Violence,* and is co-editor of *Sociologists Backstage: Answers to 10 Questions About What They Do* (with Sarah Fenstermaker).

Miliann Kang is a professor of women, gender, and sexuality studies at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, where she also teaches sociology and Asian American studies. She received her PhD from New York University and her research interests include: the social construction of race, class, and gender, sociology of the body, and emotional labor and service interactions.

John Kitsuse (1923-2003) was an American sociologist who contributed to the sociology of social problems, criminology, and deviance. He is known for his pioneer work in studying social problems as social constructions, which resulted in his book, *Constructing Social Problems (*with Malcolm Spector).

John H. Laub is Distinguished University Professor in the Department of Criminology and

Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland, College Park. His interests include: crime and deviance over the life course, juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice, and the history of criminology. In 2011 he was awarded, along with Robert J. Sampson, the Stockholm Prize in Criminology for their work on how and why offenders stop offending.

Edwin Lemert (1912-1996) was an American sociologist who developed the idea of primary and secondary deviation as a way to explain the process of labeling. He received his PhD from Ohio State University, and taught at several university, including University of California, Davis. His work includes: *Social Pahtology: A Systematic Approach to the Theory of Sociopathic Behavior, Social Action and Legal Change,* and *Instead of Court: Diversion in Juvenile Justice.*

Stephen Lyng is professor of sociology and criminal justice at Carthage College. He received his PhD from the University of Texas at Austin, and specializes in medical sociology, social theory, social psychology, and the sociology of risk. He is author of *Edgework: The Sociology of Risk Taking*.

Henry D. McKay (1899-1980) was an American sociologist who, along with Clifford R. Shaw, conducted some of the first systematic, empirical, sociological interpretations of the problem of juvenile delinquency, using oral history.

Robert Merton (1910-2003) was an American sociologist. Merton served as professor at Columbia University, and in 1994, won the National Medal of Science for his contributions to the field and for founding the sociology of science.

Lee F. Monaghan is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Limerick, Ireland. He has written extensively on issues relating to male embodiment, including work published previously in *Body* & *Society.* His current ESRC project uses embodied sociology to engage with recent debates on (male) overweight and obesity.

DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN (1927-2003) was an American politician and sociologist. From 1975-200, he was the senior United States Senator from New York. He was also the author of numerous books, including the forthcoming *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity and International Politics.*

Sharon Oselin is an assistant professor of sociology at California State University, Los Angeles. She earned her PhD in sociology from the University of California, Irvine, and her research focuses predominately on sex workers, specifically street prostitutes, and anti-war movements.

Anthony M. Platt is Professor Emeritus at California State University, Sacramento. His work includes: *The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency*, *The Politics of Riot Commissions, 1917-1970,* and *E. Franklin Frazier Reconsidered.*

Victor Rios is associate professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He received his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley. He research interests include juvenile justice, social control, race, dignity, resilience, and educational equity. He is also author of *Punished: Policing Lives of Black and Latino Boys*.

Robert J. Sampson is Henry Ford II Professor of Social Sciences at Harvard University and

Director of the Social Sciences at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study. He was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 2008 and served as President of the American Society of Criminology from 2011-2012. Widely published, he is the author of Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect, the culmination of over a decade of research based on the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). In 2011 he was awarded, along with John H. Laub, the Stockholm Prize in Criminology for their work on how and why offenders stop offending.

Clifford R. Shaw (1895-1957) was an American sociologist who, along with Henry D. McKay, conducted some of the first systematic, empirical, sociological interpretations of the problem of juvenile delinquency, using oral history.

Jonathan Simon is the Adrian A. Kragen Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley. His research focuses on the role of criminal justice and punishment in modern societies and insurance and other contemporary forms of governing risk. His published work includes: *Poor Discipline: Parole and the Social Control of the Underclass, 1890-1990*, and *Governing through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear*.

Yvette Taylor is a professor at London South Bank University, where she is head of the Weeks Centre for Social and Policy Research. Her work includes: *Working-Class Lesbian Life: Classed Outsiders*, and *Lesbian and Gay Parents: Social and Educational Capitals*.

Sheldon Ungar is a professor of sociology at the University of Toronto. His research involves real world events that have produced social scares, including the nuclear arms race, emerging diseases, and global climate change.

Rajah Valli is associate professor of sociology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. She received her PhD from Columbia University, and her research interests include: women's experience of partner violence, social stratification, and qualitative research methodologies.

Victor Hugo Viesca is a professor of California State University, Los Angeles. He received his PhD from New York University, and his research draws from the fields of ethnic studies, urban studies, and cultural studies. He is also co-founder of the urban art and skateboard company UN SK8's.

Scott Vrecko is a lecturer in the Department of Sociology and Philosophy at the University of Exeter, where his work focuses on political, social and economic aspects of the life sciences, especially those relating to mental health and illness.

Connections Contributors:

Tammy L. Anderson is a Professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice at the University of Delaware. Her recent books *Rave Culture: The Alteration and Decline of a Philadelphia Music Scene*, *Sex, Drugs, and Death*, and *Neither Villain nor Victim: Empowerment and Agency among Women Substance Abusers* (Rutgers University Press), along with her many peer review papers on substance abuse, crime, and music scenes, showcase her range of scholarship in the area of deviance, culture, and social control.

Emily Bonistall is a doctoral student at the University of Delaware. She earned her BA from

the University of Dayton in 2009 and her MA from the University of Delaware in 2012. Her research interests generally include gender, deviance, and culture, with a specific focus on sexual violence prevention.

John Brent is a doctoral student at the University of Delaware in the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice. After completing his undergraduate studies at Northern Kentucky University, he completed his M.A. in Criminal Justice at Eastern Kentucky University. His recent work focuses on the structural and cultural trends of transgressive behavior, building a theoretical foundation for criminal justice theory, and the methodological trends in criminology. His work has been published in a book and several manuscripts in peer-reviewed journals including: the *British Journal of Criminology, Justice Quarterly,* the *Journal of Criminal Justice,* and the *Journal of Criminal Justice Education.*

Philip Kavanaugh is an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Penn State Harrisburg. Dr. Kavanaugh earned his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Sociology from the University of Delaware with substantive emphases in theory and deviance. A former graduate research fellow with the National Institute of Justice, his doctoral project examined how contextual, situational and dispositional factors coalesce to shape physical and sexual assault outcomes among young adults with active night lives. Related publications have appeared in *Feminist Criminology, Adicciones, Deviant Behavior, and The Sociological Quarterly*. He maintains interests in crime and deviance, sociological theory, and qualitative methods.

Aaron Kupchik is Professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice at the University of Delaware. His research focuses on the punishment of youth in schools, courts, and correctional facilities. He is the author of *Homeroom Security: School discipline in an age of fear* (NYU Press, 2010) and *Judging Juveniles: Prosecuting adolescents in adult and juvenile courts* (NYU Press, 2006), and a past recipient of the American Society of Criminology Michael J. Hindelang Award and the American Society of Criminology Ruth Shonle Cavan Young Scholar Award.

David Lane holds a Doctorate from the University of Delaware. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of South Dakota. His research interests include issues within deviance, collective behavior, identity, and culture. Current research focuses on how tattooists construct their social world, as a marginal occupation in advanced capitalism, relying on an anachronistic guild/craft form of organization. An extension of this work uses the routine activities perspective to examine the relationship between violence and the spaces where tattoo shops, liquor stores, strip clubs, adult books stores, and restaurants are located in the largest cities in the United States.

Victor W. Perez is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice at the University of Delaware. His interests include the medicalization of neuro-diversity in childhood, lay production of health knowledge, and social movements that challenge scientific consensus.

R.J. Maratea is an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at New Mexico State University. His research interests include mass communication, social problems, deviance, and the production of social reality in cyberspace.

Laura Monico received her B.S. in Sociology and Political Science from Shepherd University and M.A. in Sociology from the University of Delaware, where she is currently a

Ph.D. candidate. Her areas of specialization include quantitative and qualitative research methods, social epidemiology, public health programming, and addiction science. For the last four years, Laura has been a research assistant at the Center for Drug and Alcohol Studies, where she primarily works on the Criminal Justice Drug Abuse Treatment Studies (CJDATS). She recently joined the Friends Research Institute, Inc.as a research consultant on projects concerning medication assisted treatment for opioid addiction.

Kevin Ralston is currently a Doctoral student in the Sociology and Criminal Justice Department at the University of Delaware. He obtained his Bachelor of Arts from Wake Forest University in 2005 and his Masters of Arts from the University of Delaware in 2010. Mr. Ralston's primary areas of interest include intersectionality and victimization. He has published work on male sexual assault victimization and pedagogy and has been involved in research examining diversion programs for sex workers. Currently, Mr. Ralston is in progress on his dissertation work examining how male victims of sexual assault re-construct their masculinity post victimization.

Lori Sexton is an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of Missouri, Kansas City. She has a Ph.D. in Criminology, Law and Society from the University of California, Irvine and an M.A. in Criminology from the University of Pennsylvania. Lori's interests lie at the intersection of criminology and sociolegal studies, with a specific focus on prisons, punishment and the lived experience of penal sanctions. Her work has been funded by the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Justice and the Fletcher Jones Foundation, and has been published in *Justice Quarterly* and *Criminology & Public Policy*.

Holly Swan is a post-doctoral researcher at the Center for Drug and Alcohol Studies, affiliated with the University of Delaware where she completed her doctorate in sociology. She has been involved in two NIH-funded studies examining HIV Services for individuals involved with the criminal justice system: one tested the implementation of evidence-based HIV services in correctional settings, the other qualitatively examined the barriers and facilitators to continuous HIV care for individuals involved in the criminal justice system. The second project funded her dissertation research. Her research interests include the intersection of deviance and health, and implementation science.