# AP Microeconomics

# Sample Student Responses and Scoring Commentary Set 2

# **Inside:**

Free Response Question 3

- **☑** Scoring Commentary

# AP® MICROECONOMICS 2019 SCORING GUIDELINES

#### **Question 3**

#### 6 points (1+1+1+1+2)

- (a) 1 point
  - One point earned for stating that Jackpot Florist's dominant strategy is to close at 6 p.m.
- (b) 1 point
  - One point is earned for stating that this is not the profit-maximizing action by Boulevard Gardens and for explaining that Boulevard will earn \$30 by choosing Delivery instead of \$20 choosing No Delivery.
- (c) 1 point
  - One point is earned for identifying the profit for Boulevard Gardens in the Nash equilibrium as \$30.
- (d) 1 point
  - One point is earned for stating that they would choose to close at 9 p.m. and offer No Delivery.
- (e) 2 points
  - One point is earned for redrawing the payoff matrix showing the effect of the agreement.

		Boulevard	
		Delivery	No Delivery
Jackpot	6 p.m.	\$35,\$30	\$43,\$32
	9 p.m.	\$37,\$38	\$45,\$40

• One point is earned for stating that Boulevard will agree to Jackpot's proposal and for explaining that Boulevard will be better off because this will increase the payoff from \$30 to \$40.

a) Jackpot's	dominant st	rategy is 1	to close at 6:00 RM.	
b) This is not it will ea	ot the prof	it-maximizing	y action by Boulevard because while choosing Delivery would	
c) Boulevard	will earn	\$30 profit	in the Nash equilibrium.	
d) The new choose No	company w Delivery.	ould choose	to close at 9:00 P.M. and	
e) [	Boulevard			
	Delivery			
6:00 P.M.	\$35,\$30	\$43,\$32		
Jackpot				
900 P.M.	\$37,\$38	\$45,\$40		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
Boulevard	would agree	to Jackp	pot's proposal because without	
it, Jackpot	would always	avs close at	T 6:00 P.M., so Boulevard could	
make \$30	profit. Howe	ver, with	the plan, Boulevard could	
<u>make \$40</u>	profit inst	read, and l	noth firms would have	
dominant str	ategies lea	ding to the	e \$45, \$40 values.	
	<del></del>			

a) Jackpotic dominant strutegy is to close at 6:00 p.m.
De March 18 Doubland Children N. 10 11
The court of action of the contract of the con
he could exam 30 dulars of profit by choosing delivery at
C) Boulevard Will eden 40 dayars in North Equilibrium.
D) The Strategies that the Man Councer and I do
10 mise of 1,00 p. M. With No. Redivens to code!
what wife its combined protes
e) (i) Barrevard
Have visugues
Δ ,
Agree \$45, \$40 \$57, \$28
Teach port
Asagree \$ 33, \$ 62 \$45, \$10
(11) Boulerturd Wan't agree with Judepot's proposal because
may typ short sivile the hards in the matrix and
Tour which makes the proposal more here ticked to Tackeret
than Boulevard.
·

GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE.

N) To dose of 6:00 pm
b) the profit maximizing action would length Jack pot be cause they
would receive more money.
d) Boulevard would form \$ 40.
Al They would close at 9:00 pm and not do Delnery
Boulevard
e) . Delievy No Delivry
i) Boulevard would benefit
Julipit if Jackpot were to cheat
9100 132, #38 1445, 1470 on the agreement. But  if Boulevord were to sheet
Mey would lose protA.
4
$\frac{95}{42} \frac{90}{38} \frac{75}{37}$
43 37
20
$\frac{435}{12} \frac{30}{12}$
-3 42

## AP® MICROECONOMICS 2019 SCORING COMMENTARY

#### **Question 3**

**Note:** Student samples are quoted verbatim and may contain spelling and grammatical errors.

#### **Overview**

The question assessed students' understanding of two-player (Boulevard and Jackpot) strategic games. In parts (a) through (d) of the question, the students were expected to identify a player's dominant strategy, identify the payoff for a player, explain why an alternative pair of actions was not profit maximizing, and identify the collective best result. In part (e), the students were expected to construct a new payoff matrix based on a proposal given by Jackpot. Students were expected to determine if Boulevard would agree to the proposal by comparing the Nash equilibrium of the original matrix with the Nash equilibrium of the new matrix.

Part (a) assessed students' understanding of a dominant strategy. Students needed to state that Jackpot's dominant strategy is to choose a closing time of 6 p.m.

In part (b) students were asked to determine whether an action is profit maximizing and to explain their answer using values from the matrix. Students needed to state that the proposed choice is not profit-maximizing and explain that Boulevard would earn more by choosing Delivery than No Delivery (\$30>\$20).

Part (c) tested students' ability to identify Nash equilibrium outcomes and to correctly identify the payoff for the player. Students needed to state that Boulevard would earn \$30 in the Nash Equilibrium.

Students were told in part (d) the two firms merged to form one company with two locations while still facing the same choices. This part of the question tested students' ability to understand profit-maximizing behavior and the effect of a change in market conditions in the context of a given payoff matrix. Students needed to recognize the new best outcome maximized the sum of the two profits in each cell, and state the actions associated with the profit maximizing outcome (9 p.m. and No Delivery).

In part (e) students needed to construct a new payoff matrix based on a proposal given by Jackpot. Students were expected to determine if Boulevard would agree to the proposal by comparing the Nash equilibrium of the original matrix with the Nash equilibrium of the new matrix. Part (e)(i) tested students' ability to construct a payoff matrix given new strategic considerations. The second part, (e)(ii), tested students' ability to compare two separate Nash equilibria in order to explain that the optimal choice is for Boulevard to agree to Jackpot's proposal because it will be better off in the new game (\$40 > \$30).

Sample: 3A Score: 6

The response answers all parts of the question correctly and earned all 6 points.

Sample: 3B Score: 3

The response earned 1 point in part (a) for identifying the dominant strategy is to close at 6 p.m. The response earned 1 point in part (b) for recognizing the option is not profit maximizing and for using values to compare the profits (\$30>\$20). The response earned 1 point in part (d) for stating that the profit maximizing strategy for the new company would be for Jackpot to close at 9:00 p.m. and Boulevard to choose No Delivery.

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### **Question 3 (continued)**

Sample: 3C Score: 2

The response earned 1 point in part (a) for identifying the dominant strategy is close at 6 p.m. The response earned 1 point in part (d) for stating the profit maximizing strategy for the new company is for Jackpot to close at 9 p.m. and Boulevard to choose No Delivery.